公司治理結構與長期投資價值 : 基於中國上市公司的實證分析

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公司治理結構與長期投資價值 : 基於中國上市公司的實證分析

 

Author: 真才基
Zhen, Caiji
Title: 公司治理結構與長期投資價值 : 基於中國上市公司的實證分析
Gong si zhi li jie gou yu chang qi tou zi jia zhi : ji yu Zhongguo shang shi gong si de shi zheng fen xi
Corporate governance and investment efficiency : an empirical analysis of the listed firm in China
Degree: D.B.A.
Year: 2005
Subject: Hong Kong Polytechnic University -- Dissertations
Corporate governance -- China
Department: Graduate School of Business
Pages: xi, 149 leaves : ill. (some col.) ; 30 cm
Language: Chinese
InnoPac Record: http://library.polyu.edu.hk/record=b2065518
URI: http://theses.lib.polyu.edu.hk/handle/200/2389
Abstract: The agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) postulates that management may not always maximize shareholders' wealth when making capital expenditure decisions. Management may pursue its own interest such as empire building, resulting in either over-investing or under-investing. Jensen (1993) argues that effective internal control mechanisms may mitigate the agency problem and therefore may improve the efficiency of capital expenditure decisions. Using a sample of 565 listed firms in China from 1999 through 2003, I examine the relationship between internal control mechanisms and investment efficiency. I use ownership structure, board composition, and auditing quality to proxy the internal control mechanisms. Investment efficiency measures are based on the methodology developed in Jensen (1993) and Fama & French (1999). I find some significant relationships between a firm's ownership structure and its investment efficiency, but fail to find any significant relationship between board compositions or auditing quality and investment efficiency. In particular, I find that investment efficiency is negatively related to the level of state ownership, and is positively related to both ownership concentration and the percentage of publicly-owned shares. In addition, firms with lower free cash flows achieve higher investment efficiency, consistent with the agency theory predictions. Our findings seem to suggest that given the dominance of state ownership among the listed firms in China, boards of directors do not serve a significant role in monitoring management, neither does auditing. I also offer some suggestions to policy makers and investors based on my findings.

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