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**IDEOLOGICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF CHINESE MUSLIM
GROUPS IN CHINESE AND U.S. MEDIA (2001-2015): A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH**

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PhD

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

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THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

**Ideological Representations of Chinese Muslim Groups in Chinese and
U.S. Media (2001-2015): A Comparative Approach**

YE Meng

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

August, 2018

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY

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YE Meng

Abstract:

The current study explores the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in American and Chinese newspapers. The study hopes to achieve a better understanding of representations of Chinese Muslims in the media, a significant ethnic group in China and part of the global Muslims. The study also hopes to contribute to the theory of the media representation of Muslims. Notably, it hopes to explore if Chinese Muslims are affected by prejudice against Muslims in the media worldwide.

The research employs corpus-assisted discourse analysis based on van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach to CDA. Corpus was used to identify the contexts for the representation of Chinese Muslims, identifying topics (i.e. subjects in the news), attitudinal features, news participants (i.e. people addressed in discourse) and collocates of terms about Muslims (e.g. "Muslim"). The linguistic features and categorisations of Chinese Muslims were then explored qualitatively with specific analytical tools, such as transitivity, topos and membership categorisation.

The data comprised two corpora, made up of news texts respectively from *China Daily* (i.e. *CD*) and *The New York Times* (i.e. *The NYT*) from Sept 11th, 2001 to 2015. The corpus from *China Daily* included 747 pieces of news (485,327 total words), while the NYT corpus consisted of 448 news pieces with 355,311 total words. Each corpus had two sub-corpora, with July 5th, 2009 (i.e. the Xinjiang Riots) as a dividing line.

The findings of the study reveal that *China Daily* has represented the majority of Chinese Muslims as an ingroup in the past 15 years, i.e. moderate Muslims and good Chinese citizens. Moderate Muslims and modern Chinese are portrayed in the discourse of Muslim culture and religion, as well as pleasant and successful Muslims. Ethnic Muslims are likewise treated as powerless minorities buttressed with the Chinese government's paternal effects. This portrait is contextualised in the discourse of social transformation and Chinese governmental officials.

A minority of Chinese Muslims, categorised as Muslim terrorists, are represented as an outgroup in *CD*. Lawless and evil Muslim terrorists have occurrences in *The NYT*.

And they are treated as enemies of most Muslim people, Beijing and the world. The representations of these ethnic Chinese Muslims become significant in the coverage of Muslims after the Urumqi Unrests in 2009. The discourse of terrorism and anti-terrorism are typical contexts of this portrait.

Chinese Muslims, in the 15-years coverage from *The New York Times*, are categorised as an outgroup in the newspaper. The majority of ethnic Muslims are treated as fundamentalists and threats to the non-Muslim world. A frequent portrayal is resentful “Oriental others” in China, in the discourse of ethnic relations and Muslim religion. Contextualised in the discourse of violence, social security and Chinese officials, Chinese Muslims are demonised as dangerous others. This portrayal of Muslims is significant in the post-09 news of Muslims. Additionally, Chinese Muslims are treated as victims of Beijing’s control and social marginalisation, in the coverage of Beijing’s controls of Muslims, violence and anger from Muslims.

In *The NYT*, a minority of Chinese Muslims are categorised as an ingroup. The delineation of this group of Muslims is powerless, but brave social activists are striving for the rights of them. This portrait is contextualised in the discourse of bravery, powerlessness and individual Muslims in the NYT corpus. However, the same small group of Chinese Muslims are treated as Muslim terrorists in *CD*.

Dissimilar and similar linguistic features are found between the two corpora. The voices from the Chinese government, the topos of comparison and advantage are typical in the CD. The positive presentation of most Muslim people and Beijing and the negative presentation of Muslim terrorists are stressed. In the NYT, the negative presentation of the majority of ethnic Muslims in China and the CCP, as well as the positive presentation of Muslim social activists are underscored. The topos of humanitarianism and justice and voices from multiple sources are in *The NYT* news. Besides, many linguistic features are similar between the two corpora, such as the topos of numbers, history and modal verbs.

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List of Abbreviations Used in the Thesis

CA: conversation analysis

CADS: corpus-assisted discourse study

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CD: *China Daily*

CDA: critical discourse analysis

CL: corpus linguistics

DA: discourse analysis

DHA: discourse-historical approach

MCA: membership categorisation analysis

SFL: systemic functional linguistics

SMC: semantic category

Sub-SMC: sub-semantic category

the CD: the CD corpus

the NYT: the NYT corpus

The NYT: *The New York Times* (i.e. the newspaper)

the CD1: a sub-corpus including *CD*'s pre-09 news about Chinese Muslims

the CD2: a sub-corpus including *CD*'s post-09 news about Chinese Muslims

the NYT1: a sub-corpus including *The NYT*'s pre-09 news about Chinese Muslims

the NYT2: a sub-corpus including *The NYT*'s post-09 news about Chinese Muslims

XUAR: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Chapter 1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will illustrate the background of the current project in Section one, explain rationale of this study in Section two, and finally present the objectives and research questions in Section three and an outline of the dissertation. The chapter is expected to give an overview of the whole projects.

1 Background

Muslims are one of the biggest ethnic communities and are widely distributed in China. The Chinese Muslim population amounted to around 22.9 million in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics in China, 2013). That is more than the total population of Syria (22.8 million) (The World Bank, 2013). On 5th July 2009, the riots in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang in the remote northwestern part of China, became headline news in domestic and international media. *Time*¹ described the situation as leaving “156 people dead and more than 1,000 injured”. *BBC*² quoted words from both sides to talk about the violence “The Uighurs say they were demanding justice for their compatriots... However, witnesses are soon describing Uighurs rampaging through Urumqi, attacking Han Chinese...”.

In contrast, Xinhua News Agency³ described that “protesters attacked passersby, burned public buses and blocked traffic”. *The Australian*⁴ added that “dramatic footage broadcast by the state-run CCTV network showed men turning over a police car and smashing its windows, a woman being kicked as she lay on the ground, and buses and other vehicles aflame”. *BBC*⁵ reported that “The situation in China's riot-torn city of Urumqi is now under control after the deployment of thousands of troops, local Communist officials have said”. *China Daily*⁶ borrowed voices of the CCP officials in the political speech “the

¹ Time (2009 07 July) “After deadly riots, ethnic tensions heat up in Urumqi”. Retrieved from <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1908969,00.html>

² BBC. (2009, 10 July). “Timeline: Xinjiang unrest”. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8138866.stm>

³ Xinhua News. (2009, 6 July). “烏魯木齊發生打砸搶燒嚴重暴力犯罪事件”. (cited in *Sina.com*) <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/p/2009-07-06/042318160186.shtml>

⁴ The Australian. (2009, 6 July). Riots in Xinjiang, China kill 140. Retrieved from <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/riots-in-xinjiang-china-kill-140/story-fn3dxity-1225746498976>

⁵ BBC. (2009, 9 July). “‘Uneasy calm’ in Urumqi”. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8141684.stm>

⁶ China Daily. (2009, 3 September). “Rare earth, common problem”. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-09/03/content_8648846.htm


riot in the regional capital of Urumqi, in which 197 people were killed and 1,600 injured seriously affected Xinjiang's tourism industry”.

Almost overnight, Chinese Muslims, especially Uyghurs Muslims, were catapulted from relative obscurity to the central focus of not only domestic but also global media. The high frequency of Chinese Muslim mentioned in local, and world news coverage has been maintained since 2009. To demonstrate this point, I conducted a keyword query with terms about Chinese Muslims in Factiva⁷ for the volume of news about Chinese Muslims in the media worldwide. The list of search terms are words about this Muslim group in English and Chinese, such as “Chinese Muslims”, “Hui Muslims”, “维吾尔” (i.e. Uyghur Muslims in simplified Chinese), “維吾爾” (Uyghur Muslims in traditional Chinese). The results reveal the importance of Chinese Muslims in English-language and Chinese-language newspapers.

Seen from Figure 1.1 below, results from such keyword search shows the increase of media coverage about Chinese Muslims. The volume of news peaks in the year 2009 and has kept rising with fluctuations since then. Such keyword search in Factiva also

⁷ Factiva is a global news database with access to various genres of media products. This database is owned by Dow Jones and Reuters and has become a news research option in Microsoft Office.

reveals that Chinese Muslims are frequently covered in media outlets with world influence, such as *BBC*, *Xinhua*, *The New York Times*, *China Daily*(CD) and *Ming Pao*.



Note: Numbers in Y-axis indicate the number of news articles about Chinese Muslims.

Figure 1.1 Media coverage about Chinese Muslims from Factiva (2001-2017)

It is clear that Chinese Muslims have gained frequent media exposure worldwide. People nowadays rely on the media to acquire knowledge about the world (Lippmann, 1922; van Dijk, 1991). Therefore, the constant coverage of these Muslims in China influences people's impression of the group.

Apart from the frequent coverage of Chinese Muslims, another motivation for studying media representation of Chinese Muslims is how Muslims are represented in the media. In a global context, Muslim countries in the Middle East and Muslim immigrants into Europe and the U.S have a mostly negative image in the Western media. Habib (2016) finds that media portrayal of Islam by American major media outlets are predominantly negative from 2007 to 2013 (Habib, 2016). Muslims are pictured as a threat to the West, through over-reporting on Muslim terrorists and negative characteristics of Muslims around the world. Moreover, Muslims are covered in relation to the topics of crimes, refugees, violence, (potential) terrorists, underdevelopment and so forth (Baker et al., 2013b; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Said, 1997). It is criticised by Said (1997: xxvii) that “the market for representations of a monolithic, enraged, threatening, and

conspiratorially spreading Islam is much greater, more useful and capable of generating more excitement”. The Western media do not represent Muslims positively, he adds, since Muslims are not part of the Western world. In response, some scholars, such as Edward W. Said, John E. Richardson and Elizabeth Poole, have urged for a balanced media representation of the Muslim-related issues. Such correction is supposed to be necessary since the negative coverage is responsible for the rising anti-Muslim sentiment or Islamophobia around the world (Chuang & Roemer, 2013; Habib, 2016; Oga et al., 2014). In the study by Organ and his colleagues (2014), it is found that more and more TV audiences had unfavourable opinions towards Muslims and Islam. Such a phenomenon was more serious among senior people than youngsters in age because the elders had more exposure to mass media than young people.

My interest to pursue this investigation is explained here. Chinese ethnic Muslims such as Uyghurs is a large Chinese community with distance and mysteriousness from Han people, which is probably resulted from marginalisation in media coverage, geological isolation and cultural differences. My years of experience in China reveals that most ethnic Muslims do not have frequent interaction with Han Chinese despite that they are living in the same city such as intermarriage or having the same education. Plus, conflicts pertinent to ethnic Muslims in the past years have disparaged the reputation of Chinese Muslims among the Han majority. For instance, as I have observed, Uyghur Muslims are symbolised as barbaric, underdeveloped, sneaky as thieves etc. In a broader sense, Muslim is a buzzword in the mediasphere worldwide. Because of the three factors above, my curiosity is aroused of if the media help to formulate the uniqueness and negative fame of Chinese Muslims. Especially, I expect to explore how Chinese Muslims are constructed in influential Chinese and American media outputs, from which a large population receive news in the world.

In sum, furthering the understanding of how Chinese Muslims and Islam are represented in the world media is more pressing than ever due to the booming exposure to ethnic Muslims in China recently and the global trend of Islamophobia in the media. It is important to examine whether the construction of Chinese Muslims and Islam fall into the anti-Muslim prejudice or otherwise.

2. The rationale for the study

The following four factors are considered in the conceptualisation of the whole study: Chinese Muslims, media, ideological representation and comparison analysis. The rationale behind the choice of each element will be explicated in this section.

2.1 The context of Chinese Muslims

As was mentioned previously, Chinese Muslims constitute one of the largest ethnic and religious social communities in China. It is noted that the actual numbers are probably much larger than 22.9 million because the Chinese census registers people by nationality rather than religious affiliation. Ethnic Muslim communities can be found in almost all Chinese provinces. They are highly visible in northwest China along the Silk Road, which goes through the present-day provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Shanxi and the autonomous regions of Ningxia and Xinjiang. Anthropologically, Chinese Muslims is an umbrella term for ten ethnic minorities (Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Salar, Tajik, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Bonan, Dengxiang and Tartar), in which Hui and Uyghur account for 90 % with about 20.6 million people. With regards to the history of Chinese Muslims, they are descendants of the Middle East and Central Asia, who started to migrate to China from the Sui Dynasty (AD 581-681). Large Muslim immigration to north China began in the Mongol-Yuan Dynasty (the 1300s -1400s) which became a permanent settlement in the Ming Dynasty (1300s-1600s) (Dillon, 1996; Gladney, 2003).

Chinese Muslims, the topic has attracted attention from academia because they have a distinctive culture in China and face conflicts with Chinese society. First, some literature concerns the history of ethnic Muslims (e.g. Dillon, 1996; Gladney, 1996, 2003). For instance, Uyghurs Muslims in China are heirs of Turkic immigrants, who moved to China around AD840. It is the second largest ethnic Muslim group in China following Hui Muslims (Dillon, 1996). Hui Muslims are influenced by Han culture considerably regarding dress and language. Many of them regard themselves as Han Chinese (Gladney, 1996). Second, some previous studies focus on the sociological investigation of some ethnic Muslims, especially Uyghur Muslims. In studies such as Yee (2003) and Rudelson and Jankowiak (2004), Uyghurs' integration into inland China has been low. The geographic position, ethnocultural consciousness and a strong sense of self-identity lead

Uyghurs to separate from mainstream Chinese society. As a result, ethnic relations exist between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang, a province with a large Uyghur population. Uyghurs Muslims are critical about the CCP's policies towards national minorities with different tactics. It is believed that issues about Uyghurs are one of the leading challenges to the Chinese government. Third, a number of studies investigate the national policies of such ethnic minorities, such as Xinjiang in China's foreign policies (Mackerras, 2015). However, as will be reflected in the literature review in Chapter two, only a limited number of studies have investigated the media representation of ethnic Muslims in China.

The significance of Chinese Muslims is the reason for choosing ethnic Muslims in the present study.

2.2 The context of media discourse

It has been extensively accepted that media in the modern world are a critical window for knowledge about the world and a primary channel for the exchange of viewpoints among nations and cultures. According to Lippmann (1922), people are increasingly relying on the media to make sense of the world outside immediate experience. Similar ideas are found in van Dijk (1991), "there is probably no other discursive practice, besides everyday conversation, that is engaged in so frequently and by so many people as news in the press and on television" (p.110). Therefore, the media discourse of Chinese Muslims influences peoples' perspectives about such ethnic groups around the world. And the CDA investigation of such media discourse suggests how media outlets aim to affect peoples' viewpoints of the large Muslim population in China.

Media are significant not only to people but nations. It is claimed in Shawcross (1992) that Rupert Murdoch believes that communication between a nation and the whole world occurs in all kinds of media products. Books, news coverage, films, magazines and so forth are not just for entertainment since national intentions are involved. Nye (2004) concludes news, international news coverage especially (i.e. soft power), as it spreads national voices and possibly normative structures overseas. A nation with a significant amount of such soft power can efficiently stimulate others to accept the viewpoints while avoiding the need for expensive hard power expenditures. Therefore, The representation of Chinese Muslims is represented in international news suggests national interest.

News is filled with subjectivity and objectivity. For subjectivity in the news, it is believed that “journalism is ultimately opinion journalism” (Pounds, 2010: 107). Journalistic discourse selectively reconstructs social reality based on subjectivity of journalists, which is influenced by ideological packages in media organisations (e.g. liberal bias) and the needs of consumers. Subjectively restructuring social reality leads to various representations of a social issue (van Ginneken, 1998). If subjectivity is embedded in the news, how about objectivity in news coverage? Objectivity is devices to make audiences or readers convinced by avoiding emotional and value-laden language, removing authorial voices. Instead, the extensive use of numbers, external voices and so forth can increase objectivity in the news coverage (Lee & Lin, 2006; Richardson, 2007). Objectivity is crucial to media power. No matter what dominant power a media institution has, power should be operated on the level of professional standards, i.e. helping to shape the dominant social ideologies by the conveyance of polytypic social event (Maras, 2013). In a word, news coverage involves varying degrees of subjectivity (e.g. Fowler, 1991; Pounds, 2010; van Ginneken, 1998).

Ideologies are inherent in media discourse, making media coverage representations of social reality, i.e. parts of social reality. Analysis of media discourse is an examination of the ideological representation of social reality (e.g. van Dijk, 1988a, 2006b). The analysis of ideologies in this discourse includes the following issues.

The first issue concerns whose ideologies are dominant in media discourse. Critical linguists view media discourse as a channel for the promulgation of ideologies of powerful social groups, who “get to speak in the news” (p. 86) and are especially ‘elite’ groups or institutions (van Dijk, 1996). Fairclough (1989) adds that journalists in the production of news empower socially dominant groups to exercise their power and shape their ideologies through “systematic tendencies in the news and other media activities” (p.54). Fairclough (1995) also obscures the connection between mainstream media and government, because governments can manipulate the media agencies speaking for their interest.

The second issue is how to reveal the ideologies of social power. Critical linguists also explicate that ideologies of social power are revealed in discourse. Language is used to construct and maintain power relationships in society (Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1998).

Language resources of all kinds are employed by journalists to construct social reality, which is wielded by ideologies of social power. Simpson (1993) claims that through choices regarding vocabulary, grammar and textual structures, journalists emphasise specific details and downplay others. The purpose of emphases and deemphases is to communicate attitudes and assumptions.

The third issue is that ideologies are revealed explicitly by the language resources of inclusive/ exclusive pronoun use, active/passive sentence constructions, tense and aspects, adjectives, modality, process types, sentence type and so on. Besides, the organisation of information in a piece of news reveals ideologies of powerful social groups. For instance, headlines and leads in the news include the most crucial information journalists intend to disseminate about social issues. They are resources to reveal ideologies of social power (Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1998a). Also, repetition moves (e.g. rhymes) increase attention to specific semantic properties in the news and thereby revealing information preferred by journalists (van Dijk, 1998a). Generally, the analysis of different aspects of media discourse shows how social issues are ideologically represented, and further insinuates ideologies of social power. I will construe how social reality is represented in reviewing critical discourse analysis in Chapter two below.

The fourth point is that international news is more ideological than domestic news (van Ginneken, 1998). International news is inherent with the national interest, foreign diplomatic purposes and the benefits of media organisations (Lee et al., 2012; Lee & Lin, 2006; van Ginneken, 1998). Meanwhile, it should be noted that the domestication of foreign news is not absolute: “The emergence of transnational journalistic culture, the hegemony of liberal market, the legacy of the Cold War and the shared perspective of allied states” have allowed for affinity in global news among nations (Curran et al. , 2015: 1). The explanation here construes the reason why I chose international news to investigate the ideological construction of Chinese Muslims.

2.3 The context of comparative analysis

The rationale for the choice of a comparative perspective is that few studies have compared the media representation of Muslims in various media systems, such as American and Chinese journalism (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017). American journalism is influential in media

communication around the world. American-based media conglomerates are monopolising information on international issues and controlling communication flows (Curran & Park, 2000; van Ginneken, 1998; Wu et al., 2015). Meanwhile, there is a strong contra-flow to create multidirectional and multicentered globalised media (Curran & Park, 2000; Sparks, 2007). The traditional Anglo-American media centre has been considerably enlarged, where people consume products with both similarities and local features. The influence of national political authority on journalism is continuing rather than being ceased (Curran & Park, 2000). Simply put, analytical results from an American newspaper reflects the ideological representation of Muslims in world media.

Chinese journalism is becoming increasingly powerful in the media sphere. Chinese national newspapers have become a primary source of information about China, even if they are known as Party organ media (Liu, 2012; Stone, 1994; Wu et al., 2015). Citations of *China Daily* and *People's Daily* by other international broadsheets dramatically increased from 2011 to 2014, though still being lower than elite newspapers from Anglophone system (Wu et al., 2015). It is believed that Chinese journalism is becoming one of a contesting and competing for the force with liberal journalism (e.g. American journalism) (Sun, 2009). Chinese state media has followed the “go global” policy with an overriding goal of extensively spreading the beliefs and values of modern China to the global media, so reporting Chinese issues to international readers (i.e. international news) has increased its significance in Chinese media, such as *China Daily* and *Xinhua News* (Hayashi et al., 2016; Sun, 2009). The importance of Chinese media in the global mediasphere and the focus on international news justify my investigation of Chinese Muslims in international news in Chinese media. I will explain the reasons for choosing *China Daily* and *The New York Times* in Chapter three.

Generally speaking, people who are interested in Chinese Muslims may be inspired by findings in the present study. Scholars studying ideological representation in media discourse may have interest in strategies in the construction of Chinese Muslims therein. Those who have significant concerns about public opinions about Chinese issues and the development of Chinese journalism hopefully gain some perspectives from the analytical results and discussion in this report.

3. The present study

3.1 Research objectives

The principal purpose of this study is to investigate the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* and *The New York Times* from 2001 to 2015. Such an objective can be achieved by two research aims:

- the conduct on synchronic comparisons about similar/dissimilar features of representing Chinese Muslims between *CD* and *The NYT*;
 - using a three-dimensional framework and corpus methods to find out common and uncommon features **between the two newspapers** regarding social impacts, context and linguistic features;
- the conduct on diachronic comparisons to identify similar/ dissimilar features of representing Chinese Muslims before and after the Xinjiang riots on 5th July 2009;
 - Using a three-dimensional framework and corpus methods to find out common and uncommon features **between the two periods** regarding social impacts, contexts and linguistic features.

In the list of research aims above, it is clear that the present study intends not to give an overview of how Chinese Muslims are ideologically represented in Chinese and American media. There are thousands of news media outlets in either of these two mediaspheres which have various readerships. For instance, *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* target at either liberal or conservative lean readers (Wishinsky, 2019). Among newspapers in China, *China Daily* focuses on disseminating China's voices globally (Liu, 2012; Stone, 1994), whereas *Southern Weekly* targets at readers in China as it is broadsheet in the Chinese language and is marketized in China. The current study is a comparison between two media outlets from the respective media system, which can give insights into covering Chinese Muslims in American and Chinese media. Second, instead of identifying ideologies inherent in the coverage of Chinese Muslims. This project aims at uncovering how Muslims are represented abiding by ideologies of media producers and social power.

3.2 *Working definitions*

What is the working definition of ideologies in the current project? The explanation of ideologies from a socio-cognitive CDA approach is employed in the current study. In van Dijk (2006b: 115),

“as ‘systems of ideas’, ideologies are socio-cognitively defined as shared representations of social groups, and more specifically as the ‘axiomatic’ principles of such representations. As the basis of a social group's self-image, ideologies organise its identity, actions, aims, norms and values, and resources as well as its relations to other social groups.”

He stresses that “ideological polarisation between ingroup and outgroups” as the primary structure of his ideologies, which “can be systematically studied at all levels of text and talk” (ibid.). In corresponding to the research aims above, this definition can be used to explore how broadsheets in two different media systems ideologically construe Chinese ethnic Muslims. Social impact analysis answers are they represented as an ingroup or an outgroup in *China Daily*? What specific identities are given to Chinese Muslims in the Chinese broadsheet? As is revealed in the definition above, van Dijk’s ideologies focus on discourse realisations. So, it helps to investigate how Chinese Muslims are ideologically construed by discourse features (i.e. contexts and linguistic features). The findings in Chapter 5 show that ethnic Muslims are typically construed with the topic of social transformation in *China Daily* to suggest their ingroup identity to the newspaper. Simply put, van Dijk’s ideologies enable me to investigate ingroup/outgroup identity of Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* and *The New York Times* and discursal realisations of such identities, which implies the ideological construction of ethnic Muslims in China in media discourse.

Another important definition in the current study is a comparison. As is shown in the research aims above, I studied the similar and dissimilar features in the datasets retrieved from two newspapers. This investigation of homogeneous and heterogeneous in data gives a comprehensive picture of how Chinese Muslims are ideologically represented between two broadsheets that are situated in two media systems.

3.3 Research questions

According to the content in the news coverage of Chinese Muslims in *CD* and *The NYT*, the research purposes above can be achieved by answering the following questions:

1. What is the overall portrayal of Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* and *The New York Times* from 2001 to 2015? (see Chapter 4)
2. What is the portrayal of most Chinese Muslims in the narrative of the relationship between the Chinese Muslim group and the Chinese government in the two newspapers? (see Chapter 5)
3. How are Muslim terrorists in China portrayed in the coverage of Chinese Muslims? (see Chapter 6)

These questions will be answered by the employment of van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach to CDA combined with corpus methods. Four steps of analysis were undertaken that triangulate mutually by specific and similar findings (e.g. topic and attitudinal analysis). That explains why research questions were framed by the content in data instead of analytical steps. For instance, the research questions can be framed as "how are Chinese Muslims represented in the CD, revealed from topic analysis?" Additionally, the first two questions address the ideological representation of the majority of Chinese Muslims in two broadsheets, whereas the third question answers how some Chinese Muslims are formulated. The Muslim minority addressed in RQ 3 is a homogeneous group in two broadsheets, which are indicated overtly in corpora especially by the same news participants (e.g. Kadeer Rebiya, Ilham Tohti) and the same content of fighting against CCP.

3.4 The organisation of the thesis

Chapter two is a review of the literature related to this thesis. Two sections are included. Section one is comprised of studies about media representation of Muslims. It includes reviews of the media portrayal of Muslims, Chinese Muslims and Muslim terrorists. The review of literature locates the present study within the existing literature on media representation of Muslims. The second section answers the question of why I choose to use van-Dijk's socio-cognitive CDA approach in the combination of corpus methods (i.e.

methodological background). First, I outline important concepts in CDA (e.g. the epistemology of CDA), primary approaches in CDA analysis, and move on to showcase the application of CDA in media discourse studies. Second, van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach to CDA is reviewed regarding ideologies and the representation of ideologies in discourse. The third part considers the use of corpus-assisted CDA analysis. Pros and cons of the corpus in discourse studies, and some corpus analytical methods relevant to the current project are reviewed.

Chapter three presents the methodology of the present study. The following information is involved in the chapter: data, framework and the use of the corpus. The current project is a corpus-assisted study of media discourse, so I explain the data source and compilation of the corpus in the data section. The analytical framework section presents in detail a three-dimensional framework, based on van Dijk's approach to CDA. The three dimensions are contexts, language and social impacts (categorisations). While explaining the framework, I present the analytical tools in each analytical dimension. In the section that focuses on the use of corpus, I explain the analytical aspects of discourse, methods and corpus tools. There is an analysis of topics, attitudes, news participants and so forth using corpus tools Wmatrix, Wordsmith etc. Corpus analysis is used at the beginning of analyses, which shows in what contexts Muslims Chinese are represented (e.g. the discourse of people's anger).

In Chapter four to six, I present the findings and the discussions. The three chapters are organised according to overriding topics in the datasets. Chapter four is an overview of how Chinese Muslims are ideologically represented in the two newspapers and attention is paid to the portrayal of most Chinese Muslims as a specific social group in China. Research question one is addressed. Chapter five concerns the representation of most Chinese Muslims in the topics of the relationship between ethnic Muslims and the Chinese government. The analytical results are pertinent to the second research question. In Chapter six, I present the ideological representation of the same batch of Chinese Muslims who account for a small portion in the Chinese Muslim population in the two newspapers and they are described as Chinese Muslim terrorists in *China Daily*. The reason to discuss them separately because the minority of Chinese Muslims are treated divergently from the

Chinese Muslim majority. In the three finding chapters, the similarities and differences in both newspapers and both periods are considered.

Chapter seven contains the conclusion of this thesis. The chapter is comprised of three sections. The chapter starts with outlining the theoretical contribution. This section includes the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in the two newspapers, a departure from or analogous with the previous studies on media representation of Muslims. In the second section of empirical contribution, I summarise the similarities and differences between two newspapers in the coverage of Chinese Muslims in two the periods according to the analytical framework of categorizations, contexts and linguistic features. After that, I explicate how the current study contributes to CDA theories. Finally, the chapter concludes with the discussion of limitations and some further studies.

Chapter 2 Practical and theoretical background

Chapter two is a review of the existing literature in relation to the present study. The project is about how Chinese Muslims are ideologically delineated in the media discourse from China and America. The review will include

- the representation of Muslims in the media (see Section 1);
- critical discourse analysis as a specific discipline (see Section 2);
- a review of van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach to CDA (see Section 3);
- critiques of qualitative CDA approaches (see Section 4), and
- corpus-assisted discourse analysis (CADS) (see Section 5).

In Section 1, I will specify the research gap in the literature, which serves as the practical reason for undertaking the current study. Section 2 to 5 will construe the theoretical background — employing corpus methods in conjunction with van Dijk's ideological analysis. A summary of the whole chapter will be provided in Section 6.

1 The media representation of Muslims

This section reviews a number of studies on the media representation of Muslims and Islam in non-Muslim majority countries, especially in America and China. Also, I will review the literature on the media portrayal of Muslims in other regions (especially in the UK), since Muslims are an influential topic around the world (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). Third, Muslims are covered in relation to terrorism in the media so that I will review the literature on media representation of Muslim terrorism. Generally, this section is comprised of:

- the representation of Muslims in Western media
- the representation of Muslims in Chinese media
- the representation of Muslim terrorists in the media

1.1 The image of Muslims in the Western media

The textual construction of Muslims and Arabs in the mass media of the Western world has been extensively studied. It is noticeable that the construction of Muslims in the media of the US, UK and other western countries are reviewed because of the homogeneity in the literature, and because the results in these previous studies are considerably similar to the representation of Chinese Muslims in the present project.

1.1.1 Muslims in American media

The media portrayal of Muslims is predominantly negative in the U.S. The Muslim world and Muslim Americans are represented as a different community from the West because they supposedly have the values different from those in western countries. All the studies to be reviewed uncover how Muslims are represented in U.S press from various aspects. And these studies are references to how Chinese Muslims are represented in American media in my project since Chinese Muslims are part of the global Muslim population. In the following sections, I will discuss these studies primarily depending on their similarities and dissimilarities as follows.

Said (1997)'s research about media representation of Muslims concerns the superiority of the West and the inferiority of the East. The work is influential to a number of studies afterwards, thus being discussed first. Said explores how Western media stereotyped Islam after the Iranian Revolution. The media representation of Muslims reveals the division between the Oriental world and the West. Said claims that the Islamic world is often represented as 'oil suppliers' or 'potential terrorists' with the ideology of Orientalism. He also adds that the ways Muslims are represented in the Western media reflect "a penchant of dividing the world into pro- and anti-American (or pro- and anti-Communist)" (p.40). News about Muslims in the West is filled with "an imposition of patterns and values that are ethnocentric or irrelevant or both, pure misinformation, repetition, an avoidance of detail, an absence of genuine perspective".

Consequently, the media portrayal of Muslims "re-divide[s] the world into Orient and Occident" (ibid.). Even if the diversity in Muslim communities is overlooked in the study, the findings and statements are influential to the research afterwards. The studies after 2001 focus either on the Muslim world (e.g. Atawneh, 2009; Kumar, 2010; Sharifi

et al., 2017) or on American Muslim citizens (Bowe & Makki, 2016; Chuang & Roemer, 2013; Powell, 2011).

1.1.1.1 Muslim world as enemies in American media

The following studies show that the Muslim world is represented as enemies to America — anti-American others, religious extremists, terrorists, and as involved in a clash of civilisations after the 9/11 attack. These features are congruent with the findings in Said (1997), but the level of negativity tends to increase after the 9/11 catastrophe. Abrahamian (2003) points out that what the newspaper tries to persuade readers is the threat to Western civilisation by Muslim “others”, i.e. “we are attacked not because what we do, but because what we are” (p.537). The speech from George W. Bush is frequently quoted in the press, such as “Enemies of freedom are attacking civilisation because we believe in progress, pluralism, tolerance” (p.538). It is also inferred that American broadsheet attempts to invoke among Americans the reconsideration about the religion and Muslims. The coverage emphasises the discussion of correct or incorrect interpretations of Islam, the peaceful or violent understandings of Koran, and good or bad Muslims. Muslim world as anti-American others is identified in another two studies. Muslim protesters against the 2003 Iraq war are represented as freakish others espousing anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments (Sahlane, 2015). Similar to Sahlane’s analysis, Kumar (2010) identifies five frames in the American press which contradict American society; Islam is “a monolithic religion”, “a uniquely sexist religion”, “inherently violent” and “spawns terrorism”; “the Muslim mind is incapable of rationality and science” (p.257-272). The frames serve the purpose of othering Muslims as opponents to the West world.

Karim (2006) identifies a violent Muslim world represented in the American press, reflecting an antagonization of Muslims around the world. The portrayal of violent Muslims is persistent in American media discourse. Karim also summarises the visual signifiers of Muslims and Islam, which includes Arab headdresses and clokes, the face of Ayatollah Khomeini, people performing pilgrimage and the domes of mosques.

American media stances towards specific Muslim groups tend to be less negatively portrayed when they need to disseminate an overarching thought (e.g. American dreams) as is suggested by Bhatia & Jenks (2018). Muslim refugees from Syria are pictured as the

threat to American society in the conservative media (such as *Fox News*), in comparison with representing them as a victimised minority in the liberal media (e.g. *The New York Times*) (Bhatia & Jenks, 2018). In liberal media (e.g. *The New York Times*), Muslims, as a whole, are regarded as jihadists with barbaric behaviours opposite to the ideology of Great America. However, Muslim refugees in the U.S are seen as ordinary people victimised by the war in Syria.

Many studies have contributed to discourse strategies in the media representation of Muslims, and numerous discourse features are similar to the findings in my project. Sahlane (2015) identifies the use of enthymematic discourse, ad hominem argumentation, negative representation and appealing to voices from pro-war activists in the discourse against anti-war Muslim protesters. This Muslim group is negatively represented as oriental and freakish others with the anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments. Or simply put, they are reframed as threats to national security and civil order. The negative portrayal of Muslim protesters with presumptive reasoning further justify pro-war strategic manoeuvring. Similarly, some other linguistic strategies are also found by Sharifi et al. (2017), which explores the discussion program about Muslims released by CNN before 2017. Non-Muslim interviewees with social prestige have more media exposure than Muslim interviewees. Their construction of alien, barbaric and violent Muslims are realised by negative labelling, generalisation and categorisation, topos of reality, humanitarianism and justice. Dissimilar to the previous studies, Atawneh (2009) investigates speech acts in Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2001-2004) primarily in American media. It is found that speech acts of appeal and threats are used to represent the Palestinian Muslim regime negatively. The Palestinian government is reported to lie to the world by disseminating its weakness through speech act of appeal (e.g. “call for” as a signifier). Also, the government is suggested to “bluff” the world, by using the speech act of threats in response to the Israeli assassination of Hamas.

1.1.1.2 American Muslims as oriental insiders in American media

The media portrayal of Muslims in the U.S. press is also an outgroup, though the portraits of these American citizens with Muslim ethnicity (i.e. American Muslims) are divergent from the Muslim world. Most of them are oriental insiders and domestic terrorists

in the U. S press, similar to the findings in Said (1997). However, Shahin (2016) reveals that only Americanized Muslims can be no harm to American society, because they accept American values.

About oriental insiders and domestic terrorists, Powell (2011) identifies different portrayals of Muslim and non-Muslims American criminals in the U.S press. Muslim criminals are represented as domestic terrorists launching attacks on the American ideal; meanwhile, other non-Muslim criminals are represented as mentally disordered. Similar to Powell's study, a picture of lawless and terrorist Muslim Americans is found in Chuang and Roemer (2013). They claim that news about the bomber in 2010 Time Square attempted attack makes the issue of these American citizens and Middle Eastern descendants. They suggest that American media attribute the Oriental insider to Muslim communities in the U.S., the subject straddling the division of Occident and Orient, Us and Them.

The following literature shows that the whole American Muslim community is represented as outgroups in the U.S press, which means that they gain derogative imagery in the news. It is found in Bowe and Makki (2016) that U.S. newspapers (2012-2013) emphasise the following different frames in the coverage about domestic Muslims; Islamic threats and Muslim neighbours are focused on the representation respectively of Islamophobia and Islamophilia. However, they claim that the two diametrically opposite frames "perpetuate Islamophobic sentiments by calling attention to the speculated incompatibility of Muslim in the first place" (p.553). Similarly, Shahin (2016) finds the above results in investigating the representation of Muslims in Taqwacore, which depicts an Islamic punk rock scene. As is revealed by findings, most American Muslims are treated as outgroups, because they are traditional Muslims, obey rules in Islam, instead of incorporating into non-Muslim society in the U.S. However, American Muslims in Taqwacore are ingroups because of being culturally Americanized and consciously attempting to reform Muslim society in the U.S. They are framed to challenge Muslims' traditional or conventional way of life. Their ethos is aligned with American ethos to reveal Americans as a saviour of these Muslim punkers.

The review of how American Muslims are represented in the U.S press is related to my project, given that Chinese Muslims in China share an identical identity as American Muslims in the US. Consider that American Muslims are negatively represented in American media, I am interested in how Chinese Muslims are contoured in the news published by Chinese media outlets.

1.1.2 Muslims as others in British media

Review of studies as follows shows that Muslims also have acquired the portrait as others in the press in British media, and many findings here are similar to Muslims in American media. These projects are reviewed because some of the features are identified in my project, the media representation of Chinese Muslims (see Chapter 4 to 6).

Muslims are characterised by otherness more often than terrorism and by negatively portraying Muslim men more often than women, as is suggested in the following studies (e.g., Baker 2010; Richardson, 2004). British press represents basically that there is no good Muslim, which tends to arouse the social consideration of Muslim immigrants in the UK. Specifically, they are involved in conflicts, harbour extreme thoughts and social inequality, and so are divergent from British (c.f. Muslims in American media). Richardson (2004)'s study is based on the coverage of Muslims in British broadsheets (1997-1998). The negative orientation to Muslim/ Islamic people is constructed with four arguments of a military threat, extremism and terrorism, despotism and sexism. In contrast, the West is presented as a civilising social force with the themes of modernisation, westernisation in Iraq and the normalisation of Israeli aggression. The split between "British" and "Others" is also revealed in the news stories about Muslims in Britain, analogous to American Muslims in the U.S press. They are constructed as harmful to others, by the highlights of such as Muslim violence in the public sphere and the debate about religious schooling in Britain. In the review of this study, the project has utilised van Dijk's analytical framework to relate discourse to a broader socio-cultural context and examined a wide range of linguistic and discourse features in the dataset. However, the analytical items in the project are subjectively selected, and a study within a systematic model is absent (Lukin, 2007).

The weakness of Richardson's research should be overcome by the use of corpus-driven methods in Baker (2010) and Baker et al. (2013a). These corpus methods are

inspiring to my projects such as collocation analysis, as will be elaborated in Methodology in Chapter 3. Generally, there are some overlapping findings among the three studies — Muslims are othered in British media. Baker's studies include comparing keywords in corpora and querying typical collocates with "Muslim(s)". The analytical stress includes topic, diachronic change of topic and contextual information. One of the significant findings in Baker's studies is that both studies imply a large number of Islamophobic opinions in the British press following the 9/11. The opinions are believed to generate social discrimination against Muslim groups in Britain. In the word of Baker and his colleagues (2013), "British journalism fans the flames of conflict between the white, normally Christian majority of people living in the United Kingdom and the minority of Muslim residents..." (p.1).

Baker's studies of 2010 and 2013 are marked by providing a comprehensive view of how Muslims are othered in the British media (Munnik, 2015; Topkev, 2016). From the macro-level analysis, the words "Muslim" and "Islam" dominantly collocate with words indexing the notion of conflict and the rising threat to social security. The pair "'Muslim'+conflict" occasionally marks the victimisation of the community. The choice of collocation gives insights into collocation analysis in my project (see Chapter 3 below). Second, British tabloids frequently cover stories about daily life, while broadsheet newspapers favour the global political and cultural issues relevant to Islam and Muslims. Third, the diachronic examination of R1 (Right one) collocates of "Muslim" indicates various issues. They are

1. an increasing focus on Muslim immigrants to the UK as opposed to those elsewhere (different from Muslims in U.S press),
2. limelights of intolerance and hatred towards Muslims after 2004, and
3. critiques on Muslims' homophobia after 2006 (different from Muslims in U.S press).

The examination in the micro-lens of discourse in Baker et al. (2013) emphasises how the Muslim world, belief, women and men are constructed. Similarly, the narrative facilitates the circulation of the Islamophobic representation. One of the striking findings is that the items of "Muslim world" and "Muslim community" signify Muslims as a homogenous

entity in the texts, being hostile and having the tense connection with the West (see also in Richardson [2004] and Said [1997]). Specifically, Islam is associated with extremism regularly, and the words “moderate” or “devout” are used in the ambivalent context. Muslim women are labelled with veil wearing and having inferior social status, while men are presented with radical ideas and actions.

Muslims and Islam are pictured in relation to violence after violent issues in the UK to demonstrate otherness of Muslims (c.f. Muslims in American media). The results in Shaw (2012) reveal that the coverage about 7/7 London bombing in 2005 is awash with the marginalisation of Islam and discrimination of Muslims in the press. It is claimed that “Islam in Britain and the world at large [are] portrayed by ways of negative and destructive stereotypes or boundary lines” (p.519). Different from the focus on Muslims as a whole in the study above, Moore et al. (2008) pay attention to the construction of British Muslims in the media after 2001. The coverage of British Muslims dramatically increases after 2005. And a large volume of stories differentiates Muslim culture and religion from the mainstream British social values. Specifically, Islam is regarded as being backward, dangerous and irrational. Muslim men have much more frequent exposures than Muslim women in the press, especially the men’s mugshots outside the court or police station.

1.1.3 Muslims as others in other Western media

In other western media (e.g. in Australian media), the coverage of Muslims focuses on the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in local society. That is analogous the divergent portrayals of American Muslims and non-Muslim Americans in the U.S press and the variant construction of Muslims in the UK and British in their British press. Muslims are covered closely related to violence, crimes and Muslim males (cf. American media). Törnberg and Törnberg (2016) identify that Muslims in Swedish social media after the 9/11 attack are outcasted. The researchers claim that Muslims are discussed by blog writers mainly in the context of conflicts, which is said to be pertinent to their religion. Muslim men are seen mostly as aggressors and extremists, while Muslim women are regarded as victims of dress code and gender inequality. Manning (2006) finds a strong association between Muslims and criminals in Australian news published within 12 months

after the 9/11 attack. It is identified that Muslims are reported to be responsible for a crime, which is reported to be committed by a Muslim man living in Australia.

1.1.4 The image of Muslim women in western media

Muslim women are a significant topic in the representation of Muslims in Western media. It has been found in numerous studies (e.g. Al-Hejin [2015]) that Muslim women in the Western media are portrayed as oppressed victims to an Islamic society which is packed with bloodshed violence and patriarchy (i.e. inequality between genders and especially wearing of Hijab among females). This information can arouse global awareness that females need liberation. Also, victimised Muslim women are treated as exotic others in the media discourse.

The veil and Hijab are found not only to symbolise the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim females but as symbols of oppression in the male-dominated society. Williamson (2014) claims that British media uses the veil to stress “perceived failures of multiculturalism” in the UK (p.64). Veils in the media texts suggest the intrusion of Islam into British culture. The social impact of the coverage is whipping up Islamophobia in society and pushing through anti-terror legislation. American and British media are believed to project Muslim females as suffering from the social violence caused by Muslim men. Similar findings are found in Al-Hejin (2015). *BBC* news post-9/11 disseminates the information that veiled Muslim women are irrelevant to the violence. They are victimised by the Muslim dress codes that indicate backwardness – females should be covered from top to toes. *BBC* news describes wearing Hijabs in many Muslim countries as compulsory, so Muslim women are treated as losing freedom. Besides, the similar framing of Muslim women is found in *The New York Times* (2001-2003) (Mishra, 2007). Female Muslims are covered as oppressed women with veils and victims of war and violence. It is criticised in the study that the newspaper is biased by deemphasising the women’s efforts at empowerment within their religion and economic environment. Women’s weakness and waiting for salvation from the West are stressed.

The review of Muslim females in western media gives insights into my study since Chinese Muslim women are recurrent in media coverage of Chinese Muslims in *CD* and *The NYT*.

1.2 The media portrayal of Chinese Muslims

The coverage of Chinese Muslims boomed after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009 (see the previous chapter), while the literature on the representation of Chinese Muslims is limited. I have found the following three studies on how Chinese Muslims are portrayed in the media, And the findings there will be compared with analytical results in my project (see Chapter 4-6).

The representation of Chinese Muslims in world media can vary dramatically. In Zheng (2011), content analysis of the post 9/11 representation of Uyghurs in *China Daily* and *People's Daily* (2002-2010) indicates a terrorist framing of Uyghur rioters. They are covered with the frame of terrorism and economic underdevelopment in *China Daily* and *People's Daily*. Zheng (2011) argues that “the Chinese government may need to use ‘fighting terrorism’ as an excuse to justify its crackdown on Uyghurs in Xinjiang while hyping economic development to buttress its assumption that Xinjiang is still economically backward and in need of help from Beijing.” (p. 116). Similar findings are found in Luqiu and Yang (2018), where Chinese state media have seldomly provided basic information about Muslims, such as their religion and culture, but about religious extremists. The findings suggest Islamophobia in Chinese news about ethnic Muslims in China. Dissimilar to the findings in the previous study, Witteborn (2011) identifies Chinese Uyghur Muslims, especially Kadeer Rebiya, are positively presented among online users. And the results are generated by the examination of people’s voices on YouTube, Twitter and so forth. There is an analogy between Uyghur Muslims and social activists, who have lost their cultural heritage and homeland. Additionally, some netizens are found to praise Uyghurs’ bravery to fight for ethnic identity and culture.

1.3 Muslims and terrorism

Portrayals of Muslims in Western media are pertinent to terrorism, and the association becomes pronounced after the 9/11 attack and specific event. It is claimed in Macdonald (2003) that terrorism is a central topic in news reports about the Middle East in the West. He also believes that evil Islam is a replacement of the evil Soviet Union. For instance, Jihad (i.e. holy war) means aggression within Islam. Besides, as was previously reviewed, many studies have found an association between Muslims and terror in coverage. Muslims

are either signified as (potential) terrorists or attributing terrorist attacks to Muslims worldwide (e.g. Chuang & Roemer, 2013; Kumar, 2010; Manning, 2006; Richardson, 2004; Said, 1997; Shaw, 2012). Ahmed and Matthes (2017) claim that terrorist attacks serve as “the catalytic point when the national media and majority adopted a common negative stance towards Islam” (p.231). Based on the above discussion, it is necessary to review how the media represent Muslim terrorism.

The first point is that aggressiveness is foregrounded. Montgomery (2005) investigated how the 9/11 attacks are framed in American public discourse. It is found that, without identifying the target terror group, American media amplify the discourse of war focusing on topics of war, evil, terror and attack. Also, actions of terror and reactions from the American government are reported in military terms at the level of the sovereign state, such as “military actions” and “entering a war”. And third, Montgomery claims that casualties are a significant topic in the discourse, whether about military fatalities or civilian casualties. Similarly, aggressive reporting of Muslim terrorism by the American press is specified in Morin (2016), in a comparison of framing Muslim and non-Muslim shooters. Terror framing of Muslim shooters is identified in the coverage of an American 2009 mass shooting case, while non-Muslim shooters are framed as criminals, not terrorists. Muslim shooters are marginalised as perpetrators based on his/her religion and immigrant status. His lawless prior life is reported in connection with the shooting, which is exaggerated to threaten America. In turn, American society is victimised by this shooting accident.

The second point is that international relations are reflected in the media representation of Muslim terrorism. Gerhards and Schäfer (2014) claim that the framing of terror attacks reflects foreign policies in the home country where media organisations are based. In reporting terror attacks in 2004 and 2005, *CNN* and *Al Jazeera* are found to stress the frame of terror, in comparison with the “crime against humanity” in *BBC* and *ARD*. Specifically, *CNN* has an aggressive style in the report, especially on the consequence of terror and American’s “war on terror”. *Al Jazeera* devotes coverage to the perpetrator’s perspectives and blames Western social elites covertly. *BBC* and *ARD* are found to detail individual life of victims while deemphasising the elaboration of Muslim criminals.

Statements in Gerhards and Schäfer's study are confirmed in Qian (2010)'s investigation of Muslim terrorists in Chinese media. The finding shows that *People Daily* shifts foci in the coverage of Muslim terrorism from 2000 to 2002, specifically from the discourse about solidarity, the 9/11 incident to events in the Middle East. Across the two-year coverage, terrorism is analogous to separatism in China, organised crimes and international cooperation of anti-terrorism. With regard to stylistic features, the Chinese broadsheet is found to be careful in the discussion, by using fixed expressions and mainly limiting evaluative or subjective expressions.

The third point is that evil and lawless terrorists and the good American government are typical in American public discourse (e.g. media discourse, political speech). And the identification relies on the deployment of membership category analysis (MCA). The study of Leudar et al. (2004) suggests that Bush is categorised as a defender of civilisation in American media, instead of a crusader attacking Islam. The actions by Bush's administration are cast as the religious war and the battle of civilisation against barbarism. Additionally, this study also reconfirms critical factors in MCA. The first factor is the importance of standardised relational pairs in the public discourse, which is the embodiment of Us and Them (e.g. good Bush's administration vs evil terrorists). The second factor is that categorisations in public discourse rely on predicates and allocations of incumbency that are represented by the actions of the past, present and future.

The last point is that the categorisation of criminal and malicious Muslim terrorists are embodied by linguistic strategies. A number of these strategies have occurrences in our datasets. Lazar and Lazar (2004) present the discursive construction of pejorative attackers in the 9/11 tragedy. American media are found to outcast Muslim attackers with the strategies of enemy construction, criminalisation, orientalised and (e)vilification. Similar to the previous study, it is evidenced that outcasting attackers as an outgroup to media outlets rely on the concept of binarism — the polarity between ingroup American and outgroup Muslim terrorists. Similar strategies are identified by Bhatia (2009, 2015a, 2015b). Two of the studies (Bhatia, 2009, 2015b) emphasise how public discourse in the U.S. constructs Muslim terrorism after the 9/11 attack. Two parties of Muslim terrorists and America are embodied metaphorically by the standardised relational pairs of 1) evil vs

good, 2) attack vs defence, 3) lawless vs lawful and 4) alliance vs opposing. Realised by a range of linguistic resources, America is categorised as being reasonable, lawful, civilised and the defender for freedom and liberty. On the contrary, terrorism is conceptualised as barbaric, tyrannical, evil, illegitimate, and thus needing the leadership of the civilised world and implicitly leading by America. Also, the polarisation is construed to create the “ideological conceptualisation of reality” of terrorism (p.287), which demystifies the power struggle between the strong and the weak (Bhatia, 2015a). It is argued that America as a powerful social group specifies the righteousness of the U.S. and wrongdoing of Muslim terrorism. Similar findings are reported in Bhatia (2015b), the representation of Bin Laden in the public discourse from the U.S. decodes the typical dichotomy of ingroup America and outgroup Muslims. The dichotomy is constructed with discursive strategies previously discussed (e.g. the strategy of criminalisation) and the religious discourse (e.g. quotes from Koran). Being special in this study is that the outcasting of America is explicitly found in the speech by Bin Laden with the same discursive strategies. Therefore, discourse from both clans achieves the goal of “ideologically simulated conceptualisation of reality” (p.30).

These studies are reviewed since a number of media portrayals of Muslim terrorists and the relevant discourse strategies are identified in the current study of how Chinese Muslims are represented in two broadsheets (2001-2015). The findings here are especially related to the ideological representation of majority Chinese Muslims in *The NYT* (see Chapter 4 and 5) and that of a few ethnic Muslims in *CD* (see Chapter 6).

1.4 Summary

The previous studies show that, with the influence of Said’s Orientalism and the 9/11 attack, Muslims are generally pejoratively portrayed in the media discourse, especially in the Western media. The 9/11 attack has worsened the media representation of Muslims. Terrorism, war and migration are significant topics pertinent to Muslims after the catastrophe. By various discourse strategies, Western media outlets (especially the media organisations in the U.S and UK) frequently link Muslims to violence, terrorism and extremism. Consequently, Muslims and Islamic religion are suggested as the threats to Western civilisation, by which the dichotomy of Muslims and West is reinforced in the

media. It is also evident from the studies that researchers in the field have critical perceptions about the negative media representation of Muslims. According to this view, academics have the risk of exploring Muslims and Islam in the media with the premise of negative presentation of Muslims in media worldwide.

Although numerous studies have been conducted, mainly there are two research gaps in the media representation of Muslims. First, revealed from studies, the attention has been paid to the mainstream media outlets in the U.S. and UK, such as *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, *CNN*. The research belies explicitly how Muslims in Asia especially in China, are represented. Second, the review suggests the need to conduct comparative studies of how Muslims are represented between Chinese and Western media. Some studies have investigated the representation of Muslims between British and American media. According to Ahmed & Matthes (2017:237), comparative studies “help scholars to show the robustness of the relationship between dependent and independent variables”. However, few inquiries have been conducted about how Muslims are pictured in the media between East and West. Therefore, the present study aims at exploring the media representation of Chinese Muslims in *The New York Times* and *China Daily*, with the methodology of corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis (CDA).

2 Critical discourse analysis as a specific discipline

CDA has rapidly developed in the fields of discourse analysis and sociolinguistics since the 1970s. CDA is a new branch in sociolinguistics, which emphasises:

- pinpointing social issues or problems,
- employing critical theories and interdisciplinary approaches for its qualitative empirical data analysis,
- incorporating contextual and historical knowledge into the analysis,
- demystifying ideology and power immanent in discourse, and
- researchers’ self-reflection during the research process (Fairclough, 1992; Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

CDA aims at revealing, understanding, and, as is expected, resisting social inequalities that are expressed, constructed and legitimated in discourse (Blommaert, 2005; van Dijk, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). It is used extensively in the investigation of media and political discourse, both of which are claimed to be manipulated by dominating social groups to promote ideologies (Fairclough, 1989; Fowler, 1991b; van Dijk, 2001; van Ginneken, 1998). Considering the employment of CDA in the proposed study, four aspects of critical discourse analysis will be reviewed in this section. They are:

- the development of CDA (Section 2.1),
- ontology and epistemology (Section 2.2),
- critical qualitative approaches (Section 2.3), and
- the usage in media discourse analysis (Section 2.4).

2.1 The development of CDA

CDA as a methodology was firstly developed by “critical linguists” by (e.g. Fowler and Kress) in the 1970s. Fairclough made a considerable contribution to the establishment of CDA. His book *Language and Power* in 1989 proposed linguistic methods for analysis, research objectives and political commitment with the investigation of politicised discourse in Thatcherite Britain. Fairclough’s book “*Discourse and Social Change*” in 1992 surveyed a series of discourse analytical approaches and differentiated “non-critical” approaches and his critical framework (Blommaert, 2005). The network of CDA was established in early 1991 after the symposium organised by van Dijk in Amsterdam. Key CDA figures such as van Dijk, Fairclough, Kress, van Leeuwen and Wodak discussed the theories and methods of CDA. It was agreed that CDA is a research paradigm, composed of diverged approaches to analyse the relationship between language and society (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Besides, van Dijk’s journal of “*Discourse and Society*” in the early 1990s interpreted principles and methods in CDA (ibid.). Nowadays, critical research is popularised in many journals, conferences, and handbooks. Wodak and Meyer (ibid.:4) claim that “CDA has become an established discipline, institutionalised across the globe in many departments and curricula”.

CDA is profoundly influenced by two antecedents: systemic-functional grammar and British cultural studies (Blommaert, 2005). Systemic-functional linguistics (SFL) by Halliday can be applied to CDA since they offer a systematic category for linguistic analysis and meaning-making in the social context (Fairclough, 1995a). Semantic meaning in the context of language use is critical in SFL analysis. SFL in CDA studies can “ground concerns with power and ideology in the detailed analysis of texts as they unfold, clause by clause, in real contexts of language use” (Martin, 2005: 275). Halliday’s three modes of meaning in discourse are a significant theoretical basis for a number of CDA analytical approaches. Approaches such as critical linguistics (Fowler, 1991b; Fowler & Kress, 1979), a sociocultural analytical framework developed by Fairclough (e.g. Fairclough et al., 2011) are influenced substantially. Noticeably, the three modes of meaning are ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions. Ideational metafunction deals with the construing of human experience and reflects the nature of the social process in discourse expressed by process types (i.e. types of transitivity). Interpersonal metafunction is connected to the text’s aspects of interactivity. Three components are involved in the metafunction: 1) speaker/writer’s attitudes concerned with the resources of appraisal, 2) social distance, and 3) relative social status typically related to the use of modality and speech act in texts. Textual metafunction is used to organise discourse and create continuity and follow in the text (Matthiessen et al. 2010).

Another theoretical basis of CDA is British Culture Studies (Blommaert, 2005). The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies, headed by Hall, explicitly aligns CDA research with neo-Marxism. In the 1960s, the school addressed some social problems in late capitalist Britain dominated by neo-liberalism and Thatcher’s New Right. In their words, neo-liberalism led to the unbalanced distribution of resources in education, social welfare and healthcare among varied social classes, which further resulted in social ills such as discrimination, inequality, social injustice and displacement. Many of these topics have become foci in CDA research. British Culture Studies also incorporate French post-structuralism theories into their model (especially Foucault’s perception of discourse). Foucault’s concept of discourse (2012) has made contributions to CDA mainly in the social theories of discourse, i.e. discourse as a social practice. It is summarised that discourse is not merely linguistic practice or record social events with words but represents issues based

on the sociopolitical environment. The production of discourse to represent social reality is governed by power relations, which in turn is realised by the discourse per se. Foucault's theory in the school of CDA implies that discourse is not an objective revelation of the social world. Foucault's concept of discourse is critically assessed by critical linguists as a lack of a framework to analyse discourse (Fairclough, 1992).

2.2 The ontology and epistemology of CDA

The ontology of CDA is what are “critical” and “discourse”. Similar to what is previously discussed, CDA is a mode of analysis, which relies on the examination of texts from various fields to unpack the discursive sources of power and dominance in society (van Dijk, 2008). The notions of ‘critical’ and ‘discourse’ are crucial to CDA. The term ‘critical’ in the approach does not imply critiques on something negative but the discussion of social issues, often social injustices (Fairclough, 1985; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Wodak and Meyer (2009) add that a critique is motivated by some economic, political or social impetus. Analysts are engaged with the notion of “superior ethic standard”, and a goal to explicitly transfer to readers their values, stances and propositions.

Critical theories, thus also CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection. Thus, they are aimed at producing ‘enlightenment and emancipation’ (ibid. : 17).

To reveal criticality, analysts usually integrate texts and contexts (e.g. sociopolitical context) to unearth the producers’ interest and contradictions immanent in discourse. The process is claimed to demystify the underlined meaning in discourse (Chilton et al., 2010).

The diverse interpretations of CDA lie in the various definitions of discourse. One dominant concept is Foucault's discourse. Discourse is seen constitutive of social reality — it structures knowledge and social reality and form subjectivity and power relations (e.g. doctors and patients) inherent in knowledge and social reality (Foucault, 2012). Fairclough (2003:124) expands Foucault's conception and considers discourse as social practices of representing “projective, imaginary, representing possible worlds, which are different from the actual world, and tied into projects to change the world in particular directions”. Especially, Fairclough investigates discourse from the angle of Marxism, so discourse is used to present new capitalism and the socio-economic change in the world such as global

economy, and Fairclough's CDA is a part of critiques of capitalism that is based on domination and exploitation. Van Dijk and Wodak both agree on the social-cognitive practice of discourse. Van Dijk (2014) conceptualises discourse as the production and reproduction of social cognition of the world, i.e. the group-specific conceptualisation of social reality. Specifically, social-cognition of the world is embodied by ever-changing ingroups and outgroups in the representation of social issues. i.e. ingroups and outgroups to discourse producers. Social-cognition of the world is presented by linguistic resources and decodes power relations in society. In this sense, van Dijk (1998a) summarises discourse as structured knowledge rather than concrete oral utterances or written documents. Van Dijk (1997) also stresses flexibility of discourse, which is different from Fairclough's conceptualisation. Discourse is not static but developed in the real world by language users. The development is embodied not only by discursive language use but the change of social cognition about social reality. Wodak not only agrees with most of van Dijk's ideas but stresses the historical background in discourse production. For her, discourse is a

“complex bundle of simultaneous sequential and interrelated linguistic acts which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, i.e. genres” (Wodak, 2001, p.66)

Besides, discourse is not a “closed unit”, but invites “reinterpretation and continuation” which relies on the comprehension on the historical background and the socio-political environment pertinent to social issues (Wodak, 2001). In addition to the concepts above, many other critical linguists name discourse such as “any spoken or variety of language use” (Verschueren, 2000: 50) and the language in acts (Blommaert, 2005). Discourse in CDA is supposed to interpret and create social processes by semiotic variables, in relation to dominant social groups and their ideologies.

CDA approaches highlight a robust social constructionist epistemology — the idea of language as much more than a mirror of the authentic world, and a conviction that discourse is essentially constructing the ideas, social process and phenomena that form the social world (Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1997). Such an epistemology is manifested by a

dual commitment to macro-social theories (e.g. Foucault's definition of discourse) and micro-linguistic methods (e.g. SFL).

2.3 *The comparison of significant approaches to CDA*

The constructionist epistemology requires data analysis in CDA with specific analytical orientations and interpretative/explanatory analytical approaches. CDA approaches, named as the hermeneutic process of the world (Meyer, 2001), is dynamic and open. Many scholars thus have attempted to systematise CDA, such as van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak and so forth. Van Dijk (2007) claims four main approaches of CDA: 1) critical linguistics in early times developed by Fowler, Kress and their colleagues, 2) Fairclough's sociocultural approach, 3) the discourse-historical approach (DHA) proposed by Wodak and her colleagues and 4) van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach. The following section will compare the above four approaches and demonstrate the applicability of the socio-cognitive approach to the project.

2.3.1 The conceptualisation of ideology

The first difference lies in the definition of ideology. It is generally accepted in CDA that speakers or writers represent aspects of social reality by their social status and their thoughts, i.e. power relation and ideologies. Ideologies are construed differently by early critical linguists, Fairclough and van Dijk. Critical linguistics uses a neutral and non-pejorative explanation of ideology: "the ways in which people order and justify their lives" (Fowler, 1991a: 92). Being "critical" does not elicit the complaints or criticism, but just commenting on the ideological features enmeshed in discourse (ibid.). Van Dijk, Wodak and Fairclough all agree on the exercise of ideologies and power in discourse, and ideologies are related to the benefit of the specific social group.

Van Dijk's definition of ideologies is social-cognitive. Ideologies "represent the possibly partisan, self-serving 'truth' of a social group" (van Dijk, 1995: 246). In discourse, they reveal the interest of the host group (i.e. the group of discourse producers) and go against the benefit of other groups. Discourse producers of a social group justify, detail and positively record some aspects of social reality in favour of them and their group, while they mute or negatively portray the section unfavourable to them. Therefore, there is an ingroup and outgroup polarity in discourse (van Dijk, 1998a, 1998b, 2011). Social

functions of ideologies are first “a socially-shared interpretive framework that allows group members to understand and make sense of social reality, everyday practices and relations to other groups” (van Dijk, 1995: 245). Ideologies also function to “allow members to organise and coordinate their (joint) actions and interactions in view of the goals and interests of the group as a whole” (van Dijk, 2006:117). Van Dijk’s conceptualisation of ideologies is like that in Wodak’s approach. Wodak regards Ideologies as “one-sided perspective or worldview composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluations” and “important means of maintaining unequal power relations through discourse” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 95). Different from ideologies defined by Fairclough, van Dijk argues that discourse reveals ideologies of both social dominating and dominated groups. There are ideologies of resistance to social dominance or ideologies (e.g. Racists’ ideologies), shaping guidelines of professional behaviours (e.g. journalists) (van Dijk, 2006). Section 3 will be an elaboration of van Dijk’s ideologies.

Fairclough uses Althusser’s perceptions of Marxism to define ideologies as “the particular ways of representing and constructing a society which reproduces unequal relations of power, relations of dominance and exploitation” (Fairclough et al., 2011:485). That means that ideologies are promulgated to achieve hegemony, the power dominance based on the economic wealth in alliance with other social forces (Fairclough, 1992). Further, Fairclough’s conception of ideologies stresses the influences of social-political contexts to language use, since language is seen as a tool for powerful social groups to change the world. It is believed that ideologies reside in the order of discourse “the totality of discourse practices of an institution and relationships between them” (Fairclough, 1993:138). It is also believed that the representation of a social event reveals the ideology of the discourse producer. In Fairclough (1995a: 28)

“The critical approach has its theoretical underpinnings in views of the relationship between ‘micro’... and ‘macro’ structure which see the latter as both the conditions for and the products of the former and which therefore reject rigid barriers between the studies of the ‘micro’... and the study of the ‘macro’”.

Fairclough’s approach to CDA needs to investigate the microstructure (i.e. structure and forms in discourse) interrelated with the socio-political context.

2.3.2 Different analytical frameworks

CDA in all approaches is based on the text. Wodak and Meyer (2009) claim that socio-cognitive and sociocultural approaches adopt more deductively oriented theories, which use a closed framework and construe patterns in discourse with a few examples. The two approaches also stress linguistic features in discourse. On the contrary, the discourse-historical approach adopts more inductive theories to conduct analysis, so ample data collection is necessary. In contrastive to approaches which investigate a broad range of linguistic features, Wodak's approach tends to explore specific linguistic features in a detailed manner. Below are more varieties regarding the four analytical frameworks.

The principle of discourse analysis, for critical linguists, is “an inquiry into the relationship between signs, meanings and social and historical conditions which govern the semiotic structure of discourse, using a particular kind of linguistic analysis” (Fowler, 1991b: 9). Therefore, they juxtapose four aspects of grammar by three metafunctions in SFL: lexicalisation, transitivity, modality and transformations (i.e. nominalisation and the passive voice). Such grammatical patterns in texts respectively realise ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions. Also, it is believed that these patterns elicit ideologies enmeshed in discourse (Fowler, 1991b; Fowler & Kress, 1979). Many of the grammatical highlights in Fowler's approach are referred to in other CDA approaches, especially in van Dijk's socio-cognitive analysis of discourse.

In respect of Fairclough's sociocultural framework, hegemony and ideology of (new) capitalism are the greatest concerns. To reveal these concerns, three dimensions of text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice build critical discourse studies, and the three aspects are respectively examined by description, interpretation and explanation. The first and third phases of analysis respectively describe textual features and explain the language use according to norms and standards in the pertinent social community. The approach stresses the second phase explicitly —interpreting discursive features in discourse. It is believed that representation of social issue can change people's views, which involves the production of discourse, intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity are emphasised because discourse is viewed to involve heterogeneous forms and meanings, represented by voices and genres. They also address

the process of how text transforms the existing conventions or previous texts into the present. The factors of hegemony and ideologies of dominant social groups determine the choice of intertextual/interdiscursive strategies in discourse production, the choice of voices and genre types (Fairclough, 1992,1995a). Overall, the framework emphasises how (new) capitalism is formulated in discourse and how the language of (new) capitalism is dialectically interconnected with socio-economic changes.

The sociocultural approach to CDA provides a three-dimensional analytical framework to discuss social events. However, in Fairclough's framework, analysing the social practice of media discourse is related to a wide range of situational, institutional and socio-cultural contexts, despite that theory in political economy is helpful for the explanation. Van Dijk (2004) argues that the difficulties in the conduct of a sociocultural CDA study lie in the missing of an "explicit theory of context".

"The fundamental problem . . . is how to put constraints on such a "contextual" or "situational" study. Indeed, how do we know or decide where to begin and where to stop such an analysis. It may begin with details of the interaction, the properties of speakers or settings, but may stretch to such vast societal "contexts" as contemporary capitalism, neoliberalism, globalisation, patriarchy, postmodernism, and so on. That is, if contextual analysis should be relevant, it is crucial not only to define possible contexts but especially to limit them".

The broad connotation of context in Fairclough's framework motivated me not to use his approach in my project, because I cannot easily decide which sociocultural perspectives can construe the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims.

Van Dijk's socio-cognitive framework reveals a discourse producer's representation of social reality, which is heavily reliant the ideological groups he/she is attached to and his/her group-specific knowledge and attitudes of the world. Correspondingly, the framework is composed of linguistic analysis, context analysis (i.e. context models), and the examination of the group-dependent memory of social issues (i.e. event models). The combination of event models and context models is social cognition, which reveals an individual's experience of the event in the specific social group. The experience includes group-dependent knowledge and attitudes of social events. The social-cognitive interface serves as the mediator between discourse and society, becoming the

start of text production and the aim of text interpretation (e.g. to change attitudes of social reality). Analysis with such a framework highlights:

- 1) who are positive ingroups and negative outgroups in discourse,
- 2) what is the contextual information when discourse producers project ingroups and outgroups, and
- 3) how different parties are projected with linguistic patterns (van Dijk, 1995, 1998a, 1998b).

It is noted that linguistic features in discourse are essential in this approach. According to the review from Wodak & Meyer (2009), the approach “illustrate(s) how a broad range of macro and micro-linguistic, pragmatic and argumentative features can be operationalised and integrated into the analysis of specific texts” (p.32). The detailed review of van Dijk’s analytical framework will be discussed in Section 3.

The discourse historical approach (DHA) “integrates systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of many layers of a written or spoken text” (p.266). This approach tends to rely on the historical background of social events and explore the diachronic change in the discourse of this event (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). That is, social and historical variables have extensively impacted on the construction of discourse and ensure that the representation of fields of action is relevant to the macro-topic (i.e. a social issue such as xenophobia) and social values. The analysis reveals group-specific perceptions and knowledge about social reality, especially viewpoints of controversial issues (e.g. xenophobic issue) from a powerful social group (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). Wodak and her colleagues conceptualise a top-down (i.e. inductive) analytical framework to find patterns in discourse. The stressed components include “macro-topic-relatedness”, “pluri-perspectivity” (i.e. intertextuality and interdiscursivity) and “argumentative as constitutive elements of a discourse” (i.e. a topos) (ibid.: 98). In practice, analysts should consult theoretical knowledge (e.g. the meaning of xenophobia) and systematically collect data and information before analysis. Drawing a context diagram (i.e. background information) helps to identify the fields of action in social events. Analysts would then spot topics and discursive strategies in discourse (especially polarisation of social actors, and topos). Finally, linguistic realisations of such discursive

strategies are examined (Wodak, 2001). It is hoped that the analytical findings are expected to be not only “available to experts in different fields” but applicable for the betterment of social practices, such as politicians, media practitioners, sociologists and so on (ibid: 70). Collectively, DHA is featured by keeping track of a social event from multiple sources over a period, such as the combination of political speeches, social media and newspaper. This typical practice in DHA aims at uncovering a panorama of the social event diachronically, which is contradictive to the research purpose in my project — the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in two influential newspapers.

2.4 *Application to media discourse analysis*

The four approaches in CDA have been extensively applied in the analysis of journalistic discourse, especially the social-cognitive approach and the sociocultural approach to CDA. Wodak’s DHA analysis has not often been adopted to explore journalistic discourse (Carvalho, 2008). The following paragraphs can justify the employment of van Dijk’s approach in the current project, i.e. the representation of Chinese Muslims in two *CD* and *The NYT*.

The socio-cognitive approach to CDA has been applied widely to study social minorities in news discourse. The issues addressed with CDA include “immigration and reception of newcomers, socioeconomic issues and (un)employment, cultural differences, crime, violence, drug and deviance, ethnic relations and discrimination” (van Dijk, 2008:112). Fairclough (1995b) comments that van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach ensures a comprehensive analysis of news discourse. To illustrate, van Dijk (1988) investigates the news on Tamil refugees in the Netherlands. Tamil stories suggest a political panic from the power elites because immigration is construed as “fake refugees and only come here to live off our pocket” (p.252). Likewise, Teo (2000) examines how inequality towards Vietnamese immigrants in Australia are justified and reproduced in Australian broadsheets. It is revealed by the findings that the exclusion of Vietnamese immigrants in the media, i.e. the community as “undisputed drug-lords” and their residence as a “crime infected suburb”. These studies are presupposed first by the existence of racism and discrimination against social minorities in the West. Dominant social groups in western societies promulgate social justice and human rights on the one hand, and, on the other hand, negatively label

the minority groups or differentiate them from the majority (van Dijk, 1997). Ethnic Muslims are a minority in China, somewhat similar to Tamils in the Netherlands and Vietnamese in Australia. Thus, van Dijk's framework applies to testify whether they are excluded from Chinese society in media texts from China and America.

People have used three other CDA approaches to study news discourse, aside from van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach. Fowler (1991b) investigates a report about a food poisoning affair (i.e. the 1988-89 salmonella Poisoning Scandal) in several mainstream British newspapers. The findings recall the function of analytical tools in the revelation of ideologies (i.e. hysterics and mania) in the news. For instance, the poisoning incident is constructed as an epidemic, harms, public anger and crisis with recurrent words, such as "outbreak," "damage," "anxiety," "fear," "warning". Using Fairclough's framework in the media discourse analysis highlights the dialectical relations between discourse and the socio-cultural background of events. For instance, Boykoff (2007) examines the coverage of climate change in American and British newspapers. The statistics reveal that anthropogenic climate change is emphasised in both UK and U.S. media discourse. After the global attention to environmentalism, American news discourse after the year 2005 reflects that humans can contribute greatly to the fight against climate change.

2.5 Summary

The current project about Chinese Muslims in journalistic discourse uses van Dijk's framework for the following reasons. The socio-cognitive approach has been used extensively in the analysis of media discourse. It is a deductive-oriented approach to investigate ingroup and outgroup ideologies in discourse. It is a three-dimensional framework, in which contextual analysis more specific than sociocultural approach. And it is an approach focusing on linguistic features at both the macro and micro levels of discourse. And, it has been successfully applied to studies with similar foci, with the light of this point, to the present study, i.e. ethnic groups and media representations.

3. A focused review of Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach

The current project specifically used van-Dijk's conceptualisation of ideologies. It has been previously reviewed that ideologies are social-cognitive (i.e. group-dependent), identified

in linguistic analysis and explained by the situation of discourse production (see section 2.3). This section will elaborate on socio-cognitive ideologies, the shape of socio-cognitive ideologies, and the operation of linguistic analysis.

3.1 Social-cognitive ideologies

Ideologies are social-cognitive, as a “shared, fundamental and axiomatic beliefs of specific social group”(van Dijk, 2009: 75), for instance, neoliberalism and feminism. Here, a social group should have the collective goal, interest and beliefs in relation to others (e.g. journalist of a media organisation). According to van Dijk (2006), this benchmark distinguishes a social group from a cultural community (e.g. teachers) or a social category (e.g. women). On the other hand, this benchmark again evidences that ideology is not false consciousness (cf. ideology as hegemony in Fairclough), but properties with social impact (van Dijk, 2001). For instance, Islamophobia and Islamophilia are both ideologies.

Since ideologies are social-cognitive constructed, there are ingroups and outgroups in the subjective mental construction of social events and discourse. As has been discussed before, socio-cognitive ideologies in discourse are favourable to the host group and unfavourable to other social groups. The notion is embodied by the ideological polarisation of Us and Them in the cognition of discourse producers (van Dijk, 2011b). Then, how are ingroups and outgroups presented in discourse? The ‘ideological square’ below shows (see Figure 2.1 below) that the presentation of ingroups stresses the positive actions or properties while mitigating negative properties and actions about the US. The presentation of outgroups, for discourse producers, emphasises the negative properties and actions while lessening the positive properties and actions of THEM (van Dijk, 1998b).




Figure 2.1 Ideological square (Adapted from van Dijk, 1998b: 33)

In this aspect, ideologies are “only the case for some kinds of group-typically so in relation to other groups” (van Dijk, 2006: 116). They are the revelation of a group’s “identity, actions, aims, norms and values” (ibid: 115). In journalism, representing social reality as ingroups and outgroups is primarily based on the ideologies of the media organisation and the moment of discourse production (van Dijk, 1998b). To illustrate, *China Daily* is known as a national newspaper in China and serves propaganda function, so an ingroup in *CD* does not discomfort with the interest of the Chinese government.

3.2 From ideologies to discourse

The description of the relationship between ideologies and discourse explain how ingroups and outgroups are shaped in mind and discourse. By group knowledge and attitudes, discourse producers shape the social event cognitively (i.e. event models). There are ingroups and outgroups in the event model of social reality. The presentation of ingroups and outgroups are controlled by context models.

3.2.1 Group knowledge and attitudes

Group attitudes and knowledge embody group-specific ideologies. They are social cognitive constructs (i.e. parts of social memory), which shape group-dependent memory of a social event (i.e. event models) (see Figure 2.2 below). According to van Dijk (1998a, 2006), group attitudes refer to the evaluative beliefs of a group (i.e. opinions and attitudes)

about specific social issues, such as the Muslims in China. Group knowledge is non-evaluative, shared, presupposed and taken for granted knowledge, which makes the communication between discourse producers and recipients possible. Group-specific attitudes and knowledge are ideological, since the attitudes and beliefs shared by a specific group may be false for other groups. Therefore, the two aspects are the embodiment of group ideologies. With regards to the social functions, the two components in discourse group members are claimed to firmly believe things in accordance with the group attitudes and knowledge (ibid.). Inversely, group-specific attitudes and knowledge also are influential to the personal conceptualisation of social reality (van Dijk, 1995, 1998b), i.e. mental models. This review explains why attitudinal features and topics were examined in the news about Chinese Muslims.




Figure 2.2 Discourse and social practice (van Dijk, 1998a, p.87)

3.2.2 Mental models

Mental models (i.e. event model and context model) are the interface between group-specific ideologies and discourse (see Figure 2.2 above). By definition, mental models are “mental representations of personal experience of specific actions, events or situations” (van Dijk, 1995: 251). They deal with the mental shaping of social reality, on the one hand, thus being subjective, individual-unique. On the other hand, mental models are the “personal ‘instantiations’ of sociocultural knowledge and group opinions” (van Dijk, 1998b:27). On the other hand, they are ideologically-based, because of being directly influenced by group attitudes, knowledge and ideologies (van Dijk, 1993, 1995, 1998a). In this sense, mental models of a discourse producer originate from his group-specific worldviews, and his representation of an issue is shared by his ideological group.

Additionally, mental models are the start of discourse production and the ultimate aim of discourse interpretation by language users. People produce and understand discourse based on the mental representation of social reality (van Dijk, 1998a, 2006). For instance, news about Chinese Muslims is produced and comprehended by the subjective models of journalists and readers about the ethnic Muslim community. Moreover, van Dijk (2001) adds that mental models of journalists are always the schematic structure of social events (e.g. attitudes and topics [setting, participants, actions]). Therefore, investigation of highlighted information in news discourse shows an ideological representation of social events by a particular media organisation.

What are event models? They are concerned with individual knowledge and opinions about the specific social event, which formulates the episodic memory (i.e. personal conceptualisation) of social reality (see Figure 2.2 above). Also, it is the outcome and revelation of group attitudes, knowledge and ideologies, so event models are attached to social memory (van Dijk, 1995, 1998a, 2001). In that sense, event models are ideologically-based and result in ideological discourse. Concerning the socio-cognitive ideologies in 3.1, The ingroup or outgroup portrayal of social events and actors relies on “the ideological bias of the mental models” (van Dijk, 2006:121). In journalism, the event model of journalists is claimed to produce new information to recipients (i.e. vital episodes of recent events) without infringing normative standard, such as disclosing national secrets,

agreeing with organisational ideologies (van Dijk, 2014). In the case of *China Daily* and *The New York Times*, different event models of Chinese Muslims in two media outlets result in various focuses in the news discourse, especially regarding topics and attitudes.

Context models are working memory (see Figure 2.2 above). Van Dijk's conceptualisation of context is limited to the moment of discourse production and consumption, instead of a grand socio-cultural context (cf. context in Fairclough's framework). Context is defined as the social situations constrains current discourse, i.e. "mak(ing) sure that language users adapt their discourse to the social environment so that it is socially appropriate" (van Dijk, 2009: 83). It is added in the paper of 2009 that context models are necessary to shape the same mental models to different communities appropriately. Context models are organised by a series of categorisations such as ongoing social actions, information of participants (e.g. participants' knowledge, identity) and a spatiotemporal setting. That means that this model is not static mental representations but change with the communicative situation. Context models mediate discourse and society, because of controlling every aspect of discourse (e.g. lexical use, structure, argumentative strategies) (van Dijk, 2001, 2009). In van Dijk (2014), context models in journalism include the ideologies of media outlets, target readership and professional norms and standard (e.g. objectivity) with which journalists usually adopt the expression to suit for these categories. In the case of *China Daily*, there is a diachronic change of topics, attitudes and discourse features in the Muslim news discourse. The change is related to some other contextual factors, such as the development of Chinese Muslim issues, national policies, international readership. The review of context models proves the need to examine contextual information in CDA analysis.

3.3 *Linguistic analysis of ideologies*

Linguistic analysis is significant in van Dijk's framework since discourse is seen as the structured form of knowledge (van Dijk, 1998a). Discourse can be seen as the ideological representation of social reality, thus serving as the start of CDA analysis.

Discourse is the revelation of contextual information (i.e. context models) and the ideological conceptualisation of the social event (i.e. event models). The two models decide several factors in discourse production. These factors include types of knowledge (e.g.

what do I know), information sources (i.e. how do I know), quality (i.e. certainty or confidence), targets (i.e. what recipients want/need to know) and the entitlement of knowledge (i.e. the epistemic relationship with recipients). These factors impact aspects of discourse. There are aspects of

- discourse topics (i.e. semantic macrostructure),
- the information structure of clauses,
- epistemic stance (i.e. the degree of certainty of speakers/ writers),
- evidential (i.e. the nature of the evidence for the statements),
- implications,
- presupposition (i.e. new propositions from new information), and
- coherence (van Dijk, 2014).

The analysis addresses both macro and micro dimensions of discourse features in the text. The semantic macro-structure is the main ideas in the discourse. About the importance, macrostructures 1) are the start of a CDA study and 2) show “(subjectively) the most important information of a discourse”. The structure also 3) “expresses the overall ‘content’ of mental models of events” and 4) is controlled by the socially dominant discourse producers. So, this structure is generally parts of discourse best memorised by recipients (van Dijk, 2009: 78). Also, semantic-macrostructures are embodied by topics and thematic structure in discourse, which are expressed especially by headlines in discourse (van Dijk, 1998a, 2009).

Micro aspects of discourse consist of local meanings and relevance. Local meaning of discourse is the explicit and implicit semantic meaning discourse. The foci lie in the meaning of words, the nature of propositions, coherence (e.g. argumentative strategies, such as *topos*), implicitness (e.g. implications, presuppositions), levels of description. The local meaning can be controlled by context models and mental models of social events. The ideological objectives are achieved with semantic meaning, i.e. highlighting good things of Us and bad things of Them, while overlooking bad things of Us and good things of Them. Relevance is the structure of the text, such as syntactic structures (e.g. passive voice, modality) and rhetorical figures. In written discourse (e.g. newspaper), various

forms express underlying meaning indirectly with the pragmatic properties of a communicative event. For instance, nominalisations and passive sentences are used to hide or background the agency (van Dijk, 1998a, 1998b, 2009).

Topic, words, phrases and all types of forms and structures in discourse are not ideological biased by nature. “It is their specific use in specific communicative situations that make them so” (van Dijk, 2006: 128). Therefore, it is necessary to conduct context analysis in combination with linguistic analysis to uncover who is represented as ingroups/ outgroups in the discourse of social issues and how they are represented (see the framework in Chapter 3).

3.4 Summary

Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach is viewed as a “powerful integrated framework for the news discourse analysis” (Fairclough, 1995b: 30). It is capable of identifying the ideological representation of social reality from three dimensions, i.e. linguistic perspectives, contexts and social impacts (i.e. ideological features) (see Chapter 3). However, there are critiques on the over-interpretation and subjectivity in qualitative CDA analysis, which relies on the small-scale dataset.

4 Critiques of the main CDA approach

CDA has received criticism mainly from the academic traditions of conversation analysis (e.g. Schegloff, 1997; Widdowson, 1995) and corpus linguistics (e.g. Blommaert, 2005; Stubbs, 1997). The scholars from the first camp question the epistemology of CDA, which is related to an over-interpretation of data. Corpus linguists concern about subjectivity in CDA approaches.

The critiques on underlying premises in CDA studies have been refuted. Widdowson (1995) views CDA as a partial socio-political interpretation without empirical evidence in the text. It contradicts the terminology of *analysis*, which attempts to reveal textual features related to different possible meanings, each being valid conditionally. To be exact, CDA researchers approach a text preconditioned by a political stance (e.g. Marxist position) and attempt to anchor the position with convergent meaning interpretation and selective analysis of textual features. In a similar vein, Schegloff (1997)

puts it further that power relations and dominance in CDA should be “a serious rendering of that material” (p. 20). The stable pattern of power relations should not be sketched more than the sociopolitical context relevant to discourse, and then projected onto discourse per se. CDA is tagged with being filled with underlying premises and guesswork (Hammersley, 2002). In response to Widdowson’s critiques, Fairclough (1996) argues that first, an exhaustive analysis of textual features seems impossible; second, his version of CDA considers the production of texts in the professional practice and social context and thus reducing the bias in the analysis. He further refutes the political affiliation of CDA while claims that covert ideologies in discourse do functionally reproduce hegemony and dominance in society. Making the approach transparent, and attempting to transform social injustice shape the epistemological perspective of CDA.

Qualitative CDA approaches are also criticised for the lack of objectivity (Blommaert, 2005; Stubbs, 1997). Blommaert (2005) argues that “the predominance of biased interpretation begs questions about representativeness, selectivity, partiality, prejudice and voice can an analyst speak for the average consumer of text?” (p.31-32). Stubbs (1997) questions the representativeness of linguistic choices in the analysis, i.e. the features found in the text should be consistent with norms in language. The use of a large dataset is also stressed in his work, which aimed to generalise the findings of typical language use. The solution, as is recommended, is the incorporation of corpus linguistics into CDA. The next section will illustrate how the corpus linguistic approach in the words of Mautner (2009) would strengthen CDA analysis.

5 Corpus-assisted discourse analysis (CADS)

Corpora are seen as a large collection of representative samples of a particular genre of naturally occurring language (Baker, 2006). According to Hunston (2002), corpus linguistics (CL) is to re-arrange language data to enhance the observation of big data probably through statistically sophisticated methods and computer programs (e.g. Wordsmith, Wmatrix). Following numbers, researchers can gain insights into text clustering and text-driven interpretations of meaning. Integrating CL into discourse analysis projects has been discussed by many scholars such as Mautner, Baker and Partington. Corpus linguistics, in their words, implements a more quantitative way to

process the encoded electronic texts, probably foregrounding the frequency of lexico-grammatical items. Therefore, it is an inductive oriented approach for retrieving patterns in a large dataset.

Similar to Fairclough's definition (Fairclough, 1992, 1995a), discourse in CL refers to the way of representing the world because it discloses the particular version of events through meaning, metaphors, representation and other semiotic signs (Burr, 1995). Researchers start analysing discourse with a systematic exploration of linguistic patterns often with high occurrences, followed by interpreting the pragmatic meaning of patterns' use (ibid.) and explaining their social functions. Critical approach adds another procedure of evaluation after explanation, always dealing with critiques of the corresponding dominant power groups and the transformation of social inequality (Baker, 2006). People in CDA field (e.g. Wodak, Meyer and Fairclough) also champion the employment of corpus in critical explorations of discourse. Corpus linguistic approach "is rather a linguistic extension of CDA. It provides additional linguistic devices for thorough analysis — and can be applied principally against the backdrop of various CDA approaches" (Wodak & Meyer, 2014: 27).

5.1 The advantages and disadvantages of CADS

The merits of corpus-assisted discourse analysis (CADS) are summarised as reducing researchers' cognitive bias during analysis (Baker, 2006; Leech, 1992; Partington et al., 2013). As is mentioned in Leech (1992), CL shares the characteristics commonly ascribed to the approach in science, especially completeness and objectivity. These benefits can compensate for the weakness in traditional CDA qualitative approaches, known as over-interpretation and lack of objectivity (Blommaert, 2005; Widdowson, 1995). It has been extensively acknowledged that adding of the quantitative dimension can strongly support qualitative CDA approaches. The credibility of analytical results is enhanced (Anthony, 2009; Mautner, 2005). Anthony (2009) believes that the combination of computer, software and big data have already allowed researchers to see language patterns and phenomena that were not previously identified. Besides, CL features in identifying repetitive patterns which demonstrate the incremental effect of discourse to mirror ideological representations (Baker & Levon, 2015; Baker, 2006, 2010; Mautner, 2009).

Baker (2010: 314) borrows the idea from Fairclough (1989) to illustrate the connection between repetitive patterns and ideologies in texts:

“The hidden power of media discourse and the capacity of...power-holders to exercise this power depend on systematic tendencies in news coverage and other media activities. A single text on its own is quite insignificant: the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of positioning the reader and so forth”.

Moreover, CADS enables researchers to use multiple methods to triangulate the analysis. Triangulation helps to check the validity of a hypothesis, showcase findings more robustly and allow for revealing unforeseen problems and aspects of the research (Layder, 1963 cited in Baker, 2006). It has also been demonstrated that a CDA study informed by corpus analysis is a productive approach to triangulation (ibid.).

The weakness of CADS mostly lies in providing only frequency-based information of the chosen patterns. Corpus analysts should be aware that corpus methods sometimes generate the ‘decontextualised’ use of language. However, digging out the norms of the language use and producers’ ideologies requires the interpretation and explanation in a broader spectrum of text (Baker, 2006). Secondly, patterns with high occurrences in a corpus do not always invoke hegemonic discourse, because “true” power could be subtly inherent in discourse, revealed by less frequently occurring patterns or even refer to nothing in the text (Baker & Levon, 2015; Baker, 2006). Therefore, using corpus enables the identification of repetitive associations which are very often pointed to a set of ideological presentations and power relations, while probably fails to unfold how discourse is realised linguistically in more complex settings (Baker & Levon, 2015). Based on the discussion of the disadvantages of CADS, the analytical items in the current project were not decided by corpus unanimously.

5.2 *The application of CADS*

CADS has been widely used in the exploration of journalistic discourse. CADS has some appearances in the analysis of news portrayal of Muslims. As was reviewed previously, Baker and the colleagues (2013b) investigate the 10-year representation of Muslims and Islam in the British broadsheets and tabloids with the 143 million -word corpus. Al-Hejin (2015) explores the representation of Muslim women in *BBC* news from

1997 to 2002 with a corpus of 1.9 million words. Muslim terrorism in Chinese broadsheets, Associate Press and Worldstream (2000–2002) is also examined in Qian (2010). Qian has compiled four parallel corpora for the comparative analysis. Generally, these studies have paid attention to highlighted information in media discourse about Muslims, e.g. the labelling of Muslims and Islam and concepts surrounding the keyword of the group (e.g. the word “Muslim”). Other discourse features are supposed to be deemphasised, such as transitivity and topos. In the present study, as will be reported in Chapter 3, I examined more linguistic features in the news coverage about Chinese Muslims.

5.3 *Corpus methods in the present study*

This section will review some corpus methods that were applied in the present study, i.e. topic modelling analysis, semantic category analysis and collocation analysis.

5.3.1 Topic modelling analysis

Topic modelling is a corpus-driven method to find some topics to describe the corpus. It can not only explicate the latent topics inductively in large corpora but the importance of each topic at the discourse level. In the words of Törnberg and Törnberg (2016a), topic modelling is “basically a catchall term for a collection of methods and algorithms that uncover the hidden thematic structure [i.e. topics] in document collections by revealing a recurring clustering of co-occurring words”. The logic behind the method is that a text has a particular topic, which is composed of a number of words. So, a topic, in topic modelling analysis, is defined as a group of words.

Topic modelling analysis is conducted as follows. The first step is generating topics inductively, which is largely unaffected by the researcher’s prior conceptualisation. Without the pre-set of any keyword, the running of an algorithm can automatically generate groups of words from corpora. Each group of words indicates a topic in discourse. It is noteworthy that the number of topics is pre-set before running the algorithm. The optimal number of topics can be calculated statistically. However, many researchers in the social sciences prefer to decide the parameter with the observation of discourse. Törnberg and Törnberg (ibid.) argue that the number of topics should be “evaluated qualitatively”, according to whether or not the results are “meaningful and analytically useful topics” (p.407). In the next step, the analysis goes to the interpretation of topics, underlying

ideologies and tensions (e.g. ideological features about Chinese Muslims) and typical discursive strategies (e.g. topos and transitivity) in discourse.

Topic modelling has been applied to investigate topics in news discourse, scientific articles, blog posts, poetry and fiction, to solve problems in a range of fields in social science. Grimmer and the colleagues (2013) demonstrate that topic modelling is applicable for investigating main topics in texts of political conflicts. Törnberg and Törnberg (2016b) investigate topics in blog posts about Muslims and Islam. In another study of Törnberg and Törnberg (2016a), the network of different topics in the same social media dataset are explored. In the present study, topic modelling analysis was applied to investigate the topics in discourse about Chinese Muslims from *The NYT* and *CD*. Generated topics from topic modelling are the extension of results from headline analysis (see Section 3.1 in Chapter 3).

5.3.2 Semantic category analysis (SMC analysis)

(Key) semantic category (i.e.SMC) analysis (Rayson et al.,2004; Rayson, 2008) is usually employed to understand more frequent occurring SMCs in one corpus in contrast to another. The semantic category (i.e. semantic field or semantic domain) is a concept that lexical items and multi-word expressions are grouped semantically referring to a specific subject (Jackson & Amvela, 2007). The relation between an SMC and its items are related to the hyponymy in lexicography. SMC analysis, then, compares the categorical words/expressions between two corpora for the key semantic categories. As is introduced in Rayson (2008), a researcher starts the analysis with the assignment of the USAS taggers built in the Wmatrix tool to the datasets. The USAS tagset is a semantic category scheme developed by Lancaster University and includes 21 major discourse fields involving 232 category labels (Archer et al.,2002). In the assessment conducted by Rayson et al. (2004), the USAS tagging system has obtained a precision of 91%. The comparison at the semantic level is an extension of keyword analysis, which explores unique word items in a corpus concerning another. SMC analysis is claimed to win over keyword analysis. It can 1) indicate the significant concepts in the texts invisible at the word level, 2) count the multiword expressions with the USAS tagset and 3) group variants within a lemma (ibid.).

With regards to practice, the comparison is made between two result lists for the relative use of SMCs, using the keyness methods (i.e. chi-square or log-likelihood test). The result of this analysis is indicated by keyness (i.e. k value). A higher k value equals the higher occurrence of an SMC in a research corpus in comparison with a reference corpus, and vice versa (Baker, 2006). The reference corpus is the comparative corpus usually a larger corpus (e.g. British National Corpus) or that of similar size (Baker, 2004). The p -level determines the threshold value k . For instance, the p -level of 0.5% leads to the threshold of 3.84, while the p -level of 0.01% indicates the threshold of 15.13. A study using the critical value of 15.13 ($p = 0.01\%$) can indicate unique SMCs in the research corpus in comparison with another reference corpus.

The corpus method has been applied extensively in CADs. Al-Hejin (2015), Baker (2006), Bednarek and Caple (2014), Branum and Charteris-Black (2015) all have applied SMC analysis. These studies mainly detected the newsworthy concepts or events in media discourse, a core practice-based and ideological factor in the creation of news. Garzone and Santulli (2004) demonstrate the capability of semantically categorical words of eliciting the attitudinal features in journalistic discourse. It is argued the semantic pattern of words in texts indexes the ideological overtones in media discourse. In the present study, SMC analysis was employed for attitude analysis (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 3).

5.3.3 Collocation analysis

Collocation means the association of words in discourse. It is believed that each word in discourse prefers to co-occur with specific groups of words to other words. For instance, the “suicide” are frequently collocated with verbs of “attempt”, “commit” and “contemplate” and so on. Collocation analysis allows for the visualisation of association between words in large datasets. Collocation contributes to “a semantic analysis of words” (Sinclair, 1991:115-116). The examination of collocates can catch the attraction among actors, entities and concepts in the corpus. Hunston (2002:109) argues that “they can convey messages implicitly and even be at odds with an overt statement”. Bakeworr et al. (2007) and Baker (2006) convey that collocation analysis is suitable to investigate the discursal presentation of a social group. The connections among actors, entities and concepts are qualitatively summarised after the analysis at the lexical level. For instance,

Baker et al. (2007) explore how refugees were represented in British newspaper from 1996 to 2005. The main semantic concepts around the words of “refugee”, “asylum seekers”, “immigrants” and “migrant” are generated, which relies on the L5-R5 collocates of the node (i.e. words in query). In the present study, collocation analysis was used to explore the important concepts around the descriptive words of Muslims (e.g. the word item of “Muslims”) (see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3).

Collocation analysis uses different measures and spans to decide the connection between two words. The measures Mutual information (i.e. MI, MI2 and MI3), Logdice and Delta P are commonly deployed based on practical motivations. The series of MI measurements can examine the most exclusive associations in the big data. Specifically, MI can examine the less frequently used patterns with a strong connection and so is used in many corpus tools. MI2, MI3 and Logdice measurements prefer the combinations with higher frequency than MI. The measure of Delta P is featured for showing the directionality of the associations (Brezina et al., 2015). Span is another parameter in the collocation analysis. Span concerns about how far apart between an inquiry word (e.g. “Muslim [s]”) and the other words can be considered as the co-occurring. Specifically, the concept deals with the number of words from the node, for instance, five words to the right and five words to the left of the node (L5-R5). According to Sinclair (1991), the most significant collocate of a word can be identifiable with the span of L4-R4. However, Siepmann (2005) argues that longer-distance collocations than L4-R4 is good to uncover the attraction between words in the corpus.

Collocation analysis is an important corpus method in CADS. It has been used extensively in the examination specific social group in media discourse. As has been previously discussed, Baker et al. (2007) investigate how refugees were covered in British media outputs ten years around the millennium. Additionally, in Baker et al. (2013a), the collocates of “Muslim”, “Islam” and “terror” are examined to find out the discourse representation of Muslims and Islam in British newspapers. Qian (2011) compares collocates around the concept of terrorists (e.g. “terrorist”) in British, American and Chinese newspapers. This study aims at displaying the ideological representation of terrorism in the media of different regions, similar to the current research.

Corpus linguistics in conjunction with qualitative discourse analysis approaches can triangulate the methods of analysis, and the two approaches will compensate for the weakness of the counterpart for the generation of more effective and objective findings. The combination of corpus methods and van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach is suitable for the current study. Corpus approach, as an inductive approach, is an assistant in identifying patterns in ample data collection. The in-depth analysis of patterns (e.g. main attitudinal features), under a more deductive-oriented approach, helps to discover the ideological features in the news corpora.

6. Summary

In this review, I have introduced the theoretical background and methodological background of this study.

About the theoretical background of this study, the literature on the representation of Muslims in the media has been reviewed in Section 1. In particular, I have emphasised the studies on:

- the portrayal of Muslims in the mainstream Western media,
- the portrayal of Muslims in the Chinese Media, and
- the representation of Muslim terrorists in the media.

It is found that scholars in media communication and discourse analysis have criticised the media representation of Muslims in the West. Muslims are narrated discursively under the influence of Orientalism, predominantly in relation to lawlessness, violence, terrorism, backwardness, discrimination towards Muslim females. However, there is a need for a comparative discourse study about Chinese Muslims in various media outlets, which is based in different cultures (e.g. newspapers in China vs in the U.S.). Moreover, the study should involve a critical perspective, such as the ideological portrayal of Chinese Muslims.

Section 2 to 5 explicate the theoretical background of the current study. The question addressed is why the study of Chinese Muslims in the media can employ van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach combined with corpus methods. CDA explicitly demystifies the ideological function of language. The primary aim is to decipher the

naturalised ideologies of dominant social groups in discourse in the manner of text-based analysis. In an examination of media discourse, van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach has frequently been used. Also, the three-dimensional framework for ideology analysis makes the approach gear towards the current study — linguistic analysis, contexts and social impacts (see Section 2 and 3). The assistance from corpus methods is necessary since the inductive method can compensate for subjectivity in van Dijk's framework, which is more deductive-oriented and in-depth qualitative analysis (see Section 4 and 5).

Overall, the current study was conducted by 1) the practical need of an ideological analysis of Chinese Muslims in news discourse from different cultures and 2) the capability of CADS to investigate ideological features. Next chapter will introduce methodology in the present project.

Chapter 3 Methodology

This chapter will start to discuss the data used in the present project (see Section 1). It will then move to introduce the analytical framework (see Section 2), which specifies the application of van Dijk's framework in the current study. The analytical framework is composed of a three-dimensional framework – context, language and social impact. Every dimension is filled with specific analytical tools. Following the analytical framework, this chapter will introduce analytical procedures in Section 3. In this section, especially, I will elaborate on the use of corpus methods to examine the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims. Section 4 will introduce the corpus tools employed in this study (e.g. Wmatrix). Conclusions of the whole chapter will be included in Section 5.

1 Data information

This part introduces data source, principles and methods of data collection, and the construction of corpora.

1.1 Data sources

Data were collected from the official website of *China Daily (CD)* and *The New York Times (The NYT)*. Online news was used in the study because news on the internet is well-known to possess a more substantial impact on readers than the print version. The following section will illustrate why two newspapers are comparable in the analysis of the media representation of Chinese Muslims

CD is an English-language official newspaper in China. This broadsheet plays a particular role in portraying Chinese image and articulating the Chinese government's voice to the international community. It is believed that this newspaper has become a source to express Chinese national ideologies to global readers (Liu, 2012; Stone, 1994). About stylistic features, *CD* projects a facade of journalistic objectivity in contrast to a more explicit nationalist tone in Chinese-language newspapers circulated in China (Guo & Huang, 2002). Guo and Huang have argued that the newspaper employs "the cosmopolitan worldviews, pluralistic opinions and occasionally alternative voices" (p.127). *CD* adapts its look to international readers' expectations in news reading, which is hoped to result in positive attitudes towards the newspaper (Pitts & Giles, 2008). In this case, all news in the broadsheet is international news, e.g. news about Chinese issues. Organisational ideologies in *CD* are different from many western media (e.g. *The NYT*). *CD* plays a similar role as *People's Daily* in China, which is a widely circulated newspaper and regarded as the "official mouthpiece" of CCP (Chinese Communist Party). *China Daily* and *People's Daily* share a high degree of ideological similarities in reporting major political events (Scollon, 2000). To further demonstrate the ideological similarity between *China Daily* and other state newspapers in China, the broadsheet frequently uses information from media outlets such as *People's Daily* and *Xinhua*. Regarding social influence, *CD* is the most cited source by international media outlets concerning messages from China (Liu, 2012; Stone, 1994). Liu (2012) discusses the readership of the national broadsheets overseas. It is claimed that

CD is significant for the U.S. government to acquire the latest Chinese information, while it is not attractive to most western consumers.

The New York Time is an influential newspaper in the U.S. (cf. *China Daily* in China), ranking within the top 5 elite newspapers in the U.S. The statistics from Pew Research Center revealed that the digital circulation of its Sunday newspaper ranked the first in 2014, the weekday newspaper ranked the second (Barthel, 2016). This American newspaper cannot represent western or American media. However, it is notable for the coverage of international news (e.g. news about Chinese Muslims), which significantly influences the content of other mass media (Volkmer, 1999). The similar set of agenda and ideological packages in reporting China are identified in other newspapers, such as *The Washington Post* and *Wall Street Journal* (Lee et al., 2001).

The organisational ideologies in *The NYT* are two folded. On the one hand, *The NY Times* is known for conveying liberal viewpoints. As is claimed by Ruschmann (2006), *The NYT* reporters tend to favour liberal thoughts, while those who hold moderate and conservative points of view are seen as the minority. On the other hand, western newspapers are not the mouthpiece of the respective government, but still conveyors of national ideologies (Becker & Vlad, 2009). About *The NYT*, it is argued that newspapers in the West function as “something akin to a house organ for the political elite” (Sigal, 1973: 47). It enables elite social actors (e.g. State Department, Congress) to promote foreign policies and intellectual discourse, and the social movement leaders to challenge social reality (Gitlin, 1980). As is put by Chomsky (1990), *The NYT* blurs the ideological boundary between the state and the corporate world. Schudson(1995) even criticises the newspaper for dismissing the autonomy of liberal media.

Generally, the two newspapers are chosen because they are influential in the global media regarding the coverage of international issues (i.e. international news). And international news in these newspapers reflects the respective national ideologies.

1.2 Data collection

News coverage about Chinese Muslims published from September 11th 2001 to December 31st, 2015 was collected. The 9/11 attack was seen as the start for two reasons. It has been found from the literature that the coverage about Muslims increased dramatically after the

attack (e.g. Baker et al., 2013; Qian, 2010). This attack triggered a more negative portrayal of Muslims than previously in the media, in relation to terrorism and threats to western civilisation and societies (Macdonald, 2003). The end of 2015 was the cut point of data collection in the present study because of the time limit to finish this project. The texts were firstly collected to form two news archives by searching the keyword queries of “Chinese Muslim(s)”, “Uighur(s)”, “Uyghur(s)”, “Ethnic Hui” and so forth⁸. All the word items are usually used to describe Chinese Muslims. Such a collection of news ensures the high occurrence of the Chinese Muslim communities in the news. After the extraction, the news pieces irrelevant to the research were manually deleted.

Since I am interested in highly frequently patterns in datasets, I manually removed reporting time, sometimes sources and authors of news articles under the headline (e.g. “CHEN JIE, 2001-09-19 09:18:38” or “Updated: 2011-10-02 07:05 By Shao Wei (China Daily)”). Cleaning of these sentences can increase the accuracy of corpus analysis, such as the automatic retrieval of topics in discourse. The information above and especially reporting time and sources were documented in a separate Excel file, which helps in-depth qualitative analysis. Additionally, the analysis in this study requires text, so data cleaning also includes the removal of HTML, pictures javascript code in corpus and reformatting texts into UTF-8. The practice enables text to be recognisable in multiple corpus tools.

Two corpora were compiled respectively with pieces of news from *CD* and *The NYT*. In order to have a comprehensive picture of how Chinese Muslims are represented in the two broadsheets, news texts of all genres are included in data. More than 95% of the chosen texts are news reports, which can appear in the column of Asia Pacific in *The NYT*, in the columns of Business, Culture, Government in *CD*. News coverage of other genres (e.g. editorial, opinions) account for 5% of the data, and it is made explicit by the newspaper per se. About 67.17% out of 747 pieces of news in the *CD* originally come from

⁸ The keywords in data collection primarily include "Chinese Muslim", "Chinese Muslims", "Muslim in China", "Muslims in China", "People in Xinjiang", "Uyghur girl", "Uygur female", "Uygur woman", "Uygur people", "Uygur women", "Uygur man", "Uygur men", "Uygur boy", "Uygur boys", "ethnic hui", "Hui people", "Xinjiang people", "people in Xinjiang", "Ningxia people", "people in Ningxia", "people in Gansu", "Gansu people", "person in Xinjiang", "person in Gansu", and "person in Ningxia".

CD; other primary sources include *Xinhua*, *Beijing Weekly* etc. 96.63% of 446 pieces of news in the NYT were composed by The NYT journalists, and the newspaper uses news from *Associated Press* and *Reuters* in the coverage of ethnic Muslims (2001-2015).

1.3 Overview of the corpora

Table 3.1 summarises information on the two corpora. The China Daily corpus (CD) is composed of 485,327 words, while the New York Time corpus (NYT) has 355,311 words (see Table 3.1 below). The average length of news items in the NYT is moderately longer than that in the CD corpus. The length's difference agrees with that news in American media is less declarative than Chinese news articles, but embraces more “historical continuities and ruptures”(Lee, 2010: 278). The date of July 5th, 2009 is the dividing line to separate the two corpora into four sub-corpora. Figure 3.1 below reveals a sharp increase in coverage about Chinese Muslims after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009. Back to Table 3.1, there are four sub-corpora of the CD1, CD2, NYT1 and NYT2. The CD1 and the NYT1 include news texts published before the Xinjiang Riots of 2009, while the other two sub-corpora consist of Chinese Muslim news published from 2009 to 2015. The pre-09 sub-corpora are smaller than their counterparts, both in terms of pieces of news texts and tokens.

Table 3.1 Information of the CD and the NYT

Corpora	Sub-corpora	Period	No. of news texts	Tokens	Words/text
CD		09/11/2001-12/31/2015	747	485,327	650
	CD 1	09/11/2001-07/04/2009	221	154,449	
	CD 2	07/05/2009-12/31/2015	526	330,878	
NYT		09/11/2001-12/31/2015	448	355,311	793
	NYT 1	09/11/2001-07/04/2009	122	109,127	
	NYT 2	07/05/2009-12/31/2015	326	246,184	




Figure 3.1 The number of news coverage per year in the CD and the NYT

Figure 3.1 presents the annual distribution of Muslims news in the two corpora. The figure also suggests the news volumes of Chinese Muslim issues in the two broadsheets from 2001 to 2015. Chinese ethnic Muslim communities have been moderately covered in the two newspapers in the past 15 years. The first increase in *China Daily* is 2003 probably because of China's Western Development program. The news coverage in *The NYT* outnumbers the coverage on *CD* in 2008. The peak occurs in the second half of the year 2009. As was mentioned before, the Xinjiang Riots of 2009 lead to the booming coverage of Chinese Muslims worldwide. After the decline in 2010 and some fluctuations in the next two years, the news volume ascends in the second half of the year 2013 and peak again in 2014 (i.e. 128 pieces in the *CD* corpus and 101 pieces in the *NYT*). The rise of news volumes in the year 2014 is probably related to a series of violence, including a bombing at the Kunming railway station occurred on Mar. 1st, 2014. The discussion of Uyghurs and Chinese Muslims continues in two newspapers in the year 2015 despite a more cooling trend than before.

2. A three-dimensional analytical framework

The section will illustrate the analytical framework in the present study. As was reviewed in Chapter 2, van Dijk's socio-cognitive CDA approach is used in the current study. Within the approach, the analysis of ideologies in the discourse involves three interrelated

dimensions of language, context and ideological features. The ideological representation of social issues, i.e. ingroups and outgroups, is revealed by discursive strategies in the discourse and contexts. The use of typical lexico-grammatical items and discourse strategies are determined by contextual information. Therefore, contextual information construes language and ideological features in the coverage of Chinese Muslims.

Based on van Dijk's framework, the analytical framework in the current study includes three dimensions: language analysis; context analysis and social impact analysis. Language analysis examines the discursive strategies used to represent Chinese Muslims. In social impact analysis, the ideological features in the portrayal of Chinese Muslims are explored. Context analysis discusses in what context Chinese Muslims are ideologically represented, i.e. the local and the global context in connection with discourse production. The framework works in the analysis of four aspects of discourse, such as the exploration of topics in datasets (see Section 3 below). Each dimension in the framework is filled with specific analytical tools, to make this project manageable.

2.1 Context analysis

Context analysis is the starting point of all analyses in this project. In the literature review (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 2), it has been that discussed contextual information (i.e. contextual models) regulates the representation of a communicative event (i.e. group-specific memory of social events or event models). Contexts can be regarded as “the social dimensions of contextual constraints of communicative events” (van Dijk, 2014: 152). So, they determine what and how people say and write about social reality. Furthermore, contexts are mental constructs with relevance to the discourse production, rather than “objective or deterministic constraints of society or culture” (van Dijk, 2006: 72). The mental construct is also influenced by event models, which is shaped by common-cultural background, group-specific ideologies, attitudes and knowledge. Thus, contexts can construe the ideological representation of social reality.

Two aspects of contexts were considered in the present study — local context and global context. The local context of discourse focuses on the local situation of the communication (e.g. the moment of news writing). The factors of place, time, other communicative actions/events in the discourse and participants (e.g. their social role,

membership or identity) are all involved. Global contexts deal with macro-level factors, such as the previous experience of the producer, shared professional knowledge, institutional ideologies and readership (van Dijk, 2006a, 2008a).

Contextual analysis of news considers a number of factors. The local context of news includes the current setting of reporting time and place, contextual information (i.e. cotext), communicative identities of the journalist or interviewees in the news, and the genre of news (e.g. editorial). In the current project, I have paid particular attention to the topics, attitudes, news participants and collocation of terms about Muslim people in the news datasets. In stating so, the analysis in this project initiates with identifying the representation of Chinese Muslims in such elements — topics, attitudes, news participants and collocates. For instance, in the discourse of social transformation in the CD, what are the linguistic features and categorisations of Chinese Muslims?

The global context of the news consists of professional knowledge about the new writing, ideologies of the media organisation, professional ideologies as a journalist (e.g. objectivity and newsworthiness), the readership of the news and sometimes the political context of news discourse (van Dijk, 2008). In the current project, I draw attention to many aspects of the global context in the news coverage about ethnic Muslims in China in *CD* and *The NYT*. The political context of news discourse, the readership of the newspaper, organisational ideologies is mainly considered.

2.2 *Language analysis*

Language analysis is the second dimension of the framework in the current project. As has been put in the literature review in Chapter 2, discourse variations are controlled or construed by “different structures of experience (models) as based on different knowledge structure” (van Dijk, 2014:195). Language in discourse is an embodiment of contextual information behind the social event in communication (i.e. context models) and ideological conceptualisation of the social event (i.e. event models). In other words, linguistic actions are seen as being sourced by “our ideological belief systems” (p.35), which is usually controlled by powerful discourse groups (Bhatia, 2015b). They are used to highlight and appreciate ingroups and “ensure a certain degree of collective security, a sense of identity and belonging”. The actions of language that outcast outgroups can further reinforce “the

solidarity within ingroups” (ibid.). The discursive linguistic representation of Chinese Muslims by various media outlets reveals another two factors in the framework.

Language analysis, following van Dijk’s approach (van Dijk, 1998a, 2009b), concerns every aspect of discourse. Van Dijk emphasises macrostructure (i.e. topic and thematic structure), local meaning (i.e. primarily about semantic meaning) and relevance (e.g. syntactic structures) in discourse. The three aspects of linguistic features are grouped as linguistic resources at the lexico-grammatical level (e.g. word choice, transitivity) and the discourse-pragmatic level (e.g. argumentative strategies [i.e. topos]).

Repetitive linguistic devices are typical linguistic features in the coverage of Chinese Muslims. According to van Dijk’s explanation stated above, recurrent linguistic strategies at all levels can contribute to the ideological representations of Chinese Muslims in the newspaper (e.g. Muslims are murderers).

I pay particular attention to transitivity and topos in the discourse. These two parts of the language are typical in the dataset and closely related to the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims. It is noteworthy that Chinese Muslims are discursively represented in news discourse, so language analysis in the present study was not limited to these language features. Typical linguistic features with a contribution to the ideological portrayal of ethnic Muslims in China have been explored. They are analyzable without the use of the following tools, such as the choice of words.

2.2.1 Tools for language analysis

This section explains the examination of transitivity and topos in the present study. In Chapter 2 (Section 2.1), I have discussed that systemic functional linguistics (SFL) and argumentative strategies are common analytical tools in CDA studies. Transitivity belongs to SFL system and helps for the revelation of ideology and power in discourse (Martin, 2005). Topos are a part of the argumentation, which belongs to linguistic devices at the discourse-pragmatic level. By definition, topos are “the content-related warrants”, which “connect the argument to the conclusion” (Wodak et al., 2009: 34). This linguistic device is usually employed in DHA approach to CDA. I will discuss how to undertake transitivity analysis and the examination of topos in the present study.

2.2.1.1 Transitivity

Transitivity in news discourse was examined in the present study. Specifically, the use of material, verbal and mental processes in the news coverage about Chinese Muslims was investigated systematically.

Transitivity is a part of language related to ideational meaning in texts and the construction of ideologies and power. Ideational meaning is the process by which human beings make sense of the world around them. The purpose of transitivity is to shape ideational meaning in discourse, i.e. actions (i.e. processes), participants in actions and circumstances in actions. Thus, transitivity analysis addresses the questions of who is acting, what actions are undertaken, and who or what is influenced by the action. Social actors in the actions are seen to be more powerful than the party being acted upon. The description of supportive (e.g. providing help to the people) and evil actions (e.g. killing civilians) reveals the ideological representation of actors (Martin, 2005). There are six process types signifying different types of actions in the world. For instance, material processes/clauses represent actions and events (e.g. “Terrorists killed Chinese people.”). Verbal clauses express the process of saying (e.g. “She replied that...”). Mental clauses represent people’s perception, cognition and affection (e.g. “They like followers.”) (Martin et al., 2010).

Material clauses, verbal and mental clauses are stressed in the present study because they express the highest level of power of dynamism (Hasan, 1985). In Hasan’s theory (ibid.), power equalises dynamism, which is regarded as the relationship between individuals or between individual and environment. Actors are given different levels of power or dynamism in various process types, which signifies the ability to control other participants and the environment. In the cline of dynamism, actors in material clauses, if not in the passive voice, are given the great power/dynamism in action towards an animate or inanimate goal or affected. The power of social actors is lessened in material clauses in the passive voice. Next, sayers in active verbal clauses are powerful in the saying action towards the recipients, targets or things mentioned. In mental clauses, sensors are also dynamism in the feeling towards the phenomenon. Actors in mental clauses are less dynamic than ones in material and verbal clauses. Examples in the following Table 3.2

reveal the ideological representation of actors in three process types. Examples were extracted from the news corpora.

Table 3.2 Process types and ideological representation of Chinese Muslims

Process types	Examples	Interpretation of process types	Ideological representation of Muslims
Material process	Arabs and Persians <u>established</u> communities in the cities of Guangzhou. (from the CD)	Arabs and Persians are actors in the material process of “established” towards the inanimate goal of “community”.	Arabs and Persians have greater dynamism in deciding whether or not they want to establish communities. The expression indicates that they have the initiative to build communities in China.
Verbal process	We <u>call on</u> Uyghur compatriots to stand up courageously against evil extremism (from the CD)	Chinese Muslims (“We”) are a sayer in the verbal process “call on” towards recipients “Uyghur compatriots.”	Chinese Muslims are passed voices and the power in the saying action of “call on”. The power indicates that Chinese Muslims take the initiative to call for a large-scale anti-extremist campaign within the communities. So, the majority of Chinese Muslims take a stance against “Muslim extremists” (i.e. a handful of Chinese Muslims involved in riots), and so elicit the portrait of moderate and peaceful Muslims, and ingroups to <i>China Daily</i> . On the contrary, “Muslim extremists” portrayed as enemies of Chinese Muslim citizens, and further embrace an outgroup identity in the newspaper.
Mental process	They [Uyghur detainee] <u>fear</u> torture or execution (from the NYT corpus)	Uyghurs are a sensor in the mental process of “fear” towards the phenomena of “torture or execution.”	The Uyghur detainees are active to feel fearful about torture or execution in the expression. Therefore, it can be suggested that they are indeed persecuted by the Chinese government. Fear is stronger in this mental clause than is expressed otherwise. For

			instance, “there is fear among them about torture and execution”.
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Note: The underlined word in the examples are different processes types in clauses

2.2.2.2 Topoi

Topoi are parts of the argumentation. The function of topoi is to connect arguments to the conclusions, key ideas and claims. Relying on the semantic meaning, the topoi “belongs to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises.” (Wodak, 2001: 74). The premises can transfer arguments to conclusions; in other words, justification of the ideas in discourse. It is elaborated that “topos are used to justify the positive or negative attributes in discourse, i.e. justify political inclusion or exclusion discrimination or preferential treatment” (ibid. p.73). Topoi are argumentation schemes for many ideological expressions, such as positive self-presentation, negative-other presentation, revealing differences/similarities, warning of dangers, discredit opponents (Wodak et al., 2009). In this case, the examination of topoi can reveal the ideological representation of social reality (e.g. Chinese Muslims) in discourse.

Topoi are “typical content-related argument schemes” that can be analysed against the list of topoi. There is a list of commonly used topoi in the ideological representation of social reality (Wodak, 2001, 2009). I will introduce eight types of topoi typical in the corpora in this study:

1. *Topos of advantage*: It is presented as a conditional in discourse. If the performance of actions is helpful or advantageous in the specific context, one should perform it.
2. *Topos of burdening*: If communities/ institutions/ countries are burdened by specific problems, people should do something to decrease the burdens.
3. *Topos of comparison*: the topos uses similarities and differences one’s argument with other similar/dissimilar situations to justify and perpetuate the argument.
4. *Topos of history*: The narrative of similar things in the past to give insights into the present actions. If actions in the past lead to specific consequences, one should omit or perform similar actions at present.

5. *Topos of humanitarianism*: If actions in discourse do (not) conform to human rights or humanitarian convictions, people should (not) perform, or should take some actions to stop it.
6. *Topos of justice*: This topos is based on the claim of “equal rights for all”. Equal treatment should be given to acts or situations that are equal in some respects.
7. *Topos of reality*: Terrible social situations are presented in discourse (e.g. poverty), which justifies the need for specific actions or decisions.
8. *Topos of threat*: If actions bear some danger or threats, people should not perform it or do something to stop it. Specific danger or threats are usually expressed in discourse.
9. *Topos of numbers*: Numerical or statistical information is given in discourse to prove performances of specific actions.

The questions arise of how topos can serve as the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims. The following sentence from the CD corpus exemplifies the use of the topos of advantage in *China Daily* – “2.2 million Hui Muslims enjoy four days off from Saturday to Tuesday to celebrate the festival”. Many Chinese Muslims benefit from the government special helps to “enjoy four days off” and “celebrate the [religious]festival”. *China Daily* is supposed to use the fact to reveal that Chinese Muslims are not deprived of religious freedom. Instead, they enjoy the freedom with aid from the Chinese government.

2.3 The analysis of the social impact

The third analytical component is social impacts, i.e. how media portray and categorise Chinese Muslims with linguistic patterns and contexts and follow their inherit ideology. As was discussed in Chapter 2, Ideological representations of social events are socio-cognitive. Socio-cognition suggests the group-specific attitudes and knowledge of a social event, which is controlled by ideology (e.g. identity and interest) of a powerful social group. And ideology determines the representation of a social group in the media. The ideological representation of social groups reveals a general categorisation of members in social events, so membership categorisation analysis (MCA) and outcasting strategies were used as tools.

These two tools were chosen with reference to Bhatia (2015a) because both her study and the current research concerns the ideological representation of social reality.

2.3.1 Tool for social impact analysis — membership categorisation analysis

MCA is an extension of the exploration of the ideological polarity – ingroups and outgroups in discourse are unfolded more comprehensively. By definition, it is “a formal analysis of the procedure people employs to make sense of other people and their activities [...] it orients to practical action [...] delimiting one’s own moral, social and religious characteristics as well those of the opponents” (Leudar et al., 2004: 244). The approach is first shaped by Sacks (1992) for conversation analysis. MCA is developed in Hester and Eglin (1997) and Watson (1978) and is employed in discourse analysis in Jayyusi (1994) and Bhatia (2015a).

MCA is applicable in CDA studies because the two approaches have similar intentions (Paulsen, 2018). Invoking people’s common-sense to justify the results, the categorisation in discourse is purposeful (Leudar et al., 2004). Categorisations of members serve the function of including or excluding other people in discourse, similar to the ingroups and outgroups in van Dijk’s CDA approach. For instance, categorisation can be used to defend an ethnic identity in the debate, and to outcast the opponent in a political speech. Different from the general grouping of ingroups and outgroups in CDA, MCA concerns about membership categorisations in the discourse about social knowledge. (Membership) categorisations (i.e. the result of MCA) can be government and criminals, mom and children. Paulsen (2018) argues that MCA outcomes are “nuanced accounts of micro-level trends” (p.140) in discourse.

Membership categorisations are identifiable through predicates and actions of individuals or groups in discourse. In Sacks’ MCA theory (1992), marked activities of the individual/ group can categorise its membership, and these activities are defined as category-bound activities. Watson (1978) develops from the concept of category-bound activities to the concept of category-bound predicates — a range of characteristics to identify categorisations. Jayyusi (1984)’s identification theory agrees with Sack and Watson’s MCA analysis.

Jayyusi's MCA theory connects membership categorisations with ideological analysis. On the one hand, Jayyusi (1984) views membership categorisations as the inferences, descriptions, and especially, judgements, which motivates the ideological division of Us and Them. On the other hand, Jayyusi differentiates the cognitive ideological labels with descriptive ideological labels. They are defined respectively as membership categories and membership categorisations. The latter one is "the work of members in categorising other members or using 'characterisations' of them" (p.20). Thus, membership categorisations are revealed in the discourse. The former is the cultural basis of membership categorisations. The relationship between categories and categorisations are similar to the connection between group ideologies and ideological representation of social reality (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 2). Membership categories are "the already culturally available category-concepts that members may, and routinely do, use in categorisation work" (p.20).

MCA analysis has frequently been employed in the exploration of the ideological representation of social reality. As has been reviewed in Chapter 2 (see Section 1.3), MCA helps to elucidate ideological portrayals of the American government in contrast to Bin Laden in Bush's speech after 9/11 (Leudar et al., 2004). In Bhatia (2015b), it is argued that MCA unfolds membership categorisations behind assigning the label of "tyrant" to one group over another, in the speech of both George W. Bush and Bin Laden. The study reveals the importance of power strategies in the ideological frame (i.e. contextual information). In a word, MCA allows for "a richer and more multifaceted analysis of the social impact of ideological stimulated language and actions of individuals and groups, thus enriching the framework to make it as multidimensional as possible" (62).

An important notion in MCA is "standardised relational pair" (Leudar et al., 2004), which is the pair of Us and Them (e.g. good government vs evil enemies). Specifically, it is "using one part of the pair in interaction invokes the others" (p.245), and the groups appear in discourse in a pair. A standardised relational pair is identified in moral terms, i.e. constituting "a locus for a set of rights and obligations" (ibid.).

2.3.2 Outcasting strategies in MCA

Another important tool of “outcasting” is related to MCA, and specifically to the categorisations of Them (i.e. outgroups to discourse producers) in discourse. In Lazar and Lazar and Lazar (2004:227), outcasting is defined as “a process by which individuals and groups are systematically marked and set aside as outcasts ... based on the dichotomisation and mutual antagonism of outgroups (‘them’) and ingroups (‘us’)”. There are five principal outcasting strategies — (e)vilification, defining moral order, enemy construction, criminalisation and Orientalisation. By using these strategies in discourse, discourse producers exclude an individual or a group from Us (i.e. ingroups). Moreover, the outcasted groups or individuals are represented as against the moral order that is universally accepted. The strategies of (e)vilification, criminalisation and orientalisation were found in the dataset of the present study.

1. *(E)vilification*: The strategy deals with the spiritual dichotomy of good and bad. The typical example includes labelling outgroups as “axis of evil” and “terrorists” in discourse. Bhatia (2015b) adds that regarding others as evil justifies the judgement and moral superiority of discourse producers. Further, any group and actions against evil groups are seen as good.
2. *Criminalisation*: With this outcasting strategy, the outgroups are narrated as opposite to the law. In discourse, they can be lexically designated as criminals (e.g. by words of “murders”, “against the law”), and the criminal actions of outgroups are stressed. The criminal actions of outgroups can be represented as the regular and intentional ones to increase the level of criminality. The narrative of the past criminal actions suggests habitual criminality. The emphasis on intentionality can be shaped by premeditation and material clauses. The criminalisation of outgroups can make the actions of ingroup members as the punishment to outgroups. Thus, ingroups are given moral superiority.
3. *Orientalisation*: Orientalisation to outcast outgroups formulates the ideological dichotomy of Us and Them. The strategy stresses the division between what is normal, acceptable and superior and what is abnormal, unacceptable and socially inferior. In the words of Lazar and Lazar (2004), the purpose of the discourse strategy is “maintaining as ‘core’ a unitary western moral order and for out-casting

the ‘other’ to the periphery” (p.234). There are four typical stereotypes in relation to Orientalism. Oriental others have the features of bellicosity, moral degeneracy, duplicity and uncivilization.

The outcasting strategies outlined above are realised by linguistic resources and facilitate the categorisation of social groups in the subjective ideological representation of social reality. Outgroups, against the interest and identity of discourse producers, are outcasted as criminals, evil and Oriental others. By contrast, ingroups, meet the interest and identity of the producers, are positively represented. On the whole, the outcasting strategies, integrated into MCA, provide a more thorough analysis of who are Chinese Muslims in the datasets.

2.4 Summary

Figure 3.2 below summarises the analytical framework in the present study, which aims at identifying the representation of Chinese Muslims in the CD and the NYT. Three dimensions of analysis were addressed, regarding contexts, linguistic features and categorisations.




Figure 3.2 Analytical framework

- Context analysis allows for revealing in what discourse context Chinese Muslims are represented. In a sense, context analysis reflects event models about Chinese Muslim issues in the two newspapers. To achieve this goal, I focused on the items of topics, attitudes, news participants and concepts of Muslims in the news corpora. The four components in texts were retrieved by the identification of topics, attitudinal features, news participants and collocates about Muslims with corpus analysis. I will elaborate on the identification procedures in Section 3. Besides, Global contexts were investigated with qualitative analysis, so as to construe the representation of Muslims in datasets.
- Language analysis concerns repetitive linguistic patterns in the CD and the NYT. For instance, what are linguistic features in the discourse of social transformation (i.e. a topic) in the CD? Lexical-grammatical features and semantic-pragmatic features were qualitatively analysed. Attention was paid to transitivity and topos in the discourse.
- Social impact analysis uncovers the influence of highlighting these discourse contexts and linguistic features in the representation of Chinese Muslims in the two newspapers. The examination deals with the portrayals and categorisations of Chinese Muslims in the discourse of the above four aspects in the CD and the NYT. Membership category analysis in combination with outcasting strategies was employed in the analysis.

Such three dimensions of analysis were conducted in four procedures. I will report them in the next section.

3 Analytical procedures

Following the analytical framework, this section reports the analytical procedure in this project. First and foremost, the analysis of topics, attitudinal features, news participants and collocates around words about Muslims (e.g. “Muslim (s)”) were performed, findings from which can triangulate mutually by similar and dissimilar results. The identification of these components in the CD and the NYT by corpus methods construe the local contexts of representing Chinese Muslims in the newspapers (i.e. context analysis). Each corpus method was used to a specific type of local contexts in corpus, LDA analysis for hidden topics in discourse, SMC analysis for attitudinal features in the corpora, the analysis of

frequently occurring personal terms for typical news participants, and collocation analysis for key concepts around the terms about Chinese Muslims. After that, qualitative analysis of the discourse which includes these contextual variables made it explicit linguistic features (i.e. language analysis), portrayals and membership categorisations of Chinese Muslims (i.e. social impact analysis). I also referred to the institutional ideologies to construe the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims, which formed the examination of global contexts in the framework above. The analytical results in four aspects of discourse will be reported in the following three chapters.

3.1 *Topic analysis*

Topic analysis was performed to investigate the main information (i.e. semantic macro-structure or global meaning in discourse). Four aspects were considered:

- 1) topics in the coverage of Chinese Muslims from two newspapers and two periods through corpus methods;
- 2) typical discursive language strategies in discourse; and
- 3) the ideological categorisations about Chinese Muslims;

Point one is the conduction of contextual analysis; point language analysis and point three to social impact analysis.

Why did I analyse topics in the newspaper datasets? Semantic macro-structure is embodied by topics in the datasets, including topics of a whole news article and topics in discourse. Also, it contributes to the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in the datasets as per van Dijk's theory (1988, 1998, 2009a). Semantic macro-structure in discourse indicates information about social events emphasised by a discourse producing group, which is a part of mental models of social reality. Information stressed by discourse producers reflects the group-specific knowledge about the event, which is decided by group knowledge and in-depth institutional ideology (e.g. liberalism). Readers will be dramatically influenced by this structure since it is best memorised. Headlines can express topics and so were analysed qualitatively in the present study.

Two forms of analysis were conducted to identify topics in news corpora. The identification relies on headlines analysis and topic modelling. After the identification of

topics in corpora, I examined the representation of Chinese Muslims in discourse related to these topics. Linguistic features, portrayals of Muslim people and categorisations were primarily stressed.

3.1.1 Headline analysis

Headlines in the news express the top-level semantic macrostructure in discourse, i.e. the overarching information in the coverage of Chinese Muslims (van Dijk, 1988b). Headline analysis deals with what topics tend to be expressed in headlines and what inferences can be drawn from the headlines in relation to the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims. And it was undertaken in a qualitative method with two steps. First, manual annotations of news headlines in the dataset were conducted. 747 pieces of news in the CD vs 448 pieces in the NYT were coded regarding what subjects they mainly concerned. Second, the importance of each topic news corpora was investigated regarding the number of articles in each group of topics.

3.1.2 Topic modelling analysis with LDA

Topic modelling allows for the identification of topics at the discourse level. Chapter 2 has reviewed that topic modelling can discover topics in discourse in an inductive manner (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016a). Topics in discourse are the thematic structure in van Dijk's semantic macro-structure (2009a). Driven by the datasets, the corpus method allows for the retrieval of hidden topics automatically in the corpora (e.g. the CD and the NYT). A certain topic is retrieved from a big dataset (e.g. the CD) with algorithms, the result of which is shown as a group of words.

The present study used LDA (i.e. Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to run topic modelling. It is a commonly used algorithm in the corpus method (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016a). Plus, a topic is seen as a list of words in topic modelling. LDA can detect word items accurately under each topic. Studies such as Grimmer et al. (2013) and Törnberg & Törnberg (2016a) have explained the principles of LDA in detail. Two parameters are important in LDA topic modelling. First, LDA works best for the texts with 500-1000 words. Therefore, I made sure that every document in this analysis was within the word limit. Documents significantly longer than 1000 words were divided into small chunks. Second, the number of topics needs to be pre-set before the analysis either with statistics

or researchers' decision. In this study, the number of topics was decided by the researcher based on qualitative analysis of sample news texts and trials with different numbers. The analytical results are the most interpretable version among all the trials. After the retrieval of topics presents as groups of words, the analysis of discourse sections including the word items was conducted. LDA toolkits have the function of linking the topic signifiers with the discourse sections.

The two forms of topic analysis discovered topics in the coverage of Chinese Muslims from macro to micro perspectives. Results from topic modelling sub-categorised the topics from headline analysis.

3.2 *Attitude analysis*

The next form of analysis is a lexicon-based analysis of attitudes in the coverage of Muslims from two newspapers. Attitudinal markers reveal ideological representations of Muslims in the news. In van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach (1998, 2009a), attitudinal lexical items in datasets express the local meaning (i.e. semantic meaning) in discourse regarding attitudes. Local attitudinal meaning in discourse reflects attitudes of discourse producers towards social reality (i.e. group-specific attitudes). Further, attitudes from discourse producers decide the mental model of social events and are decided by group-ideologies (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 2). Therefore, Attitudinal lexical items contribute to the ideological representation of social reality.

In the present study, this lexicon-based attitude analysis was conducted to identify the most different and similar attitudes in pairs of corpora (e.g. the CD vs the NYT). The corpus method of semantic category analysis (i.e. SMC analysis) was undertaken for attitudinal features in corpora. Similar to topic analysis above, the ideological categorisation of Chinese Muslims and typical linguistic features were examined in the discourse related to these attitudes.

3.2.1 The identification of attitudinal features with SMC analysis

Semantic categories (SMC) analysis was applied to identify attitudinal features in discourse and the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in this discourse. In practice, an SMC in a corpus (e.g. the NYT) is compared with the SMC in a reference corpus (i.e.

another corpus with the similar size, such as the CD) (see Section 5.3.2 in Chapter 2). Each SMC in this project symbolises an attitude in discourse, such as happiness, violence. The level of an SMC's uniqueness in the specific corpus (e.g. the NYT) is decided by keyness (k) and threshold values. A larger keyness symbolises a rise of the uniqueness of SMCs in, for instance, the NYT corpus. Threshold keyness and the corresponding p -level decide the number of unique SMCs in the NYT.

In the current project, both unique and significantly common SMCs between two corpora are emphasised. The examination of similar SMCs is based on the following reasons. In the interpretation of corpus analytical findings, the similarity is treated as important as differences especially pertinent to the studies about the representation of social reality (Bang, 2009). It has been proved in Bang's study that the similar attitudes between two corpora contribute to the ideological representation of foreign countries in the U.S press. Besides, from the results of the current study, similar SMCs between two corpora can be interpreted differently. In the present study, SMCs with p -value nearly one is the similar categories between the two corpora, because $p \approx 1$ indicates little difference between the frequency of a specific SMC in two corpora.

The practice of SMC analysis is elaborated as follows.

- The first step was semantic tagging. USAS semantic tagset embedded in Wmatrix helps the semantic tagging in a corpus (see Chapter 2). 232 USAS semantic taggers were assigned to the corpus (i.e. CD, CD1, CD2, NYT, NYT1 and NYT2) via Wmatrix. All single words and multiword expressions in the corpus were semantically grouped into over two hundred divisions. Wmatrix will be introduced in Section 4 below.
- The second step was a comparison to identify dissimilar and similar attitudes between two corpora. The comparison at the level of the semantic category (SMC) was realised with the log-likelihood test (LL test), to assess the overuse or underuse of categorical words respectively in corpus 1 (e.g. the CD) in relative to corpus 2 (e.g. the NYT). I replaced the term research/reference corpus respectively with corpus 1 and 2 for convenience. A positive k signals the overuse of a word group in corpus 1 than corpus 2,

while a negative k means the opposite. In the current project, the critical log-likelihood value of $|15.13|$ ($p < 0.0001$) determined the key attitudinal SMCs. Therefore, any tag with a higher $|k|$ was statistically significant (cf. Rayson, 2003). Furthermore, the corresponding category was significant divergent attitude between the two corpora under investigation. On the contrary, SMCs with p -value close to “1” were common attitudinal SMCs between two corpora. Top three common attitudes were identified and discussed in each round of comparison because no threshold value has been suggested in the literature.

Among 232 SMCs in the USAS system, 30 SMCs deal with attitudes in discourse based on the meaning of attitudes in SFL, so they were investigated in herein. Attitudes address the language resources to articulate positive and negative feeling which involves “emotional reactions, judgment of behaviours and evaluation of things” (Martin & White, 2005: 35). For instance, items in the SMC E4.1 (Happy/sad: Happiness) express emotional reactions. Some attitudinal SMCs may be overlooked. However, it is noticeable that the investigation of these 30 attitudinal SMCs suggests the general evaluative properties in corpora (see Table 3.3 below). In each attitudinal SMC, positive and negative items are automatically labelled with the sign of “+” (positive attitudes) and “-” (negative attitudes). For instance, A5.1+ is the tag of positive items in Safety/danger, while A5.1- signifies negative items in this SMC. So, attitude analysis involves 60 sub-categories (30 positive groups vs 30 negative groups).

Table 3.3 Attitudinal semantic categories in the USAS system

Taggers in the USAS system	Semantic category	Taggers in the USAS system	Semantic category
A1.1.2	Damaging and destroying	E4.1	Happy/sad: Happiness
A1.2	Suitability	E4.2	Happy/sad: Contentment
A1.4	Chance, luck	E5	Fear/bravery/shock
A1.5.2	Usefulness	E6	Worry, concern, confidence
A1.7	Constraints	O4.2	Judgment of appearance
A11.1	Importance: Importance	S1.2.1	Personal traits: Approachability and friendliness
A11.2	Importance: Noticeability	S1.2.2	Personal traits: Avarice
A12	Easy/difficult	S1.2.3	Personal traits: Egoism
A15	Safety/danger	S1.2.4	Personal traits: politeness
A5.1	Evaluation: Good/bad	S1.2.5	Personal traits: Strong/weak
A5.2	Evaluation: True/false	S1.2.6	Personal traits: Sensibility
A5.3	Evaluation: Accuracy	X5.1	Attention
A5.4	Evaluation: Authenticity	X5.2	Interest/ boredom/excited/ energetic
E2	Liking	X9.1	Ability: Ability and intelligence
E3	Calm/violent/ angry	X9.2	Ability: Success/failure

3.2.2 Qualitative analysis

Qualitative analysis was conducted after SMC analysis. In each attitudinal SMC retrieved from the above analysis, the top 10 most frequently occurring items were examined. I chose concordance lines and discourse sections with top attitudinal items in each SMC. Concordance lines, shaping the discourse of these attitudinal features in the news corpora, were extracted from the software Wmatrix and Wordsmith (see Section 4.1 and 4.2). The analysis of discourse highlights the linguistic features, portrayal and categorisations of Chinese Muslims.

3.3 *The analysis of news participants*

The third form of analysis was exploring vital news participants pertinent to the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in the datasets. News participants are persons frequently addressed in the news about Chinese Muslims in *CD* and *The NYT*. The construction of news participants has an ideological implication. In van Dijk's idea, "power and dominance of groups can be identified by their control over and access to discourse" (van Dijk, 1993:225). Plus, media studies often address the question of who is addressed in media outputs, such as Shahin (2015) and Sharifi et al. (2017).

The identification of news participants in the corpora uses a corpus method. The frequency of personal names in the news corpora decides typical news participants in the CD and the NYT. The majority of personal names in the corpora were retrieved through semantic tagging in Wmatrix. It was found that items in Z1 are all personal names in the USAS tagset. Another two criteria were followed in the item selection. First, the terms with the raw frequency ≥ 2 were included in the analysis. This selection can make the project manageable. Second, ambiguous items, such as "Hu", "Xu", "Muhammad" were not included in the analysis. Many ambiguous personal terms are repeated by less frequent personal terms in the corpus. For instance, "Hu" can be repeated by "Hu Jintao". The exclusion of ambiguous terms helps the research to identify the most important news participants in the CD and the NYT.

As a result, 1,962 and 1,303 personal terms respectively in the NYT and CD corpora were used to investigate. The items investigated in the project cover above 66% of the personal terms in both corpora.

After quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis emphasises how Chinese Muslims are represented in the discourse of news participants. Interesting personal names with high frequency in the corpus were selected. Their concordance lines (from Wordsmith) and discourse sections were examined, regarding linguistic features and categorisations of the Muslim group.

3.4 Collocation analysis

It has been reviewed that collocation analysis can detect the most significant semantic meaning around nodes (i.e. the word in the query, e.g. “Muslim”). The central semantic meaning around a node denotes the ideological representation of social reality, saying Chinese Muslims in the U.S. and Chinese media. Semantic meaning around the node is extracted based on the associated words, which are retrieved by different statistical measures. I will explain the analytical steps as follows (see Section 5.3.3 in Chapter 2 for the explanation of theories).

The first step is the identification of nodes in the CD and the NYT. A corpus-based combined with corpus-driven paradigm was used in this form of analysis (Mautner, 2009). The former use corpora to verify researchers’ hypothesis, whereas the latter use the corpus to decide analytical patterns (e.g. SMC analysis). The two paradigms are not exclusive to each other, because the hypothesis can be posed based on other corpus studies (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001).

In the present study, nodes were retrieved from two sources. They are frequently occurring words to signify Chinese Muslims, i.e. **TERRORIST**, **MUSLIM** in Table 3.4. The two items were retrieved by a corpus-driven method. Wordlists of the two corpora were generated by WordSmith, in which the above items were identified among the top 100 frequently-occurring items. The other items are interesting personal names given by news participant analysis. All the word items in Table 3.4 are relevant to ethnic Muslim communities in China, and each of them has a high frequency in datasets.

Such nodes were chosen for the following reasons. There was a trial to retrieve items only with corpus-driven manner, and the items such as **UIGHUR**, **MINORITY** and **SEPARATIST** were identified to describe Chinese Muslims. However, the collocation analysis of these items suggests that the concepts around these words (e.g. “Uighur”) have been elaborated in the previous steps. There is no need to repeat the findings. By contrast, the exploration of the items in Table 3.4 provides more novel insights than the analysis of other nodes. Therefore, the following node words were used in collocation analysis.

Table 3.4 Nodes for collocate analysis in the NYT and the CD

Nodes	Raw frequency in the NYT corpus	Raw frequency in the CD corpus
MUSLIM	489	1,160
TERRORIST	383	744
TOHTI	329	92
KADEER	147	324
XI (JIN PING)	129	192
HU (JINTAO)	52	25

Note: The raw frequency was retrieved after lemmatisation, e.g. TERRORIST includes “terrorist” and “terrorists”.

The second step is identifying the typical collocates of node words in Table 4.4. Important collocates of the nodes (in Table 3.4) were decided by two measures of MI and frequency, in the tool of GraphColl (see Section 4.3). According to Brezina et al. (2015), the use of two measures can generate the strongest and the most frequent associations of nodes. Other critical values in the analysis were the span of L5-R5, the cut-off value of 3 in MI test and 5 in frequency test. These critical values have been used in McEnery (2006), the investigation of swearing patterns in English. The semantic property of these nodes was manually identified afterwards. Semantic properties of the words in Table 4.4 reflect how Chinese Muslims are constructed in the CD and the NYT.

4 Corpus analytical tools

The following computer software in corpus linguistics was deployed in the current study — Wordsmith, Wmatrix and GraphColl. They were mainly for the identification of topics, attitudinal features, news participants and collocates of Muslim terms.

4.1 Wordsmith

WordSmith tool is an integrated suite of programs that help to investigate how words or patterns behave in corpora. Three primary functions in the program are Wordlist, Concord and Keyword. The wordlist tool allows for the visualisation of all words and clusters in a research corpus in the alphabetical or frequency order. Concord helps to present a concordance display about words in the query, i.e. the words/ phrases in context. Figure 3.3 below presents some concordance lines of the word “happy” in the CD corpus

(sorted by L1). In the present study, concordance analysis includes semantic meaning, typical linguistic features and social impacts. Using the function of KeyWord allows for the display of unique words in a research corpus in comparison with a reference corpus (e.g. CD vs NYT). The level of uniqueness of items in the research corpus is explicated by keyness (Scott, 2016). Similarly, the uniqueness of a key SMC in SMC analysis is revealed by keyness. This project mainly used the function of Concord to generate concordance. Concordance was used in attitude analysis, news participants analysis and collocation analysis. Wordlist was used to identify the main items to express Chinese Muslims.

The screenshot shows the Concord software interface with a menu bar (File, Edit, View, Compute, Settings, Windows, Help) and a concordance table. The table has two columns: 'N' (line number) and 'Concordance' (text snippet). The word 'happy' is highlighted in blue in several instances across the text.

N	Concordance
1	prepared nuts, cakes, lamb and other food three days ago. "My family will pray for a happy future. I hope the festivities can disperse the unpleasant feelings left from
2	company. Here, I wish Muslims around the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region a happy festival. Eid Mubarak! This year marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of
3	of us felt grieved, and the bad guys were not willing to see the fact that we are living a happy life," Hashim Dawut responded. "In Xinjiang, Uygurs and Hans are inseparable,
4	been running his shop since 1999 and has to do the same job every day, he lives a happy and comfortable life. He enjoys talking with his customers about trivial details
5	meal after sunset) together after the isha (night prayer). Ablikim Tursun in Hami city: a happy naan maker Ablikim Tursun has to get up at 4:30 am and mix flour for the
6	female friend in Beijing, a Han Chinese, who is married to a Hui Muslim. They have a happy family. Today, when I see pictures of the bloody clashes in Xinjiang, it
7	The Chinese traditionally believe that a good neighbourhood is essential for a happy life. Mass construction of residential apartments began sweeping across
8	.(28:77), which encourages followers not only to follow the teachings but also live a happy life. I hope Islamic leaders and followers can become better off through diligent
9	attention and care from the Party and the government than ever before. We are also happy to see that some Muslims voluntarily provided meals to those who were sick
10	leaders and Muslim friends, Tomorrow is the day to celebrate Eid al Fitr and I am happy to join you for the last fast-breaking meal on the last day of Ramadan. The
11	University comes from Kelamayi, a new city that is known for its oil fields. "I am happy and nervous. My parents have come from Kelamayi to watch me run, and I
12	think about the happiness of us and your grandchildren. Don't destroy the stable and happy life in Xinjiang. Don't follow the provocation from some people in other countries
13	visit gave us encouragement. We, the Xinjiang people, will have a stable, peaceful and happy life," Liu Qun, a local resident, said. "There were few visitors at this food
14	residents of different ethnic groups really want and need for leading a peaceful and happy life. Mr Erdogan's remarks, which constitute interference in China's internal
15	contact with Chinese minorities. He said he was impressed by their "harmonious and happy lives in the era of the Reform and Opening-up and under the government's
16	in Lanzhou run by Xiguan mosque. She said teaching makes her feel fulfilled and happy. "I am their teacher in class and they are my teachers after class," she said
17	. At the naming ceremony, the girl was given the name Marziya, meaning joyful and happy in the Kazak language. The Honbays already had six kids, and adding an
18	in Xinjiang's key projects. People in Xinjiang have the right to live a prosperous and happy life. But terrorist attacks, such as the one in Shanshan, deprive them of that
19	a Kazak traditional ritual, the couple named the girl Marziya, which means joyful and happy in the Kazak language. For a family with 6 kids, the Honbay's decision meant

Figure 3.3 Screenshot: sample concordance lines of “Happy” in the CD corpus

4.2 Wmatrix

Wmatrix⁹ was used for attitude analysis and the examination of news participants. Wmatrix is web-based software for corpus analysis and comparison developed by Paul Rayson. The program is featured by providing the interface that allows for automatic annotation with the CLAWS and USAS tag sets, which extends the keyword analysis at the word level to the comparison of grammatical categories and semantic fields. As was introduced in the literature review, the USAS tagging system is capable of assigning semantic labels to words and multi-word expressions in the research corpus. There are 21 major semantic categories (i.e. SMC) and 232 subdivisions in the USAS tagging system. The automatic

⁹ Wmatrix: <http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/>

annotation and categorisation using USAS are based on the inbuilt template list of 3,7000 lexical items and 17,000 multi-word expressions. Furthermore, the tagging system also specifies positive and negative items in some semantic fields (e.g. E, emotion) with the signs of plus and minus (Archer et al., 2002; Rayson, 2008, 2015). The following table expresses 21 semantic fields in the top hierarchy. Six SMCs are engaged in the present study, for instance, A (general and abstract terms), E (emotion), and Z (names and grammar).

A general and abstract terms	B the body and the individual	C arts and crafts	E emotion
F food and farming	G government and public	H architecture, housing and the home	I money and commerce in industry
K entertainment, sports and games	L life and living things	M movement, location, travel and transport	N numbers and measurement
O substances, materials, objects and equipment	P education	Q language and communication	S social actions, states and processes
T Time	W world and environment	X psychological actions, states and processes	Y science and technology
Z names and grammar			

Figure 3.4 Major semantic fields in the USAS tagging system (Archer et al., 2002)

4.3 *GraphColl*

GraphColl (Graphical collocation module) in #LancsBox¹⁰ was used for collocation analysis. It is a flexible tool to investigate the collocation and collocation network of node words (i.e. words in query). In simple words, the tool realises automatic

¹⁰ #LancsBox: Lancaster University corpus toolbox was downloaded with <http://corpora.lancs.ac.uk/lancsbox/download.php>

identification of collocates according to a specific span and statistical measure (e.g. MI3). Fourteen types of measures for collocation analysis were embedded in this tool.

Results suggest three factors of 1) significant collocates of a node, 2) the direction of collocation (e.g. left) and 3) the strength or frequency of collocation. Collocation network not only visualises the three factors above but shows n-order collocates. In the association of “physically” → “frail” → “elderly”, “frail” and “physically” are respectively the first and the second-order collocate of “elderly”. The collocation network of GraphColl was not used in the present study, because the first-order collocates of node words (see Table 3.4) are sufficient for analysis. However, this function can be applied to investigate lexical connections in discourse and further discourse structure at the lexical level (Brezina et al., 2015).

5. Summary

Chapter 2 and 3 presented the theoretical considerations and methodologies which underpinned the present study. The following three chapters will present the findings from the application of CADS. The findings will show the use of corpus methods for the identification of patterns in four aspects of language. With patterns retrieved above, findings will also show the application of the three-dimensions framework to generate ideological representations of Chinese Muslims in the two newspapers.

Chapter 4 The overall picture of Chinese Muslims in *CD* and *The NYT*

Chapter 4 consists of analyses that aim to uncover an overall picture of how the majority of Chinese Muslims were ideologically portrayed in the two newspapers with the three-dimensional framework previously discussed (i.e. Research Question 1). The question can be addressed by important information in the news coverage about Chinese Muslims.

Four aspects of discourse were examined with corpus analysis, which denotes contextual information in the representation of the holistic Chinese Muslim society in *CD* and *The NYT*. As has been reported in the section of the analytical framework in Chapter 3, corpus analysis for contextual information was conducted at the start of the analysis. Therefore, this chapter will report first in what (similar/dissimilar) context Chinese Muslims are represented in the two newspapers. I will also report the quantitative results from the four types of corpus analysis (i.e. topic analysis, attitude analysis the analysis of news participants and collocation analysis), and these quantitative results will also be addressed in three finding chapters.

How are most Chinese Muslims represented in these contexts? In this chapter, I will also focus on the overall features in representing them as a social group in China. Readers may be wondering whether they are represented as a mysterious Chinese ethnic group or are treated as being open to other social groups? To address these questions, I will use quantitative findings presented above in combination with qualitative findings. Following considerations are addressed:

- categorisations and portrayals of most Chinese Muslims as a social group in China;
 - similar and dissimilar categorisations and portrayals of most Chinese Muslims as a social group in China between the two newspapers and two periods;
- contexts for constructing them as a social group in China;

- similar and dissimilar contexts for constructing most Chinese Muslims as a social group in China between two corpora and two periods;
- linguistic features in constructing them as a social group in China;
 - similar and dissimilar linguistic features in constructing most Chinese Muslims as a social group in China between two corpora and two periods.

In the report, I will report how the majority of Chinese Muslims are categorised as a social group in China after the presentation of findings from corpus analysis.

Chapter 4 is comprised of four sections. Section 1 will report the findings from topic analysis (i.e. headline and topic modelling analysis) and discuss the representation of the majority of Chinese Muslims as a social group. Then the chapter will continue to discuss the attitudinal features in data and the portrayal of most Chinese Muslims with these attitudes. Section 2 will concern the portrayal of most Chinese Muslims as a social group when the attitudinal features are addressed. Section 3 will report frequently occurring news participants in data and how they are related to the discursive construction of Chinese Muslims. Section 4 will be a summary of the chapter.

It is found that findings from collocation analysis serve as an elaboration of the previous three aspects of analysis. So, I will report the findings to reveal how most ethnic Muslims are treated as a social group in China also. However, quantitative findings will not be reported to avoid repetitions but will be listed in Appendix 3.

1 Important topics and the overall image of Chinese Muslims

Previous literature has paid attention to frequently occurring topics in the news discourse about Muslims. Primarily, Muslims are frequently covered in the context of conflicts, war, crimes and religious issues in the Western media (e.g. Al-Hejin, 2015; Baker et al., 2013; Said, 1997; Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). For instance, Baker et al. (2013: 65) claims that

the presentation of Islam and Muslims in UK newspapers in the twelve-year period from 1998 to 2009 was predominantly carried out in a context of conflict, and the religion and its faithful were frequently portrayed as causes for concern, if not sources of threat.

Likewise, in social media, Muslims are discussed primarily regarding their culture, religion and conflicts (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016b). However, it is found in Zheng (2011) that the four topics about terrorism, economic development, social stability and crimes are essential in the coverage about Uyghur Muslims in Chinese newspapers (2002-2010). Terrorism and economic development are dominating topics in the news of Chinese Muslims from 2002 to 2007. Stability and crimes are essential from 2008 to 2010, the period being labelled as “crisis times” (p.119). The following report will uncover whether Chinese Muslims are constructed in the CD and the NYT with the same topics as has been discussed in the literature.

1.1 The distribution of topics and topic shift

The section reports findings from topic analysis, i.e. headline analysis and LDA analysis. Two terms are related to the analysis — topic category and topic. A topic category is a cluster of topics dealing with similar issues, while a topic is a subject that is discussed in the discourse. Topics retrieved from headline analysis are topic categories, ones from LDA topic modelling analysis (i.e. LDA analysis hereafter) can be grouped into the topic categories. The name of all topic categories and topics are determined manually, which is based on the meaning of headlines and groups of topic indicators.

There are eleven categories of topics in the CD and ten categories of topics in the NYT (see Table 4.1). Nine categorical topics are overlapping between two news datasets. Two out of the eleven topic categories are typical in the CD, one specific category in the NYT. From LDA analysis, the optimal number of topics in the CD corpus is 22 and 24 in the NYT. LDA analysis did not capture the topic categories of accident/ natural disaster and media critique in the CD. However, headline analysis has demonstrated the of these topic categories in the corpora. The list of topics from LDA analysis is shown in Appendix 1.

Findings in Table 4.1 below show that, from the quantitative perspective, many frequently occurring topic categories in the CD and the NYT are congruent with what previous studies have found. Three aspects of topic categories are frequent in the CD.

- Social transformations: Social transformations pertinent to Muslim communities are the most frequently occurring topic category in the corpus. Indicated by headlines, over 20% news articles in the CD deal with topics such as the development of the economy, education and living condition related to Muslim communities. From LDA analysis, the relevant topics are recurrent in the corpus implied by the contribution value of 0.21. Contribution values reveal the importance of topic categories at the discourse level (see Table 4). I will discuss this topic category mainly in Chapter 5.
- Violent acts and terrorism: Three topic categories suggest violence acts and terrorism: 1) social response to terrorism/violence (e.g. Chinese government's action to terrorism), 2) terrorism/violence and 3) social security (e.g. boosting security level). More than 28% of 449 articles are grouped in these categories. With a contribution value of 0.91, such categories have a frequent occurrence at the discourse level. Response to terrorism takes up 13.79% (contribution value =0.09); terrorism/violence 9.37% (0.06), and social security 5.09% (0.07). I will illustrate the topic category mainly in Chapter 6 of Chinese Muslim terrorists (i.e. a handful of Chinese Muslims who are involved in conflicts or embrace dissident political views from the Chinese government)
- Culture and religion: *China Daily* emphasises cultural and religious aspects of Chinese Muslims, which is indicated implicitly by 25% of headlines in the CD (contribution value of 0.23). The two topic categories will be elaborated in Section 1.2 of this Chapter since pertaining to the categorisation of Chinese Muslims as a social group.

In the NYT corpus, conflicts and international affairs are the most significant.

- International affairs: In addition to conflicts, Chinese Muslims are frequently covered in the context of international affairs in the NYT. 18.26% out of 448 pieces of news are grouped into this topic category. And the contribution value of this category is 0.17 at the discourse level. Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo Bay are a

symbolic international issue in relation to the construction of Chinese Muslims (see Chapter 6).


- **Conflicts:** Conflicts include the topic categories of terrorism/violence, reaction to terrorism/violence, social security and ethnic relations. In Table 4.1 below, Terrorism/ violence takes up 17.37% of 448 pieces of news (the contribution value of 0.28); response to terrorism 20.04% (0.05); social security 10.47% (0.07) and ethnic relations 7.13% (0.12). Conflicts are dominant in the coverage of Chinese Muslims in the past 15 years. More than 55% of the news articles in the NYT are headlined in relation to terrorism/violence, reaction to terrorism, ethnic relation (e.g. ethnic tensions), social security. Indicated by the contribution value of 0.52, many topics in discourse can be grouped into these topic categories. Topics in this category will be illustrated in three findings chapters. And, Chinese Muslims will be insinuated as an outgroup in the NYT

Table 4.1 Distribution of topic categories in the CD and the NYT

		CD		NYT	
		Headline analysis	LDA analysis	Headline analysis	LDA analysis
1	Social transformations	20.08%	0.21	4.01%	0.11
2	Community affairs	6.43%	0.08	0	0
3	Culture	16.60%	0.11	5.12%	0.08
4	Islam as religion	8.84%	0.12	0	0
5	Terrorism/violence	9.37%	0.06	17.37%	0.28
6	Reaction to terrorism/violence	13.79%	0.09	20.04%	0.05
7	Social security	5.09%	0.07	10.47%	0.07
8	Ethnic relations	8.84%	0.17	7.13%	0.12
9	Muslim protesters	0	0	14.70%	0.09
10	International affairs	6.69%	0.08	18.26%	0.17
11	Accidents/Natural disasters	2.41%	0	0.45%	0
12	Media critiques	1.87%	0	2.45%	0.01
Mean		9.09%	0.09	10%	0.1

Note: See footnote¹¹ for calculating the contribution value of a topic category. LDA analysis contributes to the study regarding identifying the importance of topic categories in the text.

This project also emphasises the construction of Chinese Muslims before or after the Urumqi Unrest in 2009. It is thus necessary to examine topic shifts in the two periods. From headline and LDA analysis in the CD, the categories of social transformation, cultural and religious aspects of Muslims are outstanding from 2001 to 2008. Terrorism/violence, response to terrorism, the ethnic relationship between Muslims and Han and community affairs (e.g. successful stories about Chinese Muslims) are stressed in the later period (2009-2015). The findings are dissimilar to results in Zheng (2011) – terrorism is emphasised from 2002 to 2007.



Note: In LDA analysis, the contribution value of a topic category in the CD corpus is the average contribution values of a category either in 2001-2009 or 2009-2015.

Figure 4.1 Topic change pre/post 09 in the CD

Figure 4.1 introduces the shift of topic categories in the CD before and after the 2009 Riots, from macro- and micro-perspective. It is notable that not many topics in news articles deal with social security issues after 2009, even if the number of articles rises. LDA analysis (the right graph) shows that Chinese journalists cover the government's acts to curb terrorism in the articles about social security. For instance, they write in an article about restoring social order:


¹¹Values in the LDA analysis is the contribution value of topic categories in a corpus by calculating the average contribution values of a topic category.

Contribution value of a topic category= contribution value of topic 1+... + value of topic n

Contribution value of topic 1= (contribution value of topic 1 in 2001+... + value in 2015)/ 15

"The importance and urgency in ensuring Xinjiang social order should be fully learned, and the fight against separatism and terrorism in the region is a long-term and acute task," said Zhou, who was visiting the region on behalf of President Hu (CD, 13th July 2009)¹².

In the NYT, the rise of categories about conflicts (e.g. violence/terrorism) after the Xinjiang Riots of 2009 is evident in two graphs in Figure 4.2, in contrast to the decrease in international affairs. From LDA analysis (see the right graph), the category of ethnic relation rises dramatically. The discourse of violent or terroristic acts in which Chinese Muslims get involved rises at the discourse level, while the number of articles drops slightly after 2009. This variation means terrorism and violent actions have frequent occurrences across articles. Additionally, the topic of Muslim protesters is essential in the 15-year coverage of Chinese Muslims, with some emblematic persons such as Kadeer Rebiya, Ilham Tohti.



Note: In LDA analysis, the contribution value of a topic category in the NYT corpus is the average contribution values of a category respectively 2001-2009 or 2009-2015.

Figure 4.2 Topic change pre/post 09 in the NYT

The next section will give an overview of how Muslim groups are constructed in the topic categories previously discussed. It should be noted that every category of topics contributes to the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims. Chapter 4 only addresses

¹² China Daily (2009, 13 July). "Senior leader highlights stability in Xinjiang".

topic categories relevant to the portrayal of Chinese Muslims as a Chinese social group in the two newspapers.

1.2 Chinese Muslims as an ingroup in CD

In *China Daily*, Chinese Muslims as a specific social minority in China (i.e. the majority of Chinese Muslims) is contextualised in the topic categories of Muslim cultures, Islam as a religion and community affairs. Within the three topic categories, Chinese Muslim groups are categorised as ingroup in the broadsheet.

1.2.1 Chinese Muslim as liberal Muslims before 2009

Chinese Muslims as liberal Muslims are underscored in the coverage before Urumqi Unrest in 2009, and journalists describe them as devout Muslim disciples with open-mindedness to non-Muslim society. The portrayal of liberal Muslims is contextualised mostly in two topic categories - culture and religion. From Figure 4.1 above, the topics about cultural and religious aspects of Muslims have a significant proportion in the CD corpus. The significance lies, primarily, in the pre-09 dataset (the CD1 corpus). Muslim culture and Islam indicate the uniqueness of Muslim communities.

Culture¹³, the topic category has a high frequency in the corpus. Seen from Table 4.1 above, 16.1% of 747 articles are in this group (from headline analysis), with the contribution value in the discourse of 0.11 (from LDA analysis). Such numbers are above the average of 9.09% (0.09). This category collects topics that focus on Muslims in a specific culture, such as history, arts, customs. In the CD, extracted both from headline analysis and LDA analysis, the prominent topics include local food (e.g. “naan”, “dish”, “noodle”), arts (e.g. “painting”, “Dolan” and “Uyghur music Nominated for UNESCO status” (CD, 27th April 2005) and history. Indicated by headline analysis, landscapes in Xinjiang are significant in the CD, which is exemplified by an article “Journey to the west” (5th May 2010).

Islam as a religion, the specific category is also quite re-occurring in the corpus. 8.84 % of the articles in the CD and its contribution value of 0.12 are higher than the average. This topic category in the CD corpus collects topics that focus on Islam as a

¹³ The term is bolded and indicates the context in which Chinese Muslims are represented.

religion, especially religious practices and figures of Islam. Typical articles are “Female imam a first for Ningxia” (25th Aug. 2003) and “Chinese Pilgrims to haj hit record” (19th Jan. 2006). The indicators include “prayer”, “imam”, “pilgrim”, “mecca”, “haj”. (also see Appendix 1)

The next two sub-sections will discuss in detail how Chinese Muslims are depicted as liberal Muslims in the discourse of Muslim religion and culture.

1.2.1.1 Muslims devout to Muslim culture and open to the world

Chinese Muslims are portrayed as loyal to Muslim culture and Islamic doctrine and open to the non-Muslim world in the CD, primarily by the coverage of religious practice and Muslim food. The term “Muslim” is closely collocated with “food”, “cuisine” and “tradition”. Important collocates of the item “Muslim (s)” is listed in Appendix 3. Plus, *China Daily* has emphasised not only the speciality of Muslim culture but its significance in Chinese society. In the following part, I will discuss how Chinese Muslims are delineated in the discourse of Muslim culture.

The next two examples are typical to show how Chinese Muslims are represented in the discourse of Muslim culture and religion. In Example 1, a large number of Chinese Muslims celebrate Corban Festival, a religious festival for ethnic Muslims in China. The example was taken from headline analysis.

Example 1

[1] Millions of Chinese Muslims celebrated the Corban Festival, or Eid al-Adha, on Sunday. [...]

Local Muslims, who enjoy a five-day holiday for the festival, shook hands with one another and expressed good wishes. [...]

"The Corban Festival is one of the most important festivals for us Muslims," said Ma Zhongyu, an ethnic Hui in Yinchuan. He attended the ritual with his 9-year-old son. (CD, 11st Oct. 2012)¹⁴.

¹⁴ China Daily (2012, 11 October). “Chinese Muslims head for Mecca”.

Consistent with the portrayal of liberal Muslims in the CD corpus, the writer symbolises liberal Muslims in the context of celebrating religious festivals in Example 1. With numbers and general terms in the CD corpus, Chinese Muslims are seen as devout religious groups who pay attention to religious festivals and the maintenance of Islam. “Millions of Chinese Muslims” and “local Muslims” are used to indicate that religious festivals are celebrated by the whole Muslim society in China. And the writer writes that an adult Muslim teaches “his 9-year old son” that Corban is “one of the most important festivals to us Muslims”. The use of his 9-year old son instead of other children reveals the continuation of religious festivals, and thus the maintenance of Muslim culture is important to Muslims Chinese. Additionally, Muslims “celebrate”, “enjoy”, “sh(ake) hands with one another” and “express good wishes”. Especially indicated by the expressions of “shook hands with one another” and “expressed good wishes”, Chinese Muslims enjoy non-religious life during religious days. Such activities are undertaken by Non-Muslim Chinese during Chinese New Year.

Chinese Muslims as a liberal Muslim group is also revealed by their willingness in religious actions and non-religious behaviours. According to transitivity analysis, material and mental clauses are used in Example 1 and typical in the CD corpus to represent liberal Muslims. In Clause [1] in Example 1, “millions of Chinese Muslims” are an actor in the material process “celebrated”, which targets at the inanimate goal of “the Corban Festival”. They are given the power to decide whether or not they want to celebrate the “the Corban Festival”. With such phrasing, so, a great number of Chinese Muslims are expressed in celebrating Corban festival by the initiative. An alternative expression can lessen the initiative of Muslims, e.g. “the celebration of Corban festival”.

Open-mindedness is a symbol to group most Chinese Muslims out of being extreme. So liberal Muslims reflects the categorisation that they are a moderate ethnic group in China.

Similar to the previous extract, Example 2 is also an extract about liberal Muslims in the discourse of Muslim culture and religion. It is presented that Muslim restaurants are popular in China and non-Muslim Chinese could eat Halah food with their Muslim friends. Example 2 was taken from LDA analysis

Example 2

You can find Muslim restaurants in any Chinese city. In an international metropolis like Shanghai, there is local legislation ensuring the supply of Muslim food. You will also find that in factories, schools and government offices in China, Muslim cuisine is available wherever there are Muslims. If you attend a get-together with friends, [1] those present will all choose to have Muslim food even if only one of them is a Muslim. (CD, 8th Nov. 2009)¹⁵

Different from Example 1 focusing on internal communication among Muslims, Example 2 stresses opening Muslim culture to the non-Muslim world for the representation of liberal Muslims. “Food” and “restaurants”, from LDA analysis, indicate Muslims’ openness to the outside world generally in the CD. The writer in Example 2 describes that “Muslim restaurants” can be found “in any Chinese cities”, “in factories, schools and government offices” and generally “available where there are Muslims”. Muslim food is an emblem of its culture. Moreover, it is known that Halal food is usually cooked by Muslim communities in specific restaurants in China. So, the coverage of the prevalence of Muslim food around China indicates Muslims’ preservation of Muslim culture (i.e. devout Muslims). Besides, opening restaurants “in any Chinese city” implies the openness of Chinese Muslims to the non-Muslim world. They step out of Xinjiang to earn a living instead of staying in Muslim regions. Similar to Example 1, general terms “Muslim restaurants”, “Muslims” and so on have a presence in the sentence, by which commonality for Muslims to leave their hometown is revealed.

“Local legislation ensuring the supply of Muslim food” contributes to the prevalence of Muslim restaurants in Shanghai. Shanghai, labelled as an “international metropolis”, is imaginably full of business challenges, such as market and rent. The “local legislation” serves as a protection to the restaurants run by minority groups in a competitive market. It is the common sense that a government will not protect or help his enemies or lawless social groups. Possible to assume that ethnic Muslim are accepted by the Chinese

¹⁵ China Daily (2009, 08 November). “Full text of Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the Arab League”.

government as good citizens. Chapter 5 will elaborate on the relationship between Chinese Muslims and the CCP in the CD.

Food choices from non-Muslim Chinese indicate respect from non-Muslims to Muslim counterparts. If “one” ethnic Muslim appears among a group of friends, “those present will all choose to have Muslim food”. The express means that non-Muslim Chinese accept Halal food in Muslim restaurants. Besides, the writer stresses that non-Muslim Chinese accepts Muslim culture with willingness. Similar to Example 1, transitivity analysis shows that “those present” (i.e. a group of friends) are involved in the material process of “choose (ing) to”, targeting at “Muslim food”. Suggested by the “cline of dynamism” (Hasan, 1985), the expression indicates that a group of friends with ethnic Chinese Muslims are constructed as a powerful social actor in their activities. So, non-Muslim Chinese are willing to follow their Muslim friends and respect their culture. Non-Muslims’ initiative in acts can be lessened in other expressions, such as “having Muslim food is all agreed among a group of people”. All in all, the narrative of food choice indicates that most Chinese Muslims have been accepted by the social majority in China as friends, because of interactions in Muslim culture. The acceptance implies the representation of the group as liberal Muslims and a group similar to non-Muslim Chinese, denoting to the categorisations of moderate Muslims and Chinese citizens.

1.2.1.2 Muslims initiating intercultural communication

Ethnic Muslims as a liberal Muslim group is also elucidated in intercultural exchange, initiated by Muslims, between Muslim groups with Han Chinese and the outside world. Such discourse of Muslim culture also differentiates the majority of Chinese Muslims from fundamentalist and extreme Muslims, who are devoted to the revival of Islam and eliminate non-Muslim societies. Contrastively, similar to the previous section, they follow Islamic doctrines as well as actively interact with the dominant Han society, thus revealing their ingroup identity in *China Daily* and Chinese society.

The cultural exchange in modern time is revealed primarily in the prose of Muslim weddings, which has a high frequency in the corpus. The number of occurrences was extracted from collocation analysis of the item “Muslim” (see Appendix 3).

Example 3 is an interesting example to show the portrait of liberal Muslims in the discourse of Muslim weddings because a personal story is covered. The extract was taken from headline analysis, and it is written that some elements of western culture are integrated into a traditional Muslim wedding.

Example 3

When the couple entered the room, followed by two ring bearers, a 6-year-old boy and 4-year-old girl, their festive red and full Islamic design attire received warm praise and admiration, especially the elegant bridal gown and hijab.

"I seldom wear a cap. It is for very special occasions only," Zhe said. Having the ring bearers was the couple's own initiative, to bring some romance and Westernized modernity. (CD, 11th April 2012)¹⁶

The writer stresses the integration of Muslim culture with the world to depict them as liberal Muslims in Example 3, which agrees with many instances in the CD. In the extract, the “full Islamic design attire” and “elegant bridal gown and hijab” have received the “warm praise and admiration” from the wedding guests. Traditional Muslim culture is appreciated with positive presentations to reveal maintaining Muslim culture and people’s devotion to Islam.

It is also emphasised in this extract that Muslims start an interaction with non-Muslim societies. The writer describes the cultural preservation “for the special occasion” among Muslim young people. In the context of these sentences, “Zhe”, the groom, is “a Muslim working at an IT company in Beijing”. By this information, Zhe keeps the Muslim identity only on special days. In other words, he gets customised to non-Muslim life, and so becomes a liberal Chinese Muslim.

To make the identity of liberal Muslims clearer, Zhe not only “seldom wears a cap”, but brings “some romance and Western modernity” into such a Muslim wedding. By “having the ring bearer” with “the couple’s own initiative”, the writer emphasises that young Chinese Muslims do not favour the revival of Islamic religion or eliminating non-

¹⁶ China Daily (2012, 11 April). “Traditional Muslim wedding with a twist”.

Muslim influences. Instead, they are open to western culture by actively incorporating into the wedding, rituals from a wedding ceremony of Christianity. The ritual of ring bearing is labelled as “romance” and “Western modernity”, in comparison with traditional Muslim “full Islamic design attire” and “bridal gown and hijab”. Young Chinese Muslims are treated as under Western cultural influences, and thus being liberal Muslims.

The portrayal of liberal Muslims here indicates the ingroup identity of ethnic Muslims to the CD. Having ring bearing for romance in wedding ceremony their inclusiveness of Christianity and so they are categorised as moderate Muslims. Moreover, the specification of influence from Western culture indicates the similarity between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese. The categorisation of Chinese Muslims as Chinese citizens is then stressed in the extract.

Another focus in the discourse of Muslim culture is a historical linkage between ethnic Muslims and Chinese society. The communication between Muslims and Chinese society in history is supposed to prove that Chinese Muslims are liberal Muslims for ages. Example 4 typifies the portrayal of liberal Muslims in such cultural talk, extracted from LDA analysis. It is written that cultural exchange between Muslims (i.e. Arabic) and Chinese dates to the Tang dynasty.

Example 4

With the permission of the Tang (AD 618-907) and Song (960-1127) dynasties, [1] Arabs and Persians established communities in the cities of Guangzhou, Yangzhou, Quanzhou, Hangzhou, Chang'an, Kaifeng, and Luoyang. Abiding by Chinese laws, they kept their religion but **intermarried** with Chinese. (CD, 12th May 2009)¹⁷

Similar to many other instances in the CD corpus, the portrayal of liberal Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of Muslims' continuous integration with Chinese society. By the general term of “Arabs and Persians”, the writer denotes to the whole Muslim world in the ancient time instead of individuals. General terms are a typical linguistic feature in

¹⁷ China Daily (2009, 12 May). “China’s Muslims date back to Tang era”.

picturing liberal Muslims in this Chinese newspaper. Moreover, their acts are stressed for the construction of liberal Muslim identities. From “establish(ing) communities” in many big cities (e.g. “Guangzhou”), Muslims have been living with non-Muslims since the Tang and Song. The cotext of this example also reveals trading with Chinese as an important activity Muslims performed in the Tang. Establishing communities in China and doing business with non-Muslims in history indicate their interactions with non-Muslim society in history.

The majority of Chinese Muslims are presented to have not only initiative but a habit of communicating with Chinese society in the example, which could be found in other instances in the corpus. The writer in Example 4 narrates the preservation of Islam as Muslims’ convention to reveal the identity of devout Muslims (cf. the previous examples), and “they kept their religion” is a typical indicator. More importantly, the writer also emphasises that Arabs and Persians are quite active in integrating with Chinese society in history, so nowadays ethnic Muslims are liberal Muslims. With transitivity analysis in Clause [1] in Example 4, “Arabs and Persians” are portrayed to “establish” (the material process) “communities” (an inanimate target). They are constructed as a powerful actor in the happening, and thus establishing communities are their choices. Alternative expressions can decrease power of these people, such as “the communities were established by Arabs and Persians” or “the establishment of communities by Arabs and Persians”. By another act of “kept... intermarried with Chinese”, integration with non-Muslim Chinese is presented as a continuation and a habitus for Muslim communities. Chinese Muslims have been formulated based on continuous communication with non-Muslim Chinese. An alternative expression, such as “they intermarried Chinese”, expresses the case of intermarriage in Tang and Song.

The projected acts are features of the categorisation of the person (Jayyusi, 1984). In the extract, Muslims’ continuous and active interaction with non-Muslim Chinese here indicates Chinese Muslims as moderate Muslims. The intercultural communication between Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese, especially intermarriage, indicates them as increasingly similar to non-Muslim Chinese. Therefore, they are categorised as moderate Muslims.

Government is another important role for picturing Muslims as liberal Muslims in the CD. The portrayal of the Chinese government indicates the ingroup membership categorisations of Chinese Muslims – good Chinese citizens and moderate Muslims. In Example 4, by “with the permission” and “abiding by Chinese law”, Muslim immigrants are described to be helped by the government to build their communities, to keep their Islamic religion and to get married to non-Muslim Chinese. The help to Muslims in history indicates that the Chinese government has accepted the citizenship of Chinese Muslims for a very long time. Treating most Chinese Muslims as citizens and offering help are traditions of the Chinese government.

To summarise, the portrayal of the majority of Chinese Muslims as liberal Muslims are contextualised in the discourse of Muslim culture and religion. Such discourse is salient in the CD, especially in the post-09 dataset. Ethnic Muslims are loyal to Muslim culture and open to the non-Muslim world, which is a convention for Chinese Muslim groups. This portrayal of Chinese Muslims indicates them as an ingroup in *China Daily*, especially as moderate Muslims in China (cf. Chan, 2014). This finding is opposite to the pejorative narrative about Muslim culture and Islam in Western media – barbaric and backward Muslims. Alternatively, as is identified in social media, “Islam is inherently and inevitably brutal and violent” (p.137). Violence, aggression and crimes are related to Muslims (Baker et al. 2013). Interestingly, Hijab is just a cultural symbol in the current project, rather than representing the suppression of Muslim women in the work of Al-Hejin (2015) and Baker et al. (2013). The findings are also different from Zheng (2011), which claims that the coverage of Muslim culture in Chinese newspapers increases after 2009 Urumqi Unrest as a tactical response to the governmental policies. Further, findings in the current project reveal that the topics of Chinese Muslim history and religion are prominent in the CD, which is different from results in Zheng’s study — the extensive coverage of Muslim culture.

1.2.2 Chinese Muslim group in China as modern Chinese after 2009

Chinese Muslims are portrayed as modern Chinese Muslims in CD’s coverage of ethnic Muslims, especially after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009. As will be shown in the section, modern Muslims mean Muslims’ acceptance of modern ideas, the convergence to Han

culture(e.g. hardworking spirit) and acknowledgement by the non-Muslim world. Such a portrayal of ethnic Muslims in China is contextualised in the discourse of **community affairs and Muslims with social achievements**.

This portrayal of modern Chinese Muslims is first contextualised in the topic category of **community affairs**. From headline analysis and LDA analysis, this topic category is more important in the post-09 (the CD2) than in the pre-09 dataset (the CD1) (see Figure 4.1 in Section 1.1). From Table 4.1 above, 6.43% of 747 articles are in this group, and the topic's contribution value is 0.08. The number almost agrees with the average value. The topic category has a relative frequency in the CD corpus. Journalists especially have covered life stories of successful Muslim individuals and working Muslim females for the circulation of modern Chinese Muslims. The sample articles in the corpus include "The Navy's Latest Wave" (28th July 2014) and "Disabled Man opens Barbecue Stall Despite All Odds" (16th Sept. 2015). The membership categorisation is opposite to the image of British Muslims in Baker et al. (2013). They claim that "As with the British Muslim community's relationship to the 'wider community' in Britain, the Muslim world here is characterised regarding poor relations with the West" (p. 130).

The discourse of **people with social achievements** is highlighted, which reveals Chinese Muslims as citizens. From news participant analysis, Muslim individuals such as businessman (e.g. Alim Amat), photographers (e.g. Kurbanjan Samat), Uyghur farmers (e.g. Hashim Dawut), students (e.g. Adili Maimaitiure) have a high frequency in the CD dataset. Chinese Muslims with social achievements account for 3.24% of the total 1,202 Chinese news participants in the CD corpus (see Table 4.3 above). The in-depth qualitative analysis here suggests that their ethnicity is usually specified, such as "the 33-year-old Uyghur photographer" (see Example 5) or "22-year-old Uyghur ethnic Zulnumar" (see Example 6). Actions of these model citizens are highlighted. Their inspirational stories are foregrounded. Moreover, *CD* emphasises their advocacy of the friendly relationship between Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese and their denouncing of Uyghur terrorism.

1.2.2.1 Successful and hard-working Muslims

Stories of hard-working and successful Chinese Muslims first and foremost elucidate how Muslims were represented as modern Chinese after 2009. Example 5

illustrated an inspirational story of Kurbanjan, and especially his endeavours to become a famed photographer in China and fights against the stereotypes of Uyghur Muslims. Kurbanjan is a frequently occurring Chinese Muslim with social achievements in data.

Example 5

[1] "You might be thought of as a barbecue operator, nut cake vendor, or even dangerous person by some people if you're from Xinjiang," the 33-year-old Uyghur photographer and documentary filmmaker says [...] ¹⁸

[2] People like **Kurbanjan** ¹⁹want to show the real lives of Xinjiang people and make others better understand this multicultural region. [...]

[3] With a Chinese and English version well received. [...]

[4] "Why can't people understand that a few bad apples cannot represent all Uyghurs, and Uyghurs cannot represent all of Xinjiang?" he asked. [...]

[5] He travelled to 20 cities to photograph and interview about 500 Xinjiangers including doctors, celebrities, street vendors and thieves. [...]

[6] A student from Clemson University wrote him a note: "Allow me to say thanks. (CD, 13 Oct. 2015)²⁰

Implied from the sentences in Example 5 above, Kurbanjan is a self-reliant, hardworking and open-minded individual conquering difficulties, and having a contribution to Chinese society. Such description follows the pattern of portraying Muslims as modern Chinese in the post-09 CD corpus, which reveals their ingroup membership categorisations.

The semantic properties in this extract reveal how Kurbanjan is constructed as a modern Chinese. The social stereotype of Xinjiang people in [1] (e.g. "a barbecue operator, nut cake vendor and even dangerous person") motivates "people like Kurbanjan" to change social reality. Based on the above difficulties, he films a documentary to "show the real

¹⁸ [...] indicates that parts of omitted texts in a news article.

¹⁹ The **bold** word is a search word in corpus.

²⁰ China Daily (2015, 13 October). "A Uyghur photographer's fight against regional stereotype".

lives of Xinjiang people” and a “multicultural region” [2]. Clearly to see from the solution that he uses a modern way in mass media to overcome hardship. Additionally, his viewpoints about Chinese Muslims are positive and in agreement with the voices from the CCP (see Chapter 5). In his words, the majority of Chinese Muslims are not “dangerous people”[1]. He argues that “a few apples cannot represent all Uygurs” [4]. Third, Kurbanjan is represented as a hard-working individual for his work. “He travelled to 20 cities to photograph” and “interview(ed) about 500 Xinjiangers” [5] with different professions. With this information, he uses his hard work to fight against difficulties. Finally, the consequence of his behaviours shows modernity. His work is “well-received” around the world [3]. And it has unfolded to young international audiences a different view of Chinese Muslims. “A student from Clemson University” “say(s) thanks” to Kurbanjan [6]. Releasing the documentary of multicultural Muslim communities to the western world has revealed the internationalisation of most Chinese Muslims. In the opposite case, he will not target the western market or display multiculturalism in the documentary.

Why does the portrait of a modern Chinese insinuate his ingroup categorisation in the CD? As aforesaid, modernity is revealed by acts of Kurbanjan, i.e. his acceptance of modern viewpoints, hard work and the acknowledgement by the international film market. Such activities are positively described, such as “show(ing) real life of Xinjiang people”, indicate ingroup identities of modern Chinese Muslims in *China Daily*.

Some typical linguistic features are used to portray Kurbanjan as a modern Chinese Muslim. First, the writer has used the stereotype “a barbecue operator, nut cake vendor or even dangerous person” to contextualise the documentary making. According to Wodak’s topos in Chapter 3, the topos of reality positions Kurbanjan’s film shooting as to correct stereotypes of Uyghur Muslims in China. The application of such a modern method is thus situated at the righteous side, which elucidates an ingroup identity of Kurbanjan in *CD*.

Second, Kurbanjan “travelled to 20 cities” and “interviewed about 500 Xinjiangers”. Numbers evidence how he has made efforts to film the documentary about multicultural and moderate Muslims.

Third, Kurbanjan is portrayed to conduct different types of self-initiative activities that present his self-reliance and energy for intercultural communication. In Clause [4], for instance, “he” is a sayer in the verbal process of “asked”, which is followed by a rhetorical question marked by “why can’t people understand [...]”. He is constructed as a powerful party in this verbal action, and, simply put, he wants to challenge the over-generalisation of Chinese Muslims. This rhetorical question, marked in this example, also indexes the stark difference between Kurbanjan and Chinese Muslims and “a few bad apples”. Generally, the writer uses words from Kurbanjan to express that most Chinese Muslims are good Muslims. Moreover, Kurbanjan is presented to be involved in activities of filming documentaries, insinuating that he is hardworking and enthusiastic. In Clause [5], “he” plays the role of an actor in the material process “travelled”, which targets at the inanimate goal of “20 cities”. He is constructed as a powerful actor in this example, which is similar to previous examples. He is willing to travel around China in order to observe the authentic life of Chinese Muslims and collect their voices. We can imply that Kurbanjan is quite enthusiastic about making the film to break the stereotype of Chinese Muslims. Such a sentence can be expressed passively to lessen his willingness in travelling to 20 cities. All in all, by actively challenging social stereotypes and travelling to many cities, Kurbanjan is represented as a self-initiative Chinese Muslims who endeavours to correct false views in society. The emphasis on his passion reinforces that Chinese Muslims with modern viewpoints are ingroups in the broadsheet.

Regarding the context in the example, personal efforts [5], difficulties in life (e.g. [1] and [4]) and the influence of one’s success (e.g. [3] and [6]) are typical in representing Muslims as modern Chinese in the discourse of successful Muslim individuals. The assistance from the Chinese government and Muslims’ support of CCP is an additional topic in the portrayal of modern Chinese Muslims. For instance, *CD* journalists stress that “[Premier]Wen asked Hashim Dawut about the reconstruction of his village”²¹ in a news article about a successful Uyghur farmer. *CD* disseminates voices of the CCP, so both topics denote to Muslims Chinese as good Chinese citizens.

²¹ China Daily (2009, 17 September). “Wen’s three meetings with Uyghur farm Hashim Dawut”.

1.2.2.2 Self-reliant Muslim women

CD journalists highlight the self-reliance and career development of **Chinese Muslim females** to index the modernity of ethnic Muslims in China. Chinese Muslim women have a frequent occurrence in the CD. Collocation analysis reveals that “Muslim” is frequently and closely paired with “women”, and “Muslims” are closely paired with “females” (see Appendix 3).

Chinese Muslim women are illustrated as working women in modern China for ingroup identities in the newspaper. They are distinguished from the veiled Muslim females, who are locked away from the non-Muslim world and persecuted by Muslim men in society. Instead, Muslim women are similar to non-Muslim Chinese females, who are known as independent working women (Economist, 2011). The homogeneity reveals the engagement of Chinese Muslim women into mainstream society. Therefore, the portrait of modern Muslim women indicates that they are moderate and good Chinese citizens.

Example 6 is typical in reporting of a self-reliant Muslim female in China, retrieved from the topic category of community affairs. In the example, Tursu is an Uyghur woman who becomes a Muslim attendant in the first bullet train in Xinjiang.

Example 6

As the first high-speed railway between Lanzhou and Urumqi is expected to officially operate at the end of the year, [1], 22-year-old Uygur ethnic Zulnumar Tursu feels lucky to be one of the attendants to be able to board her hometown’s very first high-speed train. [...]

Tursu and her team have received training from the Urumqi Railway Bureau and will be sent to receive further schooling from high-speed train operators.

Working as a long-distance train attendant means less time to spend at home. [2] Tursu used to work three consecutive days and then take a three-day break. She feels relieved that [4] her boyfriend supports and [5] understands her working

hours. “He loves me as a person, not my profession.” She said. (*CD*, June 5th, 2014)²²

Consistent with other instances in the *CD* to portray modern Muslims, different actions of the Uyghur woman are covered in Example 6. In the first paragraph, Tursu expresses her luck to be the attendant in Chinese speedy train. Speedy trains are owned by a giant state-owned company, which can symbolise mainstream Chinese society. So, Tursu is delighted to work in mainstream Chinese society. Besides, the writer makes it explicit that Tursu feels lucky in communicating with Chinese society with the initiative. With transitivity analysis, in Clause (1), Tursu is a sensor in the mental process of “feels”, which is targeted at “lucky” in the job “one of the attendants” in the speedy train. Tursu is constructed with power to feel delighted to work on the train is her choice. Her power decreases in other expressions, such as “it is lucky for Tursu to be one of the attendants”. From Tursu’s happiness in the job, she is constructed to be pleased to become an independent working woman. Also, from the expectation to work in Chinese society same as non-Muslim counterparts, the writer draws an analogy between this Chinese Muslim woman and non-Muslim Chinese females. We can thus imply that the writer categorises her as a moderate Chinese citizen with Muslim ethnicity and an ingroup member to *CD*.

The next two paragraphs illustrate her past, present and future working experience — “having received training”, “used to work three consecutive days” and “will be sent to receive further schooling”. The expressions strengthen her identity as a modern Muslim by uncovering the continuity of being a working woman. More than that, the use of material clauses in which Tursu plays an actor decodes that it is her choice to become a working woman. For instance, in “Tursu used to work three consecutive days” in Clause [2]. “Tursu” is an actor in the material process of “work”, targeting at the scope “three consecutive days”. This expression represents Tursu as a powerful party in the happening, so we can imply that she wants to work three consecutive days. This material clause can be expressed otherwise, such as “three consecutive days’ of work”, but her initiative in action will be lessened. Collectively, Tursu is represented as a working woman with the freedom to decide her working hours, and so having self-reliance and a modern mentality. In relation

²² China Daily (2014, 05 June). “Uygur woman ‘lucky’ to work on hometown’s 1st bullet train”.

to the previous discussion, she is thus grouped into the majority of Chinese working females and a moderate and ordinary Chinese citizen.

The relation of Muslim men to modern Muslim women does not frequently occur in the CD. However, the talk about Muslim men in Example 6 constitutes modern Muslim male groups. Her boyfriend “supports and understands her working hours”. In Clause [4], the mental processes “supports” and “understands” and sensors “her boyfriend” decode that he plays a powerful sensor in the feeling of supporting and understanding. In other words, the expression assigns his initiative to support and understand her girlfriend, which indicates egalitarian perceptions about genders. The modern view of egalitarianism groups him as moderate Chinese Muslims and ingroups in *CD*.

Chinese Muslim women are represented as modern Muslims, opposite of victimised Muslim women in the western media. Chinese Muslims are not “described in negative terminology. They are neither narrated with repression or constraint nor simply labelled as backward, ‘un-Western’ illiberal and hence undesirable” (Richardson, 2004: 90). They are not imposed on wearing a veil. The veil or headscarf are not seen as the barrier for Muslim females to communicate with the outside world (cf. Al-Hejin, 2015; Baker et al., 2013; Williamson, 2014). The newspaper does not emphasise Chinese Muslim women as the victims of violence either (cf. Mishra, 2007).

1.3 Chinese Muslims as an outgroup in The NYT

In the NYT corpus, the topic categories about conflicts (i.e. response to terrorism/ violence, terrorist violence, social security and ethnic tension) and international affairs (especially the Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo Bay) are prominent (see Table 4.1 in Section 1.1). The representation of Muslims in *The NYT* almost completely follows the typical media construction of Muslims in the West. Overall, Chinese Muslim communities are negatively portrayed in the dataset (cf. Baker et al. 2013; Said, 1997), i.e. having outgroup categorisations. Chinese Muslims are involved in violent, terroristic acts and conflicts (e.g. Richardson, 2004; Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). They are angry and resentful fundamentalists, posing threats to Western society (cf. Said, 1997). Also, there is a tense and difficult relationship between Chinese Muslims and the rest of China in the NYT, like

the relationship between British Muslims and non-Muslims in UK newspapers (Baker et al., 2013a).

1.3.1 Orientalisation of Chinese Muslims

Chinese Muslims as the ‘Oriental others’ in *The NYT* is a portrayal of the majority of Chinese Muslims before the Xinjiang Riots in 2009, which is contextualised in the topic category of **Muslim culture**. This category does not frequently occur in the NYT corpus, particularly in the post-09 corpus (see Table 4.1 in Section 1.1). However, it is related to the representation of Muslims before 2009 — Chinese Muslims are weird and backward others. Analogous to Muslims worldwide, there are contradictions between Chinese Muslims and the Western world. Similar to the claim in Baker et al. (2013: 256), Chinese Muslims are “the monolithic Islam, indistinguishable from within and different from those outside”. Simply put, Chinese Muslims are constructed as an outgroup in *The NYT*. From the dataset, the newspaper emphasises tourism in Xinjiang (i.e. the Northwestern province in China with a large Muslim population). Especially, Islamic food is emphasised, with examples of “A trip back in time on the Silk Road” (NYT, 12th May 2009), “hotel”, “desert”, “trip”. It is further identified from topic modelling that the topic of local food (e.g. “naan”, “dish”) is essential in discourse. These topics reveal exotic features of Chinese Muslims and their living regions, further indicating mysteriousness of such social group. Such a portrait agrees with Said’s (1997) findings of Muslims in the American press, i.e. Muslims are represented as Orientals.

Journalists of *The NYT* also emphasise backwardness in Chinese Muslim culture, manifesting the use of the outcasting strategy of Orientalisation (Lazar & Lazar, 2004) in representing the majority of Chinese Muslims. This discursive strategy focuses on the “strange, aberrant and inferior” features of Them in contrast to the “normal, virtuous and superior” (p.234) image of Us, i.e. the West.

Example 7 is a perfect example of how Oriental Muslims are portrayed in the discourse of Muslim culture. Taken from headline analysis, the example presented the travelling experience to buy a train ticket from Xinjiang to Beijing in 2006. It seemed impossible for a foreigner to buy a train ticket with Chinese Muslim ticket officers.

Example 7

Then the ticket clerk pronounced the two syllables that every traveller in China dreads: “Mei you.” The literal translation is “don’t have,” but the phrase can imply anything from “That simply does not exist” to “I’m afraid of foreigners; [1] maybe one of my braver colleagues will step forward to help you.” (NYT, 2nd Aug 2006)²³

The portrayal of Chinese Muslims as an Oriental group (i.e. barbaric, outdated) in the NYT is common in the topic category of Muslim culture, especially before 2009. Such a portrayal of Muslims reveals that they are seen as Them in the newspaper. In Example 7, the short answer “Meiyou” from a ticket office in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) denotes Muslims’ closed mentality to other Chinese. These syllables make “every traveller in China dread”, and non-Muslim Chinese are scared by their Muslim counterparts.

Oriental Others are further embodied by narrating Muslims’ behaviours in the corpus. In Example 7, the exclusiveness of foreigners is stressed. “I [the Muslim ticket officer] am afraid of foreigners” presents explicitly her fear of foreigners, different from the portrayal of Chinese Muslims in the CD in the proceeding discussion. That is, they are open-minded to the non-Muslim world (see Section 1.2). Back to Example 7, moreover, the details of “one of my braver colleagues” and “step forward” construe fear from Muslims. Helping a foreign customer is something which requires bravery, instead of a part of her work. Even a “braver” man needs to “step forward”. Thus, in the view of the officer, helping a foreigner is not an easy task for her Muslim colleagues.

The Muslim officer views that help should be performed with willingness, and it is very hard. In his words, “one of my braver colleagues” is an actor in the material process of “step(ing) forward”. The writer, with such expression, gives a potential helper the power in action. It is implied that, in the view of this Muslim ticket officer, helping a foreigner should be realised by the decision of a potential helper. Moreover, it is not easy to find

²³ The New York Times (2006, 2 August). “On a people’s train from Urumqi to Beijing”

such a helper in her views. The difficulty is explicated by the modal verbs “maybe” and “will” and the epistemic activity in Clause [1]. “Maybe” is a modal verb meaning low “probability” in the implicit subjective way. The use of “Will” indicates the progress of the activity (Dunmire, 2010). As such, the Muslim clerk perceives that there is a low possibility for a brave man to “step forward”. Generally, Muslim officer uses “Meiyou” to reveal that none of the Muslim ticket officers can help a foreigner with a ticket, which indexes that the whole Chinese Muslims population is quite backward in connecting to the world.

The writer does talk about exotic things during the trip in the cotext. For instance, an Uyghur man plays folk songs on the train, and the writer wanders in “modern Urumqi”. However, negative information at the beginning of the article (i.e. Example 7) outweighs positive message elsewhere. The news article thus foregrounds the exclusiveness and backwardness of Muslim communities. Being out of sync with the modern world is often the portrayal of Muslims in British and American media discourse (Moore et al. 2008; Shahin, 2016). The picture indicates Muslims as terrorists. In the words of Shahin’s words (2016: 226), “their backward mentality is at least partly responsible for breeding radicalism, even terrorism in Muslim society. Therefore, the portrayal of Chinese Muslims as backwards and exclusive Oriental others indicate that they are bad Muslims, i.e. fundamentalists and threats to the non-Muslim world.

2 Important attitudes in the coverage of Chinese Muslims

Attitudinal features in discourse can reveal how discourse producers conceptualize social reality based on the group-specific attitudes and knowledge about the similar issues, and this has been introduced van Dijk’s framework (1998a, 2006b) (also see 3.2 in Chapter 3). The discourse of different types of attitudes in the CD and the NYT also contributes to the ideological portrayal of Chinese Muslims in the two newspapers. In methodology in Chapter 3, attitudinal features in the corpora were generated from key semantic category (SMC) analysis with log-likelihood (LL) test. Common and uncommon attitudinal SMC between two corpora were collected. Based on the analysis, frequent-occurring items in each SMC were examined in concordance lines. Appendix 2 lists frequently-occurring

items in each key attitudinal SMC, i.e. those significantly different from the comparison corpus.

This section will report the attitudinal features in the CD and the NYT in a quantitative manner. The section will then move to the portrayal of most Chinese Muslims in the discourse of these attitudes, such as the discourse of joy. Like the previous section, any discussion pertaining to the Muslim-CCP relationship and Chinese Muslim terrorism will be discussed in the next two chapters.

The findings cover the frequency of 1) positive and negative attitudes and 2) the most similar and different attitudes in various newspaper datasets. The result was retrieved from quantitative semantic domain analysis of 30 attitudinal SMCs (30 positives and 30 negative sub-categories) in the corpora and sub-corpora. The findings cover the significantly uncommon ($k \geq |15.13|$) and common (p close to 1) attitudinal SMCs between corpora. Section 2.1 and 2.2 will reveal the general attitudinal features in the corpora. The next sections will showcase how Chinese Muslims as a community are portrayed with these attitudes. The common and uncommon attitudinal SMCs and frequently occurring markers are listed in Appendix 2.

2.1 Overall attitudinal features in the CD vs the NYT

The finding suggests that *China Daily* and *The New York Times* have a divergent tone in the news on Chinese Muslims in the last 15 years (see Table 4.2 below). From the frequency of evaluative markers (i.e. word and multiword expressions), positive words/multiword expressions are overwhelmingly used in the CD, while negative items are used in the NYT corpus. In terms of the positive attitudes, 10,533 items are identified in the CD corpus in contrastive to 5,748 in the NYT data. The 30 negative subcategories have 8,881 markers in the NYT corpus, compared with 7,500 items in the CD (see Table 4.2 below). Such a feature is just in conformation to the noticeable difference in Chinese and American media discourse — good vs bad news (Tong & Sparks, 2009; Wu & Ng, 2011). However, some positive attitudes are also overwhelmingly used in *The NYT*, and some negative attitudes are marked in the *CD* news.

Table 4.2 Attitudinal markers in the CD and NYT corpus

	CD	NYT	<i>k</i>
Positive items	10,533	5,748	329.38
Negative items	7,500	8,881	943.81

Note: if *k* value is larger than the critical value of |15.13|, there is a significant difference between two frequency numbers. The level of difference varies with *k* value.

In the CD corpus, nine (out of 30) positive SMCs are prominent in relation to the NYT, the *k* value of which is generally larger than 18 ($k \geq 15.13$). The SMCs are Good (e.g. “good”, “improve”), Authentic (e.g. “authentic”, “proper”), Beauty (e.g. “beautiful”, “charm”), Like (e.g. “enjoy”, “popular”), Happy (e.g. “celebrate”, “happy”), Important (e.g. “important”, “major”), Successful (e.g. “success”, “solve”), Excitement/energy (e.g. “interest”, “active”), Ability/intelligence (e.g. “fluent”, “capable”), Safety (e.g. “safety”, “safe”) and Bravery (e.g. “courage”, “heroic”). From such recurrent attitudinal features, positive emotions and the attitude of success are significant in the *CD*’s coverage of Chinese Muslims. The attitudinal markers include “happy”, “smile”, “love”, “enjoy”, “excited”, “develop”, “improve”, “successful”. The negative attitudes of unluck (e.g. “unfortunately”, “unlucky”), insensibility (e.g. “irresponsible”, “ridiculous”) and selfishness (e.g. “boast”, “arrogance”) are significant in the corpus. The latter discussion will inform that the ideological representations of the majority of Muslims as ingroup in *CD* are contextualised in the discourse of these attitudes.

Ten (out of 30) negative SMCs ($k > 19$) and three positive categories ($k > 27$) are outstanding in the NYT corpus in comparison with the CD. All negative categories and the items reveal that the attitudes of conflict, tense relations or hatred are focused on *The NYT*’s coverage about Chinese Muslims. They are Violent/angry (e.g. “violence”, “attack”), Worry (e.g. “tension”, “anxiety”), Inappropriate/unfriendly (e.g. “hostility”, “enemy”), Dislike (e.g. “resentment”, “grievance”), Dissatisfied (e.g. “frustration”, “discontent”), Fear/shock (e.g. “terror”, “fear”), Boring (e.g. “restive”, “reluctant”), Bad (e.g. “fatally”, “bad”) and Failed (e.g. “fail”, “lose”). The positive SMCs are True (e.g. “evidence”, “fact”), Free (e.g. “freedom”, “liberation”), Accurate (e.g. “right”, “properly”). Many types of negative attitudinal features function to construct Muslim terrorists in China, that is, a small group of Chinese Muslim protesters and dissident holders (see Chapter 6).

The significantly common attitudinal SMCs between the CD and the NYT are Safe, Brave, Unluck, Insensible and Selfish. The p -value of these categories is more significant than 0.81 (i.e. close to 1), so the SMCs show the most similar attitudes between the two news datasets. The recurrent items include “safe”, “brave”, “heroic”, “unfortunately”, “absurd”, “ridiculous”, “arrogant”, “brazenly”.

2.2 Attitudinal shift in the CD and the NYT

Substantial attitudinal markers are found in the CD2 (i.e. post-09 dataset) compared with the CD1 ($k = -353.29 \leq -15.13$). Comparing the CD1 (i.e. pre-09 dataset) and the CD2, we find that there is a stark increase of negative attitudes in the post-09 Chinese newspaper dataset see (Figure 4.3 below). Based on percentages of attitudinal markers in the respective dataset, 1.84%²⁴ of negative evaluative markers were identified in the CD2 in contrast with 0.9%²⁵ in the CD1. The k value is -649.21 from LL test. The calculations for such are explained in footnotes. The percentage suggests more negative coverage about Chinese Muslims in CD after the Xinjiang Riots than before 2009. On the other hand, the news coverage follows the tradition of positive reporting, and the percentage of positive attitudes in the CD1 and the CD2 remains the same.

The NYT1 (i.e. pre-09 dataset) and the NYT2 (i.e. post-09 dataset) have the similar number of attitudinal markers ($k=-3.3$). In the NYT corpus (also see the following figure), the attitudinal change between the NYT 1 and the NYT2 presents a dramatic growth of negativity and decline of positivity. The percentage of positive items in the respective sub-corpus drops from 1.81%²⁶ in the NYT1 to 1.54%²⁷ in the NYT2 ($k=33.47$), while the negative items rise to 2.62%²⁸ in the NYT2 ($k=-50.63$).

²⁴ 1.84%=6,078/330,878

(Percentage of negative attitudes in the CD2=frequency of negative items in the CD2/ tokens of the CD2)

²⁵ 0.9% = 1,402/15,449

(Percentage of negative attitudes in the CD1=frequency of negative items in the CD1/ tokens of the CD1)

²⁶ 1.81%=1,974/109,127


(Percentage of positive attitudes in the NYT1= frequency of positive items in the NYT1/tokens of the NYT1)

²⁷ 1.54%=3,787/ 246,184

(Percentage of positive attitudes in the NYT2=frequency of positive items in the NYT2/tokens of the NYT2)

²⁸ 2.62%=6460/246,184

(Percentage of negative attitudes in the NYT2=frequency of negative items in the NYT2/tokens of the NYT2)



	CD1	CD2	<i>k</i>	NYT1	NYT2	<i>k</i>
Positive	2,798	6,398	-8.34	1,974	3,787	33.47
Negative	1,402	6,078	-649.21	2,422	6,460	-50.63
Total	4,200	12,476	-353.29	4,396	10,247	-3.31

Note: if *k* value is larger than the critical value of |15.13|, there is a significant difference between two frequency numbers. The level of difference varies with *k* values.

Figure 4.3 Attitudinal shifts in the CD and the NYT

In the comparison between pre-09 (i.e. the CD1) and post-09 (i.e. the CD2) datasets in the CD corpus, five negative SMCs lead to the increase of negative attitudes in the CD. The five attitudinal features are damaging (e.g. “destroy”, “victim”), violent or angry (e.g. “attack”, “violence”), fear or shock (e.g. “terror”, “fear”), dislike (e.g. “hatred”, “resentment”), difficult (e.g. “problem”, “challenge”). It should be mentioned, before a more detailed discussion in Chapter 6, that the portrayal of Muslim terrorists in China increases after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009.

In regards to the attitudinal change in the NYT, the rise of negativity in the post-09 dataset (i.e. the NYT2) results from the SMCs of violence and anger ($k=140.1 > 15.3$). In a sense, a negative portrayal of Chinese Muslims is more prominent in the sub-corpus. Frequently occurring markers in the category include “violence”, “attack”, “riot”. In the

pre-09 news dataset (i.e. the NYT1), two semantic categories are significant: the positive attitudes of being suitable (e.g. “eligible”, “appropriate”, “qualify”) and the negative personal trait of unfriendliness (e.g. enemy, hostility).

Some attitudinal SMCs are common between two pairs of sub-corpora in addition to the differences. Between the CD1 and the CD2, the categories of Selfish, and Avarice are similar (e.g. “take advantage”, “mean”). The SMCs of Useless and Avarice are common between the NYT 1 and the NYT2, signified by “covert”, “ineffective”, “useless”, “futile”.

2.3 Ingroup in CD: Pleasant and open-minded Chinese Muslims

This section will explain how Chinese Muslims are portrayed as a social group with attitudinal features and the relevant topics (e.g. ethnic relations).

2.3.1 Cheerful Chinese Muslims in China

China Daily frequently covers emotional satisfaction from Chinese Muslims or those having contact with the ethnic minority. This portrayal is contextualised in the discourse of **happiness and enjoyment** (e.g. “happy”, “enjoy”) from Chinese Muslims. As was mentioned in the previous section, Happiness and Preferences are key positive attitudinal SMCs in the CD, the k value of which respectively are 56.7 and 97.64 ($k \geq 15.13$, $p < 0.0001$). Moreover, the attitudinal features of Happiness and Like are related to the topic category of **ethnic relations** in most cases. The category collects topics about the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese. Figure 4.1 in Section 1 reveals that this topic category is moderately covered in the CD. 8.84% of 747 articles are headlined in relation to the ethnic relationship, and the contribution value of this topic category at the discourse level is 0.17. Both values are above average.

Muslims’ happiness and enjoyment are frequently signified by the items such as “happy”, “happily”, “enjoy” and “harmony” (see Figure 4.4 below). Concordance lines in the figure reveal that the ethnic minorities express their satisfaction mostly with the peaceful living environment and a healthy relationship with non-Muslim Chinese. Examples include expressions of “having a stable, peaceful happy life” in Line 1, “enjoying doing business in Kashgar” in Line 6, and “play(ing) with it with everyone happily anyway” in Line 8. Indeed, *China Daily* has emphasised Muslims’ joys in the discourse of a healthy

relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese. Headline analysis shows that typical articles include “Sweet fruit creates bonds of friendship” (CD, 3rd July 2014) and “Bridge to more respect” (CD, 18th Nov. 2011). This coverage of Chinese Muslims is supposed to promote social harmony between Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese. According to Chilton et al. (2010), social harmony in Chinese media discourse represents a political unity between the socially dominant and non-dominant groups. Furthermore, harmony and ecstasy of the Muslims reveal the ingroup membership categorisation of ethnic Muslims. They are pleasant and friendly to other Chinese societies, and that suggests their categorisations of Chinese citizens and a moderate Muslim ethnic group.

Pleasant Chinese Muslims are represented by voices from various sources. In Figure 4.4 below, there are voices from Chinese Muslims “I” in Line 4, Muslim business in Kashgar (Line 6) or “a local [non-Muslim] resident” (Line 1). Using voices from different sources for one argument is the strategy of appealing to the majority (Sahlane, 2015), which can help to authenticate the view that ethnic minorities live with joy under the CCP’s governance. Other typical linguistic features will be discussed in Example 8,9 and 10, taken from attitude analysis.

1 Xinjiang people will have a stable, peaceful and	happy	life," Liu Qun, a local resident, said. "There were ²⁹ (Example 9)
2 men in their 40s and 50s. "Only this age group is	happy	to do farm work in Xinjiang," Li said. "Cotton picture
3 le who are peace-loving citizens. "They were very	happy	, they were having complete religious independence (Example 8)
4 hose three countries, as well as in others. I was	happy	to see Vice-President Xi and the leaders of all
5 Mardan Mehmet never hesitates to show how	happy	he is. "I earn 5,000 yuan (\$777) a month, have (Example 10)
6 ought back home through Khanjar Port. "I really	enjoy	doing business in Kashgar. It is very important for
7 have never been any hatred between them. They were	enjoying	a peaceful life." Makhdoom said he had met man
8 shoebox stuffed with grass, but I played with it with everyone	happily,	anyway." In downtown Urumqi, the region's capital,

Figure 4.4 Sample concordance lines about Happiness and Enjoyment in the CD

Example 8 (see Line 3 in Figure 4.4 above) is a typical example to display pleasant Chinese Muslims in the discourse of happiness from Muslims. It is written that a Pakistani journalist appreciates Uyghur Muslims and presents his observations in Xinjiang during the frequent visits.

Example 8

Makhdoom kept visiting China for the past seven years, almost four or five times a year. "Every time I go to Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, I see **tremendous harmony** among the Uygurs and non-Muslim Chinese," he said. "There has never been any hatred between them. They were enjoying a peaceful life."

Makhdoom said he had met many Uygur people who are peace-loving citizens. "They were very **happy**"²⁹, they were having complete religious independence and religious freedom," he added. (CD, 12th July 2009)³⁰

Similar to what was discussed above, the portrayal of joyful Muslims in China is contextualised in the discourse of Muslims' cheerfulness in China in Example 8., indicated by "happy" and "harmony".

The writer uses voice from a Pakistani newspaper to reveal that Uyghurs live pleasantly and peacefully in China (i.e. "They were enjoying a peaceful life" and "they were very happy"). Specifically, there is a harmonious relationship between Uyghur Muslims and other Chinese citizens (i.e. "tremendous harmony among Uyghurs and non-Muslim Chinese"). Chinese Muslims can keep Islamic religion — "having complete religious independence and religious freedom". All the expressions of pleasant Muslims, (e.g. "having complete religious independence and religious freedom") indicate that they are good and moderate Muslims. To explain the portrayal from a socio-political perspective, *China Daily* is a propaganda tool of the Chinese government. Following the occurrence of riots (see the publishing time), it is necessary for *CD* to showcase that Chinese society is not in the chaos. In this manner, the extract displays a harmonious relationship between the social majority and minority. By stark contrast, the discussion later will show that harmony between Muslim and Han Chinese is challenged in the coverage from *The NYT*. The

²⁹ The **bold** words are attitudinal markers.

³⁰ China Daily (2009, 12 July) "Xinjiang riot well planned by foreign wire-pullers".

discussion will show that Chinese Muslims face social discrimination (see Section 2.4 below).

Many of the following strategies are reoccurring in the representation of Uyghur Muslims as a joyful group. First, the use of general terms (cf. Muslim culture in Section 1.2). “Uyghurs” and “many Uyghur people” serve as the emphasis sentiments of the whole Uyghur group, instead of individuals. Uyghurs are in “tremendous harmony among Uyghurs and non-Muslim Chinese”, which implies happiness.

Second, numbers (Wodak, 2001) appear in the introduction of Makhdoom and adds credibility to his viewpoints. His frequent visit (i.e. “almost four or five times a year”) and long-time service in Xinjiang (i.e. “for the past seven years”) demonstrate the substantial observation in the region and frequent communication with Uyghur Chinese. Such numbers ground “Happy” Muslims, “harmony”, “enjoying peaceful life”, since his empirical experience in China leads to the statement.

Third, the topos of advantage is used to explain pleasant ethnic Muslims. In Wodak (ibid., also see Section 2.1 in Chapter 3), such an argumentative strategy mainly deals with the continuation of actions beneficial to the majority of recipients (e.g. citizens). Such a strategy is also frequent in covering the relationship between the minority with CCP (see Chapter 5). In Example 8, Uyghur Muslims are covered to “have complete religious independence and religious freedom”, “enjoy a peaceful life” and the harmonious ethnic relationship with a non-Muslim Chinese majority, which means that they are benefits takers in Chinese society. It is well-known that religious freedom and peace are critical to Chinese Muslims. Therefore, what has been stressed in Example 8 reveals the portrayal of pleasant Chinese Muslims. The detailed explanation of Muslims’ happiness reveals a conventional way to construct ingroup in media discourse. Jayyusi (1984: 28) writes:

Often in political debates or polemics between different parties, the negatively implicative actions of the opponent are often deprived of explanation by-grounds and transformed instead into a feature of the opponent’s character ... while an exactly similar action by one’s own party is provided with an occasioned reason.

The identity of the information source in Example 8 strengthens the truthfulness of pleasant Uyghur Muslims in China (i.e. the local context in the extract). Makhdoom is a Pakistani newspaper chief and a Muslim. As a Muslim insider and outsider of Chinese domestic violence, it is common sense that Makhdoom has much more possibilities to

speak for Uyghur Muslims than for non-Muslim Chinese. He should be honest, whether ethnic Muslims are suppressed or kindly treated in China. Under such circumstances, Makhdoom's appreciation in Example 8 above reveals the fact that Uyghur Muslims are differentiated from dangerous rioters in 2009 Urumqi Unrest. The use of an international source indeed helps to increase objectivity in the news and distance *China Daily* from explicit political propaganda.

Seen from another two typical examples (see Line 1 and 5 in Figure 4.4 above), *China Daily* also includes the voices of Xinjiang residents to present that Xinjiang people felt more and more satisfied with the lives in China after the strife in 2009. In Example 9, a non-Muslim Xinjiang resident feels delighted because of the restoration of social order. In Example 10, an Uyghur resident expresses satisfaction to the writer because of the improvement of living standard. In the two extracts, Chinese Muslims are portrayed as cheerful Chinese groups in the discourse of Muslims' happiness.

Example 9

"Zhang's visit gave us encouragement. We, the Xinjiang people, will have a stable, peaceful and *happy* life," Liu Qun, a local resident, said.

"There were few visitors at this food market after 11 pm last summer, as most of us were worried about our security in the aftermath of the deadly riots that happened on the same day two years ago.

"But this year, there are a lot more visitors. [1] More and more people have shaken off the shadow of the riot." (CD, 6th July 2011)³¹

Example 10

Mardan Mehmet never hesitates to show how *happy* he is.

[2] "I earn 5,000 yuan (\$777) a month, have a car, and can still support my two younger sisters in their studies," says Mehmet, a Uyghur man working at a huge

³¹ China Daily (2011, 06 July). "Party chief shares kebabs with locals, reinforcing confidence".

project to produce substitute natural gas from coal in Ili, in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. (CD, 9th Aug. 2011)³²

Regarding similarities, first, the use of voice from a “local resident” in Xinjiang and the term of a “Uyghur man” uncover the portrait of pleasant Muslims. Besides, analogous to the previous examples, the topos of advantage and numbers are common linguistic strategies to represent pleasant Chinese Xinjiang people. The interviewees in both examples appreciate the increase of visitors in a peaceful society and the increase in family income. Numbers tend to objectify social improvement. “Few visitors”, “a lot more visitors” and “more and more people” in Example 9 present the prosperity in the food evening market after 11 pm one year after the violence. Likewise, Numbers, “5000 yuan (\$777) a month”, indicate the increased personal income which benefits to Muslim citizens. Third, the topos of comparison is a marked linguistic feature in these examples. According to Wodak et al. (2009), the argumentative scheme helps to emphasise the difference between now and then, and so the (positive) uniqueness of the current status quo looms large. In Example 9 and 10, the strategy is used to stress the presence of benefits. In Example 9, “most of us were worried about our security” last year is contrasted with “more and more people have shaken off the shadow of the riot” now. Xinjiang people are presented to lose the fear of violence gradually, and life is improved. It can be implied that happiness is attributable to having the advantages of peaceful and better lives in China. Given that they are satisfied with the current living condition in Communist China, we can imagine that they are not in the group of extremism. So satisfaction of ethnic Muslims means that they are categorised in the state newspaper as moderate and good Chinese Muslim citizens.

Another similarity is that modal verbs in the voice of Chinese Muslims are used to portray them as a contented group in China. The modal verb of “will” denotes to the epistemic future (Dunmire, 2010). From “we will have a stable, peaceful and happy life”, the modal verb reveals that the speakers (i.e. vendors in Xinjiang) are confident about a prosperous life in the future. Similarly, “I can” has the sense of ability with explicit subjectivity (Martin et al. 2010). With “I [...] can” in Clause [2], the Uyghur interviewee

³² China Daily (2011, 09 August). “Gas project bringing jobs to many Xinjiang residents”.

holds the idea that “5000 yuan (\$777) a month” from a national project can guarantee their life. Two modal verbs denote the ability and promising future of the social groups, which suggests ingroup categorisations. Such a positive expression about future life in China also insinuates that they are an ingroup in *CD*, moderate and good Chinese Muslim citizens.

The last similarity lies in that Muslims live a good life and their initiative to perform so. The acts also indicate that they are good Chinese citizens with Muslim ethnicity. In Clause [1] in Example 9, “more and more [Xinjiang] people” are assigned as an actor in “shak(ing) off” (material process), which targets at the inanimate goal of “the shadow of the riot”. Similarly, in Clause [2] in Example 10, “I” (a Muslim) plays the role of an actor in the material process of “earn” “5000 yuan”. It is expressed that Muslims are powerful actors to improve their life. And this expression implies that Chinese Muslims want to have a good life and further want to have happiness in China.

Of great interest is the use of repetition in Example 9. “We, the Xinjiang people” signals the equality between Uyghurs and non-Uyghur Chinese and further indicates the inclusiveness of ethnic Muslim by Han Chinese counterparts. Muslims in Xinjiang are not marginalised by non-Muslims but involved in the common future “a stable and peaceful and happy life”. Han’s inclusiveness to the majority of Chinese Muslims in Xinjiang decodes *CD*’s perception that Chinese Muslim, Uyghur Muslims especially are Chinese citizens.

2.3.2 Chinese Muslims have a passion for intercultural communication

In addition to the portrayal of pleasant Chinese Muslims, Muslims’ participation in communication with other social groups described the discourse of **Beauty, Like, Energy/interest and Ability**. These attitudes are marked in the *CD*, since the SMCs (e.g. the SMC of Beauty) are significant in the *CD* compared to the NYT, with the *k* value respectively of 78.02, 97.74, 19.29 and 17.95 ($k \geq 15.13$, $p < 0.0001$). The frequently occurring attitudinal items include “beautiful”, “attract”, “loved”, “excited”, “skills” “passion”. These attitudes frequently occur also in the topic category of **ethnic relations** (see Section 2.3.1). Typical articles and indicators include “Uygur-Han couple recounts crystal wedding” (*CD*, 12th July 2009), “Uygurs, Han eat side by side” (*CD*, 8th July 2009), “ethnic unity”, “social stability”.

Chinese journalists focus on non-governmental communication between the majority and the minority (especially Uyghur Muslims) in the news to insinuate the portrait of open-minded and passionate Chinese Muslims in intercultural communication. The first topic is that non-Muslim Chinese expect to communicate with ethnic Muslims since they have an attractive landscape, cuisines and unique culture. The first seven lines in Figure 4.5 below indicate that Chinese people are interested in the local Muslim food (“passion for Shanxi’s food” in Line 1) and Uyghur silk (“People in Shanghai loved it” in Line 4), historic site (“attracted nearly 100 photographers” in line 6), landscape (Line 2 and 3) and the life of Chinese Muslims (Line 7). It is recognisable from the activities carried out by non-Muslim Chinese that they are curious and interested in ethnic Muslim peers. Accompanied by passion from the Chinese majority to ethnic Muslims, journalists usually recount cultural differences in detail to reinforce the variety. Take Line 4 as an example, the popularity of spinning yarns in Shanghai is reported – “They were fascinated about how the elite is made”³³. Han’s interest in Chinese Muslims indicates openness, peace and energetic of Chinese Muslims. Because of that, they increasingly attract attention from the social majority in China.

³³ CD (2015, 30 October). “Xinjiang Oasis dwellers’ knack for spinning yarn”.

1. Personal taste the country is catching Ye Jun's	passion	for Shaanxi cuisine, he reports in Beijing. Shaanx
2 dy to printmaking and oil painting. She has a big	passion	for ethnic culture and diverse landscapes, and man
3 and has been obsessed with taking pictures of the	beautiful	landscape and diverse culture in Xinjiang ever sin
4 oting the craft there. "People in Shanghai	loved	it," says Amar, who has been in the trade for 45 years. "They were fascinated about how the etles is made".
5 trees and springs, it has become a famous tourism	attraction	. An ancient tree before the mazar is said to ha
6 d from mid-October to December. The two festivals	attracted	nearly 100 photographers from all over the count
7 n a micro blog called "I'm a Xinjiang person" has	attracted	tens of thousands of participants, each recounti

8 friends. I will invite them to Xinjiang and to my	beautiful	hometown after I return home. And even if one day
9 rroups. "Traditionally, we don't usually teach our	skills	to non-Hui people or to women, but in my club, I broke the rule.
10 nt of my students, who are interested in learning	skills	and working outside, I feel happy," she said.
11 outside Xinjiang and leave home for so long, I feel very	excited	to see the outside world." (Example 11)

Figure 4.5 Sample concordance lines about Beauty, Like, Energy/interest and Ability in the CD

The second topic for the portrayal of open-minded and energetic Chinese Muslims in intercultural communication is here. They introduce Muslim culture to non-Muslim Chinese. Shown from the second group of lines in Figure 4.5 above, ethnic Muslims are willing to attract tourists (e.g. "I will invite them to Xinjiang" in Line 8), exchange skills with non-Muslim Chinese ("but I broke the rule" in Line 9), and physically go out of Xinjiang (Line 10 and 11). Different from the discussion in 1.2 above, these attitudinal features lead to the focus that Chinese Muslims welcome the bilateral communication between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese with high energy and passion. The focus of cross-cultural communication implies openness of Muslims to Chinese society.

Openness and energy in intercultural communication indicate them as an ingroup in *CD*. Muslims successfully attract attention from non-Muslims with cultural uniqueness and introduce local culture to the social majority in China. *CD* indeed covers the interaction between two Chinese social groups. Moreover, it is implied by opening up local culture to non-Muslim Chinese that the core of Chinese Muslims is accessible to non-Muslims. Chinese Muslims are thus categorised as a moderate Muslim group in China (similar to the previous categorisations).

The third topic in the discourse of energy and interest is that Chinese Muslims expect to learn from non-Muslim Chinese, also insinuating open-minded and energetic Chinese Muslim groups. Example 11 is a perfect example (also see Line 11 in Figure 4.5 above) for this information and portrait, which is contextualised in the discourse of energy and excitement from Muslims. In the example, A 27-year-old Uyghur woman expects to work out of Xinjiang and study in the eastern part of China.

Example 11

"My hometown is a typical agricultural county," said the 27-year-old Uyghur woman. "So [1] I chose to study farm machinery in Shandong province. The knowledge I get there will be very useful in the development of my town. It is my first time to go outside Xinjiang and leave home for so long. I feel very **excited** to see the outside world." (*CD*, 26th Mar. 2011)³⁴

Consistent with findings in the *CD* corpus, the writer presents her passion for communicating with the outside world with an attitudinal marker of "excited". In the discourse about her excitement, the writer stresses that the 27-year old Uyghur woman wants to acquire knowledge outside of her hometown. With transitivity analysis, "I" in Clause [1] is an actor in the material process, i.e. "choose", which targets at "study[ing] farm machinery". By this expression, the Uyghur girl plays a role a powerful actor in the doing, or she chooses to study farm machinery in Shandong. In stating so, we can imply that she has the passion to communicate with the world, which reveals her identity of a

³⁴ China Daily (2011, 26 March). "Training program to boost employment in Xinjiang"

modern Muslim woman (cf. Section 1.2.2 above). By contrast, “the study of farm machinery is my choice” is an alternative expression to decrease her initiative in the act. Additionally, the Uyghur woman has realised the underdevelopment of Muslim regions and the necessity for communication. Her hometown in Xinjiang is described as a “typical agricultural county”. Moreover, she is aware of the development in another Chinese region with a large population of Han Chinese. That is, she plans to “study farm machinery in Shandong province”. Such a plan symbolises Chinese Muslims as energetic and open to the outside world.

Her openness and energy are also made explicit in the narrative of advantages in the study trip. The topos of advantage is used here, which is a linguistic feature in representing a large group of cheerful and open-minded Chinese Muslims. In her words, the knowledge from Shandong “will be very useful for the development of my town”. Like the previous examples, the model of “will” in the expression is a marker of epistemic future and indicates that she promises to open her hometown to the world outside.

The portrayal of this young Uyghur woman reveals that *CD* categorises most Chinese Muslims as ingroups in the newspaper. Their active integration into non-Muslim society symbolizes the sameness between non-Muslim and Muslim Chinese. Thus most of Chinese Muslims are categorized as peaceful and normal Chinese citizens with Muslim ethnicity.

To summarise, the portrayal of pleasant and open-minded Chinese Muslims signifies an ingroup categorisation of this group in the CD. The majority of Chinese are moderate Muslims with Chinese citizenship. That is opposite to the portrayal of American or British Muslim citizens in the respective country. They isolate themselves from the major American society (Bowe & Makki, 2016). They are problematic and pose a threat to social security in Britain (Baker et al., 2013a; Richardson, 2004). They can be homegrown terrorists in connection with Muslim fundamentalism (Chuang & Roemer, 2013).

2.4 Outgroup in the NYT: Upset and fanatic Chinese Muslims

As was previously discussed, negative attitudes are outstanding in *the New York Time*’s coverage about Chinese Muslims, which has a dramatic rise after Urumqi Unrest in 2009.

This section will illustrate the representation of Chinese Muslims in the discourse of different negative attitudes. The portrayal of angry and fanatic Chinese Muslims in the NYT will be discussed (e.g. fear, resent, dissatisfaction). Moreover, the section will explore the link between such portraits and Chinese Muslims as an outgroup in *The NYT*. The portrayal of Chinese Muslims agrees with what Baker et al. (2013) said Muslims in a British newspaper is portrayed as being angry and offended in many cases. The term “Muslim community” is described regarding “antagonise, offensive, upset, uproar, resentment and anger” (p.126).

2.4.1 Resentful Chinese Muslims against non-Muslim Chinese

Upset Chinese Muslims are depicted mainly in the discourse of **dissatisfaction**, **dislike and fear** and the topic category of **ethnic relations** (cf. Chinese Muslims in intercultural communication). Section 2.1 of this chapter introduced that these negative attitudes are prominent in the NYT corpus, and their k value retrieved from the log - likelihood test respectively are 80.58,70.40 and 30.53 (also see Appendix 2). Moreover, headline analysis shows that such negative attitudes appear in a salient topic category in the dataset — **ethnic relations**, which deals with the strained relationship between Uyghur Muslims and Han Chinese in the past 15 years. This topic category is covered in 7.13% of 448 news articles in the NYT, and its contribution value is 0.12 larger than the mean value of 0.1.

Typical articles and indicators include “Killings Stir Fears of Ethnic Tensions in Chinese Region” (NYT, 8th March 2013), “Uighur in China Say Bias is Growing” (NYT, 7th Oct. 2013), “tension”. Seen from Table 4.1 in Section 1.1 above, topic category of ethnic tension is frequent in discourse since the contribution value of this topic is 0.12. Moreover, the coverage of this topic increases after the Urumqi Unrest (see Figure 4.2 in Section 1.1). The following section will illustrate how resentful ethnic Muslims in China are portrayed in the coverage of ethnic tensions.

1 al Asian border region of Xinjiang. Many Uighurs	resent	what they call discrimination by Han , the dominant
2 versity in Australia, said many Uighurs have long	resented	religious leaders aligned with the Communist Party
3 han to China's Han ethnic majority. Many Uighurs	resent	the growing Han presence in the region, and growin (Example 12)
4 ring all around them. There's little wonder that	discontent	has become so widespread . The efforts of the centr
5 say they have a hard time finding good jobs. The	frustration	many Uighurs have is they are trapped, prevented by bigotry and strict residency rules
6 quash expressions of Uighur cultural identity and religion. Uighurs have	complained	of job discrimination and the suppression of Uighur-language (Example 13)
7 "A generation from now, I	fear	our people will be functionally illiterate in Uighur."

8 She welcomed the change. As we pulled up to a crumbling Uighur neighbourhood, she said, "When I first came here, I was	afraid	when I saw people dressing like that." I exited t
9 in recent days, we've been angry toward the Uighur," Mr. Lu said. "And of course we're	scared	of them." The family came from Zhoukou, in Henan
10 Ten knew that a Uighur had killed a Han, and we were	panicked	. We were very scared. But then we learned more, (Example 14)

Figure 4.6 Sample Concordance lines about Dislike, Dissatisfied and Fear in the NYT

The first group of lines in Figure 4.6 reveal that *The NYT* journalists focus on the strong, long-term (Line 2) and widespread ("discontent has become widespread" in Line 4) negative emotions (i.e. dissatisfaction, resentment and fear). In Line 2, the newspaper informs readers that Uyghur Muslims are not peaceful but easily transform to be troublemakers, i.e. "long resented religious leaders". Possibly to assume that such a common presentation of aggressive emotions can draw the world's attention to the vast Muslim population in China. Thus, *The NYT* uses the portrait of resentful Muslims for categorising them as threats to the world.

In the narrative of fear and anger, Chinese Muslims are represented as having the incentive to become fundamentalists, which reinforces Muslims' outgroup identity. First,

the narrative of fear represents them as the helpless group. From “our [Uyghur] people will be functionally illiterate in Uighur” (Line 7), Chinese Muslims are immersed in fear of losing ethnic culture and identity. Second, Chinese society and the Chinese government become another motivation, typically presented by the topos of justice and humanitarianism. In Wodak (2001), these two argumentative schemes in the discourse are usually deployed to call for the activities of justice. In the NYT corpus, actions in violation of the rule of humanitarianism and rule of social equality are listed together with angry and scared Chinese Muslims. Upset Chinese Muslims are a consequence of the social exclusion in the Han-dominated Communist China. For instance, Uyghur Chinese are discriminated by the social majority (Line 1), become the minority because of the growing number of Han Chinese (Line 3). Chinese Muslims are strictly controlled by a “strict residency rule” (Line 5) and are gradually eradicated of their culture and identity (Line 6 and 7). These activities indicate the identity of marginalised Chinese Muslims vs non-Muslim Chinese. So, living in Han-dominant Chinese society influences the formation of upset Muslims, which reconfirms the outgroup membership categorisations of Chinese Muslims.

The following extract is a perfect example of upset Chinese Muslims in the discourse of Muslims’ dislikes and dissatisfaction in China, taken from attitude analysis. Extract 12 (see also Line 6 in Figure 4.6 above) showcases that Uyghur Muslims did not welcome increasing Han immigrant to Xinjiang in 2014.

Example 12

Xinjiang is the homeland of Uighurs, a largely Muslim people whose Turkic culture is much closer to that of the people of Central Asia than to China’s Han ethnic majority. [1] Many Uighurs **resent** the growing Han presence in the region, and growing numbers have embraced more traditionalist forms of Islam. (NYT, 8th May 2014)³⁵

Consistent with the previous discussion, the writer, in Example 12, presents resentful Muslims with the attitudinal marker of “resent”. The general term “Many Uighurs” and “resent” imply that all different groups of Uyghur Muslims as a unity are resentful in

³⁵ The New York Times (2014, 5th May). “Police in deadly confrontation in restive Chinese region”.

China. Moreover, the expression of “growing numbers” and “embraced more traditionalist forms of Islam” are indicators that denote resentful Muslims, probably the whole Chinese Muslims, to the categorisations of fundamentalists and threats. A common concept of Islamic fundamentalists is the advocacy of strict conformity to the fundamentals of Islam and corruptions of the influence of the non-Muslim world.

Another symbolic linguistic feature for depicting upset Chinese Muslims in *The NYT* is that journalists stress actions and feeling of the community and their initiative in the performances. In Example 12, “many Uighurs” are not compelled to feel resentful towards Han counterparts. They are assigned as a sensor in the mental process “resent”, which targets at “the Han presence in the region”. In the same vein, “growing numbers [of Chinese Muslims]” is involved in the acts of “hav(ing) embraced” (material process) “more traditional form of Islam” (inanimate goal). It is clear from these two expressions that more and more Muslims are represented as a powerful party in their actions. Simply put, they want to resent Han people and want to embrace a traditional form of Islam (i.e. thoughts of fundamentalists). Therefore, the expressions build up that resentful Chinese Muslims are dangerous to the non-Muslim world. An alternative expression can lessen the power of Uyghur Muslims in these behaviours. For instance, Clause [1] can be replaced with a sentence that “there is resent from many Uighurs towards the Han presence in the region”. The mental clause reinforces anger and hatred among a large population of Chinese Muslims towards their lives in China.

Of particular interest in Example 12 is the introduction of Xinjiang and Muslim communities in history, with which the topos of history is used. They are “much closer to that of the people of Central Asia” than to Han Chinese. It can be implied that ethnic Muslims are different from the Han majority in China, but similar to Muslims in such as other countries (e.g. Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan). The writer also attributes “homeland of Uighur”, “the growing Han presence” and “resent” to Uyghurs Muslims. Uyghurs are seen to oppose the increasing number of Han Chinese in their “homeland” and refuse integration with mainstream Chinese society. By connection Chinese Muslims with those Muslim countries and the unacceptance of non-Muslim culture, *The NYT* maps Chinese Muslims to evil Muslims (e.g. Taliban) who threaten Western society. By then, most ethnic

Muslims in China are seen as an outgroup in *The NYT*, i.e. dangers to the West and fundamentalists. The argument is contrasted with the discussion of *China Daily*. In the CD, Chinese Muslims are shaped by on-going integration with Han Chinese.

The extract is the background in a report on the violent incident in Aksu in 2014. Hateful Uyghurs loom large in the report. The journalist claims that “the brief reports from Aksu described a confrontation with knives and a bomb but did not give details of the suspects or their motives”. We can easily see the outgroup membership categorisations of Chinese Muslims in the whole news article.

Resentful Chinese Muslims are also revealed as socially marginalised by Han Chinese. Journalists uncover hatred from the social minority and unfair treatment of Chinese Muslims. In Extract 13 (see Line 6 in Figure 4.6 above), Uyghurs are not satisfied with their experience in China. The line was taken from attitudinal analysis.

Example 13

Uighurs have **complained** of job discrimination, and the suppression of Uighur-language education as millions of Han migrants have settled in Xinjiang, the Uighurs’ ancient homeland. (NYT, 8th Sept. 2008)³⁶

Similar to the previous example, the displeasure of Chinese Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of feeling dissatisfaction (i.e. “complained”). The journalist also uses a general term, “Uighurs”, to present a great number of Chinese Muslims as a unity, and they have complaints about living in China (cf. Example 12). The topos of history also has a presence in Example 13. The expressions of “Uighurs’ ancient homeland” and “millions of Han migrant” uncover that Xinjiang is not the territory of Han Chinese in history. Alternatively, Uyghurs are residents in the region, who are attached to the Muslim world. The attitudinal marker “complained” means Uyghurs want to keep the attachment with Muslim world more than with Han Chinese. Uyghurs are thus seen as world Muslims, probably Muslims in Central Asia. Similar to Example 12 above, the historical past of

³⁶ The New York Times (2015, 31st March). “Mysterious Surrounds Disappearance of Xinjiang Article and Related Apology.”

Uyghurs and unhappiness reveal Chinese Muslims as an outgroup in the NYT, especially, a menace to the West and fundamentalists.

It is also expressed in this extract that dislike of Uyghurs in China is of their choice. From transitivity analysis, “Uighurs” is a sayer in the verbal process “complaint” about “job discrimination and the suppression of Uyghur language education” (i.e. verbiage or the content of what is said/indicated). Uyghurs are assigned, by the expression, with the power to make complaints. We can then imply that Uyghur Muslims want to complain about the unfairness in Chinese society. Uyghurs’ expectation for complaints can be lessened in other expressions, for instance, “the complaint of social discrimination and social suppression”. By the active complaints of the unequal treatment in China, it is revealed that Muslims do not feel content, but upset in China.

2.4.2 Fanatic Chinese Muslims against Chinese Muslims

Fanatic Chinese Muslims are stressed when journalists specify fear and shock from non-Muslim Chinese. Horror from non-Muslims is posited in the discourse of **ethnic tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese**, as well as the discourse of **fear and dislike from non-Muslim Chinese**. The *k* values of SMCs of Fear and Dislike respectively are 30.53 and 80.58 in the NYT in comparison with the CD. Fanatic Muslims indicate them as an outgroup in the NYT corpus.

Seen from the second group in Figure 4.6 above, in which lines were taken from attitudinal analysis, *NYT* journalists frequently include voices from non-Muslim that depreciate their Muslim counterparts. Han Chinese express horror and exclusion towards Uyghur Chinese after the turmoil, such as “I was afraid” (Line 8). The trigger lies in violence and killing (e.g. “a Uighur had killed a Han” in Line 10) and Han’s denial of Islamic culture (Line 8). The expression from Han Chinese about Uyghur Chinese pictures two groups of people: 1) fanatic Uyghur Muslims and 2) angry Han Chinese. Both groups are against the harmonious ethnic relationship as is discussed in the CD. Such information is similar to what Kaltman (2007) has found after the interview with Han Chinese. The results show that Uyghur-Han relationship is easy to break because of Uyghurs’ criminal activities. Many Han interviewees believe that Uyghurs are unreasonable. Specifically,

Uyghurs are claimed to favour committing a crime, not because of laziness, but only to harm Chinese society.

Anger, horror and suspicion towards Uyghur Muslims from Han Chinese are evident in Extract 14 (see Line 10 in Figure 4.6 above), Lu says that strike in 2009 engenders fury and scares from Han migrant towards Uyghurs. The sentences were taken from a news article published one day after the violence in 2009.

Example 14

Mr Lu's father said that of more than 100 photographs of bodies that he looked through at a police station to identify his son

Each victim had a number. His son was 51.

“Of course, in recent days, we have been **angry** toward the Uighur,” Mr Lu said.

“And of course, we’re **scared** of them. (NYT, 8th July 2009)³⁷

As was discussed above, fanatic Muslims are represented in the discourse of fear and dislike in Example 14, which is indicated by the attitudinal markers of “angry” and “scared” and “victim”. Anger and fear are expressed by a non-Muslim Chinese in Xinjiang with a direct quotation, i.e. “Mr Lu said”, so Mr Lu is active in present his fear and fury. From transitivity analysis, “Mr Lu” is positioned as a sayer in the verbal process of “said” and the verbiage (i.e. the content of saying) is about scare and anger towards the Uighur. The non-Muslim Chinese is given the power to decide whether or not to convey his negativity towards Chinese Muslims then. An alternative expression can decrease Lu’s power, such as “It was said [...]”. Generally, Lu’s anger and horror present that non-Muslims are very unhappy about the happenings. Mr Lu also narrates an unpleasant situation actively at the beginning of this example. From “His son was 51”, Lu’s son, probably Han Chinese, is a physical victim of the violence. Further, Lu, his father, becomes a moral victim because of his son’s death (cf. Leudar et al., 2004).

Numbers are another linguistic feature in the image of fanatic Muslims. In Example 14, the use of number authenticates the situation. “More than 100 photographs of bodies”

³⁷ The New York Times (2009, 8th July) “Migrant describe grief from China’s strife”.

and “51” demonstrate large casualties in “ethnic violence” (from cotext) between “the Uyghur” and Han Chinese. As such, Uyghurs are insinuated as fanatic killers of Han Chinese. And they are vilified because of slaughtering others (Lazar & Lazar, 2004). The portrait of fanatic Muslims polarises the group to fundamentalists.


Apart from the demonisation of Muslims, possibly to imply that fanatic Muslims are shaped by non-Muslim Chinese (cf. previous examples). The pronouns of “we” and “the Uyghur”/ “them”, in Lu’s voices, build the dichotomy between the two parties. The newspaper stresses that Uyghur Chinese people are expelled from the majority of Chinese. The use of differentiation (van Leeuwen, 2008) alludes to the fact that Uyghur Muslims are marginalised by the Chinese majority. Apart from the demonisation of Muslims, possibly to imply that fanatic Muslims are shaped by non-Muslim Chinese similar to the previous examples. The pronouns of “we” and “the Uyghur”/ “them”, in Lu’s voices, build the dichotomy between the two parties. The newspaper stresses that Uyghur Chinese people are expelled from the majority of Chinese.

3 Essential news participants in relation to the construction of Chinese Muslims

News participants are defined as the persons having occurrences in the news articles. The examination of news participants is because news access is a revelation of the power and ideologies in the news (van Dijk, 1993). In Chapter 3 above, the results were retrieved from the examination of personal terms in the corpora. USAS tagging system in Wmatrix is used as the analytical tool. 1,962 and 1,303 personal terms are found respectively in the NYT and CD corpus. Reoccurring items with contributions to the portrayal of Chinese Muslims were examined in detail (e.g. “Rebiya”). The items investigated in the project cover above 66% of the personal terms in both corpora. The finding will be reported as follows.

Among the total frequency of personal names, more than 67% of them are non-Muslim Chinese, i.e. 1,317 (out of 1,962) in the NYT and 1,202 (out of 1,303) in the CD corpus. Because of the dominant frequency, I will focus on the ideological construction of Chinese news participants in this project.

The news participants investigated here are people of Chinese nationality. According to ethnicity, Chinese participants are re-categorised into non-Muslim Chinese (e.g. “Xi Jinping”), Chinese Muslim communities, Uyghur Muslims (e.g. “Mr Qassim”) and other Muslims (e.g. “Ma Lanying”). Such names are identified based on the personal terms and elaboration in the news (“a Uighur woman, Kadeer Rebiya”).



Note: A percentage = the frequency of the category/ the total of personal terms of Chinese people (1,317 in the NYT and 1,202 in the CD)

Figure 4.7 Chinese news participants in the CD and the NYT

Seen from Figure 4.7 above, first, personal terms indicating non-Muslim Chinese have a higher frequency than those of ethnic Muslims in China. In the NYT, 65% out of 1,317 personal nouns expresses non-Muslim Chinese ($F=860$), while 35% items for Chinese Muslims. In the CD corpus, the ratio is 54% out of 1,202 ($F=654$) for non-Muslim Chinese vs 40% Chinese Muslims ($F=548$). Next, among the personal terms about Chinese Muslims in both corpora, Chinese Muslims with Uyghur ethnicity are more frequently than other ethnic Muslim groups. The difference is especially significant in the NYT corpus, which is suggested by 29% ($F=377$) Uyghur Muslims in contrast to 6% (80) other Muslim groups. Third, in the group of other Muslims, religious figures (e.g. imam) and Hui people (e.g. “Hui Liangyu”) are dominating in frequency. It is implacable from the two news corpora that Uyghur Muslims are the representative of Chinese Muslim communities.

However, demographically speaking, Hui people have a larger population than Uyghur Muslims in China (Dillon, 1996). The predominance of non-Muslim Chinese in the coverage is similar to the results in Sharifi et al. (2017), guests in the CNN’s interview about Muslim issues are mostly non-Muslims rather than Muslims per se.

Table 4.3 Significant Chinese news participants in the CD and the NYT

CD		NYT	
Non-Muslim Chinese leaders	39.10%	Chinese officials	34.47%
Non-Muslim supporters	1.25%	Muslim/non-Muslim social activists	43.43%
Chinese Muslim public officers	3.91%		
Successful Muslims	3.24%		
Religious leaders	15.06%		
Chinese Muslim terrorists	34.61%		

Note: A percentage = the frequency of the category/ the total of personal terms of Chinese people (1,317 in the NYT and 1,202 in the CD)

Regarding the social identity of Chinese news participants (see Table 4.3 above), the CD stresses top Chinese leaders (39.10 % of 1,202 Chinese news participants) and their supporters (i.e. non-Muslim researchers or professors). How top Chinese leaders help the ideological construal of ethnic Muslims in China will be elaborated in Chapter 5 and 6. Regarding significant Chinese Muslim news participants in the CD, local Muslim public officers account for 3.91 % among 1,202 (see Chapter 5 and 6); Uyghur Muslims with social achievements have 3.24% (see Section 4.2.1 before), and religious leaders have 15.06 % (see Chapter 6). Additionally, Chinese Muslim terrorists, i.e. a small number of Chinese Muslims involved in riots and conflicts, have 34.61% among the total frequency of personal terms that indicate Chinese people in the CD. Discussion of such a small group of Chinese Muslims will be found in Chapter 6 which is named “Muslim terrorists and Chinese Muslims.”

In the NYT dataset, significant Chinese news participants encompass top Chinese leaders (see Chapter 5), non-Muslim Chinese social activists (to enlarge hardline strategies towards Muslim social activists), Muslim social activists. Findings, later on, will show that Muslim social activists are a small group of Muslim protesters in China who are identified as terrorists in *China Daily*. Findings of this group of Chinese ethnic Muslims will also be elaborated in Chapter 6. Shown from Table 4.3 above, top Chinese leaders has 34.47% of 1,317 occurrences of personal terms that indicate Chinese people in the corpus. Muslim and non-Muslim social activists together account for 43.43% of the total number of Chinese news participants.

It is clear that the portrayal of Chinese Muslims in these contexts will be discussed or has been addressed in the previous sections. So, I will briefly discuss the representation of ethnic Muslims with three examples as follows.

3.1 Important news participants in the CD

In the CD corpus, as was identified previously, people from the Chinese **government (i.e. Chinese Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese)** are underpinned in the CD. The personal terms of this group have 43.1%³⁸ shares of all Chinese news participants in the corpus (see Table 3.4 above). The close relationship between Chinese Muslims and the Chinese government is revealed, which will be elaborated in the next chapter. Additionally, the salience of Chinese Muslim terrorists in the CD demonstrates the necessity to discuss how they are delineated in the dataset.

Example 15 below shows how Chinese Muslims are represented in the discourse of Chinese leaders. The section will be elaborated in Chapter 5 – the relations between Chinese Muslims and the government and Chinese Muslim terrorists will be elaborated in the next two chapters. In Example 15, Hui Liangyu encourages IAC (i.e. The Islamic Association of China) to contribute to Chinese society.

³⁸ 43.1% = 39.01% (non-Muslim Chinese leaders)+ 3.91% (Chinese Muslim public officials)

Example 15

Vice-Premier Hui Liangyu encouraged the IAC (The Islamic Association of China) to better exercise patriotism and contribute more to China's stability and economic and social development (CD, 15th Oct. 2003)³⁹.

As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the discourse of top Chinese leaders, “Hui Liangyu” in Example 15, serves as the context to represent Muslims as benefit takers of the CCP’s help. Moreover, this portrait denotes that Muslims are good citizens and moderate ethnic groups in China, i.e. an ingroup in the state newspaper.

In Hui’s encouragement of IAC, the word “encouraged” means a request from the CCP, not command. The Chinese government gives great respect to Chinese Muslims to support CCP. Moreover, what Hui encourages ethnic Muslims to do is practising better “patriotism”, “China's stability and economic and social development”. IAC, from such phrasing, is expected only to contribute to social stability and economic growth which is beneficial to Muslims. The implication is that this Chinese Muslim organisation is encouraged to help vast numbers of Muslims in life. Further, Chinese Muslims are given autonomy, which insinuates that they are opponents in Chinese society, but moderate Muslims and good Chinese citizens. Regarding linguistic patterns, acts of help performed by the Chinese government are narrated with material clauses from transitivity perspective. “Hui Liangyu” plays a role as an actor in “encouraged” (material process), which targets at an animate goal of IAC. So, HUI is constructed as a powerful actor in the happening, which indicates that HUI inspires IAC to contribute to Chinese society by the initiative. Alternatively, it is the CCP’s choice to give Muslims autonomy and respect, which indexes the ingroup membership categorisation of Chinese Muslims. A passive expression “The IAC is encouraged by Hui Liangyu” can decrease Hui’s initiative in the behaviours.

The CCP’s freedom and respect to Chinese Muslims are also revealed in the cotext. Premier Hui not only disseminates the importance of economic betterment and social stability but also praises IAC’s performance and specifies the responsibility of the

³⁹ China Daily (2003, 15 Oct.). “China’s Islamic Association celebrates 50th Anniversary”.

organisation” to “explain and develop the active side of the Islamic religion and culture to better adjust to society”.

As aforesaid, the personal terms of Chinese Muslim terrorists account for 34.61% out of 1,202 personal terms of Chinese people. Example 16 can typify how this handful of Chinese Muslims are represented in these narratives. Ilham Tohti’s lawless activities were described in the extract.

Example 16

[1] Ilham Tohti severely damaged the national security and social stability, the municipal public security bureau in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, said in a statement under its microblog account on Sina Weibo, China's equivalent of Twitter (CD, 26th Jan. 2014)⁴⁰.

The portrayal of Chinese Muslim terrorists is found in the discourse of Ilham Tohti. According to reports from other news sources, Ilham Tohti is an Uyghur scholar who was sentenced by the Chinese government to lifelong imprisonment for disseminating separatism and terrorism. In this extract, the writer stresses illegal Ilham Tohti in *China Daily* with the category-bond activities “severely damaged the national security and social stability” (see Clause [1]). Lazar & Lazar (2004) (also see Chapter 3) claims that illegitimation is a frequently used rhetorical strategy to outcast ideological others. Illegal actions are frequent in the expression of Muslim terrorists around the world. Thus, Ilham Tohti is categorised as an outgroup in the Chinese newspaper in agreement with the judgement from the CCP.

The journalist describes illegal acts of the Uyghur individual and stresses his deliberation of being lawless. The active action can reinforce Tohti’s lawlessness and the outgroup identity in the Chinese state newspaper. In the CD corpus, such a linguistic feature has been identified in many other instances about illegal Chinese Muslim terrorists (see Chapter 6). In “Ilham Tohti severely damaged the national security and social stability”, “Ilham Tohti” plays the role of an actor in “damage[ing]” (material process) “the

⁴⁰ China Daily (2014, 26 Jan.). “Uyghur teacher involved in separatist activities”.

national security and social stability” (an inanimate goal). The Uyghur scholar is given the power in his action, and so he is purposeful in harming Chinese social stability and security. In other words, it is Tohti’s personal choice to perform illegal behaviours and thus impair social security in China. Similar to multiple instances previously construed, alternative expressions can decrease his deliberateness in illegal actions. For instance, the clause can be presented as “national security and social stability are damaged”.

Using Beijing’s voice for the outgroup categorisation of a small number of Chinese Muslims is typical in *China Daily* (see Chapter 6). Beijing as a news source embodies the portrayal of illegal Chinese Muslim terrorists as adversaries of the government. We can find in Example 16 denouncement of Ilham Tohti is issued by “the municipal public security bureau in Urumqi”. The use of Sina Weibo as the channel of the announcement that is labelled as “China’s equivalent of Twitter” means the dissemination of this portrait to all Chinese citizens and reinforce the negative portrayal of terrorists.

3.2 Important news participants in the NYT

The NYT also emphasises two aspects of news participants — Uyghur social activists and Chinese government officials. That means Chinese Muslims are represented in the discourse of Muslim social activists and Chinese leaders in the NYT. The previous section has explicated that Chinese Muslim terrorists in *CD* and Muslim social activists herein are the same small batch of Chinese Muslims (e.g. Ilham Tohti), which I will elaborate in Chapter 6. Here I will show you how top Chinese politicians help to construct ethnic Muslims in *The NYT*, who cover 34.47% of all Chinese news participants in the corpus.

Example 17 is typical to display how Chinese Muslims are represented in the discourse of Chinese politicians. Beijing’s actions about Muslim male citizens were criticized after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009.

Example 17

The 2009 bloodshed also led to sweeping arrests of Uighur men, and deeply scarred ethnic relations in Xinjiang. Mr Yu, the party leader, suggested that pervasive security could prevent a repeat (NYT, 29th June 2013)⁴¹

Chinese Muslims are represented as evil groups and the victims of the Communist government and in the discourse of “Mr Yu”. Muslims are linked with “the 2009 bloodshed” and are “deeply scarred ethnic relations”. Such negative labels indicate the disquiet and dangerous features of Chinese Muslims. Thus, Chinese Muslims are categorised as an outgroup in the newspaper, especially threats to the non-Muslim world.

The portrayal of victimised Chinese Muslims is embodied in this example for the outgroup categorisation of this group, with the typical use of the topos of humanitarianism⁴². It is described that “sweeping arrests of Uighur men” is performed for “pervasive security”, and it “could prevent a repeat” of the riot. In the expression, the CCP holds that “Uyghur men”, the whole male group (i.e. the use of general terms), are responsible for the 2009 bloodshed. Second, the modal verb, “could”, means possibility, not a certainty. So, the writer presents that the arrest of Uyghur males is based on the hypothesis of gaining stability instead of the fact that they are suspect criminals. As an implication, Uyghur men are victimised by the loss of humanitarianism in Communist China. Also, it can be implied that *The NYT* uses voices of the CCP to identify the authoritarian government to its Muslim citizens, instead of advocating the Chinese government. So, the Chinese government is also categorised as Them to the newspaper.

The journalist emphasises the CCP’s verbal action of controlling Muslims. Mr Yu is a sayer in the verbal process of “suggested” towards “pervasive security” (i.e. verbiage). Yu is assigned the power in this verbal action, which indicates that he wants to make suggestions about the increase of Beijing’s authoritarianism to Uyghur Chinese. It is revealed that the CCP firmly believes “sweeping arrests of Uyghur men” is for “pervasive security” is correct. The suggestion will not sacrifice freedom for the non-criminal Muslim

⁴¹ The New York Times (2013, 29 June).” Violence in restive region prompts crackdown”.

⁴² I will discuss that the topos of humanitarianism is frequently used to portray Chinese Muslims as victims to the CCP’s government in Chapter 5.

citizens. The stress on Beijing's initiative to boost control of Muslims reveals the victimisation of the majority of Chinese Muslims. Any alternative expression will decrease Yu's initiative in the verbal action, such as "it is suggested that pervasive security prevents a repeat". Concerning literature, the topos of humanitarianism is found typical in the coverage of Muslims in the Western media. Sharifi et al. (2017) identify that such topos is used in American's TV program about the Middle East. Muslims are implied to live in a miserable situation under Islamic regimes. Washington's intervention then is seen as the salvation of Muslims from a terrible life.

3.3 Summary

To sum up, news participants with Chinese identity are predominant in the datasets, in which non-Muslim participants outweigh Muslim participants in quantity. However, both parties are essential in the representation of Chinese Muslims.

China Daily focuses on news participants of Chinese politicians, scholars at universities, successful Muslims and Islamic religious leaders. They can be contextualised in the government's subsidisation of Chinese Muslims (also see Chapter 5). For instance, Chinese politicians are presented with their low-profile activities towards Muslims, symbolising that Chinese Muslims have gained freedom and respect from CCP. Further, they are categorised as moderate Muslims and good Chinese citizens. Muslim terrorists are another frequent-occurring news participants in the CD. For instance, Chinese Muslim terrorists can be portrayed as illegitimate and different from Chinese Muslim communities (also see Chapter 6).

In the NYT, Muslim protesters and top Chinese politicians are essential news participants. For instance, the analysis of top Chinese politicians suggests victimised but dangerous/disquieting Chinese Muslims. The detailed discussion about the significant news participants will be reported in a full-fledged manner in the next two chapters.

4 Summary

This Chapter has shown that the majority of Chinese Muslims are categorised as an ingroup in *China Daily*, while grouped as Them in *The NYT*. They are positively represented in the CD corpus mainly as moderate Muslims and regular Chinese citizens. In the NYT, by

contrast, the membership categorisation of Chinese Muslims is Islamic fundamentalists and threats to the non-Muslim world.

Moderate ethnic Muslims and Chinese citizens are dominant in the CD. The categorisations are contextualised in the discourse of social transformations, cultural and religious talk and reaction to violence/ terrorism, positive attitudes (e.g. happiness, success) and news participants with a positive image (e.g. successful Muslim citizens). Negative reporting increased in 2009, because of violent social issues pertinent to some Muslims.

Regarding the portrayal of Chinese Muslims in the CD, the discourse of a number of positive attitudes (e.g. happiness) and the topic category of ethnic relations project pleasant, peaceful and open-minded Chinese Muslims. The image is strengthened by three topics of 1) the non-biased treatment of Chinese Muslims in society, 2) Muslims' engagement in intercultural communication and 3) the improvement of livelihood. Before the Xinjiang Riots in 2009, ingroup categorisations are represented as a liberal Muslim community - maintaining Muslim culture, loving life and having a long-term integration with non-Muslim Chinese and the Western world. They are liberal Muslims in *CD* in contrast to backward social groups in *The NYT*. The newspaper, after 2009, highlights Muslim community affairs and successful Muslim individuals, especially Muslim women. Thus, ingroup Muslims in *CD* are embodied by the portrait of modern Chinese Muslims. They are influential, self-reliant, tenacious and friendly to the non-Muslim world, all of which reveal their similarities with non-Muslim Chinese. The difference between Muslim and non-Muslim communities is backgrounded so as to strengthen Muslims' identity as first as Chinese citizens and then modern Muslims.

Most Chinese Muslims are represented by different linguistic patterns in the CD. From the linguistic analysis, they are positively presented. It is noted that general terms are used to denote the whole Muslim communities, which reinforce Chinese Muslims of different groups as a unity. Good actions, voices and positive feeling of Chinese Muslims and initiative in the actions are presented by material, verbal and mental clauses. Modal verbs (e.g. for promising future) and positive labelling are used to reinforce different portraits above. The topos of reality, advantages, history and numbers are used for the construal of ingroup Chinese Muslims in *China Daily*.

Chinese Muslims as Islamic fundamentalists and threats to the non-Muslim world are outgroup categorisations in the NYT. They are contextualised in the re-occurring topics of violence, ethnic tension, the social response to violence. The coverage including negative attitudes, such as anger, worry, unfriendliness, and including news participants of Chinese politicians both reveal the negative portrayal of ethnic Chinese Muslims.

How about the representation of Chinese Muslims in the NYT? In the discourse of ethnic tension and negative attitudes (e.g. angry, dissatisfaction), they are represented as a group with resentment and unhappiness in China throughout the 15-year coverage of Chinese Muslims. Muslims as part of world Muslims (e.g. Muslims in Afghanistan) and social marginalisation of Muslim groups in China are stressed to reveal such a portrait. Another nondominant topic category in the NYT, Muslim culture, suggests ethnic Muslims as backward people and exclusive to other societies before 2009, or, simply, 'Oriental Others'. The writer emphasises the differences between Chinese Muslims and the modern world to categorise them as threats to the non-Muslim world and Islamic fundamentalists.

Chinese Muslims as outgroups in the NYT is negatively presented. Typically, their negative feeling (e.g. resent), words (e.g. complaints) and immoral actions are described, by mental, verbal and material processes. These actions are contrasted with Muslims' self-initiative communication, celebration festivals and working hard in the CD. General terms and the topos of history are used to indicate the various Muslim groups as a monolithic society in China, and meanwhile, isolate them from the non-Muslim world. Negative labelling and modal verbs are used to present saying, unhappiness and exclusiveness of the group. Chinese Muslims marginalised in the Han-dominated society are realised by the topos of humanitarianism, justice, voices from Han Chinese, and differentiative social actors are used to confirm outgroup Chinese Muslims in the NYT.

Chapter 5 Chinese Muslims and the Chinese government

Having looked at a broader picture of Chinese Muslims in the two datasets and periods, Chapter 5 and 6 will elaborate on more specific aspects of the construction of the whole Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* and *The NY Times*. As was identified in Chapter 4, most Chinese Muslims are frequently portrayed in relation to the Chinese government in corpus. Chapter 5 will explore how the majority of Chinese Muslims are ideologically portrayed in the discourse about the relationship between most ethnic Muslims and the CCP (i.e. Research Question 2). The chapter thus also construe how most Chinese Muslims are represented ideologically by contextual variables and linguistic features in the CD and the NYT. Specifically, Section 1 to 3 deal with how Chinese Muslims are represented in relation to the ruling party in *China Daily*, such as the portrayal of Muslim citizens in the supporting policies from the CCP. Section 4 and 5 discuss the representation of Chinese Muslims in *The NYT*'s coverage of Chinese Muslims and the Chinese government. Section 6 serves as a summary of this chapter.

The discussion in this chapter also considers the social-political context. As has been described in Chapter 1, the development of Chinese Muslim society is closely related to the Chinese government. The Chinese government has developed supportive national policies targeted at Uyghur Chinese since 1949. It was written in the Constitution that Chinese Muslims enjoy social equality, religious freedom and regional autonomy. Beijing has established Islamic associations since 1953. The organisations are claimed to help the Chinese government to follow the strategy of religious freedom and unite all ethnic Muslim groups. In the 21st Century, several White Papers were composed by the CCP for this large group, especially on human rights (in 2017), religious freedom (in 2016) and social development (2009). According to the latest guideline of Xinhua released in 2018, many terms or some information related to Muslim ethnic groups were prohibited in the mass media discourse in China (Xinhua, 2018). Additionally, Chinese Muslims have been involved in some social conflicts with the Chinese government since 1949. For instance, there were uprisings in Yun Nan in 1975, the bombing issue in Xinjiang in 1993 and the Urumqi Unrest in 2009 (i.e. The Xinjiang Riots). Chinese Muslims, especially Uyghur

Muslims have posted great challenges to Beijing. Under these circumstances, it is interesting to explore how the complicated relationship is constructed in the two different and influential newspapers. It is also interesting to identify how Chinese Muslims are projected in the media.

Quantitative findings mentioned in Chapter 4 will be elaborated in Chapter 5 to reveal in what context most Chinese Muslims are represented, such as the topic category of transformation in the CD. I will also illustrate the categorisation/ portraits of Chinese Muslims and linguistic patterns in these contexts.

1 CD: Powerlessness and social transformation

The Chinese government helping Muslim people in social transformations is contextualised mainly in the discourse of **social transformations**, the discourse of **officials from the Chinese government** and the discourse of **good and successful Muslims**.

1.1 Social transformations and Chinese Muslims

There is sizeable social development in relation to ethnic Muslim communities with the help of CCP (i.e. the Chinese government or Beijing), which is more salient before the 2009 Urumqi Unrest than after violence. The portrayal of Chinese Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of **social transformations** and **Chinese politicians**.⁴³

1.1.1 Social transformations


Social transformations, a rather broad topic category, consists of topics that focus on improvements in various aspects of Muslim (e.g. the betterment of economy, agriculture, ecology). As was reported in the previous Chapter, the category remains central in the corpus and reach the summit before the Xinjiang Riots in 2009 (see Section 1.1 and Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). Both headline analysis and LDA analysis show the salient topics in this topic category. 20.28% of 747 articles are in this topic category. The contribution value⁴⁴ of the topic category is 0.21, which is higher than the average (9.09%, 0.09) (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4), so the topic category of social transformation is a recurrent topic in corpus. The salient topics are 1) the improvement of Muslims' living standard and 2) economic

⁴³ Bolded words are discourse contexts in the portrayal of Chinese Muslims

⁴⁴ Contribution value of a topic category is the strength of a category in discourse.

betterment. They are indicated by words of “economic”, “industry”, “residents” “village” etc. (also see Appendix 1).

Collocation analysis also can demonstrate that Chinese Muslims are portrayed frequently with the topic of social transformation. “Muslim” collocates with words of “product”, “merchant” and “commodities”. And “rich” and “Muslims” are mentioned together in the corpus (see Appendix 3).



Note: The results in headline analysis mean the proportion of a topic in a year in relation to other topics in the corpus. Numbers from LDA analysis result indicates the contribution value of a topic in relation to the values of other topics in a year.

Figure 5.1 Diachronic development of the topics of living standard and economic growth in the CD

Among all topics in the category of social transformation, **living standard and economic development** are recurrent. Figure 5.1 above shows the change of these two topics from 2001 to 2015, where Chinese Muslims are depicted more often in the discourse of economic development than in the discourse of improving Muslims’ living standards. The findings overlap with the features in *People’s Daily* (i.e. the newspaper targets at domestic readers). In the news coverage about Uyghur Muslims between 2002 and 2010, journalists emphasise the governmental efforts in the economic development in Xinjiang and the elimination of regional poverty (Qian, 2010). Another common feature in two pictures of Figure 5.1 is that the topic of economic development peaks in 2002 and 2011 and keeps rising after 2013. The diachronic change of this topic echoes with Beijing’s supportive programs for ethnic Muslims. Headline analysis shows the connection between regional economic development and Beijing’s supportive policies. The peak in 2002 can be caused by China’s West Development. During the national program, the Chinese government took actions to develop the Western regions of China, such as the construction

of “West-East Gas Pipelines” in Xinjiang (i.e. the province with a large Muslim population). In the CD, an article headlined “Construction starts on Xinjiang Hotan gas pipeline” (10th Aug. 2002) is about the national program. Besides, “One Belt One Road initiative” is related to the topical rise after 2013, such as “Xinjiang economy forms closer international ties under New Silk Road” (11th July 2015).

Example 1 is a typical extract of representing Muslims as receivers of the CCP’s help in social development, which was extracted from LDA analysis. It is presented that the national development of Xinjiang connects this region with the world.

Example 1

URUMQI - China's far western Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region is becoming better connected with the international community after the implementation of the Silk Road **Economic Belt**. (CD, 11th July 2015)⁴⁵

Similar to other instances in the CD, the writer in Example 1 situates Chinese Muslims in the context of social transformation by the indicators of “economic”. In this short example, Xinjiang, the autonomous region for Uyghur Chinese, is revealed to benefit from the implementation of the national strategy. The writer specifies the benefit as “a better connection with the international community”. Muslims are thus portrayed as being supported with help from a father-like CCP government to connect with the world. A domestic social group capable of receiving governmental help should be citizens without criminal acts. Therefore, Muslims as the recipient of the CCP’s help denotes to the ingroup categorisations of them as peaceful Chinese citizens in *China Daily*. Additionally, the specification of Muslim international connection denotes to the openness of ethnic Muslims. Possibly to assume that Muslim people expect to better connect with the international communities, and so, becoming moderate Muslims rather than fundamentalists.

Two linguistic strategies are salient in the construction of Uyghur Muslims as a beneficiary of the CCP’s help. The topos of advantage is used — Xinjiang becomes a

⁴⁵ China Daily (2015, 11 July). “Xinjiang economy forms closer international ties under new Silk Road”.

beneficiary of “the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt”. With nominalisation “implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt”, the Chinese government as the performer of opening Xinjiang to the West is deemphasised at the beginning of the news piece. The lead is usually composed of the most important and interesting information about a piece of news. Fairclough (1989) claims that the use of nominalisation serves to leave the attribution of responsibility unclear. The nominalisation in the lead can obscure who is responsible for implementing the initiative, and further distance the news article from an explicit appreciation to the CCP. With regards to the local context, the latter discourse provides the background of the internationalisation of Xinjiang. Also, the *CD* journalist elaborates on how the CCP implements the strategy. It is reported that Chinese leader XI Jinping raised this initiative in the year 2013.

1.1.2 Chinese Muslims and the CCP officials

The Chinese government’s assistance in the social betterment of Muslim communities is contextualised in the discourse of **top Chinese officials** and **Chinese officials with Muslim ethnicity**. It has been discussed in Chapter 4 that Chinese government officers are recurrent in the coverage of Chinese Muslims with 43.1% of 1,202 personal terms that connote Chinese people (see Section 3 in Chapter 4). The question arises of how the narrative of Chinese government officials helps the representation of Muslim communities.

Top Chinese officials are portrayed as principal developers for economic status in regions with a large Chinese Muslim population and especially in Xinjiang (see Figure 5.2 below). In turn, Chinese Muslims are beneficiaries of social transformations in Xinjiang. In the first line, Jiang Zemin prompts the development of Xinjiang in the West Development Campaign. He “called for enhancing awareness of the importance of the large-scale west development campaign”. In Line 2, Xi Jinping initiates the Silk Road Economic Belt program, in which Xinjiang is an important hub city. It is an “overland network” with the purpose of “boosting international trade and cooperation”. The positive term “boosting” suggests the openness of Uyghur Muslims to the world (cf. Example 1 above). From another perspective, the first two examples were extracted from news pieces respectively published in 2002 and 2015. The expressions of “the large-scale west development campaign” and “the Silk Road Economic Belt” reconfirm the connection

between topics in the coverage and the socio-political environment. This linkage confirms that the increase of economic development as a topic in the CD is relevant to the supportive national policies.

The conducts of top Chinese leaders are stressed in the CD in the projection of top Chinese leaders as a developer of Xinjiang. Material clauses are a typical linguistic feature to express the acts of Chinese leaders. From Figure 5.2 below, “Jiang Zemin” and “Xi Jinping” are assigned to the role of an actor in the material process (e.g. “proposed”), targeting at social transformations (e.g. “Silk Road Economic Belt”). The two presidents are thus represented as powerful in transforming the social situation in Xinjiang. And Chinese leaders have the initiative to develop Xinjiang and help Chinese Muslims. An alternative expression will lessen the dynamism of top Chinese officials in the behaviour, such as “it is proposed that...”. Similar to the previous discussion in Section 1.1.1, it is common sense that any Chinese citizen eligible to receive subsidization from the ruling party must be regarded as to support the CCP’s policies and ingroups in Chinese state media. Therefore, the depiction of Muslims as the beneficiary of development in Xinjiang

reveals them as an ingroup in *CD*.

1 Western region continue to lag President	Jiang Zemin	<u>called for enhancing awareness of the importance of the large-scale west development campaign</u> and pushing forward work on this front on Monday.
2 President	Xi Jinping	proposed the Silk Road Economic Belt in 2013, an <u>overland network</u> focused on <u>boosting international trade and cooperation</u> on infrastructure projects with Central, South and West Asian countries.
3. in language" he said, adding that in this way they will have <u>more working opportunities</u> .	Nur Bekri	<u>revealed that the Chinese government will spend a total of 3 billion yuan rebuilding the old town area of Kashgar</u>
4. Region especially those in <u>the southern part of Xinjiang have been living a better life.</u> " he said.	Ismail Tiliwaldi ,	chairman of the region <u>told</u> a news conference yesterday in Beijing" I can announce here that <u>the days when people did not have enough to eat are over now,</u> " he said.

Figure 5.2 Sample concordances lines about Chinese officials in the discourse about social transformations in the CD

The CCP officials with Muslim ethnicity are announcers of social development. Voices from Muslim insiders are used, increasing the persuasion of social improvement (cf. voice from a Pakistani journalist in Chapter 4). In Line 3 of Figure 5.2 above, Nur Bekri announces the national investment in Kashgar (i.e. a big city in Xinjiang with a sizeable Uyghur population) to rebuild the old town. He “reveal(s)” that CCP “will spend a total of 3 billion yuan” to rebuild “the old town area of Kashgar”. Another Muslim public official claims the end of starvation in Xinjiang (see Line 4). The words show the success of Beijing’s supportive program — “the days when people did not have enough to eat are over now”. From the announcement, Chinese Muslims are revealed as beneficiaries of the CCP’s help in the living environment. Moreover, the stress on the betterment of living condition sometimes demonstrates the powerlessness of the majority of Chinese Muslims. “The old town area of Kashgar” (Line 3) and “enough to eat” (Line 4) present that many Muslims are capable of getting rid of poverty with governmental help. Still, they have not reached the standard of a well-off society, which is a national strategy in China. The portrait

of powerless Chinese Muslims receiving the CCP's help in living condition reflects the categorisation of good Chinese citizens and moderate ethnic people (cf. the previous paragraph)

Two linguistic strategies are typical in the discourse of Chinese Muslim officials, who have strong alignment with the Chinese government. First, verbal actions of Chinese Muslim politicians are stressed, expressed by verbal clauses. "Nurbekri" and "Ismail Tilwalidi" are sayers in the verbal process of "revealed" and "told", targeting at the verbiage. Usually, the verbiage is about the CCP supportive policies towards the Chinese Muslim group, such as "The Chinese government will spend a total of 3 billion yuan rebuilding the old town area of Kashgar. The Chinese Muslim politicians thus play a powerful role in the expression, who can decide whether or not they want to announce the CCP's assistance. The power indicates that they are eager to disseminate that their compatriots have received governmental help to eliminate poverty and improve living condition. Any other expression will decrease the willingness of Muslim officials. For instance, the verbal clauses in Line 4 can be replaced by "It was told that 'the days when people did not have enough to eat are over now'".

The second linguistic feature is that similar to Example 1 above, the topos of advantage is used in the announcement from Muslim officials. The statement from Chinese Muslim per se authenticates benefits Chinese Muslims take from the supportive national policies. In the example, people in the underdeveloped region of Xinjiang "have been living a better life" and have "more working opportunities". Focusing on the benefits of Muslim citizens constructs a harmonious link between a father-like government and the majority of Chinese Muslims. Further, they are categorised as good Chinese citizens and moderate ethnic groups (i.e. ingroups in the newspaper).

1.2 Powerlessness and economic development

It is found in the corpus that *China Daily* emphasises economic development in all aspects of social transformations. Many types of positive attitudes are also used to construct the CCP's help with economic growth in the region with a large Chinese Muslim population, such as **Goodness, Success, Importance**. It has been reported in Chapter 4 that these positive attitudes are marked in the CD corpus, composed of *CD*'s coverage of Chinese

Muslims from 2001 to 2015. The k value of these attitudinal SMCs respectively are 256.58, 21.01 and 30.47 ($k \geq 15.13$, $p < 0.0001$) (see also Appendix 2). Appreciation of Beijing's activities and policies to the ethnic minority is not surprising, as the Chinese media serve to disseminate the Party's voices (Lee, 2000; Lee et al., 2002).

Concordance lines in Figure 5.3 below are typical in the illustration of successful governmental aids, such as initiating inter-regional and international business cooperation (see Line 4, 5, 6 and 7), help with food quality (Line 8, 9 and 10) and infrastructure building (Line 1, 2 and 3). For instance, there are "improvement of infrastructure" (Line 2), "the success of the Urumqi trade fair" (Line 4) and "unified halal standard is a recipe for success" (Line 9). These highlights in the news, on the one hand, mirror the emphasis in White Paper in 2009 (the State Council Information Office, 2009). Infrastructure building, the opening up in Xinjiang, Xinjiang modernisation and the betterment of people's livelihood are covered enormously. On the other hand, Beijing encourages business collaboration with Arab countries ("domestic investment environment for Arabian" in Line 5). Similar to the previous section, Chinese Muslims are then seen as recipients of the CCP's help in the regional economy. Shown in Example 2 below, powerlessness is another element in the portrait of Chinese Muslims.

1. A scheme to renovate the old city area to	improve	the living conditions and enable the area to resist natural disasters began in September 2001 (Example 2)
2. billion yuan, four times that in 1994. (3) Distinct	Improvement	of Infrastructure In 2003, the total investment
3. its highways are some 21,000 km. They represent an	important	part of the transcontinental highways connecting A
4. Trade and Economic Co-operation Department. " the	success	of the Urumqi, trade fair has demonstrated the important
5. build infrastructure, as well as	improve	its domestic investment environment for Arabian
6. cy of opening to foreign investments will help us improve	improve	the production efficiency of the State-run enterpr
7. n the fact that it is located at what has been an	important	merchant route, the 'Silk Road', since ancient tim (Example 3)
8. said Ablā. "Good quality contributes a lot to the	success	of our food products." Besides striving for high
9. Ma said. Unified halal standard is recipe for	success	Growing Muslim market requires food prepared in a
10. ensure the quality of its products, said Ablā.	Good	quality contributes a lot to the success of our

Figure 5.3 Sample concordance lines about Success, Good and Important in the CD

Two typical examples will be analysed here. The analyses demonstrate that, in the discourse of these attitudes — success, goodness and importance, Muslims are treated as powerless groups receiving governmental help with economic growth.

Example 2 (see Line 1 in Figure 5.3) was taken from the attitudinal analysis. It describes that the investment makes people in Kashgar moving from the shabby old house

to the modernised buildings. Kashgar is a city in Southern Xinjiang with a huge Chinese Muslim population.

Example 2

A scheme to renovate the old city area to improve the living conditions and enable the area to resist natural disasters began in September 2001, with a total investment of 660 million yuan (US\$79 million). Nearly 5,000 households, or 35 per cent of the residents of the old city area, are expected to move into modernised residential quarters. (*CD*, 7th Sept. 2003)⁴⁶.

Similar to other instances of this portrait of Muslims in the *CD*, the writer stresses governmental policies success and Muslims' benefits in Example 2. "Improv(ing) the living conditions" is resulted from the investment of "660 million yuan (US\$79 million)". A large number of Chinese Muslims are said to benefit from the investment and strategy, and so become recipients of governmental help in the economy. "5,000 households, or 35 per cent of the residents of the old city area" will move into a "modernised residential quarter". From assisting many Muslims with new houses, we can imply that the majority of Chinese Muslims are qualified to gain the CCP's help in living, or they can enjoy the Chinese welfare system. By this indication, *CD* categorises them as moderate and good ethnic Chinese citizens. In turn, the CCP is a father-like government to ethnic citizens.

Muslims are not only recipients of the CCP's help in the economy but powerless groups. Like the concordance lines in Table 5.2 above, "the [new living] area to resist natural disasters" is an indicator in the extract. This expression implies that Muslims Chinese used to inhabit the region that cannot "resist natural disasters". And the CCP's investment to build new houses can save them from insecurity. "Modernised" is another term indicating powerlessness of Chinese Muslims, because, by the word, the CCP's help with the economy is said to modernise ethnic Muslims. In other words, Muslims still need modernisation. The point does not contradict the portrayal of modern Muslims in Chapter

⁴⁶ China Daily (2003, 07 October) "Kashi's timeless charm captivates visitors"

4, since the analysis here only uncovers that Muslims need more modernity based on the current situation.

A number of linguistic features in Example 2 are symbolic of constructing Muslims as powerless receivers of CCP's economic development efforts. The topos of advantage is used, same as in many instances in the corpus. Improving living conditions and moving into modernised houses symbolise that Chinese Muslims are beneficiaries of the supportive program. The topos of numbers is another frequently used linguistic strategy to quantify CCP's tremendous help to ethnic Muslims. The exact number of "a total investment of 660 million yuan" and "35 percent of the residents" signify that it is a large project to support residents. Positive labels of "improve living conditions" and "modernised residential quarters" present helpfulness from the CCP to Muslim citizens. Similar to Example 1, the Chinese government as investors are backgrounded with nominalisation — "a total investment of 660 million yuan", probably to deemphasise the CCP's involvement in the local economy. However, the cotext of this extract elicits that the CCP is the investor of a total of 660 million RMB. It is found that the writer uses "civilian dwellings" to describe the new building for Muslims. And that is a part of the social security system in China.

Example 2 about Xinjiang's development praises the local government in Xinjiang for its competence and success in helping Xinjiang residents. As was discussed in Chapter 4, economic development in Xinjiang is a symbolic topic to unfold social transformations in *China Daily*. The emphasis on economic growth assumes that the hype on the government's achievements in coverage tends to justify its father-like role (i.e. strong, centralised and macro-managing role in the regional economic development. It is claimed in Cai (2008: 22): "Sometimes the stated economic greatness maybe just a cover for state's concern with its political legitimacy and power". This concern is also supported in Zheng (2011)'s research about Uyghur Muslims in Chinese newspapers.

Example 3 (see Line 7 in Figure 5.3 above) is another typical instance of how CD represent powerless Muslims receiving governmental help in the discourse of success, excellence and importance. The example presents a national strategy that Xinjiang will be built as a trading centre in the West of China.

Example 3

Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli said at the conference that the region has **advantages** in its geographic location and rich natural resources and should become a strategic energy base for the country. “Xinjiang should be established as a western port for China’s foreign trade given the fact that it is located at what has been an **important merchant route**, the ‘Silk Road’, since ancient times” Zhang said. (CD, 24th September 2013)⁴⁷.

Indicated by the markers of “advantages” and “important” “established” and “West port” in the extract, the writer reveals the national strategies in economic development in Xinjiang. By the plan, Muslims in Xinjiang are constructed as receivers of CCP’s help with economic growth.

In Example 3, voices from Chinese vice-premier are used to announce economic strategies beneficial to Muslims, which is similar to many other instances in the corpus. “Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli” as a sayer in the verbal process, “said”, which is targeted at the verbiage (i.e. that [...]). This expression insinuates that Zhang has the initiative to praise Xinjiang and announce national plans to the majority of Chinese Muslims. The sentence can be re-written as “According to Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, the region [...]”, by which initiative of the CCP politician can be decreased. Zhang’s initiative in the act insinuates that helping Muslims with the economy is critical for the Chinese government. Referring back to the discussion between ingroup categorisation and Muslims as beneficiary in supportive policies, we can imply ethnic Muslims as good and moderate Chinese citizens in China in this extract.

The writer positively represents the CCP’s plan in Xinjiang with Zhang’s words. Internationalisation and modernisation of Xinjiang are stressed by “a strategic energy base for the country” and “a western port for China’s foreign trade”. The meaning is that Chinese Muslims in Xinjiang will become modernised and globalised by the strategies. In turn, it is indicated from this topic that Muslims in Xinjiang are not as globalised as is expected

⁴⁷ China Daily (2013, 24 September). “Govt to boost Xinjiang region”

by the CCP. They are still a powerless group needing governmental assistance. Moreover, the writer backgrounds the role of the CCP in supportive actions. It is notable in “Xinjiang should be established as a western port” that the writer hides the actor in the material process (i.e. “established”) with passivation. Fairclough (1989) claims that passive voice can obfuscate the agency to lessen the involvement of performers in the events. According to this statement, the de-emphasis of the CCP in Example 3 plays down The CCP’s involvement in supporting Chinese Muslims with economic strategies. The expression can play up supportive actions per se, and highlights Muslims as the beneficiary of the economic assistance.

Zhang also expresses appreciations of the majority of Chinese Muslims and Xinjiang in Example 3 above. Positive attitudinal markers of “advantages” and “important” indicate the importance and benefit of Xinjiang to China. First, it is expressed that Xinjiang has “advantages in geographic location and rich natural resources”. Second, “Silk Road”, “merchant route” and “since ancient time”, these expressions indicate that ethnic Muslims have never been exclusive to non-Muslims (i.e. the topos of history). “Silk Road” is labelled as a “merchant route” in the extract. And it is well-known to link Asia and Europe via Xinjiang. The use of Silk Road here thus implies that Xinjiang people have been customised to conducting business with non-Muslims. By geopolitical advantages of Xinjiang and openness of people, Muslims are seen as an ingroup to the newspaper.

Modal verbs are frequent in the representation of Muslims as receivers of Beijing’s subsidisation. The item of “should” in Example 3 strengthen Muslims as recipients of governmental help in economic growth. The modal verb “should” implies the meanings of 1) obligations that ground the demand in the subjectivity of the speaker, and 2) possibilities that intermediate the certainty and increase the objectivity of information or knowledge. The extract is then interpretable in two ways – the Chinese government has a duty or a choice in the business development of Xinjiang. However, in the corresponding news from Xinhuanet, Zhang emphasises the government’s duty to involve Xinjiang’s development into national planning (i.e. “必须把新疆的发展放到全国的大局中统筹谋划”) (Xinhua, 2013), which means Beijing’s determination to support Chinese Muslims for the betterment of the regional economy. So, “should” in Example 3 indicates

responsibility on the part of the central government in supporting the regional economy. Based on Fairclough (2000), the use of modal “should” forms “authoritarian language” (p.108). By the modal verb, then, the writer implies the resolution of the Chinese government to build Xinjiang as “a western port for China’s foreign trade”. In other word, CCP regards helping them with globalisation and modernisation as a duty of the government. It is well-known that a government has obligations to support its legal citizens. By this information, the obligation to help most Chinese Muslims indicate that they are good and moderate ethnic Chinese citizens.

The global context of the news article can construe the toughness in the governmental voice to help Chinese Muslims, e.g. the socio-political environment related to news production. Before September 2013 (i.e. the reporting time), five violent attacks occurred in Xinjiang, including Kashgar clash resulting in 15 casualties (Lee, 2014). The journalist from *The Guardian* (2013) claims the riot occurred on April 23rd in Kashgar as the “deadliest single incident in the region since 2009”. *China Daily* is known to disseminate the CCP’s voices. After the act of violence, the strong determination indicated by “should” suggests the CCP’s great concern of Chinese Muslim. The emphasis on supportive economic strategies is supposed to show CCP’s sincerity to solve social problems in Xinjiang and its parental care to Muslim citizens. As is claimed in Mackerras (2014:249): “If economic development continues to succeed, if attempts at disruption fail and diminish, it is possible that, though it will never disappear, tension will gradually lessen”.

2 CD: Religious freedom

In the CD, ethnic Muslims are represented to worship Islam with assistance from CCP. Such a portrayal of Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* is in tune with the White Paper on the religious freedom in Xinjiang (the State Council Information Office, 2016). This paper stresses the full implementation of religious freedom in Xinjiang and the government’s increasing ability to administer religious affairs based on law. Many religious facts include the engagement of the Chinese government. For instance, Beijing has organised chartered flights for the Mecca’s pilgrimage since 1996; they help to ensure the smooth religious practice during Ramadan. They also protect and repair many religious and cultural heritage

sites, especially mosques. Many similar topics are identified in the CD corpus primarily in topic analysis and the exploration of attitudinal features.

The topic category of **Islam as a religion** is the context of this portrait of the Chinese Muslim group. This topic category has been elaborated in Chapter 4 (see Section 1.2), so I will brief it here. The topic analysis shows that the coverage of Muslim religion is significant in the *CD*'s pre-09 news coverage about Chinese Muslims. There are news articles of "Officials help celebrate Muslim festival" (20th Sept. 2010), "9600 Chinese Muslims flying to Medinah for Haj this year" and "Diplomats appreciate well-protected culture in Xinjiang" (13th Aug. 2009). From "official help celebrate", "diplomats appreciate", it is indicated that Chinese Muslims are buttressed with the CCP's help to enjoy religious freedom.

Findings from collocation analysis can reassure that the representation of Chinese Muslims in the CD is frequently contextualised in the discourse of Muslim religion. The word "Muslims" tends to collocate with "hajj", "pilgrimage", "Ramadan", and a similar case is found with the word "Muslim" (see Appendix 3). Muslims are mentioned pertinent to Islam, and so we can assume that ethnic Muslims are allowed for religious practice.

Example 4, taken from topic analysis, exemplifies the representation of Muslims gaining the CCP's help for religion in the discourse of Islam (i.e. Muslim religion). It is presented that the Chinese government helped Chinese Muslims for the Mecca pilgrimage by chartering flights in the year 2014.

Example 4

Authorities estimate the total number of Chinese pilgrims will exceed 14,000 who go to Mecca on a government-organised trip this year. [1] The last group for the hajj is scheduled to leave on Saturday. [...]

The five-day session will also be attended by over 50 Chinese official
functionaries who will provide medical and security services. (CD, 17th Sept.
2014)⁴⁸

Consistent with other instances in the CD for this portrayal, the writer stresses in Example 4 the assistance from the CCP to ethnic Muslims to join in an international Islamic ritual. Behaviours of Beijing symbolise most ethnic Muslims in China as the recipient of CCP's help for religious freedom. Beijing not only organises over "14,000" Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, but appoints "50 official functionaries" for "medical and security services". The CCP's concern about Muslims' health and safety indicates considerations of the government in organising Muslims to Mecca, which suggests the CCP as a father-like government to its citizens.

Sending Muslim people to the pilgrimage reveals Muslims as an ingroup in *CD*. The Mecca's pilgrimage is a ritual pertinent to every Muslim, being radical or moderate. Sending Chinese Muslims to Mecca shows that the CCP has a level of respect for Chinese Muslims. To add, because they are Chinese citizens and moderate ethnic group, the CCP organises a vast number of Chinese Muslims and concern about their security and health. This point can prove that the state newspaper helps the government to promote the categorisation of good and moderate ethnic Muslims in the example.

Three linguistic features in Example 4 above boost the representation of Muslims as recipients of the CCP's care in religious freedom. The topos of numbers is a frequently used linguistic feature in such a portrait in the corpus. In Example 4, "Exceed 14,000" pilgrims and "50 Chinese functionaries" present a large-scale religious trip organised by the Chinese government. Simply put, a great number of Chinese Muslims enjoy the subsidisation from the father-like government. From the context, the Chinese government is scheduler of "the last group of Hajj", and the intervention of the government is downplayed by the passive voice (see Clause [1]). Third, modal verbs are also typical for this portrait in the CD. "Will" in Example 4 downplays the factuality of assistance, by making it an epistemic future (Dunmire, 2010). However, it is implied from "will exceed 14,000", "will

⁴⁸ China Daily (2014. 17 September). "Over 14,000 Chinese Muslims set for Mecca pilgrimage".

be attended by 50 Chinese official functionaries” and “will provide medical care and social security” that the CCP has attached attention to Muslims in China and decide to subsidise them for the religious ritual.

Additionally, in the discourse of **happiness** (similar to Section 2.3 of Chapter 4), *CD* disseminates that the CCP creates a free environment for the majority of Chinese Muslims. From the discussion in Chapter 4, happiness is a marked attitudinal SMC in the *CD* corpus, with the *k* value of 56.17. The *journalists* recount the “celebrat(ion)” of religious festivals (see Line 1, 4 and 5 in Figure 5.4 below), “enjoy(ment) of freedom” (Line 2) and “conver(tion) to Islam” (Line 3). According to Janyusi (1984)’s category-bond activities, Chinese Muslims are implied to enjoy Islam in China happily. In the NYT, religious freedom of Chinese Muslim groups is also a big concern in the American newspaper. However, it is focused quite differently. Muslims in China are under the constraint of religious freedom (see Section 4).

1 autonomous regions, more than 2.2 million Hui Muslims	enjoy	four days off from Saturday to Tuesday to celebrate (Example 5)
2 ine. People of ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang	enjoy	freedom of religious belief, and their customs and
3 ex relented. "I have <u>converted to Islam</u> because I	love	Conde," the 24-year-old said. She has taken the Mu
4 such as Hui, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik and Kirgiz also c	celebrate	the Corban Festival. Ma Xueyan, a Hui minority, wa
5 vice president of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of Ruzhou	celebrated	the traditional festival of the Hui and Uyghur--Lessr Bairam

Figure 5.4 Sample concordance lines about Happiness in the CD

Example 5 (also see Line 1 in Figure 5.4 above) is also typical for representing that Muslims enjoy religious freedom with the CCP’s help in the discourse of Muslims’ happiness. It was extracted from attitudinal analysis, and it presents that Xinjiang Muslims celebrated Ramadan with governmental supports in the year 2012.

Example 5

In the Ningxia Hui autonomous region, more than 2.2 million Hui Muslims **enjoy** four days off from Saturday to Tuesday to celebrate the festival. In the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, [1]1,000 metric tons of additional meat products were supplied last week to ensure more than 11 million Muslims in the region **could** celebrate the occasion at affordable prices. (*CD*, 20th Aug. 2012)⁴⁹

The markers of happiness, “enjoy” and “celebrate”, holidays and meat indicate that Chinese Muslims enjoy Ramadan with meat and holidays. A great number of Chinese Muslims are involved in this celebration. Similar to the previous example, numbers of “2.2 million Hui Muslims” and “11 million Muslims” mean that the celebration pertains to a large Chinese Muslim population.

Muslims as benefits takers are presented by the topos of advantage too. They “enjoy four days off” and are supplied with “1,000 metric tons of additional meat products [...] at affordable prices”. In other words, a large number of Chinese Muslim benefit from meat supply and a four-day holiday during Ramadan. The celebration and happiness during Ramadan and encouragements from the CCP elicit to the ingroup categorisation of ethnic Muslims in *CD*, an official newspaper in China. Given that ethnic Muslims are seen as moderate Muslims advocating the CCP’s governance, they are qualified to receive this social welfare and paternalistic care from the Chinese government.

Of great interest in Example 5 is that the CCP as a supporter is deemphasised (similar to examples in Section 1). In Clause [1], the actor in the material process “supplied” is backgrounded with passive voice. According to Fairclough (1989), the use of passivation can downgrade the actors’ involvement in the supply of meat during this Muslim festival and upgrade the fact of supplying (cf. Example 3). However, the global context of the news article makes CCP the supporter of Muslim citizens. In China, the government can regulate public holidays and finetune the meat price to “affordable prices” during holidays. The

⁴⁹ China Daily (2012, 20 August) “Muslims celebrate end of Ramadan”

government indeed must regulate the market of necessities in daily life, e.g. meat for Muslims during Ramadan.

To sum up Section 2 in Chapter 5, the majority of Chinese Muslims are treated as having religious freedom in China with the CCP's assistance. Such a portrayal of Chinese Muslims again demonstrates an ingroup membership categorisation of ethnic Muslims by the Chinese state newspaper. To the Chinese government, they are moderate citizens with Muslim ethnicity, thus having freedom and receiving help and respect from the CCP. This ingroup membership categorisation is revealed in the discourse of Islam as a religion and Muslims' happiness in the CD. The topos of numbers and advantage and positive labelling are typical to present the ethnic group as receipts of father-like cares from the CCP. Like the previous section, Beijing's actions are stressed with material processes. Modal verbs are used in the announcement of the CCP's actions and Muslims' benefit.

3 CD: Powerlessness and intercultural communication after 2009

China Daily promulgates the difficulties of ethnic Muslims in intercultural communication and assistance from the Chinese government in the coverage of Chinese Muslims. Muslims' hardship in communicating with the non-Muslim world is stressed in the post-09 dataset (i.e. the CD2). And, as was discussed in Section 1, powerless Muslims in living are emphasised in the pre-09 dataset (i.e. the CD1). Such portrayals of Chinese Muslims in post-09 dataset echo with the portraits of Muslims discussed in Chapter 4. That is, Chinese Muslim people are open to the non-Muslim world and expect for intercultural communication. The portrayal of Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of **improvement of education, hardship in life and intelligence of Muslims**. The analytical result was taken from topic analysis and attitudinal analysis.

3.1 Powerlessness and intercultural communication after 2009

The majority of ethnic Muslims are treated as having problems with interactions with the non-Muslim world in the discourse of **hardship in life**. It has been reported in Chapter 4 that difficulties are a prominent attitude in *CD*'s post-09 coverage of Chinese Muslims, taken from the attitudinal analysis. The log-likelihood suggests that *k* value of its SMC is 21.61 (≥ 15.13 , $p < 0.0001$) in the CD2 compared with CD1.

In the post-09 dataset, difficulties are presented in the following instances – “it's so difficult for us women to go outside”, “people's lack of understanding of Xinjiangers” and “the place is poor and isolated”. From these expressions, the writer highlights the misunderstanding between Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese and geological isolation of Muslims. Moreover, journalists present these topics as causes of communicative difficulties between two Chinese groups. The CCP's endeavour to solve the problem is emphasised in the discourse. Following instances are typical in the CD2 corpus: “We call them ‘problems among people’ ”meaning they can be solved through coordination”. Based on the narrative of difficulties and help, Muslims are represented as powerless recipients of the CCP's aid in intercultural communication.

Example 6, from the attitudinal analysis, is typical to reveal such a portrait of ethnic Muslims in the discourse of their difficulties. Muslims in the southern Xinjiang had problems communicating with Han officers after the 2009 violence. And government officials would carefully find the solution.

Example 6

The project aims to ease ethnic tensions and counter the infiltration by terrorist forces.

"Southern Xinjiang has been isolated from the outside world for a long time. the Uygur and Han ethnic groups don't communicate with each other, and 'Eastern Turkistan' terrorists have become rampant. [1] If the situation continues, misunderstandings between Uygurs and Hans will be exaggerated." [...]

Mullah Abdul Sammy, a respected senior cleric, who told him, "all real Muslims hate terrorism".[...]

"Sending officials to southern Xinjiang is a trial. [2] We need to cautiously look for solutions to the problems." (CD, 16th Mar. 2012)⁵⁰

⁵⁰ China Daily (2012, 16 March) “Agent to change”.

Chinese Muslims' powerlessness in intercultural communication is first insinuated in Example 6 by the indicator of "problems". In the CD, journalists usually explicate difficulties to indicate the portrait of powerless Muslims receiving governmental help in communication. In the extract, the writer specifically uses voices from a Han CCP official (i.e. Chen) to announce the difficulties. In his voice, the expressions "isolated from the outside world" and "don't communicate with each other" mean that there are internal reasons among Muslims for the difficulty. Chinese Muslims have a hardship because of geological isolation from non-Muslim Chinese and little communication with Han Chinese. The expression "infiltrated by terrorist forces" is the external cause of the difficulties. The CCP see that terrorism has impacted people in Southern Xinjiang, i.e. Uyghur Muslims. Both causes reflect the use of the topos of reality, a strategy frequently used for this portrait in the CD. Besides, the writer presents a threat in the example, with the topos of threat and modal verbs. In Wodak (2001,2009), the topos of threat is defined as dangers or threats with conditional clauses in discourse, so as to call for a stop. In Clause [1], the hardship is premised (i.e. "will") to exaggerate "misunderstandings between Uyghurs and Hans". Ethnic tension between Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese will be enlarged, justifying the response from the CCP.

The expressions of "sending officials to southern Xinjiang is a trial" and "need to cautiously look for solutions" present Beijing's assistance with a communication problem in the extract. The two acts imply the CCP's great efforts in helping Uyghur Muslim, representing the father-like figure. First, Southern Xinjiang is remote from the Han area in Xinjiang. Indicated by "a trial", the result of sending Han official to the remote Muslim region is not guaranteed. The trial suggests the CCP's efforts to solve Xinjiang issues. Second, the terms "need to" and "cautiously" mean that carefully solving the problem is a must for Han officials. It can be indicated that Beijing has paid particular attention to solving Uyghurs' communication problem with Han Chinese. This information insinuates the fact that Muslims deserve the CCP's attention and efforts because they are good Chinese and moderate Muslims. So, the portrait denotes Muslims as ingroups to the Chinese government and this state newspaper.

The writer also presents Chinese Muslims as good Muslims with words from “a respected senior cleric”. The positive term “respected” indicates respects from the Chinese official to Muslims and the religion. From “all real Muslims hate terrorism”, the majority of Chinese Muslims in the region are divided from Muslim terrorists.

Topics in the cotext of the extract also reveal the appreciation of the CCP and an ingroup membership categorisation of ethnic Muslims. For instance, Chen is reported to study the Quran and making an Uyghur friend. The writer stresses the struggles and to solve the communication problem are also recorded. The struggle is caused by Chen’s lack of professional knowledge and experience, which appreciates Chen as an ordinary man to local Uyghurs. That is different from the conventional coverage of CCP officials in Chinese media discourse - perfect and strong individuals serving people heart and soul. These narratives of Chen, a CCP official, reveals Beijing’s father-like caring for Chinese Uyghur citizens.

3.2 Powerlessness and the development of Mandarin after 2009

CD journalists underline that Muslims’ vulnerability in Mandarin barricades their interaction with non-Muslim Chinese. Such a portrayal of ethnic Muslim is contextualised in the discourse of **improvement of education, the intelligence of Chinese Muslims** (e.g. “skill”, “ability”) and **difficulties in life** in most cases. Headline analysis suggests that improvement of education is a frequently occurring topic in the topic category of social transformations. And it is more salient in the post-09 dataset than in the pre-09 dataset. Also, as has been reported in Chapter 4, ability and intelligence ($k=17.95 \geq 15.13$) are positive attitudinal features in the *CD* corpus (also see Appendix 2). The difficulty ($k=21.62$) is an attitudinal feature in the *CD2*. Both findings were retrieved from attitudinal analysis. Detailed analysis suggests that markers of three attitudes are common in the discourse of improving education in the post-09 dataset. Two main topics in the discourse are Muslims’ poor proficiency in Mandarin and Beijing’s assistance.

Seen from Figure 5.5 below, *CD* writers stress that Uyghur Chinese lack the Mandarin language proficiency (e.g. “can’t speak Mandarin at all” in Line 1 in Figure 5.5 below). They are “encouraged to learn Mandarin” (Line 2). The publicly-owned oil company helps to improve Mandarin proficiency among most Chinese Muslim population

(“help them overcome language difficulties” in Line 3). From these expressions, Chinese Muslims are portrayed as powerless groups enjoying the CCP’s help for improving language proficiency in those topics.

1. n Chinese, but most of his classmates	can't	speak Mandarin at all. Most of these students are ethnic Uygurs o
2 ur. After all, the Uygurs are	encouraged	to learn Mandarin, and bilingual education should work both ways," s
3. Uygur, Kazak, Hui and Mongolian. To help them overcome language	difficulties	, the company arranged for Han workers to teach them.
4. ng, ethnic residents lack basic Mandarin language	skills	due to inadequate education while many Han office (Example 7)

Figure 5.5 Sample concordance lines about Ability/intelligence and Difficulty in the CD

Example 7 (see Line 4 in Figure 5.5) is a typical example to showcase how the government supports powerless Uyghur Muslims to improve Mandarin proficiency. Similar to Example 6 above, it was also extracted from attitudinal analysis. The Chinese government organises a language program for Uyghurs and non-Muslim public officials here.

Example 7

In Xinjiang, ethnic residents **lack** basic Mandarin language **skills** due to **inadequate** education while many Han officials from inland provinces lack Uyghur language skills. [1] The government has organised massive language classes to bridge the gaps. (CD, 1st Mar. 2012) ⁵¹

In the example above, powerless Muslims needing help in the language is constructed. And indicated by markers of “lack”, “inadequate” and “skills” is contextualised in the discourse of Muslims’ intelligence and difficulties in life. These markers are specifically situated in “lack of basic Mandarin language skills” and “inadequate education”, which index insufficient or ineffective communication between

⁵¹ CD (2012, 1 March). “Uygur language microblogging service launched”

Xinjiang Muslims and others and an unpleasant situation. Such expression formulates the topos of reality, a typical linguistic feature in the portrait. Moreover, the reality is reported to relate to a great number of Muslims in Xinjiang. Indicated by the general term of “ethnic residents”, Muslims in Xinjiang are not proficient in Mandarin and lack adequate education. The journalist also pinpoints that “many Han officials from inland” are not proficient in the local dialect. Xinjiang Muslims and a number of Han officials, both need governmental help for improving language proficiency.

The journalist also covers help from the CCP, insinuating the portrayal of powerless Muslims enjoying Beijing’s support for intercultural communication (cf. Section 3.1 above). From the expression “the government has organised massive language classes”, the CCP seeks solutions for Muslims’ language problems with supportive behaviours of education. The use of perfect tense “has” indicates the CCP has addressed the language problem before it is reported, and the performance will continue. Moreover, the journalist makes it explicit the CCP’s initiative in the act of, like many other instances our corpus, with material clauses. In Clause [1], “the government” is assigned to the role of an actor in the material process of “organised”, targeting at the inanimate goal “massive language classes”. The expression sends power to the Chinese government to organise massive language classes. So, with such phrasing, the Chinese government organises a great number of language classes voluntarily. The clause can be expressed with a passive voice to decrease the CCP’s initiative in the act of support. From the narrative of offering language training actively, the writer promotes the CCP’s concerns and care to Chinese Muslims. From the CCP’s paternal care to Chinese Muslims, the ethnic group is indicated as an ingroup to the Chinese government and *China Daily*, i.e. good Chinese citizens with Muslim ethnicity.

With regard to the global context, the attention to the bilingual competence among Muslims reveals CCP’s success in strengthening national identity after riots. Dwyer (2005) identifies that the Mandarin promotion program is proposed by the central government to enhance the identity of Chinese citizens among ethnic Muslims. In this sense, *China Daily* helps the CCP to inform international readers that most ethnic Muslims are first and foremost Chinese citizens.

4 NYT: Repression and the Chinese government

The CCP's control of Chinese Muslims is an overriding portrait in the coverage of the relationship between Chinese ethnic Muslims and the Chinese government. This portrayal of Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of **social security and constraints**. Chinese government's actions of restraining the Chinese Muslim majority are foregrounded, which constructs the relational pair of authoritarian government and the victims of authoritarianism. Focusing on humanitarianism in the coverage of the relationship between the CCP and ethnic Muslims is not surprising. Political freedom is one of the most significant concerns in the news about Chinese issues (Wang & Shoemaker, 2011). American media have continued to portray the PRC as an "invariant dictatorship" (p.362) since 1989. For instance, the U.S media have privileged the erosion of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong under China's pressure (Lee et al., 2001).

4.1 *Beijing's surveillance of Chinese Muslims*

The portrayal of Chinese Muslims as a constrained social group by the CCP is first contextualised in the discourse of **social security** in most cases. As has been mentioned in Chapter 4 (i.e. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 in 1.1 of Chapter 4), social security is a topic category with a moderate frequency in the NYT and its frequency increases after the 2009 Xinjiang Unrest. More than 10% out of the 499 articles are in this topic category and the topic strength in the discourse of 0.07. The number of articles in this category is above the average value of 10%.

Social security, the topic category consists of all topics about how the CCP constrain and repress most ethnic Muslims in the NYT. The CCP's behaviours involve suppressing Muslims, increasing scrutiny, boosting security level, controlling Muslims' access to the Internet and the restoration of social order. The typical news piece is "In Restive Chinese Area, Cameras Keep Watch" (NYT, 2nd Aug. 2010). With LDA analysis, the topics of increasing social scrutiny, suppressing Muslims, Internet censorship, and restoring social order are highlighted in the discourse. The topics are indicated by terms such as "stability", "surveillance", "security", "internet", "online", "censorship". Chinese Muslims are seen as a repressed group by an authoritarian administration in China (see Appendix 1).

Results from collocation analysis can reassure that most Chinese Muslims are treated as victims to the CCP's surveillance. The word "Muslim" collocates with the words of "crackdown" and "restriction". They are covered under the control and suppression in Chinese society (see Appendix 3).

Example 8 is typical to show the representation of repressed Chinese Muslims in the discourse of social security, which is a salient topic category in the NYT. The journalist presents that a number of Chinese Muslims were arrested after the Urumqi Unrest in 2009.

Example 8

BEIJING — [1] Chinese authorities said Tuesday that [2] they had taken 718 people into custody in connection with last month's ethnic riots in the western region of Xinjiang, but an official with an ethnic Uighur exile group said the true number was far higher. (NYT, 4th Aug. 2009)⁵²

In the above example, like many other instances in the corpus, we see restricted Muslims and the authoritarian Chinese government. Numbers are typical in the representation of restricted ethnic Muslims. The expressions "718 people" and "true number was far higher" are used to express large-scale custody of Chinese Muslims. With an alternative voice (i.e. another typical linguistic feature) "official with an ethnic Uighur exile group", "true number was far higher" forms a comparison. "718 people" in the CCP's voice are presented as lower than the true number of arrests. Therefore, "the last month's ethnic riots" (i.e. Urumqi Unrest in 2009) does not motivate the Chinese government to identify and punish criminals. Instead, the CCP is reported in relation to the repression of Muslim citizens and the release of fake news after violence. Here we can imply that the writer represents the CCP as an authoritarian controller of its ethnic citizens. Chinese ethnic Muslims, in turn, are victimised by the CCP. How about the representation of Chinese Muslims? The writer also juxtaposes victimised Muslims and "the last month's ethnic riots" in the example, and that indicates that the government's constraints drive them to become violent and resentful. In combination with the contour of resentful and Oriental Chinese

⁵² The New York Times (2005, 04 August) "China's tally of 718 arrests in July riots is questioned".

Muslims in Chapter 4, victimised and violent Muslims reveal their outgroup identity in the news despite that their human rights have been restrained. The victimisation of human rights among Muslims primarily is used to depreciate the Chinese government. In a word, most Chinese Muslims and the CCP are both treated as outgroups in the American broadsheet.

Words and conducts of the Chinese government and its initiative in behaviours are stressed in the NYT to reflect Muslims under Beijing's surveillance. In Example 8, the writer stresses two topics. 1) "Chinese authorities" actively acknowledge the custody of 718 Chinese Muslim citizens. 2) The Chinese government arrest many Muslim males on purpose. With transitivity analysis, these two facts are expressed by verbal and material clauses. First, "Chinese authorities" play a sayer in the verbal process, "said", with the verbiage, which is about the arrest of Muslim males. The expression sends the power to the authorities to make this announcement. So, we can imply that the CCP announces the arrest totally by the initiative. Second, in another clause, "they" [i.e. The Chinese government] are assigned to a role of an actor in "take(ing)" (material process) "718 people" (an animated goal). The Chinese government is represented as a powerful party to decide whether or not they want to victimise (i.e. take) Muslim males, who are less powerful than the Chinese government. The expression thus reinforces authoritarianism of the Chinese government and the victimisation of most Chinese Muslims. Any alternative expressions can decrease the power of the Chinese government. For instance, there is "it is said that 718 people have been taken into custody". The act of arresting ethnic Muslims and the CCP's active involvement reinforces the CCP's authoritarian government and victimisation of these Muslims in China.

The local context of the extract can reconfirm the representation of victimised Chinese Muslims vs authoritarian Chinese government. The correspondent Michael Wines⁵³ questions the news information from Chinese news outlets, such as the identity of these detainees.

⁵³ The New York Times (2005, 04 August) "China's tally of 718 arrests in July riots is questioned".

4.2 The loss of religious freedom and free speech

They are also represented as a group with little religious freedom and liberty of speech under the governance of Beijing. The depiction of Chinese Muslims is contextualised in the **discourse of CCP's control of Muslims' freedom**. It has been reported in Chapter 4 that freedom and constraints are attitudinal features in the NYT. The k value of the SMCs of Free and Constraints are respectively 40.25 and 396.18 in the NYT compared its counterpart corpus.

1. ng. Chinese officials have been waging a security	crackdown	in Xinjiang that many human rights advocates consider thinly-veiled repression of the region's Uighurs
2. China has used isolated terrorist acts to justify a wholesale	crackdown	on its Uighur Muslim population. "China is using t (Example 9)
3. ation firewall. People inside Xinjiang risk their	freedom	to pass information to him. Some circumvent China
4. d, they showed up in droves. "Limiting people's	freedom	and trying to restrict the flow of information W
5. the Chinese government has taken a hard line against Internet	freedom	in the last year. This spring, Beijing created a new department, Bureau Nine, to help police social networking sites and other user-driven forums.
6. blockslate last month, but residents still cannot	freely	access the Internet. China Pressed to Account f
7. Even the most aggressive measures discussed in the draft,	restricting	Internet access in a particular region to "safeguard the national security
8. groups have long criticized the lack of religious	freedom	in China and highlighted the harsh treatment of underground Catholics, Tibetan Buddhists and Uighurs
9. ared in recent years, fueled in part by religious	restrictions	imposed by the Communist Party and increased m
10. esert region in western China have imposed strict	limits	on religious practices during the traditional Mus
11. Amnesty International said recently that the Uighurs' identity and well-being are being "systematically eroded."	limit	the use of the Uighur language restricts religious

Figure 5.6 Sample concordance lines about Constraints in the NYT

Figure 5.6 sheds light on how Chinese Muslims are deprived of religious freedom and freedom of speech in the NYT. Ethnic Muslims are densely populated in Xinjiang, so “the security crackdown in Xinjiang” in Line 1 reveals that a great number of Chinese Muslims are under CCP’s hardline policies. Additionally, there is “people inside Xinjiang risk their freedom to pass information to him” in Line 3, and there is “harsh treatment of underground Catholics, Tibetan Buddhists and Uighurs” in Line 8. The two examples reveal that many ethnic Muslims have lost speech freedom, and Uyghur Muslims constituting a large Chinese Muslim group are deprived of freedom to worship Islam in China.

Chinese Muslims’ loss of religious freedom and free speech indicates the Chinese government as an outgroup in the broadsheet. It is written in the American Constitution that there should be no prohibition on the free exercise of religion, no infringing on the freedom of speech (First Amendment to the United States Constitution, n.d.). According to Chilton et al. (2010), in an individualistic society, such as the U.S and Britain, citizens should have freedom and equal participation to discuss and criticise social problems. The portrayal of the CCP, as was shown above, shows its deprivation of fundamental freedom from its citizens instead, and thus reveals its authoritarianism to Muslims.

Why does the loss of religious liberty denote outgroup membership categorisations of Chinese Muslims in *The NYT*? Muslims are devout Islamists no matter where they are. The deprivation of their religion indicates the elimination of the core of being Muslims. The previous discussion has unfolded that they are treated as a backward, exclusive Oriental Chinese group in the NYT, and they are resentful and fanatic towards Chinese society. In the corpus, there are instances that “many Uighurs resent the growing Han presence in the region”, “we (Han Chinese) are scared of them (Uyghurs)” and “A Uighur had killed a Han”. Relating the majority of a fanatic and barbaric Muslim group to the loss of Islam in China herein, readers can assume that ethnic Muslims can disparage security around the world and formulate menace worldwide. Therefore, *The NYT* strategically uses Muslims’ loss of religious freedom to categorise most Chinese Muslims as outgroups.

Example 9 (also see Line 2 in Figure 5.6 above) is a typical extract about Muslims with little religious freedom and freedom of speech. The extract is contextualised in the discourse of controlling Muslims’ freedom, which is related to attitudinal analysis. It is

presented that the Chinese government uses anti-terror as an excuse to crack down the Uyghur dissidents. And Muslim religion is suppressed for controlling of the Uyghur Muslim population.

Example 9

China adopted some of the measures, the groups said, after it persuaded the Bush administration that a little-known Uyghur exile group, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, was responsible for terrorist acts and belonged on America's list of leading terrorist threats. The groups said [1] China has used isolated terrorist acts to justify a wholesale **crackdown** on its Uyghur Muslim population.

"China is using the suppression of religion as a whip over Uyghurs who challenge or even chafe at Chinese rule of Xinjiang," Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said in a statement. (*NYT*, 12th April 2005)⁵⁴

The extract was taken from a piece of news published before the 2009 Xinjiang Unrest. The news mainly announces that Uyghur Muslims face “ever-more-intrusive control” in worshipping Islam. Labelled by the Chinese government, the control is a part of the Chinese long-term battle against separatists. Clearly in Example 9, Joseph Kahn, the Beijing’ bureau chief in the *Times* then, constantly uses voice from international human right organisations (e.g. Human Rights Watch). The statements from “the groups” help to formulate *The NYT’s* viewpoints that Uyghur Muslims are under strict governance by the dominant Chinese government.

Analogous to other instances the NYT corpus, the representation of repressed Chinese Muslims first is revealed by the negative term “crackdown” and “suppression” in Example 9. Such negative attributes present that the Chinese government is dealing with Uyghur Muslim citizens in the same manner as to punish criminals. The writer makes it explicit that the target of suppression is not only for Muslims but for their religion. There are “a wholesale crackdown on its Uyghur Muslim population” and “suppression of

⁵⁴ The New York Times (2005, 12 April) “China said to step up religious persecution of minority in its west”.

religion”. So, Uyghur Muslims, a large Chinese Muslim group, are reported to lose religious freedom. This experience of most ethnic Muslims indicates Beijing’s lack of humanitarian concern for its people. In terms of linguistic patterns, the topos of humanitarianism is used in Example 9, which is a typical linguistic feature in the NYT about CCP’s depriving religious freedom of Muslims. Besides, the writer specifically maps “a whip” metaphorically to “the suppression of religion” “over Uighurs”. “A whip” can recall the imagery of tyrants in a slave society whipping its citizens. A modern democratic government, by contrast, allows for the “challenge or even chafe” at its governance. Therefore, the use of metaphor intensifies the lack of humanitarianism of the CCP and victimisation of Muslims.

The CCP’s acts of constraints towards most Chinese Muslims are described in Example 9 similar to Example 8 above. With transitivity analysis, In Clause [1], “China” (i.e. the CCP) is assigned to the role of an actor in the material process of “used”, in which “isolated terrorist acts as an excuse” is targeted as a goal. In this manner, the CCP is given the power to decide its action. Alternatively, the phrasing means that the CCP wants to use isolated terrorist acts as an excuse to “justify a wholesale crackdown” on Uyghurs. The expression can enhance authoritarianism of the CCP and deepen victimisation of Chinese Muslims.

It is found that the CCP deprives Chinese Muslims of religious freedom is also found in other western media. For instance, *the Guardian* (2017) reports:

Uighur rights groups complain of severe restrictions on religion and freedom of expression and say the attacks are isolated incidents caused by local grievances, not part of a wider coordinated campaign. Young men are banned from growing beards in Xinjiang and women are forbidden from wearing face veils.

Alternative voices are another linguistic feature in portraying Muslims’ loss of fundamental freedom. Giving voices to “Human Rights Watch” means that the crackdown has attracted attention from global human rights organisations. Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is another information source in Example 9. The label of ETIM as “a little-known Uighur exile group” suggests the organisation as a scapegoat of Muslim issue. As a little-known exile organisation, ETIM is probably incompetent to perform terrorist acts in China. The narrative of the two news resource has also reconfirmed the actions of CCP aim at controlling Muslims and depriving of their religion. Authoritarianism of the

CCP and victimisation of Muslims is revealed. Again, the elimination of Islam among Chinese Muslims can aggregate their resent in China and ignite their fight for Islam. Because of that, it is assumable that such a large Muslim population can explode and disparage social security in China and the whole non-Muslim society. Therefore, the loss of religious freedom indicates their outgroup membership categorisations in *The NYT*—most Chinese Muslims can find easily to threaten social security in the West because of the elimination of their religion. Section 5 will show the vicious consequence of Beijing's constraints of Muslims' freedom, which verify the derogative image of ethnic Muslims in the newspaper.

To summarise Section 4.2, *The NY Times* accentuates the attitudes of freedom and constraints, which emphasises that Chinese Muslims are under the CCP's control of religious freedom and free speech. Ethnic Muslims are delineated as a victimised minority to the limitation, in contrast with Beijing as a performer of restriction. Muslims suffer from the eradication of Muslim identity and the loss of free speech. It is assumed that loss of freedom will drive monolithic Muslim fundamentalists who value Islam significantly to become threats to security among non-Muslims. Thus, victimisation of Muslims tends not to show sympathy towards the group, but outcast them as an outgroup in the broadsheet.

The Chinese government is an authoritarian, who deprives the fundamental human rights of the ethnic minorities. The newspaper categorises the CCP government as an outgroup in the NYT and as a catalyst for outgroup Muslims in the newspaper. The relationship between Beijing's controls and victimised Muslims is similar to the pair of resentful Muslims and Han's social marginalisation (see Chapter 4). This sketch of Chinese Muslims has formed a dramatic disparity with the Muslims' coverage in *China Daily*. In the CD, the governmental policy shows father-like caring to ethnic Muslims for religious freedom and the betterment of living standard.

4.3 Nation-wide control of Chinese Muslims

Beijing's harsh control of Chinese Muslims is substantiated in the discourse of the news participants — HU Jintao and XI Jinping. News participant analysis reveals NYT underscored these two Chinese officials in the news about ethnic Muslims. Chinese officials with both Muslim and non-Muslim ethnicities embrace a considerable share

(34.73%) of 1,317 Chinese news participants in the NYT (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). These two Chinese have frequent occurrences among Chinese officials. The personal terms of Hu Jintao (e.g. “Hu Jintao”) and Xi Jinping (e.g. “Mr Xi”) collectively occur 181 times (see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3) in the NYT corpus, accounting for 40% of personal terms of Chinese officials.

1. ly . During a ? study session last month ? for provincial and ministerial leaders, President	Hu Jintao	called for a mix of increased Internet controls and investment in local government services to (Example 10)
2. According to Xinhua, the state news agency, Mr. Hu	Mr. Hu	visited rural areas and factories; a major oil centre; and the regional capital, Urumqi, where the rioting occurred.
3. “Preserving and maintaining the overall stability of Xinjiang is currently the most urgent task,” said	Mr. Hu	according to a statement published by the New China News Agency.
4. out of fear that the Uighurs might carry out violent acts.	Mr. Xi	also emphasized strengthening state control over religion, and presumably Islam in particular. (Example 11)
5. in some other Asian nations, including China, where	Mr. Xi	, chief of the Communist Party directs the military.
6. er as the country’s top leader in November 2012.	Mr. Xi	visited police units in Urumqi as well as in the a
7. After coming to power in late 2012,	Xi Jinping	, the president and party leader pushed an agenda for interethnic “contact, exchange and mingling,”

Figure 5.7 Sample concordance lines about top Chinese leaders in the NYT

Hu Jintao is covered primarily in the following topics in the NYT. He visits Muslim living areas stricken by violence (“visited [...] where the rioting occurred” in Line 2). He increases the control of speech (“called for a mix of increased Internet controls” in Line 1 of Figure 5.7). He stresses stability in Xinjiang (“overall stability of Xinjiang” in Line 3). By these topics, the *NYT* journalists represent the president as an appeaser of violence and a controller of speech. It can be indicated that the Chinese government as an authoritarian to its Muslim citizens. In turn, Chinese Muslims are treated as victims of nationwide repression.

Example 10 (Line 1 in Figure 5.7) can exemplify the representation of Muslims under the nation-wide control in the discourse of HU. It is presented that Mr Hu required to control Muslims' access to the Internet in the year 2011.

Example 10

During a study session last month for provincial and ministerial leaders, [1]
President **Hu Jintao** called for a mix of increased Internet controls and investment in local government services to reduce “inharmonious factors to the minimum.” (NYT, 28th Feb. 2011)⁵⁵.

Similar to many other instances in the NYT for portraying most ethnic Muslims as victims of national-wide control, and the topos of humanitarianism is employed in Example 10. To “reduce ‘inharmonious factors to the minimum’”, he pushes for the controlling of speech among these Muslims. Plus, “call(ing) for [...] investment in local government services” is conducted not for the benefit of its citizens but the uniform governance of Muslim citizens. Muslim citizens' free speech is sacrificed for CCP's government. From the loss of free speech, the CCP is treated as having a lack of humanitarian concerns for its ethnic citizens.

NYT writers also stress HU's actions and his initiative in the act frequently for this portrait. In Example 10, the writer emphasises HU's resolution in prompting the restriction of Muslims' freedom of speech with material clauses. With transitivity analysis, “President Hu Jintao” is assigned as an actor in the material process “called for, in which “a mix of increase Internet controls” and “investment” are targeted. HU is constructed as a powerful actor increasing internet controls and investment, which indicates his initiative in the behaviour. The behaviour of HU can be expressed in another way to decrease his initiative in the encouragement of internet control and investment. For instance, “according to Hu Jintao, a mix of increased Internet controls is necessary”. Here, we can indicate that HU's instruction to the local governments and his willingness to do so reveal the nation-wide limitation of Muslims' freedom of speech.

⁵⁵ The New York Times (2011, 28 February). “In China, security muffles call for change”.

How does the portrayal of repressed most Muslims under the nation-wide control illuminate their outgroup membership categorisations in the newspaper? The presidential speech to control Muslims' speech indexes that Muslims should keep silent about the loss of religious control. And as was explored in Section 4.2. Muslims are too devout to be deprived of the freedom of worshipping Islam. To add, most ethnic Muslims in China are extremely dissatisfied with Han dominance and the Chinese government, thus killing Han Chinese and provoke conflicts and protests in China. It is assumable that suppressing them from the complaint about the loss of religious freedom will irritate these monolithic and fanatic Muslims, and they are supposed to become problematic to global security. Collectively, the wholesale victimisation of most Chinese Muslims elicits to these Muslims as an outgroup to the newspaper, and especially as potential threats to the world.

XI Jinping, as a news participant in the NYT, has more frequent presences than HU Jintao in the NYT. His behaviours in the discourse (see Line 4 to 8 in Figure 5.7 above) portray him as a strong leader of the Chinese Communist Party towards Muslim citizens. Collocation analysis shows (see Appendix 3) that XI Jinping is frequently collocated with "leader", "leadership", "party". Also, the president is closely pairing with items such as "uncompromising", "leadership". From Figure 5.7 above, besides, we can see XI in the discourse of military. XI emphasises "strengthening state control over religion" (Line 4 in Figure 5.7 above), "direct(ing) the military" (Line 5), "visit(ing) police unit". Additionally, XI faces the rising violence in China (e.g. "state news media reported calling it a brazen terrorist assault" in Line 7). These topics reveal XI's iron-handed strategies towards its Muslim citizens from the central government. XI Jinping is represented as the head of an authoritarian regime. In turn, Chinese Muslims are demonstrated to live in nation-wide suppression and further become anti-government and anti-social.

The portrayal of Xi Jinping in the NYT is divergent from that in the CD. From the discussion of Chinese anti-terrorism in the next Chapter, *China Daily* stresses that XI orders the harsh crackdown of terroristic acts to protect Chinese citizens. The *CD* journalist

also records XI Jinping's empathetic behaviours to Muslim, such as "Xi sat right here when he came to my house" after the crisis (CD, 6th May 2014)⁵⁶.

Example 11 (see Line 4 in Figure 5.7 above) is a typical example. Contextualised in the discourse of XI Jinping, Muslims symbolise a repressed group under the nation-wide crackdown. It is shown that XI stressed the national control of religious freedom after 2014.

Example 11

[1] Mr Xi also defended the party's recent policies in Xinjiang, even though those policies have led to frustration among many Uighurs [...]

In his remarks, [2] Mr Xi also emphasised strengthening state control over religion, and presumably Islam in particular. He said officials "*should* focus on cultivating a team of patriotic religious people and taking effective measures to improve the quality of people of the religious circle." The positions of religious leaders, he said, should be limited to those who "love the country and love their religion." (NYT, 30th May 2014)⁵⁷

The use of negative labelling and the topos of humanitarianism signal this portrayal of Chinese Muslims. Similar instances are frequently found in the NYT about repressed Muslims under the nation-wide control. In this example, "strengthening state control over religion" reveals the hard-hand policy from Chinese Muslims. The expression "the policies led to frustration among many Uighurs" shows the disappointment of most Chinese Muslim citizens. So, XI does not win the heart of Chinese Muslims, because of inhumane policies. Responding to the loss of trust, the president "defend(s) the party's recent policies in Xinjiang" and strengthen(s) state control over Islam, instead of showing any care to the citizens. By the narrative, Chinese Muslims are represented as victims of Beijing's authoritarian government.

⁵⁶ China Daily (2014, 06 May). "Xi spreads the word on fighting terror".

⁵⁷ The New York Times (2014, 30 May) "China moves to calm Restive Xinjiang Region"

XI's verbal actions and conducts are usually emphasised to depict that Muslims are under a nation-wide constraint by the Chinese government. In Example 11, the journalist uses verbal and material clauses to stress XI's behaviours. With transitivity analysis, in Clause [1], for instance, "Mr Xi" plays a role as an actor in "defend(ing)" (material process) "the party's recent policies in Xinjiang" (inanimate goal). XI is constructed as a powerful party in the happening by the clause, which implies that XI performs so by his choice. Similarly, "Mr Xi" is assigned to the role of sayer in the verbal process "emphasised," "strengthening state control over religion" (verbiage) (Clause 2). He is again represented as a powerful party in the stressing the rise of state control of religious freedom. In other words, he chooses to emphasise the reinforcement of the state control of religion. Two clauses have alternative expressions to play down XI's willingness in behaviours. For instance, Clause 1 can be replaced by a sentence that "the party's recent policies in Xinjiang were defended". All in all, the narration of acts indicates that XI's decision to control over Islam is resolute.

Modal verbs help to represent XI as an iron-handed Chinese leader towards Chinese Muslims to reveal Muslims under nation-wide repression. In the corpus, modal verbs are frequent in the discourse of XI. In Example 11, with two "should(s)", controlling Islam is implied as duties for Chinese government officials. It is written that "officials" are responsible for "cultivating patriotic religious people". Religious leaders "should be" "limited" by the CCP not by Muslims citizens. Moreover, they have the primary quality of "patriotic" rather than "love their religion". From these descriptions, XI emphasises that government officials in China must brainwash most ethnic Muslims to be obedient to the CCP.

It is clear that XI's instructions are contrary to the doctrines in Islam. The previous discussion shows that Chinese Muslims are not only devout Islamists but full of hatred, satisfaction towards Chinese and exclusive to the outside world. In this manner, XI's instructions can increase anti-social sentiments among Muslims. And the Muslim group, being irritable and monolithic, probably become trouble makers to the non-Muslim world. Thus Chinese Muslim people are categorised as an outgroup in this extract.

The portrayal of XI Jinping as an iron-handed leader is not rare in the western media. For instance, *the Economist* (2014: 80) wrote: “He has rejected the communist tradition of collective leadership, instead of establishing himself as a paramount leader within a tightly centralised political system.”.

To summarise Section 4.3, the discourse of top Chinese officials reveals the portrayal of Chinese Muslims. They are treated as a Chinese group under a nation-wide suppression in religious freedom and free speech. The portrayal reflects the Chinese government as an authoritarian government to Muslim citizens. The deprivation of freedom of religion and speech is assumed to motivate Muslims to menace social security in China and the world. Collectively, they are categorised as outgroups in the NYT.

5 NYT: Violence against Chinese society


Most Chinese Muslims, in the NYT, are frequently positioned in conflicts and continuing violence against the Chinese government and society. These topics mean that they are negatively portrayed in the broadsheet. As will be discussed later, Chinese Muslims are represented as disquieting groups in China engaged in riots, which is contextualised in the discourse of terrorism, violence, and anger and worry from non-Muslim Chinese. In contrast, in *China Daily*, Chinese Muslims are categorised as an ingroup in the newspaper, and are represented positively in the discourse of, for instance, Muslims’ happiness and satisfaction.

The portrayal of ethnic Muslims in the NYT as disquieting others in violence agrees with how Muslims (e.g. Muslims in the UK/US and the Muslim world) are represented in Western media. It is claimed that Muslims are portrayed in relation to violence, crimes and terrorism after the 9/11 in American media coverage (Kumar, 2010; Shahin, 2016; Sharifi et al., 2017). Kumar (2010: 260) explores, in U.S. media narratives, “Islam is inherently violent, [and] the west spreads democracy, while Islam spawns’ terrorism.” American Muslim citizens with some misconducts are represented as homegrown terrorists, with some Orientalized qualities of Others (Chuang & Roemer, 2013). Similar features have a presence in media discourse from other western countries (Al-Hejin, 2015; Baker et

al.2013a; Macdonald, 2003; Richardson, 2001, 2004; Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). For example, British Muslims frequently appear in a negative context in the domestic news in the UK, especially in violence (Richardson, 2001, 2004). The discussion about the Islamic world is followed by news of wars, conflicts and violence (Macdonald, 2003) in Reuters. It is identified by Törnberg & Törnberg (2016) that Muslims are embroiled in conflicts in the social media discourse.

5.1 Muslims engaged in violence

Muslims engaged in violence is contextualised in the discourse of **terrorism and violence** in the NYT. Terrorism and violence is a topic category focusing, to a large extent, on bloodshed events, violent forces, and the consequence of violent issues, especially after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009. As has been discussed in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.1), 17.37% of the 449 articles in the corpus are grouped in this topic category. And the contribution value of this topic category is 0.28. Both numbers are higher than the average of a topic category in the NYT — 9.09% (average contribution value of a topic = 0.09). *The NY Times* has reported many violent issues in relation to most Chinese Muslims, such as a Kashgar violent attack on 30th July 2011 (“Deadly violence strikes Chinese City racked by ethnic Tensions” [NYT, 31st July 2011]).



Note: The results in headline analysis means the proportion of a topic in a year in relation to other topics in the corpus. Numbers from LDA analysis result indicates the contribution value of a topic in relation to the values of other topics in a year⁵⁸.

Figure 5.8 The diachronic development of the topic category Terrorism/ violence in the NYT

⁵⁸ Contribution value of a topic category in 2001 = contribution value topic 1 in 2001 + ... + contribution value of topic n in 2001

The NYT underscores violence pertinent to most Chinese Muslims, before and after the Urumqi Unrest (See Figure 5.8). The focus increases after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009 and peaks in the year 2013. Specifically, *The NYT* highlights a series of violent actions in the year of 2003 (i.e. East Turkistan Islamic movement and Al-Qaeda), in 2008 (e.g. Kashgar attack occurring around Beijing Olympics), in 2009 (i.e. the Xinjiang Riots), in 2013 (especially Tiananmen square car blaze) and 2014 (i.e. bombing at Kunming train station). Headline analysis suggests that most of the issues concerning Chinese Muslims are domestic violence rather than terrorist attacks. The membership categorisation of the majority of these Muslims in China in the NYT is not terrorists, but people who incite domestic violence.

Four topics emerge from LDA analysis, i.e. riots in Urumqi, acts of violence in other regions of China, the consequences of violence and the relation to world terrorism. The consequence of social disorders is covered less frequently than the other three topics. Typical indicators involve “injured”, “people”, “security”, “death”. The news about Chinese Muslims and Al-Qaeda reaches the summit in the year 2002, with indicators of saying “East Turkestan Movement” and “Al-Qaeda”. Acts of violence are emphasised after the Xinjiang Riots in 2009, especially in the year 2013 (e.g. “violence”, “killed”, “attack” “assailant”). The violence in Xinjiang is emphasised in the coverage of 2009, with terms of “Xinjiang”, “July”, “killed”. They are (e)vilified by some indicators. For instance, “killed”, “assailant” and “Al-Qaeda” mean the acts of slaughtering and the connection with terrorist groups. They are thus represented as fundamentalists and threats to the non-Muslim world, i.e. an outgroup member in the NYT corpus.

Results from collocation analysis can reconfirm that Muslims are frequently represented as people engaged in violence in the NYT. The word “Muslim” is paired with “tension”, “unrest”. And the item “Muslims” is collocated closely and frequently with “violence” (see Appendix 3). These combinations suggest that Chinese Muslims are portrayed neither as a peaceful group, nor terrorists, but trouble makers to social security in China.

Example 12 is a typical example of the portrayal – Muslims are engaged in violence. The portrait is contextualised in the discourse of violence (i.e. a salient topic in the NYT).

In this example, two different voices are provided to discuss how many Uyghur Muslims are trained in Al-Qaeda.

Example 12

[1] The Chinese vice premier, Qian Qichen, told Mrs Robinson that [2] the government believed that 1,000 Uighurs have been trained in Afghanistan in **Al Qaeda** camps. But [3] scholars both here and in the West say that Uighurs have little interest in **Taliban-style fundamentalism** and have put the number of Al Qaeda trainees much lower, perhaps in the dozens. (NYT, 10th Nov. 2001)⁵⁹

In Example 12, some ethnic Muslims are connected with “Al Qaeda camps” and “Taliban-style fundamentalism”, an organisation of Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists. The connection is a signal that some ethnic Muslims in China are evil and probably related to violence (cf. fanatic Muslims in Chapter 4). In the NYT, (e)vilification (Lazar and Lazar, 2004) is a typical strategy in the portrayal of Muslims. The demonisation of Chinese Muslims clearly shows them as an outgroup to the NYT. Since these evil Muslims having a connection to fundamentalists, they are Islamic fundamentalists and menacing the non-Muslim world. In stating so, a number of ethnic Muslims are categorised as an outgroup in the newspaper.

In this extract, the writer uses different numbers from two information sources to reveal the authoritarian Chinese government to Chinese Muslims (cf. Section 4). The topos of comparison and numbers are used. Voices from “scholars both here and in the West” are not as a stakeholder in the Muslim issue (cf. Human rights organisations in Example 9 above), but a neutral information resource compared to Chinese authorities. In their voices, “Uighurs have little interest in Taliban-style fundamentalism”, “much lower” and “in the dozens” mean that only a small number of Uyghur Muslims are terrorist, while most of them participate in violence and disparage security in non-Muslim society as was aforesaid. By comparison, “the Chinese vice premier”, who represents the Chinese government, announces a higher number of Uyghur trainees in Al Qaeda camps. It is implied from the comparison that most of ethnic Muslims, who engaged in violence, are not world terrorists

⁵⁹ The New York Times (2001, 10 November). U.N. official fears China uses terror war as front for abuses.

(cf. Beijing's ideas) but evil others in ethnic violence (see Example 13 and 14 below). *The NYT* attacks the CCP for exaggerating terrorist force in China. The socio-political context shows that the CCP indeed highlighted the peril of terrorism pertinent to some Chinese Muslims in 2001, which empowered the government to join in the global anti-terrorism campaign. Collectively, the extract reveals that most Chinese Muslims are explicitly expressed as terrorists.

5.2 *Disquieting Chinese Muslims after 2009*

In the NYT, Chinese Muslims are also portrayed as a disquieting group against non-Muslim counterparts and the CCP. They are disquieting because, as will be illustrated in this section, most ethnic Muslims launch assaults and violence in Han-dominated society, and become problematic to the non-Muslim world. This portrayal of ethnic Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of **violence** and Muslims' **anger and worry**. From the attitudinal analysis, these attitudes are marked in the NYT2 (i.e. the post-09 coverage of Chinese Muslims). In the comparison between the NYT and the CD, the k values of Violent/angry and Worry are either 529.26 or 152.89. The k value of Violent/angry is 140.1 (≥ 15.13 , $p < 0.0001$) in the NYT1 compared with the NYT2. The latter analysis will show that the attitudes appear in the discourse of violence and terrorism.

Disquieting Chinese Muslims are contextualised mainly in two topics. First, Chinese Muslims are constructed as performers and participants of ethnic conflicts. *The NYT* journalists make the repeated mention violent attacks arising from ethnic conflicts (e.g. "surging violence between Uighurs and Han" Line 1), troubled Xinjiang region (e.g. Line 7). Ethnic Uyghurs attempt to topple the government through violence (e.g. "Uighur militants attacked a police station" in Line 9). Militant Chinese Muslims kill and attack Han Chinese and the Chinese government in ethnic conflicts. Indicated by "militant Uighurs", "attacked", "killed" in the figure, Muslims are covered as not only bellicose but more importantly, evil. Han Chinese and the CCP are primarily the targets of killings and attack. "16 officials" (Line 10), "police station" (Line 9) and "Han Chinese" are victimised by Muslims' behaviours such as killing and attack. Based on these topics, it is perceived that Chinese Muslims are categorised as an outgroup member in the newspaper.

These findings are somewhat similar to political speech about anti-terrorism delivered by the American government (Bhatia, 2015a; Leudar et al., 2004). In Bhatia (2015a), the speakers use expressions such as “attack”, “havoc”, “threat of terrorist attack”. The language of negative actions constructs terrorists as the attacker of America, enemy and criminals. The portrayal justifies the U.S. military planning mentioned in the speech. Leudar et al. (2004) also identify the terrorists’ attribution as attackers. “Bush categorised the events in America as attacks on freedom and democracy, and Blair takes this one step further – they are attacks on ‘the civilised world’”. It can be indicated that the portrayal of Chinese Muslims as disquieting groups by *The NYT* is similar to how terrorists are represented in the West. Therefore, it can be assumed that the majority of Chinese Muslims have acquired an outgroup identity in the NYT. Despite the discourse construction of Chinese Muslims are analogous to the representation of terrorists, Muslims in China are not overtly expressed as terrorists in *The NYT* (c.f. Example 12 above and Example 13 and 14 below). Simply put, the broadsheet has not marked ethnic Muslims as terrorists in discourse but has used such a manner to negativize them as a peril to Western society. This representation of ethnic Muslim majority is similar to how Muslims are treated in multiple Western media (e.g. Chuang & Roemer, 2013; Kumar, 2010; Richardson, 2004), so ethnic Muslims in China are no difference with negativized Muslims elsewhere in such media discourse.

Typical linguistic features in the representation of disquieting Chinese Muslims are illustrated here. First, media reports from China and voices from the Chinese government are the significant news sources in the coverage, particularly in the narratives about slaughtering. The use of “authorities said” and “State media reported” indicate that the announcements come from the Chinese government. The topos of numbers and the violent acts of Muslims are emphasised. For instance, there is “two Uighur militants attacked a police station” (see Line 9). Violent actions and numbers also shape the use topos of a terrible reality, i.e. the bloodshed consequence of violence (e.g. the casualties in violence). These linguistic features help to disseminate the information of severe ethnic violence between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese. The detailed analysis will be shown in the following two examples.

1. s, which are run by Han. In recent years, surging	violence	between Uighurs and Han has troubled Xinjiang, m
2 imed responsibility in an online video for recent	violent	attacks that killed dozens in China's western Xin
3. etonation of explosive devices, the repsorts said.	Violent	episodes in Xinjiang have become more frequent in
4. violence has erupted in parts of Xinjiang where	tensions	between Uighurs and the Han are strongest. Often,
5. after a violent confrontation in western China's	tense	Xinjiang region in which the police fired on assai
6. ken the region and cities elsewhere in China. the	assaults	have been linked to tensions between Uighurs, who
7. ars, surging violence between Uighurs and Han has	troubled	Xinjiang, most notably a riot in the regional cap (Example 14)
8. ests" and naming two suspects from Xinjiang, the	troubled	region in China's far west whose ethnic Uighur p
9. Games. Last week the authorities said two Uighur	militants	attacked a police station in the Xinjiang city of
10. est on Monday. State media reported the attackers	killed	16 officers and wounded 16 others, likely making (Example 13)
11. Kashgar. Chinese officials have said the assault	killed	16 paramilitary officers and wounded 16 others,

Figure 5.9 Sample concordance lines about Violent/ angry, Worry in the NYT

Example 13 and 14, both from the attitudinal analysis, typify the representation of disquieting Muslims, in the discourse of violence, people's anger and worry. Example 13 (also see Line 10 in Figure 5.9 above) is the lead in an article headlined "Ambush in China raises concerns as Olympics near". The journalist, Andrew Jacobs, reports on the violent attack that occurred on August 4th, 2008 in Kashgar. In Example 14 (see Line 7), surging ethnic tensions between Han and Uyghur minority is described. This narrative is used as the background of assassination of Imam by an Uyghur young man in Xinjiang.

Example 13

[1] Two men armed with knives and explosives ambushed a military police unit in China's majority Muslim northwest on Monday. State media reported that the attackers **killed** 16 officers and wounded 16 others, likely making it the deadliest

outburst of ethnic **violence** in China since at least the early 1990s. (NYT, 5th Aug.2008)⁶⁰

Example 14

In recent years, surging violence between Uighurs and Han has **troubled** Xinjiang, most notably a riot in the regional capital, Urumqi, in 2009 in which [2] at least 200 people were killed, many of them are Han. That led to an intense crackdown on Uighurs by Han-dominated security forces. (NYT, 25th Aug. 2014)⁶¹

What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the two sentences? The first similarity is that journalists in both examples label the killing as ethnic violence rather than terrorist attacks. “The deadliest outburst of ethnic violence” and “violence between Uighurs and Han” present the outburst domestic violence between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. Chinese Muslims are not terrorists, but just disquieting groups in ethnic violence.

Furthermore, disquieting Muslims in ethnic conflicts are revealed first by numbers. In Example 14, the expressions of “attackers killed 16 officers”, “wounded 16 others” and “200 people were killed” imply the victimisation of CCP officers and people. Example 14 presents that “at least 200 people were killed, many of them are Han”. Han Chinese civilians are also physical victims of violence. Muslims troublemakers are then a threat to many Chinese. Massive slaughtering is against the universal moral order, so attacking and killing a number of people demonises disquieting Muslims and evidence their threats to any non-Muslim society. And they are categorised as an outgroup member in *The NYT*. This finding echoes with findings in Said (1997) — Muslims are portrayed as having the desire of killing non-Muslims in American movies.

The third similar point is that violent acts of Muslims and their deliberateness are usually stressed to represent disquieting Muslims, expressed by material clauses. In Clause

⁶⁰ The New York Times (2008, 5th August) “Ambush in China raises concerns as Olympic near”.

⁶¹ The New York Times (2014, 25th August) “Teenager arrest in killing of Imam in Western China”

[1] in Example 13, “two men armed with knives and explosives” play a role of an actor in “ambush(ing)” (material process) “a military police unit” (an inanimate goal) during “the weekday”. With the expression, two armed Uyghurs are given the power to behave so, which indicates that they deliberately perform the ambush with arms. An alternative expression can decrease the initiative of two armed Uyghurs in action. For instance, “there are two men armed with knives and explosives around a military police unit”. Moreover, it is indicated from “knives and explosives” and “during the weekdays” that two men aim at attacking the police officers and killing officers at work. Therefore, they are evil, and probably threatening to the non-Muslim world.

Violent acts of Muslims are also described in Example 14. In Clause [2], “at least 200 people” and “kill” indicate immoral killers. Who is the killer of 200 people? The use of passive voice in this material clause, indicated by “killed”, background Chinese Muslims as performers of the slaughter, but highlights the terrible result. However, the portrayal of Muslims as disquieting others is not deemphasised in the extract. “Most notably a riot in [...] Urumqi, in 2009” can recall everyone the Urumqi Unrests, in which Chinese Muslims are well-known to undertake killings in that riot.

The last similar point between the two examples is that Muslims’ past violent behaviours are described in the examples, with the topos of history. Addressing criminal or immoral in the past is the symbolic way in the representation of others because they reveal the continuity of being wrong (Lazar & Lazar, 2004). In Example 13, it is covered that Chinese Muslim have incited deadly violence towards non-Muslim Chinese “since at least the early 1990”. The expression indicates the occurrences of deadly violence before 2008 (i.e. the reporting time). Chinese Muslims are thus regarded as disquiet and anxious all the time. A similar case is found in Example 14, in which the writer refers to Urumqi Unrests in 2009 in “at least 200 people were killed, many of them Han”. The writer links the violence in 2014 to the Urumqi Unrest in 2009. So, killers in the violence in 2014 and 2009 have the same level of evilness. By the narrative of violence, Chinese Muslims are represented to have a habit of being violent and evil, from the connection of now and then. Therefore, *The NYT* categorises the community as long-term menaces to the world.

6 Summary

The chapter addressed the second research question. That is:

What is the portrayal of Chinese Muslims in the narrative of the relationship between most Chinese Muslims and the Chinese government in the two newspapers?

In the CD, the majority of ethnic Muslims in Chinese are portrayed as recipients of the CCP's paternalistic care. They are buttressed with governmental supports in economic growth, living standards, religious freedom and intercultural capabilities, especially Mandarin proficiency. CCP's assistance in the economy and people's livelihood is stressed in the pre-09 dataset. The power of the Muslim people is an optional element in the portrayal. The topic of intercultural communication between ethnic Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese is emphasised in the post-09 dataset, with which Muslims are represented with helplessness. Chinese Muslims gaining Beijing's subsidisation to enjoy full religious freedom occur in the data of both periods. These portrayals of Muslims demonstrate these ethnic people as moderate Muslims and Chinese citizens to the Chinese government and *China Daily*, which keeps alignments with the government. The ingroup categorisations and the specific portrayals are contextualised in the discourse of social transformations, Muslim religion and Chinese politicians. Different types of primarily positive attitudinal discourse are also contexts, such as the discourse of goodness, success, importance, happiness, difficulties.

The portrayals of ethnic Muslims in Chinese are frequently represented by the following linguistic features. First, supporting from the CCP with material processes and modal verbs are used to present Muslim people as receivers of help. The CCP as a performer of subsidisations is often backgrounded by passive voice or nominalisation in economic support. Modal verbs are usually used to present the CCP's initiative in assisting (e.g. "The CCP will invest 600 million") and promising future of Muslim citizens. A typical instance is "Muslim Chinese will move to modern buildings". Second, the topos of numbers, advantage and positive labelling represent Muslims as beneficiaries of governmental help regarding economic development and religious freedom. Voices from the CCP are usually utilised in economic assistance. Third, general terms and the topos of

reality are frequent in representing powerless Muslims with Beijing's subsidisation in language proficiency.

The majority of Muslim people are categorised as an outgroup in the NYT corpus, and specifically in the topic that they are deprived of religious freedom and free speech. First, they are represented as victims of the CCP's control, especially regarding the deprivation of religious and free speech. It is indicated from the loss of freedom that Muslims are forced to be antisocial. So, Muslims as victims to the CCP's authoritarianism means that they are categorised as fundamentalists and threats to the world. Another portrayal of ethnic Muslims is disquieting social group joining performing ethnic violence. This portrait is more salient in the post-09 coverage of Chinese Muslims than previously. Hazardous and troubling Muslims are revealed by (e) vilification, which further indicates the categorisations of them. The coverage of massive killing Chinese and connecting to global fundamentalist groups suggests that they are fundamentalist Muslims and threats to the non-Muslim world. In the NYT, these portrayals of ethnic Muslims in China are contextualised in the discourse of social security, violence, terrorism and top Chinese leaders. The discourse of a group of negative attitudes, i.e. the discourse of control, worry, anger and violence contribute to the representation of Muslim people.

In the NYT, the authoritarian CCP and victimised/evil Chinese Muslims are divergent from how the American press covers the connection between Muslims and governments. Similar to the findings in the current project, Muslims and Muslim governments are both negatively represented in American media (Kumar, 2010; Sharifi et al., 2017). However, the government-Muslims relationship is a terrorist Muslim government and terrorist Muslim citizens (Macdonald, 2003). The connection between the Muslims and Beijing is also divergent from the ingroup American government and outgroup Muslims in the U.S press. Muslims' hatred of the U.S is not because Muslims have been ill-treated by Americans, but because of the divergences in religion and ethnicity (Abrahamian, 2003).

Typical linguistic features in the representation of evil, violent Chinese Muslims are as follows: 1) Negative labelling, topos of numbers and voices from CCP are common in all portrayals of outgroup Muslims; 2) Muslims as victims of the CCP's constraints are

explicitly represented by the topos of humanitarianism, general terms, alternative voices (e.g. voices from human rights organisations); 3) Beijing's acts of restriction are expressed by material clauses; 4) Violent actions of Muslims in material clauses and the topos of reality are typical to represent evil and disquieting Muslims in ethnic violence.

Chapter 6 Chinese Muslim terrorists and Chinese Muslims

This Chapter focuses on how *CD* and *The NYT* have portrayed the same batch of Chinese Muslims with a small portion among the whole Chinese ethnic Muslims. As was previously illustrated, the previous chapters also have outlined that the small group of Chinese Muslims who are demonstrated by the same news participants (e.g. Kadeer Rebiya), has acquired heterogeneous imagery from the representation of the majority of Chinese Muslims in both broadsheets. Regarding the context of marked construction of the handful of Chinese Muslims, Chapter 4 has reported that a great number of news articles are thematised by the CCP's counterterrorism in China, terrorism and violence in the CD. These topics are more salient in the post-09 dataset than the previous set. Horror and fear are prominent attitudes in both corpora, also especially in the CD2. It is explicit that the small number of Chinese Muslims are treated as Chinese Muslim terrorists in *China Daily*. The question arises how Chinese Muslim terrorists are discursively constructed in the CD and how the same batch of ethnic Muslims are categorised and linguistically constructed in the NYT corpus.

Previous studies have focused on the strong connection between Muslims and terrorism in American or British media discourse. Terrorism is an important topic and expression in the coverage about the Middle East (Baker et al., 2013a; MacDonald et al., 2013; Richardson, 2004; Shahin, 2015, 2016). Also, British Muslims or American Muslim citizens are reported to be associated with terrorism. Richardson (2004) suggests that "Islamic terrorists" can "seek support from British Muslims" in British newspapers (p.133). Muslims in the US are projected as the radicalised Muslim terrorists or homegrown terrorists in American press outlets (Chuang & Roemer, 2013). The threat of terrorism frequently emerges in the coverage of these Muslims in the American press (Bowe & Makki, 2016). It is worthy of investigating how terrorism is related to Chinese Muslims in the broadsheets.

The findings and discussions in this chapter start with the analytical results from the topic analysis, attitude analysis and the examination of news participants. Quantitative findings reported in Chapter 4 will be detailed here. Moreover, results from the collocation analysis functions to advocate the findings above. Specifically, collocates of TERRORIST


(i.e. “terrorist” and “terrorists”), TOHTI and KADEER and so forth will be presented here. I will also illustrate the linguistic patterns and categorisations/portraits of the small number of Chinese Muslims in the discourse above.

The organisation of Chapter 6 is as follows. Section 6.1 to 6.4 deal with the projection of domestic Muslim terrorists in the CD. Section 6.5 discusses the categorisation of the “Muslim terrorists in China” in the NYT. The conclusion is presented in Section 6.6.

1 CD: Muslim terrorists in China

1.1 Performing terrorist attacks

China Daily has frequently covered violence and terrorist attacks in relation to Muslim terrorists in the 15-year coverage of the ethnic community. However, as was found in Chapter 4, *CD* covers the news about the reaction to terrorism and violence more frequently than the news about terrorism (see Figure 6.1 below).



Note: The results in headline analysis mean the proportion of a topic in a year in relation to other topics in the corpus. Numbers from LDA analysis result indicates the contribution value of a topic in relation to the values of other topics in a year.

Figure 6.1 Diachronic development of the topic category Terrorism/ violence in the CD

Figure 6.1 above shows that the topic of terrorism and violence rises significantly after 2009 in both corpora (cf. findings in Chapter 4). We can see that *CD* journalists cover the series of terroristic and violent issues more frequently after the Urumqi Unrest. Headline analysis suggests that news coverage increases dramatically in the year 2002, 2009 and 2013. Results from the LDA analysis suggest that the topic of terrorism/violence ascend in the 15 years’ news about ethnic Muslims and skew in the year 2013 and 2014. Results from two types of topic analysis are different because, as was found, *CD* highlights the social

response to terrorism and violent actions in the news articles about terrorism/ violence. Besides, revealed from LDA analysis, the topic of terroristic and violent actions has more exposure than the topic of consequence at the discourse level. In the CD corpus, the indicators about terrorism and the behaviours include “attack”, “killed”, “terrorism” and “extremism”, while terms such as “innocent”, “people” are the symbols for the consequence of the attacks (see Appendix 1).

Figure 6.1 also reveals that *CD* journalists highlight bad behaviours (e.g. killing civilians) more than the consequence (e.g. the casualties of attack and economic loss) when they cover terrorism and violence (also see Section 1.2 below). As such, participants of violence are categorised as Them rather than Us in this Chinese newspaper. The categorisation is based on Jayyusi (1984) that the projected actions are symbols of categorisation. Collocation analysis also shows that Muslim terrorists are labelled as “group”, “organisation”, “handful” or “terror attacks” (e.g. “Witness account of Xinjiang terror attacks” (6th July 2013)) (see Appendix 3). These labels mean that these violent Muslims are a handful of bad Chinese Muslims. By such analysis, *CD* has a divergent specification of performers of violence from *The NYT*. Violence and attacks are conducted by a small group of bad Muslims in the *CD*, while in the *NYT* corpus, assaults are initiated by the majority of Chinese Muslims since they hate China, the Chinese government and the whole non-Muslim world.

1.2 Terrorists, extremists and separatists

What is the membership categorisation of the handful of Chinese Muslims who perform violence? It is found that Chinese Muslim terrorists are given triple identities in the *CD* – terrorists, separatists and extremists. Shown from Figure 6.2 below, Chinese Muslim terrorists, i.e. Muslim rioters, are covered with labels of “terrorists”, “extremists” and “separatists” (see Line 1 and Line 2).

The Chinese newspaper zooms in the social identity of Uyghur rioters/ protesters in social violence as a group of terrorists - religious extremists, and terrorists. In the following Figure 6.2, the first group of lines explicates that rioters in the violence are labelled as “terrorists”, “extremists” and “separatists” (see line 1 and 2). The collocation of TERRORIST (i.e. “terrorist” and “terrorists”) in the *CD* corpus reaffirms the

juxtaposition of three categorisations of Muslim terrorists in China. TERRORIST is closely or frequently collocated with “extremist” and “separatist”(see Appendix 3 for details).

1.2.1 Criminal and evil terrorists

What are the portraits of these terrorists, extremists and separatists? They are specifically represented as criminal and evil terrorists in *China Daily*. The portrait of criminal and evil Muslim terrorists is contextualised in the discourse of **violence, anger, fears, dislike and damaging**. As was presented previously (see Section 2.1 in Chapter 4), these attitudes are more salient in the NYT than in the CD, and the k values of their SMCs are larger than 15.13 ($p < 0.0001$). Specifically, the SMCs of Violent/Angry and Terror gain the k of 529.26 and 30.53 from the LL test. The attitudes of violence and anger are salient in the NYT2 (i.e. post-09 sub-corpus) in comparison with the NYT1 with the k value of 140.1.

Figure 6.2 shows that *CD* journalists highlight the conduct of terrorists and the consequence of their behaviours in order to represent a handful of lawless and immoral ethic Muslims.

1. International Relations. The ETIM , which advocates violence to	forces	the separation of Xinjiang from China, has been identified as a terrorist group by China, the
2. anonymity in discussing the matter. The "three evil	forces	of terrorism, separatism and extremism were boos
3. ghur Congress leader Rebiya Kadeer. "The riot has	destroyed	the spiritual support with which the terrorist, separatist and extremist forces cheated the people to participate in the so-called 'Jihad'
4. nt organizations have close contacts with foreign	terrorist	groups and some of their members have been trained outside China
5. n to sabotage China's unity. The "East Turkistan"	terrorist	forces pose threats to the development and stability of northwest China
6. er." The riot was not an isolated issue . It was a	violent	crime which was instigated and directed by separatists
7 hile trying to stop the rioters. The rioters also	attacked	a construction site, killing a number of workers
8 al authorities said Thursday. A group of "violent "	terrorists	kidnapped two people in the remote mountainou
9 tremist forces, the researcher said. "The violent	terrorist	attacks this year mainly targeted grassroots go
10 shot dead eight attackers in clashes. The Kashgar	violence	followed a terrorist attack targeting a police station in the city of Hotan
11 lot' Separatist groups "intentionally manipulated	hatred	among young Uygurs over a dispute in Guangdong
12 attempts to sow the seeds of racial and religious	hatred	in Xinjiang. Xinjiang does not belong to any singl
13 egion. The rioters just attempted to sow seeds of	animosity	between the Uygur and the Han Chinese, which they
14 nic minority issues in the region, Abudu said the	riot	demolished the foundation of economic development
15 e ethnic Uygurs and eight were of Han ethnic. The	attacks	also left 21 others injured. On the afternoon whe
16 he violent attacks. During Xinjiang's most deadly	unrest	in decades, 197 people were killed and about 1,700 other injured
17 the Xinhua News Agency. The incident has severely	harmed	ethnic unity, damaged social stability and has c
18 s hatred and resentment against other religions, and	undermine	Xinjiang's religious harmony and ethnic unity. The (See Example 1)

Figure 6.2 Sample concordance lines about Violent/Angry, Terror and Damage in the CD

The first point is that Muslim terrorists (i.e. the handful of Chinese Muslims) are involved in the activities that demonstrate their portrait of perpetrators. Seen from Figure 6.2 above, they are covered to “kidnap two people” (Line 8 in Figure 6.2 above) and to “kill a number of workers” (i.e. Chinese residents) (line 7). Moreover, collocation analysis demonstrates that these ethnic Muslims are connected with violence. The item **TERRORIST** is strongly and frequently collocated with “violence”, “plotted”, “attacks”, and “shot”. These collocates of **TERRORIST** uncover that a handful of Muslim terrorists indeed perform pejorative activities. All these actions are against the criminal laws in China, and so reveal their criminality. It can be thus assumed that the CCP’s response to these violent Muslims is justified.

The emphasis on these Muslims’ lawless acts agrees with how terrorists are represented in Western media. Lazar and Lazar (2004) identify criminality of Muslim terrorists in public discourse. Richardson (2004) claims the importance of criminal acts in the British media coverage of terrorists. Likewise, American mainstream media pay considerable attention to the murder, massacre, attack and the like in the discourse of terror (Morin, 2016). The reference to the illegal terrorists is claimed to be an attempt to emphasise “the need to maintain law and order” (Bhatia, 2006: 14).

The second point is that the small group of ethnic Muslims are linked to world terrorists. And by the information, they are evil others in *China Daily*. “Jihad”, i.e. holy war and aggressive Muslim actions is directly related to terrorism in the media worldwide (Macdonald, 2003; Rane et al., 2014). In Figure 6.2 above, this handful of Chinese Muslims is covered with “Jihad”. In the same vein, collocation analysis suggests the terms of **TERRORIST** and “Al-Qaeda” are strongly connected in the CD. It is well-known that al-Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden and was related to a number of terrorist attacks around the world. The connection between Chinese Muslim terrorists and al Qaeda can demonstrate terrorism and indicate immorality of Chinese Muslim terrorists. The following extract can showcase how Muslim terrorists in China are covered as same as evil others.

Muslim extremists from the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region have gone to the Middle East for training, and some may have crossed into Iraq to take part in the upsurge of violence there, China's special envoy for the Middle East, Wu Sike, said on Monday. (CD, 29th July.2014)⁶²

The use of (e)vilification showcases that Muslim terrorists in China are outcasted as an Outgroup in the CD, since the strategy is used specifically to present Outgroup membership categorisations through the focus on the activities against the morality and religious doctrines (Lazar & Lazar, 2004). It is commonly used because the discourse can “invoke fears” from readers (Bhatia, 2009). For instance, its use in discourse of terrorism in Western media can invoke horror from readers towards terroristic activities (Montgomery, 2005). use in Bush’s political speech against Bin Laden can arouse hatred towards Afghanistan, as well as justify Bush’s anti-terror movement (Bhatia, 2015a, 2015b). In the CD corpus, (e)vilification is used to assign the few Muslims with the identity of terrorists, which justify Beijing’s activities to crackdown them.

The third point is that a few ethnic Muslims are treated as threats to the majority of Chinese Muslim citizens, which explicates the divergence between them and most ethnic Muslims. Muslim terrorists “sow the seeds of racial and religious hatred in Xinjiang” (see Line 12 in Figure 6.2 above), to cause ethnic tensions in China. They are reported to kill Chinese citizens, indicated by the expression that “197 people were killed” [in Xinjiang] (Line 16). They are detrimental to the regional economies, such as demolishing “the foundation of economic development” (Line 14). They are covered to damage “ethnic unity and religious harmony” (Line 18). It can be indicated that the majority of (Muslim) Chinese people become physical and moral victims to these violent Muslim terrorists. Similar to the previous paragraph, this portrait of Muslim terrorists in *China Daily* is also similar to the representation of terrorists in American media. It is claimed in Bush’s political speech that terror attacks are religious violence, and so having the long-term and severe threats to the American society (Bhatia, 2015a).

Four linguistic features are typical in representations of evil and criminal Muslim terrorists in China. First, this handful of Chinese Muslims is negatively labelled as

⁶² China Daily (2014, 29 July). “Uygur extremists 'training in Middle East', envoy says”.

“terrorists”, “extremists” and “separatists”. These three labels indicate categorisations as well as lawlessness and evilness of the few Chinese Muslims. Second, their activities and deliberateness are stressed. To illustrate, in Line 18 in Figure 6.2, “a group of ‘violent’ terrorists” are empowered by performing the role of an actor in the conduct of “kidnap(ping)”. Their power is targeted at the animate goal of “two [Muslim] people”. Muslim terrorists are then represented as being deliberate in the act of kidnapping two Chinese Muslims. The similar case is found in Line 3 and Line 7. Second, numbers are a typical linguistic feature in this portrait of Muslim terrorists. The expressions of “a group of ‘violent’ terrorists”, “some of their members”, “197 people were killed” all indicate the existence of Muslim terrorists (cf. Example 11 in Chapter 5) and the victimisation of Chinese people. Third, the topos of reality is recurrent in the CD. *CD* journalists underscore the vicious consequence of violence performed by Muslim terrorists, include serious casualty (Line 16), regional economic loss (Line 14), social instability (Line 18) and potentially religious hatred and ethnic tension.

The discourse of terrorists in the CD corpus can justify the coverage about the CCP’s acts of anti-terrorism (see Section 3 below). CCP is the ruling party in China, so it has the monopoly of violence within a given territory if the law can justify the physical force (Henslin, 2003). From the above analysis, *CD* has made it clear that the handful of violent Muslim terrorists have performed activities in the violation of the law and universal values and victimised Chinese citizens. Therefore, the Chinese government has the right to crack down Muslim terrorists in China to protect Chinese citizens. According to the discussion of paternalism (Le Grand & New, 2015), the crackdown of a group of terrorists for the majority of Chinese citizens reveal the father-like figure of the Chinese government.

Additionally, the discourse of violence tends to panic international readers because of the global concern of Muslims, which finally enables them to agree with Beijing’s decisions. As was introduced in Chapter One, Islamophobia in the western media has been prevalent in the past several decades (e.g. Baker et al., 2013b). Media Islamophobia has formed the demonised Islam and Muslims in people’s perception (e.g. Chuang & Roemer, 2013; Ogan et al., 2014). In this way, *CD*’s coverage of Muslim terrorists, as we discussed

above, is supposed to evoke readers' Islamophobic ideas. So, CCP's crackdown on terrorism is believed to be better than nothing.

Example 1 (also see Line 14 in Figure 6.2 above) typifies the representation of evil and criminal Chinese Muslims in the discourse of terror and damage. In the example, some Chinese Muslims perform harmfully to Chinese society.

Example 1

Religious extremists [1] advocate extreme ideas, [2] incite religious hatred and resentment against other religions, and [3] undermine Xinjiang's religious harmony and ethnic unity. (CD, 24th Sept. 2015)⁶³

Similar to the above discussion and many other instances in our corpus, Chinese Muslim terrorists are labelled as “religious extremists”, indicating the disobedience of morality. They are thus seen as evil extremists. Additionally, the journalist underscores the conduct of Muslim terrorists and their deliberation in the acts of evil. “Religious extremists” serves the role as an actor in the conducts of “advocat(ing)”, “incit(ing)” and “undermin(ing)” (i.e. material process). These processes are related to immorality, i.e. “extreme ideas”, “religious hatred and resent” as well as “Xinjiang’s religious harmony and ethnic unity”. So, Muslim terrorists are empowered and so have deliberation to conduct evils. Of particular interest in this extract is that the parallel of advocating extreme perceptions, inciting religious hatred and damaging social harmony amplify the portrait of devil Muslim. As per Atkinson (1989), this is the use of the list of three, realised by juxtaposing three actions to amplify semantic meaning in the discourse (see Section 3 below).

What are the consequences of such evil acts? The semantic properties in Example 1 indicate the victimisation of most Chinese citizens, such as devastating religious harmony and the ethnic relationship between Muslims and Han Chinese. Similar to what we have discussed previously, sufferings of the majority of Chinese, especially Chinese Muslims, serves as the justification of the CCP’s crackdown of the handful of Muslims. And the

⁶³ China Daily (2015, 24 September). “Most terrorist groups knocked out at planning stage: White paper”

information appears in the cotext of Example 1. The journalist writes in the lead: “BEIJING - China respects and protects the religious belief freedom of people in Xinjiang but will firmly curb religious extremism in line with the law, a white paper said Thursday”.

The embodiment of the small group of ethnic Muslims (i.e. Uyghur rioters) as extremists reflects the outgroup identity in the CD, and agrees with the definition of terrorism in Chinese Anti-terrorism Law. Terrorism refers to “any proposition or activity—that, using violence, generates social panic, undermines public security, infringes on personal and property rights, and menaces government organs and international organisations. Terrorism aims to realise certain political and ideological purposes”. The narrative in the newspaper also reflects CCP’s White Paper “*Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang*” (The State Council Information Office, 2016). The document said that it is religious extremists that caused a series of serious violent terrorist acts in China. Additionally, religious extremism is the common enemy in the world, and so countries have the responsibility in the anti-terrorism. The governmental activities in Xinjiang are a significant part of the fight to eradicate religious extremism around the world.

1.2.2 Kadeer and Tohti as typical terrorists

Kadder Rebiya and Ilham Tohti are stressed in the CD, because, as was mentioned in Chapter 4, personal terms of Chinese Muslim terrorists account for 34.61% of 1,202 personal terms that indicate Chinese. The terms of Kadeer Rebiya have 324 occurrences in the corpus (27% out of 1,202), whereas those of Ilham Tohti appear 92 times (7.6%). It is well-known that they have dissident opinions with the Chinese government and protest overtly for their divergent perspectives. So, the minority of Chinese Muslim terrorists primarily are protesters against the Chinese government and Chinese society.

Kadeer is labelled as a separatist in the corpus. Collocation analysis suggests that “Kadeer” is frequently collocated with “separatist” in the CD. What does this separatist do then? Seen from Figure 6.3 below, she is covered to “be the mastermind behind the July 5th” riot in 2009 (Line 1); “responsible for instigating the protests” (Line 3); and use “the Internet to exaggerate details” (Line 4). She is chairwoman of WUC, “busy attempting to twist the truth by spreading a pack of lies” (Line 5). Also, she “paint(s) the Chinese

government as a cruel repressor” of Chinese Muslims (Line 8). In these lines, every action she has conducted is against laws in China and a sense of morality, such as masterminding riots, twisting the truth and spreading lies.

1. visiting the country, said the Foreign Ministry.	Kadeer	is believed to be the mastermind behind the July 5
2. ves, a controversial documentary depicting	Rebiya Kadeer	, a notorious Chinese separatist was screened at t
3. Turkish-Chinese relations are likely to be strained in the coming weeks. Whether or not	Kadeer	is responsible for instigating the protests as the protest
4. them there would be a "big incident". They said (the family)	Kadeer	had used the Internet to exaggerate details of a July 5 riot.
5. After denying their role in the July 5 riot in Urumqi, The Uygur Congress (WUC) and its chairwoman	Kadeer	have been busy attempting to twist the truth by spreading a pack of lies
6. the name of human rights and democracy the government said. Born in Xinjiang in 1951,	Kadeer	, a former businesswoman in China, made a fortune (see Example 2)
7. Another open letter – to the victims of the July 5 riot – claimed	Kadeer	and the WUC was responsible for the unrest.
8. Piercing through Rebiya's veil Once again,	Rebiya Kadeer	is attempting to paint the Chinese government as a cruel repressor of the Uygurs
9. he Internet. Riot not spreading Officials refuted	Kadeer's	claims that riots have been spreading across the

Figure 6.3 Sample concordance lines of KADEER in the CD

Example 2 (also see Line 6 in Figure 6.3 above) is typical in representing Rebiya Kadeer in the CD corpus. The writer writes that the Uyghur woman is involved in tax evasion, fraud, imprisonment and overseas terrorists. The news was published four days after the Xinjiang Riot.

Example 2

Born in Xinjiang in 1951,[1] Kadeer, a former businesswoman in China, made a fortune illegally from the 1980s on through tax evasion and fraud.

She was sentenced to eight-year imprisonment in 2000 on charges of illegally disclosing state secrets and was released on bail in 2005 to seek medical treatment in the United States.

She immediately got involved with overseas terrorists, separatists and extremists forces there, according to Wang Lequan, Communist Party chief of Xinjiang. (CD, July 9th 2009)⁶⁴

Same as other instances in the CD, Kadeer is labelled as lawless others, which is discourse strategy for the categorisation of terrorist, separatist and extremist. It has been specified that she is “involved in overseas terrorists, separatists and extremists”, meaning that Kadeer is treated as a member of world terrorists and is (e)vilified. With the expressions of “illegally” and “was sentenced to eight-year imprisonment”, the writer reveals that the woman was treated like a criminal by the government. The behaviours of “tax evasion and fraud” and “disclosing state secrets” construe her illegality. She has violated not only criminal law but the Chinese Constitution. Moreover, her lawless actions are presented, and deliberateness is stressed in the criminal acts. With transitivity analysis of Clause 1, “Kadeer, a former businesswoman in China” is an actor in the activity of “mak(ing)” (material process), which targets at “a fortune illegally”. She is thus treated as a powerful actor who can decide to make a profit illegally. All the three linguistic features show that Kadeer Rebiya is seen as an outgroup in the CD, specifically as terrorists, extremists and separatists.

The writer uses the topos of history to convey the message that lawlessness is her habitus, which predicts her criminality in the future. The employment can strengthen her outgroup identities in the CD. In the past, she conducted “tax evasion and fraud” and joined in the world terrorist organisation; currently (from the cotext), she leads the “deadly July 5 Xinjiang riot”, where “156 people died” and “more than 1000 injured”. Who knows what

⁶⁴ China Daily (2009. 09 July). ”Evidence shows Rebiya Kadeer behind Xinjiang riot: Govt”.

criminal and immoral activities she will perform in the future? Kadeer is thus a criminal terrorist leader who is malicious to China and the world. In theories, the conveyance of one's criminality in the past and present is employed in political discourse (Lazar & Lazar, 2004) and media discourse about terrorism (Morin, 2016). It is found in Morin's work that *The New York Times* and *the Washington Post* frame Hasan as a criminal terrorist with this strategy. The two newspapers connect Hasan's "past, personal, professional and spiritual life" (p. 995) explicitly and implicitly with the incident of shooting.

Ilham Tohti in *China Daily* has been briefly discussed in Chapter 4. The discussion shows that he is categorised as an outgroup in the Chinese state newspaper via the strategy of illegalization, and specifically, he is categorised as a terrorist, separatist and extremist. Because of a high frequency in the corpus, this Uyghur scholar will be discussed in detail here. Similar to the portrayal of Kadeer Rebiya, Tohti is also portrayed with the emphasis on his illegal activities. He "fabricated the statistics" (Line 1 in Figure 6.4 below), "instigated others to write and reprint articles to distort the fact" (Line 2), "manipulated opinion polls" (Line 4) and "colluded with leaders of overseas East Turkistan separatist" (Line 5). All activities mentioned above position him against laws in China. Also, the connection with leaders of East Turkistan separatist reveals his categorisation of a world terrorist, separatist and extremist. East Turkistan Islamic Movement is known as an overseas organisation to perform terrorism, separatism and extremist activities in China. Different from the portrayal of Rebiya, however, Ilham is not seen as a leader of Chinese Muslim terrorists, but a typical terrorist. Moreover, his behaviours, such as the fabrication of statistics and the circulation of false information criminalise and demonise this Uyghur scholar.

1. e. According to the records, witnesses said	Ilham Tohti	fabricated the statistics. He stayed at home and d
2 “witnesses said. According to the record	Ilham Tohti	instigated others to write and reprint articles to distort the fact
3 " Aygul Yakup , who attended the trial, said	Ilham Tohti	is a criminal of the nation. He formed a separatist group.
4 tried in Urumqi. MANIPULATING OPINION POLLS	Ilham Tohti	manipulated opinion polls, published false data on
5 government and to overthrow the government.	Ilham Tohti	organized a group with the disguise of his identity, colluded with leaders of overseas East Turkistan separatist forces.
6 king Tohti to secessionist activities in January.	Tohti	used a website he set up, "Uighur Online", to spre
7 police authorities in China's far western Xinjiang region said on Saturday night	Ilham Tohti	severely damaged the national security and social

Figure 6.4 Sample concordance lines about Ilham Tohti in the CD

Four typical linguistic features are found in the portrayal of Kadeer and Tohti as outgroups in *China Daily*. First, negative labelling employed frequently in contrast to positive labelling in the NYT, indicated by words such as “notorious”, “criminal”, “colluded” and “manipulated”.

Second, *CD* journalists imply deliberateness of Ilham Tohti in the criminal actions, same as Kadeer Rebiya (see Example 2 above). For instance, “Ilham Tohti” is involved in the material process of “manipula(tion)”, the target of which is “opinion polls”. Such an expression reveals that he is given the power to determine to perform illegally in China and so are intentional in action. An alternative expression can downgrade intention of this Uyghur scholar such as “the manipulation of opinion polls”.

The third common feature is appealing to the authority and witness testimony. Collocation analysis reveals that the combination of “said” + “Kadeer” and “said” + “Tohti” are frequent in the CD (see Appendix 3). The journalists have extensively used voices from the Chinese government in the narrative against the two persons, such as from Chinese Foreign Ministry (Line 1 in Figure 6.3 above), police officers in Xinjiang (Line 7) and

“Wang Lequan, Communist Party chief of Xinjiang” in Example 2 above. Also, seen from the first two sources, voices from Rebiya’s family and a witness in the Tohti’s trial are adopted to represent these two news participants as criminal terrorists, fundamentalists and extremists. In addition to the employment of voices, the Chinese government and witness are expressed as the sayer in the verbal process that is indicated by “said”. In Line 3 in Figure 6.4 for instance, “Aygul Yakup” serves as the sayer in “sa(ying)” that “Ilham Tohti is a criminal of the nation”. Similar to the second point above, the expression uncovers his dynamism/power to convey his words. Thus, Yakup, a Chinese Uyghur citizen, is active in identifying Tohti as a criminal of China, implying Tohti as harmful to Chinese Uyghur citizens.

2 CD: Enemies of the world

The terrorist force is not only an enemy in China but also to the world. Four aspects of information are emphasised in the CD corpus. First, it has been discussed in Section One that Chinese Muslim terrorists are portrayed as members of world terrorists. To put it further, *China Daily* emphasises the similarity between world terrorists and Chinese Muslim terrorists in the criticism of Western media and governments (see Figure 6.5 and Example 5 below). These two aspects of information justify CCP’s anti-terror activities. Secondly, *China Daily* stresses that many countries condemn terrorist activities in China and anti-terror activities by the Chinese government. The coverage was identified in the topic category of **reaction to terrorism/violence**, which has a high frequency in the CD corpus especially after Xinjiang Riots. As was discussed in Chapter 4 above, the percentage of such a topic category among 747 articles is 13.79%, and its contribution value is 0.11(\geq the mean value of 0.09). In the CD corpus, there are news articles of “Britain condemns terrorist attack in Xinjiang” (23rd May 2014) and “The US condemns terrorist attack in China’s Xinjiang” (ibid.). In these articles and similar ones, *CD* journalists emphasise denouncements from politicians with global influence, quote their voices and refer back to violence per se (see Example 3 below), which reveals antagonization of Chinese Muslim terrorists in the world.

In response to this point, the coverage of **XI and HU** underscores the enlargement of Chinese anti-terrorism to the world (see Example 4 below). The coverage of these two news participants is significant in the CD, since the personal terms of Xi Jinping and Hu

Jintao appear respectively 192 (16% of 1,202) and 25 (3%) times in data. The construction of these Chinese Muslims as malicious world enemies can be seen in the following sentences. The Chinese government is promoting that “China is being drawn into the tide of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism that is affecting Africa, India, Indonesia, Western countries and elsewhere” (Mackerras, 2015: 29).

Example 3 exemplifies that Chinese Muslim terrorists are denounced internationally in the discourse of reaction to terrorism, a marked topic in the CD. In the example, the US condemned the occurrence of violence in Xinjiang in 2014.

Example 3

[1] The United States condemns the "horrific" terrorist attack in Urumqi, capital of northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the White House said Thursday.

"This is a despicable and outrageous act of violence against innocent civilians, and the United States resolutely opposes all forms of terrorism," White House spokesman Jay Carney said in a statement. (CD, 23rd May 2014)⁶⁵

As was explored above, the writer specifies the condemnation from the US to represent immoral Muslim terrorists as global enemies. The newspaper explicates the Americans' initiative in blaming Chinese Muslim terrorists. From transitivity analysis, “the United States” in Clause [1] performs as a sayer to “condemn” (verbal process) “the ‘horrific’ terrorist attack in Urumqi” (matters). The US (i.e. the White House) is thus given the power to perform condemnation instead of being forced to do so. Any alternative expression will lessen the power of the US, such as “the ‘horrific terrorist attack in Urumqi’ is condemned by the United States”. This analysis applies to the clause of “White House spokesman Jay Carney said ...” and “the White House said...”. With regards to the attitudes of the American government, the negative labels of “condemns” and “opposes” indicate that they disagree with the behaviours of Chinese Muslim terrorists. With “despicable and outrageous act of violence against innocent civilians”, innocent Chinese

⁶⁵ China Daily (2014, 23 May). “US condemns terrorist attack in China’s Xinjiang”.

are sacrificed by morally unacceptable activities performed by terrorists. So, Muslim terrorists in China are seen as malicious others by the White House, demonstrating the portrayal that they are enemies of the world., And enemification of the small Chinese Muslims here reflects the outgroup categorisations especially extremists.

In the discourse of **HU and XI**, *China Daily* covers the CCP's collaboration with neighbouring countries in the anti-terror movement. This finding matches with what Qian (2010) found in *People's Daily* after the 9/11 attack. Results in his study suggest that the Chinese state newspaper highlights the report on the international corporation in fighting terrorism. Results in my study also underline that acts of terror are detrimental to civilian and all nations around the world, agreeing with policies and acts from the CCP. Studies show that the Chinese government initiated international cooperation or coordination for China's stability and safety and peace elsewhere (Liu & Chang, 2017; Mackerras, 2015).

Example 4 represents how anti-terror cooperation reveals Chinese terrorists as global enemies and evil others in the narrative of these news participants. In the example, the meeting was held between China and Pakistan top leaders in 2003 on Sino-Pak coordination in curbing terrorism.

Example 4

The leaders of China and Pakistan pledged to battle separatist Muslims while linking economic deals aimed at boosting trade ties.

In his first meeting with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf since taking office, Chinese President **Hu Jintao** said **both nations must battle** the "three forces" - extremism, ethnic separatism and terrorism. (CD, 4th Nov. 2003)⁶⁶

Like many other instances in the CD corpus, two aspects of information are salient in the description of anti-terror cooperation – government officials of China and another country promise for an anti-terror ally by the initiative. These contextual variables indicate anti-terrorism as a unifying force between China and neighbouring countries. Similar to Example 3 above, journalists stress the verbal behaviours of governments and their intention. “The leaders of China and Pakistan” perform as a sayer in “pledg(ing)” (verbal

⁶⁶ China Daily (2003, 04 November). “Sino-Pak pledge to fight the ‘3 evils’”.

process), targeting at “battl(ing) against separatist Muslims” (matter). This expression means that they are given the power to determine to promise to fight against separatism and so are active in the performance. Any alternative expression will decrease the initiative of these officials, such as “it was pledged to battle separatist Muslims”. Of great interest in Example 4 is that the journalist uses the modal verb of “must” in Hu’s words about the anti-terror campaign. The use of “must” reveals that it is the responsibility of the two nations to fight against Chinese Muslim terrorists. Besides the statement of anti-terrorism, the unification is also revealed by a scenario that Pakistan agrees on the categorisation of Chinese Muslim terrorists proposed by Beijing, i.e. terrorists are “extremism, ethnic separatism and terrorism”. The unification between China and Pakistan contour these Chinese Muslims or dissident holders (see Section 1.2.2 above) as a small group of global adversaries and the imagery overtly categorizes them as outgroup in the state newspaper.

Analysis of the cotext of Example 4 also reveals this portrait of Chinese Muslim terrorists. HU’s appreciation of Mr Musharraf (i.e. “You are an old friend of the Chinese people”) is used to showcase the solidarity between the two nations, and further to reinforce the anti-terror cooperation between China and Pakistan. This rhetorical strategy of politically motivated appreciation is typical in political speech (Bhatia, 2006).

China Daily expresses similarities between domestic terrorist/anti-terrorist activities and the world terrorists after Xinjiang riot in the discourse of **anti-terrorism**, a key attitude in the CD corpus. This narrative deepens the perception that domestic terrorists in China are a part of the international terror force and validates CCP’s movement. This information is contextualised in the discourse about anti-terrorism in the CD2.

1 ed and stigmatised. China's uphill battle	against terrorism	in Xinjiang is part of the world's fight against terrorism. (see Example 5)
2 the US <u>should be</u> consistent and condemn all terrorist acts and work with other countries to curb terrorism globally,"	curb terrorism	globally," Zhu said. Bonnie Glaser, a senior ad
3 China hopes the US <u>will</u> work with the international community to	fight terrorism	and enhance international anti-terrorism cooperation, she said

Figure 6.5 Sample Concordance lines about anti-terrorism in the CD2

Three concordance lines in Figure 6.5 above are typical to reveal Muslim terrorists as world enemies in anti-terror discourse and I will choose Line 1 for detailed analysis. In

this line (also see Example 5 below), The journalist showcases that terrorists in China and religious extremists in the world control and kill people.

Example 5

[1] But the extremist groups are annihilating Uygur culture after having hijacked Islam. What has been happening in Somalia and Pakistan is equally disturbing.
[...]

[2] [...] Religious extremism is the primary cause of terrorist attacks throughout the world. Similarly, religious extremists have been behind the spate of terrorist attacks in and outside Xinjiang over the past five years.

[...] China's uphill battle against terrorism in Xinjiang is part of the world's **fight against terrorism**. (CD, 5th July 2014) ⁶⁷

Similar to other concordance lines in Figure 6.5 above, behaviours of Chinese Muslim terrorists are compared with acts of terror elsewhere by the topos of comparison. With the indicators of “equally”, “same” and “similarly”, there is sameness between Chinese Muslims terrorists and terrorists in Somali and Pakistan. Therefore, these Chinese Muslims are perpetuated as a world terrorist group and global enemies. Such a portrayal of this Chinese Muslim group allows for the outgroup categorisation of Chinese Muslim terrorists — terrorists, extremists and separatists. Chinese anti-terror movements meanwhile are parts of the world anti-terror campaign, which then produces the effect that “we are in the same boat”.

The in-depth analysis finds that the writer of Example 5 stresses immoral behaviours between terrorists in Somalia and Pakistan and Chinese Muslim terrorists, which substantiate constructing Chinese Muslim terrorists as world terrorists. Similar to Example 3 above, negative labelling and the topos of reality are used to formulate evil terrorists. Terrorists from these countries annihilate “culture” by “hijacking Islam” (i.e. the topos of terrible reality). They are “religious extremists” (i.e. negative labelling), who “cause of terrorist attacks throughout the world” or behind terrorist attacks. Based on the

⁶⁷ China Daily (2014, 5 July) “Bigots are biggest threat to Uyghur culture”.

maliciousness of Chinese Muslim terrorists and those elsewhere, these Muslims who account for a small portion of the whole Chinese Muslim population as has been discussed previously are parts of world terrorists. Further, Chinese anti-terrorism campaigns are a “part of the world's fight against terrorism”.

Example 5 is contextualised in the news article blaming Western critics that Chinese ethnic policies as the eradication of the Uyghur culture. At the beginning of the news, an accusation from the West is forwarded and criticised. Western media regard the CCP’s policies towards Xinjiang as “eradicating traditional Uyghur culture”, and the CD journalist sees the claim as a fallacy. Then, the journalist draws links between terrorists in China and Islamic extremists worldwide twice (see Example 5). In the summary of the article, it is claimed that Chinese anti-terrorism affects the world’s fight against terrorism (i.e. “part of the world fight against terrorism”).

To sum up Section 2, aspects of information (especially the discourse of anti-terrorism) embody that Muslim terrorists are enemies to the world after 2009. They have threatened the international order. They have received the condemnation of Muslim terrorists by foreign countries, and in response, there is international cooperation in anti-terrorism. Chinese Muslim terrorists and world terrorists are essentially the same. These aspects of information indicate the categorisation that Chinese Muslim terrorists are terrorists, separatists and extremists.

With regards to typical linguistic patterns for this portrait, first, Chinese Muslim terrorists as international threats are shaped by the topos of reality. For the situation caused by terrorists, activities of these Muslims and their intentionality are expressed with material clauses. Second, in the presentation of international criticism and anti-terror cooperation, international voices and voices from the Chinese government are typical. These voices are presented frequently by verbal processes to indicate that Muslim terrorists in China are criticised actively by global forces and that the anti-terror ally is built voluntarily. Specific for the international collaboration in anti-terrorism, the CCP’s activities are stressed, with material clauses. Modal verbs can strengthen the establishment of such an anti-terror ally.


And the sameness between Chinese Muslim terrorists and world terrorists is presented by the topos of comparison.

3 CD: Enemies of the Chinese government

Chinese Muslim terrorists are not only enemies in China and the world but portrayed as opponents of the Chinese government.

3.1 *Antagonization by the Chinese government*

The antagonization of terrorism in China is first revealed by the topic category—**social reaction to terrorists**. As was discussed above, this topic category has a highly frequent occurrence in the newspaper corpus. The result is reaffirmed in Figure 6.6 below — acts of the Chinese government in the anti-terrorism campaign is dominant in the topic category. It should be noted that the three topics are not very clear in the LDA analysis. Therefore, I only presented the change of the whole topic category.



Note: The results in headline analysis mean the proportion of a topic in a year in relation to other topics in the corpus. Numbers from LDA analysis result indicate the contribution value of a topic in relation to the values of other topics in a year.

Figure 6.6 Diachronic development of the topic category Reaction to terrorism/violence in the CD

Reaction to terrorism/violence, the topic category, first spikes in the year 2009, seen from both figures in Figure 6.6. The analysis suggests that “police” and “government” have a high frequency in the coverage of that year. There are news pieces such as “Police have evidence of World Uyghur Congress masterminding riot” (7th July 2009). The coverage keeps ascending with fluctuations after 2009 and reaches a peak in 2014. Headline analysis shows that reports about CCP’s anti-terror actions have a significant contribution to the topic increase. There are news articles titled “Xi vows punishment on terrorists” (2nd

Mar.2014), “Xi urges 'decisive actions' against terrorism after Xinjiang blast” (1st May 2014). “China's police chief calls for severe punishment on Xinjiang terrorist attackers” (23rd May 2014). In these headlines and topic indicators, expressions such as “police”, “masterminding riot”, “severe punishment” and “terrorism” reveal that they are lawless and evil, which activate the categorisation of terrorists, separatists and extremists.

The change of this topic category reflects the enlargement of the government-led anti-terror campaign after 2009. The Chinese government has completed many large-scale activities to curb the rise of terrorism (e.g. military drills with neighbouring countries) and has paid great attention to the “police crackdown” in the campaign (Lanteigne, 2016; Mackerras, 2014).

Paring with the packed reports on CCP’s actions against Muslim terrorists in China, the attitudinal analysis also unfolds Chinese Muslim terrorists as enemies of the CCP. As was discussed in Chapter 4, Successful (e.g. “success”) and Interest/energy (e.g. “energy”) are key positive SMCs in the CD (also see Appendix 2). Figure 6.6 below shows that the attitudes of **success** and **energy** are used mainly in these contexts —1) the official determination of anti-terrorism (e.g. line 3) and 2) the heavy-handed strategies from the police (e.g. line 4). *CD* journalists present that “strong and effective measures should be taken” and “police officers will always stay active in fighting terrorism”. Moreover, “prevent(ing) acts of terror” in line 2, “win(ing) back racial harmony” in line 5 and the previous discussion reveal that the coverage of CCP’s action against terrorism is beneficial to Chinese society and the world. In other words, Chinese Muslim terrorists as government enemies reflect Beijing’s paternalism to its citizen. From social-political viewpoints, the CCP-led Chinese government is legitimate power in China and thus can use public police and military as the primary instrument to curb the horrible people in a given territory (Henslin, 2003).

1. city, in any country. Therefore, we <u>have to take</u>	effective	and important action and cooperate to fight all
2. spots organisations, which would <u>have to be</u> more	effective	to prevent acts of terror, Yxu added. On April 23,
3. capital Urumqi following the attacks. "Strong and	effective	measures <u>should be taken to prevent more terror</u> at (Example 6)
4. ty official said police officers <u>will always stay</u>	active	in fighting terrorist crimes and severely crack do
5. osity of the terrorists. We <u>must work together to</u>	win	<u>back racial harmony</u> ." Among the thousands of
6. questions." Based on Ekber's account, police <u>were able to</u>	track down	Eli to the terrorist group Eastern

Figure 6.7 Sample concordance lines about Success and Energy in the CD

Example 6 (also see Line 3 in Figure 6.7 above) is a typical example of how *China Daily* for the portrayal of Chinese Muslim terrorists as enemies of the Chinese government. The extract is contextualised in the discourse of CCP's success and passion. Zhang, a secretary in Beijing responsible for the Xinjiang issue, said in 2011 that governments at all levels should crack down the terror after violence.

Example 6

Zhang Chunxian, the secretary of the Xinjiang regional committee of the Communist Party of China, has ordered a crackdown on terrorists, religious extremists, and illegal religious activities at an emergency meeting held in the regional capital Urumqi following the attacks.

"Strong and effective measures should be taken to prevent more terror attacks and guarantee people's safety, their assets and regional stability," he said.

"(We should) [1] resolutely punish terrorists according to the law, [2] crack down on terror activities, [3] resolutely crack down on extreme religious forces and [4] effectively contain illegal religious activities." (CD, 2nd Aug. 2011)⁶⁸

Clearly, in the example and other instances in Figure 6.7 above, Muslim terrorists as CCP's opponents come from lawlessness and evilness. In other words, they are illegalised and (e)vilified by negative labelling, similar to the examples in Section one.

⁶⁸ China Daily (2011, 2 August) "Xinjiang identifies terror organization"

Shown from Example 6 specifically, “illegal religious activities” and “according to the law” mean that Muslim terrorists stand opposite to laws; Evilness is manifested by “extreme religious forces”. Given by the writer’s stress of maliciousness, the handful of Chinese Muslims are given outgroup categorisations in the imagery—the opponents of the Chinese government. These Muslims are categorised as terrorists, extremists and separatists. Because of the maliciousness of these Chinese Muslims as a menace to the majority of Chinese citizens, the CCP is justified to crackdown on Chinese Muslims. Moreover, CCP’s anti-terror campaign reveals the father-like care to Chinese citizens.

The imagery of Chinese Muslim terrorist as the CCP’s opponents are explicated by the voices from the CCP and their firmness in fighting against Chinese Muslim terrorists. In Example 6, “He said” marks the use of voices from the CCP, in which “he” (i.e. Zhang Chunxian, a top Chinese official) is a sayer in the verbal process of, “said”. “He”, in the name of the Chinese government, thus, is given the power to decide to take strong and effective measures in anti-terrorism. “It was said” is an alternative expression where the initiative of the Chinese government is lessened.

Firmness of the Chinese government is first explicated by the attitudinal markers of “effective”, “resolutely” and “effectively” in Example 6 above. The presence of these attitudinal markers demonstrates that Chinese Muslim terrorists as the CCP’s enemies are contextualised in the discourse of energy and success. Second, modal verbs can reveal the CCP’s determination. In the second paragraph, although “should” appears in the passive voice (i.e. “should be taken”), responsibilities of taking “strong and effective measures” are grounded to the Chinese government in the voice of the Chinese official. According to Fairclough (2000: 108), the use of modal verbs indicates “authoritarian language”, which suggests “moral toughness”. Zhang means that the Chinese government has determined to employ hard strategies for Muslim terrorists. Firmness of the Chinese government is also revealed by the use of material processes. Also in Zhang’s voice, the inclusive “we”, in the last paragraph, indexes the Chinese government. With transitivity analysis, “we” is the actor in the material processes (e.g. “resolutely punish”), which targets at the goal of terrorists and extremists. The expression gives the CCP the power to determine whether or not to punish and control the handful of Chinese Muslims. It is thus implacable that the act

of CCP's anti-terrorism is voluntary. In contrast, dynamism of the CCP can be decreased by other presentations, such as "extremists will be resolutely punished".

Of great interest in Example 6 is the use of the list of three to reveal the CCP's firmness in anti-Chinese Muslim terrorism, which reinforces the portrait of Muslim terrorists as CCP's enemies. Speakers in political speeches usually use the parataxis of at least three actions with similar patterns to reinforce speech force and increase the persuasion (Atkinson, 1989). The journalists in above example juxtapose "punish(ing) terrorists", "crack(ing) down on terror activists", "crack(ing) down on" extremists and "contain illegal religious activities". These four actions are listed to convince international readers that the Chinese government will bring lawless and evil Muslim terrorists to justice.

Regarding the cotext of Example 6, The journalist first records several acts of terror that occurred in Kashgar consecutively on 30th and 31st of July 2011, which caused 13 casualties and 40 injuries. The article carries on with the governmental emergency meeting in Urumqi following the attacks where Zhang made a speech (see Example 6 above). He "ordered" the utilisation of police force to crack down on terrorism. The narration of killing citizens before Zhang's statement serves to justify the employment of violent instruments towards the protagonists.

Chinese Muslim terrorists as CCP's enemies are also embodied by the use of the topos of advantage. The strategy is not marked in Example 6 above, but has appearances in sentences in Figure 6.7 above. "Prevent(ing) acts of terror" (line 2), "prevent(ing) more terror" (line 3) and "win (ing) back racial harmony" (line 5) are indicators of the topos of advantage. The implication of this strategy is that anti-terrorism is beneficial to Chinese social security and the majority of the Chinese government. Cracking down on Muslim terrorists in China thus mirrors paternalism of the CCP.

Additionally, **the narrative about top Chinese officials** also highlights the portrait that Chinese Muslim terrorist is the government's opponents (cf. Section two). There are expressions in the CD — "Xi Jinping pledged to punish terrorists severely", "Xi calls for strong ethnic unity to guide nation after riots" and "Hu has given 'important instructions' on how to deal with the situation". Similar to Example 6 above,

verbal process (e.g. “call for”) and material process (e.g. “given”) are typical for this delineation, revealing firmness of the CCP in anti-terror. Negative labelling, “punish(ing) terrorists” and “riots”, indicates lawlessness of a minority of Chinese Muslims. Together with the topos of advantage (e.g. “ethnic unity”), journalists justify the CCP’s initiatives and emphasise its father-like figure.

3.2 *Anatagnisation by Chinese Muslim officials*

CD highlights the coverage of Chinese officials with Muslim ethnicity, where Chinese Muslim terrorists as enemies of the Chinese government are revealed. They are important news participants in the CD as was discussed in Chapter 4. For instance, Nur Bekri, covered as a chairman of the Xinjiang region, is a news participant with a high frequency in data (F=33). Seen from Figure 6.8 below, He reports the death toll in riots, the anti-terror decisions and the situation of social security in Xinjiang after the violence. He said that “many innocent people were injured” in Line 1 and “vowed at the session to nip terrorist activity in the bud” in Line 2. Line 4 narrates the news events that Mr Bekri inspected the Chinese army in Xinjiang and reminded soldiers of their duties to remember hardship in the campaign against separatism in 2011.

Also, similar to 3.1 above, Chinese Muslim terrorists are illegitimated. By the injury of innocent people (Line 1), “mobster” (ibid.) and “violent and terrorist activities” (Line 2), Muslim terrorists are positioned against laws. And lawlessness indicates the categorisation of terrorists, separatists and extremists. Additionally, treating Muslim officials as victims to these Chinese terrorists in Line 1 strengthens terrorists as perpetrators. The expression “he was hit by mobsters in the head with stone” means the suffering of Nur Bekri, authenticating the fact that “many innocent people were injured”. Lawlessness of terrorists justifies CCP’s anti-terror activities as care to the majority of Chinese citizens.

1. 31-year-old officer was killed He was hit by mobsters in the head with a stone, " said	Nur Bekri	. He added that many innocent people were injured in the head by thugs with iron rods
2. Xinjiang which covers one-sixth of China 's landmass but still lags behind economically	Nur Bekri	vowed at the session to nip terrorist activity in the bud" " <u>We will annihilate the violent and terrorist activities</u> while they are still being planned and before they are put into action," he said.
3. f violence or terrorism cannot change the overall stable situation of Xinjiang " he said.	Nur Bekri	said another threat comes from changing situations in neighbouring countries. He was responding
4. In an inspection of security forces,	Nur Bekri	told army personnel and armed police officers that they should remember " how difficult anti-separatism work is
5. Early in the morning of April 29, 1996, a dozen armed terrorists broke into the homes of	Qavul Toqa	, a member of the CPPCC National Committee and deputy to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region People 's Congress (See Example 7)

Figure 6.8 Sample concordance lines about Chinese Muslim politicians in the CD

In the discourse of Chinese Muslim politicians, most of the linguistic features to portray terrorists as government enemies are similar to Section 3.1 above. Negative labelling (e.g. "terrorist activities") reveals illegitimacy of Chinese Muslim terrorists. Muslim officials' voices and activities are stressed, realised respectively by verbal clauses (e.g. "he added") and material clauses (e.g. "we will annihilate"). Since officials are placed as sayers and actors in clauses, they are given the initiative to determine anti-terror activities. In other words, the Chinese government are resolute in fighting against terrorism. Also, there is the presence of modal verbs, e.g. "should" and "will", to reveal firmness of the CCP. By "they should remember 'how difficult anti-separatism work is'" (Line 4 in Figure 6.8), curbing separatism is a long-term task for "army personnel and armed police officers". Further, Muslim terrorists in China are long-term opponents to the Chinese government, because of being terrorists, separatists and extremists.

The suffering of Muslim officials is marked in suggesting terrorists as the government's enemies and so will be explored in detail. In Example 7 below, the journalist wrote in the 2002 article that Qayual Toqa was hurt by terrorists.

Example 7

Early in the morning of April 29, 1996, a dozen armed-to-the-teeth terrorists broke into the homes of **Qavul Toqa**, a member of the CPPCC National Committee [...] creating bloody terrorist incidents by means of explosion, shooting and stabbing. (CD, 21st Jan. 2002)⁶⁹

In the above extract, it is explicit that the attackers are Chinese Muslim terrorists. They are negatively labelled as “terrorists” and as informed by the headline are members of Eastern Turkistan Independence Movements. They are a few Chinese Muslims who participated in riots, which implies their outgroup identity in the newspaper. More than that, their illegal activities towards Qavul Toqa, “a member of the CPPCC National Committee” are described in detail to reinforce the outgroup categorisations of Chinese Muslim terrorists. ETIM members are seen as “armed-to-the-teeth terrorists” to represent their powerful and menacing to the Chinese leader. This specification of “armed-to-the-teeth” is consistent with the portrayal of Muslim terrorists as criminal gunmen in American media discourse (Altheide, 2007). And the use of nominalisation in this phrase de-emphasize who provides arms to ETIM members, which can probably cause curiosity among readers.

Besides, terrorists “br(eak) into the home” in Example 7 and conduct “explosion, shooting and stabbing”. This perilous situation means that this Uyghur official becomes a physical victim to illegally armed terrorists, by which Chinese Muslim terrorists are seen as enemies of Chinese officials and the government. Referring back to the CCP’s judgment of this small group of Chinese Muslims (see Section 1.2 in Chapter 6), the state newspaper uses this imagery to elicit to the categorisations – terrorists, extremists and separatists.

Terrorists’ intentionality in illegal activities is implied in the extract also to reinforce such a portrayal and the outgroup identity of Chinese Muslim terrorists. With transitivity analysis, “a dozen armed-to-the-teeth terrorists” serve as actors in the material clause (i.e. “broke into”), the target of which is “home of Qayul Toqa”. Terrorists are given the power to decide whether or not to break into Toqa’s home and victimise him. Alternative presentations will lessen terrorists’ initiative, such as “Toqa’s home was intruded by a dozen armed-to-the-teeth terrorists”.

⁶⁹ China Daily (2011, 21 January) “‘East Turkistan’ terrorists exposed”.

By the coverage of suffering Chinese government officials and lawless Chinese Muslim terrorists, acts of government in anti-terrorism are rationalised (cf. Section 3.1 above). For instance, they will “annihilate the violent and terrorist activities” in Line 2 of Figure 6.8. The coverage further creates the relational pair of lawless terrorists vs lawful government to stress the portrayal that terrorists are enemies of the Chinese government. This relational pair is also found in the anti-terrorism speech delivered by the American administration. The terminology such as “murdered”, “confirm the legitimacy” show the criminalisation of 9/11 attackers (Bhatia, 2015b).

4 CD: Enemies of Chinese Muslim citizens

The antagonization of Muslim terrorist forces is also related to Chinese citizens, especially Chinese Muslims. Figure 6.6 in Section 3.1 above has informed that Muslims’ reaction to terrorism is less frequently repeated than the coverage of the government’s crackdown of Chinese Muslim terrorists. Among the 747 articles in the CD, the number of articles surges 10% pre-2009 to 20% afterwards. For instance, the newspaper released the article “Uyghur students: ‘We will stay silent no more!’” (2nd May 2014), in which Uyghur students become parts of anti-terrorism movements (see Section 4.2 below). Terrorists are thus seen as enemies of the majority of Chinese Muslim citizens. In the following part, I will discuss in detail how this portrait is discursively constructed, as well as what categorisations are inferred from this portrait.

4.1 Anger from Chinese Muslims after 2009

China Daily highlights the information that the majority of Chinese Muslims have fury about Chinese Muslim terrorists. The information is positioned in the discourse of **damaging, people’s fear, shock and outrage**. As was investigated in the attitudinal analysis, damaging, fear shock and anger are marked attitudes in the CD2 corpus. The k values of their attitudinal SMCs are all larger than the threshold value of 15.13 (see Appendix 2). The SMC of Angry especially has the k value of 791.65 in the CD1 contrastive with the CD2.

How to construct Chinese Muslim terrorists as people’s enemies? Seen from Figure 6.9 below, the journalists magnify voices from Xinjiang residents experienced in the riots.

On the one hand, the witness testimony spells out that terrorists conducted killing on the street and “damaged our good life” in Line 2, for the criminal and vicious imagery of terrorists (cf. previous sections). This image not only reveals antagonization by the majority of Chinese but demonstrates the categorisation of terrorists, extremists and separatists. On the other hand, journalists document witness’ shock and hatred against the lawless group also with voices from Chinese Muslims. Witnesses said that they are “shocked by the scene” (Line 9) and “we hate them” (Line 2), which indicates witness as physical and moral victims to terrorists. Chinese Muslim terrorists are thus seen as opponents of Chinese majorities.

Focusing on the fear of the social majority is also found in the media discourse of terrorism in the world. According to the results in Leudar et al. (2004: 247), fear denotes their identity as “intended moral victims”, and “the incumbency of that category may imply a weakness relative to the attackers”. In other words, it is implacable that terrorist attackers are enemies of normal citizens. Moreover, focusing on the fear of Chinese citizens evokes rationality of CCP’s anti-terrorism discussed previously. The CCP’s anti-terror campaigns purported to save Chinese citizens from harms and terror. This second point is consistent with findings in Altheide (2007). “The discourse of fear was joined with politics of fear” (i.e. Military actions), which “enabled decision makers to couch control efforts” in the name of being the best interests of citizens and protecting citizens (p. 302).

1. g revenge for us," she said. "Why did the rioters	destroy	our beautiful and peaceful Xinjiang region in such
2. qun is a beautiful and peaceful town. The rioters	damaged	our good life and <u>we hate them</u> ," said Zaytuna Gha
3 understand the motive behind them. "I was really	angry	when I heard the news. You know the government has
4. e? This is my home!" he says, still irritated and	angry	when recounting the incident. His plan is to photo
5. ctims as well. As her family members, we are very	angry	<u>about the riot organized by our mother to separate (see Example 8)</u>
6. ther didn't make it..." Muratjan said. "I have no	fear	but hatred!" "Why did those rioters kill my father
7. ouns and were trapped for 13 hours at the center,	fearing	they might get killed out on the streets. Kamil
8. besides Urumqi." "My family in Xinjiang are also	afraid	, " she said. Ebeyjan Ahmad, whose arms and head wer
9. the first rescuers to arrive at the scene. "I was	shocked	by the scene," Ma recalled. "I helped carry the
10 s although I was wearing amask," he said. "It was	horrifying	. And I began to understand why the local Uygur

Figure 6.9 Sample concordance lines about Fear/Shock, Anger and Damage in the CD2

Example 8 (see also Line 5 in Figure 6.9 above) is typical for portraying that Chinese Muslim terrorists as enemies of the social majority in the discourse of anger. The example documents anger from family members of Rebiya Kadeer, a notorious Uyghur separatist⁷⁰, as is labelled in *CD*'s coverage. Kadeer's family members, her son, daughter and brother denounce Kadeer for triggering the riot to undermine the peaceful society. They also express apology and sympathy to those affected by the violence.

Example 8

"Those who committed crimes should take responsibility," they said. "We were not involved in the riot. We are innocent, and we are victims as well. As her family members, we are very **angry** about the riot organized by our mother to separate the country. We feel sorry for the victims and their families," they wrote. [...] In addition, they asked the Uygur people "not to believe what she said" and urged them to befriend people from other ethnic groups. (*CD*, 4th Aug. 2009)⁷¹

⁷⁰ China Daily (2012, 05 July). "West's double standard clear to see".

⁷¹ China Daily (2009, 04 Aug.). "Kadeer caused riot, says family"

Same as other instances in Figure 6.9 above, journalists use witnesses' testimony in Example 8. By the expressions of "we are victims as well" and "as her family members", the journalist means that family members of Rebiya are victimised by terrorist acts related to Kadeer. Also, the writer underscores their anger towards Rebiya, apology and sympathy for victimised Chinese citizens, with expressions of "we are very angry" and "we feel sorry for the victims". In this expression, an initiative of expressing anger and apology is specified. With transitivity analysis, "we" is the sense in the mental clause "feel sorry", targeting at "victims and families". The expression infers the message that family members of Kadeer can determine their mental activities of anger and unsatisfaction. Both aspects of information reveal that family members of Kadeer align with most Chinese citizens, while misaligning with Rebiya. Therefore, Kadeer Rebiya, as well as her colleagues labelled as "those", cause victimisation to the majority of Chinese Muslim citizens and thus their opponents.

Voices from family members also highlight behaviours of Kadeer and her coup to justify the portrait that they are people's enemies, which elicits to their outgroup identity in the newspaper. Family members of Kadeer use "those who committed crimes", "riot organised by our mother" and "separat(ing) the country", illuminating that Kadeer and rioters are against Chinese criminal law. In Chinese Criminal law, separating the countries are offences concerning any activities, implemented or planned by individuals or organisations to split the state or undermine the unification of the country (Zhou, 2003). They also warn people "not to believe what she (i.e. Rebiya) said", thus identifying their mum as a liar. Criminality and immorality in the voice of Kadeer's family members realise the categorisations — Chinese Muslim terrorists are terrorists, extremists and separatists in *China Daily*.

The example was extracted from the letter from Rebiya's family members published after the 2009 Urumqi riot. The information in the letter is the same as voices from other Chinese media. Numerous media organisations in China published articles following the event to blame the woman for the misconduct. For instance, *Xinhua* had the editorial claiming that Rebiya and her World Uyghur Congress plotted the Unrest and should not be indulged (People Daily, 2009). The similar news can be found in and *Phoenix*

New Media (i.e. a Hong Kong-based Chinese-language media) and *Sina* (i.e. the largest Chinese-language mobile portal). They released, after Urumqi Unrest, the articles of “World Uyghur Congress as the main plotter for the 2009 Xinjiang riot”(2009) and “Source of evils, the overseas command centre of Urumqi Unrest”(Sina, 2009). In a sense, Rebiya and her colleagues are known as the common enemy by Chinese people. By stark contrast, *The New York Times* had one article on the interview about Rebiya after the unrest, in which Rebiya was sketched positively (See Section 5 below).

4.2 Enemies of religious staff

Chinese Muslim terrorists as enemies of Chinese Muslims reveal in the discourse that they are opponents of Chinese religious staff. As an implication, they are antagonised by Islam in China.

Muslim Religious personnel such as Imam are frequently occurring news participants in the CD corpus (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). News participants analysis suggests that 15.06% out of 1,202 Chinese news participants in the dataset are Muslim religious personnel. The close analysis herein suggests that *China Daily* highlights its anti-terror measures in the coverage of the past 15 years. Religious staff appear in the news contexts of people’s anti-terrorism (e.g. “Imam condemns attacks in Kashgar” (3rd Aug. 2011)), condemnation of terrorism (e.g. “Imam describes Urumqi shootings” (15th July 2009)) and work for ethnic unity. In these news articles, it is written that they “chanted a text from Qur’an in Arabic”, “stressed Muslims consider peace a blessing”, “built Xinjiang into a better place with the efforts of all ethnic groups”. They “continued to look into and interpret Islamic classics, especially in how they relate to stability and ethnic unity”. The information reveals that religious staff are aligned with the Chinese government and stand for the majority of Chinese Muslims. Moreover, they “said yesterday the three Uyghur men were shot on Monday”, condemned “attacks in Kashgar”, thus are against Chinese Muslim terrorists. The words of “attack” and “shot” create a lawless identity of terrorists similar to Section 4.1 above, rationalising the antagonization also revealing the categorisation of terrorists, extremists and separatists.

The portrayal of religious staff as fighters of Chinese Muslim terrorists is consistent with governmental voices in China. Yu Zhengsheng, a top political advisor, claims:

"(We should) actively guide religions to adapt to a socialist society, boost lawful religion management, cultivate a team of patriotic religious personnel and ensure the role of believers and figures in the religious circle in contributing to the economic and social development," Yu said⁷².

Then how to construct Chinese Muslim terrorists as enemies of Islamic religious personnel in *China Daily*? In Example 9, the speaker, i.e. head of the Islamic Institute in Xinjiang, excludes extremists from Islam by unveiling their evil conducts. Mawla (Abudu Rekefu), in Example 10, is constructed as a heroic religious leader in helping Xinjiang citizens. The news of Example 10 was released just after the 2009 Urumqi Unrest.

Example 9

Abudurehep Tumniaz, head of the Xinjiang Islamic Institute in Urumqi and a respected religious leader in the region, said extremists tend to use religion as a cover to lure people into terrorist activities. [...] [1] "They misinterpret the Quran and fool people," he said. (CD, 9th July, 2013)⁷³.

Example 10

In the July 5 incident, **Moulvi Abudu Rekefu**, a widely honoured scholar, displayed praiseworthy spirit. That night, he and the China Islamic Institute staff rescued 15 residents who were being chased by rioters, hiding them at the ins [...] participated in a news conference to condemn the rioting and reveal the truth to the whole world. (CD, 13 July 2009)⁷⁴

The similarity between these two examples first lies in the positive labelling of these clerics of Islam and negative labelling of Chinese Muslim terrorists. Abudurehep Tumniaz is signalled as “a respected religious leader”, same as Moulvi Abudu Rekefu, “a widely honoured scholar” and “praiseworthy spirit”. The signalling of their awesome reputation reveals the trustworthiness and correctness of their voices and further an ingroup categorisation in *China Daily*. In the voice of these reputable scholars, Chinese Muslims

⁷² China Daily (2015, 01 Oct.). “China stresses stability, security in Xinjiang”.

⁷³ China Daily (2013, 09 July). “Terror law called for after Xinjiang attack”.

⁷⁴ China Daily (2009, 13 July). “Moulvi hopes for a peaceful Urumqi”.

with participation in conflicts are labelled as “extremists” and “rioters”. So, Chinese Muslim terrorists are antagonised by these religious leaders who are given an ingroup identity. Thus these Chinese Muslims are categorised as an outgroup in the newspaper.

Religious leaders’ activities of complaints and rescuing citizens from being attacked clarify the imagery — Chinese Muslim terrorists are their opponents. And the portrayal reinforces the outgroup categorisations of Chinese Muslim terrorists. With transitivity analysis, the journalist uses verbal (e.g. “said”) and material (e.g. “rescued”) clauses to describe performances of the two religious leaders and specify their initiative in the undertaking. For instance, in Example 9, “Abudurehep Tumniaz” is the sayer in the verbal process of “said”, which targets at “extremists tend to use religion as a cover” (i.e. the verbiage). The expression reveals the power of this imam to decide the action to blame extremists. “It is said that extremists tend to use religion as a cover” is an alternative expression and the power of this imam is decreased. In Example 10, the writer presents the heroic behaviours of this Imam and his colleagues. “He and the China Islamic Institute staff” are actors in the material process (i.e. “rescued”), and the activity targets at the animated role of “15 residents”. Again, these religious staffs are given the power to determine the performance of rescuing Chinese Muslims. The sentence that “15 residents were rescued” can descend the power of the religious staff. The spontaneous denouncement and saving Chinese citizens of religious leaders exclude “extremists” and “rioters” from ingroup. Addressing the alignment between *China Daily* and the religious staff, we can imply that Chinese Muslim terrorists are given outgroup categorisations in the newspaper.

Ingroup Religious staff underscore the evil and criminal of Chinese Muslim terrorists, not only to reinforce the portrayal but to explicate *CD*’s outgroup categorizations of these Muslims. Similar to the previous example, they stress the identity of Chinese Muslim terrorists as a liar, using “religion as a cover to lure people into terrorist activities”, “misinterpret(ing) the Quran and fool(ing) people” and “revealing truth to the world”. “Rioters” and “rioting” indicate that they are against laws in China, which is boosted by the negative labels of “terrorist” and “extremists” (cf. previous examples). Collectively, these Chinese Muslims are treated by the religious leader and *CD* as terrorists, extremists and separatists.

Besides, religious staff specify intentionality of Muslim terrorists of being criminal and immoral, which builds up the negative portrayal and outgroup categorisations in the newspaper. For instance, “they” is the sayer in the verbal clause (i.e. “misinterpret”), which targets at the phenomenon of “the Quran”. This expression infers the message that Chinese Muslim terrorists are given the power to determine to misrepresent the Quran. They, thus, are dishonest to the majority of Chinese Muslims intentionally. An alternative sentence will decrease the power of Chinese Muslim terrorists, such as “the Quran is misinterpreted”. With the revelation of intentional criminality and evil, Chinese Muslim terrorists as enemies of Muslim religious leaders in *CD* indicates that they are categorised as terrorists, extremists and separatists.

4.3 *Chinese Muslims’ war on terror after 2009*

It is suggested in the post-09 CD dataset that anti-terrorism efforts in China are not only as a governmental task but win Chinese people’s participation. Chinese citizens, especially the majority of Chinese Muslims launched the anti-terror war in China after 2009, so revealing the portrait that terrorists are enemies of Chinese Muslim fellows. This portrait is contextualised in the discourse of people’s energy, bravery and anti-terrorism in the CD2 corpus. Attitudinal analysis shows that **energy, bravery and anti-terror** are significant attitudes in the CD2 in comparison to the CD1 (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 2).

Seen from concordance lines about these attitudes in Figure 6.10 below, journalists emphasise that “Uygur people are standing up” (Line 3), they “must unite against terrorism” (Line 1) and they “courageously fight(fought) against evil extremisms” (Line 7). Indeed, the majority of Chinese Muslims have participated in the war against Chinese Muslim terrorists, and so this small group of Muslims with participation in violence are opponents of most Chinese Muslim citizens. From the sociopolitical background, the coverage of “people’s war” in fighting terrorism mirrors CCP’s anti-terrorist campaigns. According to Henslin (2003), people’s war against Chinese Muslim terrorists is used as a unifying device (by the government), and it is a means of arousing supports from Chinese people of CCP’s war of anti-terror. Premised by the agreement between such a portrayal of Chinese Muslim terrorists here and the CCP’s policy of anti-terrorism, *China Daily* uses the imagery to categorise these Chinese Muslims as terrorists, extremists and separatists.

1. must unite. All nationalities <u>must</u> unite	against terrorism	. We can stay silent no longer and we will remain (see Example 11)
2. autonomous region, launching a "people's war"	against terrorism	. Xinhua contributed to this story. yangwanli@c
3. ordinary Uyghur people are standing up .	against the terrorists	The terrorist incident, in which 35 Han and t
4. call on terrorists. He also called on the public to	actively	expose terrorist schemes and contribute to maintain
5. call on. All of us should be grateful to the kind and	brave	Uyghur compatriots who showed sympathy for the
6. "In the 19th century, the Xinjiang people	courageously	fought against the Tsarist Russian invaders and foil
7. too late. We call on Uyghur compatriots to stand up	courageously	against evil extremism and lend a hand to the

Figure 6.10 Sample Concordance lines about Energy, Bravery and anti-terrorism in the CD2

What are discursive features in the coverage of people's war against Chinese Muslim terrorists? From Figure 6.10 above, first, general terms (i.e. plural, collective or singular with (in)definite article) and positive labels are used repeatedly to an anti-terrorism union participated by Chinese Muslims. The expressions of "Uyghur compatriots" (i.e. Uyghur Muslims), "the public", "Xinjiang residents" (i.e. citizens in Xinjiang) and "all nationalities" (i.e. every Chinese citizen) all infer that Chinese Muslim citizens are significant parts in the Chinese anti-terror war.

Second, *CD* journalists stress self-initiative activities against terrorists among Uyghur Chinese. In Line 6, for instance, "Xinjiang people" is an actor in the material process ("fought against"), which targets at "the Tsarist Russian invaders", who historically supported ETMI. By this expression, the majority of ethnic Muslim citizens are given the power to determine whether or not to crack down terrorists. An alternative expression can decrease the dynamism of Xinjiang people in their terrorists, such as "Tsarist Russian invaders was cracked down by courageously Xinjiang people". Line 7 also indicates that Chinese Muslims harbour the initiative in anti-Chinese Muslim terrorists. "We" (i.e. Uyghur students) is the sayer in the verbal process ("call on") "Uyghur compatriots" (i.e. receiver). This verbal action targets at the verbiage (i.e. the content of what is said) of "to stand up courageously against evil extremism". Like Line 6, Uyghur students are given the dynamism to determine their verbal actions. Alternative expressions can lessen the

initiative of Uyghur students, such as “Uyghur compatriots are called on to stand up in anti-terrorism”. From the analysis of Line 6 and 7 above, Chinese Muslim citizens are treated as active and devoted fighters against terrorists.

The third point is that, similar to the previous sections, the handful of Chinese Muslim terrorists are criminalised and (e)vilified by negative labelling. They are treated as “terrorists”, “terrorism” and “evil extremism” by the Chinese Muslim majority, which means that they are immoral and criminal to citizens. Concerning the positive expression of the Chinese Muslim majority, *China Daily* formulates the relational pair of good majority vs evil/lawless minority to for the categorisation that Muslim terrorists are a small group of terrorists, extremists and separatists. This finding is consistent with that in Bhatia (2015a). In Bush’s statement of anti-terrorism after 9/11 attack, good American citizens and evil terrorists are both emphasised, dissociating terrorists with Americans. It is discussed that the pair can “keep” Americans “intact and moral superiority”, so acts of anti-terror are rationalised.

Example 11 (also see Line 1 in Figure 6.10 above) is not typical but an interesting example of the portrayal that Muslim terrorists are enemies of Chinese Muslims after 2009. Specific in this example is the use of speech by Uyghur students. They called for a union of all nationalities in China to fight against the violent terrorists, after the explosion in Urumqi train station occurring on 30th April 2014.

Example 11

The enemies fear that we unite, which speaks for the power of unity. The more the enemies want to destroy our unity, the more we must keep united. We must unite. All nationalities must unite against terrorism. We can stay silent no longer, and we will remain silent no more. Let us stand shoulder to shoulder and deliver a blow to violent terrorists. (CD, 2nd May 2014)⁷⁵

Similar to other instances in the corpus, people’s war on terror and Muslim terrorists as enemies are contextualised in the discourse of anti-terrorism in this extract.

75 China Daily (2014, 02 May) “Uygur students: ‘We will stay silent no more!’”

Specifically, Uyghur students herein label terrorists as “enemies”, “terrorism” and “violent terrorists” to uncover adversary and legalisation of the small group of Chinese Muslims. These negative labels map the portrait to the categorisations of terrorists, extremists and separatists in *China Daily*, because of the agreement between such a portrayal and the CCP campaign of people’s war against terrorist forces in China as was discussed previously. Specific in this example is that reprinting the Uyghur’ full letter reveals that *CD*’s agreement with the statement from Uyghur students. Collectively, Chinese Muslims terrorists are given outgroup identities in *China Daily*.

The Uyghur student also underpins that majority of Chinese Muslim citizens are fighters against Chinese Muslim terrorists. The viewpoints are supported by *China Daily*. Thus Chinese Muslim terrorists are given outgroup categorisations. Similar to the discussion before, Uyghur students use inclusive “we” and “all nationalities” to build an ally and differentiated from Chinese Muslim terrorists labelled as “the enemies”. The juxtaposition of “we” and “the enemies” also reveals a relational pair of friends vs enemies, implying the portrait of antagonised Chinese Muslim terrorists. Another typical feature is that Uyghur students call on the active anti-terror activities by the majority of Chinese, Muslims especially, to fight against terrorists, by which Muslim terrorists are antagonised. To illustrate, “all nationalities” are the active actor in the material process (i.e. “unite”), and the goal of uniting is “against terrorist”. Chinese citizens are given the power to form a union for a crackdown on Muslim terrorists in this manner. In comparison, another expression can decrease the power, like “there is a must for all nationalities to unite”.

Example 11 is featured by the use of modal verbs, a list of three, imperative sentences and metaphors. Such linguistic patterns boost this portrait of terrorists as enemies of Chinese Muslims in the example, which builds up the outgroup categorisations of the small group of Chinese Muslims with participation in *China Daily*. By the expressions of “we must unite”, “we must keep united” and “all nationalities must unite”, the writer grounds the heavy duty or high probability of fighting terrorism to every Chinese citizen. In the view of Uyghurs, Chinese citizens should have the moral toughness to build an anti-terrorism union (as per authoritative language in Fairclough [1992]). Relevant to the use of modal verbs, the juxtaposition of three “we must” even builds up this firmness in fighting against Chinese Muslim terrorists. That is similar to examples in the portrait that Muslim

terrorists as enemies of the Chinese government. Besides, the use of “we can” and “we will” implies readiness and promise for Chinese to eliminate Uyghur terrorists immediately, and again embodies anti-terror union and antagonization of Muslim terrorists. Imperative sentences and metaphors in the example index that Uyghur students request the participation of every Chinese to crack down on violent terrorists. An imperative sentence lies in the final sentence in the extract, presented by “let us”. In this imperative sentence, the metaphors of “stand shoulder to shoulder” and “deliver a blow” indicate the union and anti-terrorism campaigns.

The emphasis on people’s involvement in the fight against terrorism in *China Daily* is timely in Chinese society. With the function of expanding anti-terror movements, the 2015 anti-terror law entails the strategy of people’s war against terrorism as a critical component. The law reiterates the duty of all organisations and individuals in China to cooperate with authorities. The necessity to introduce knowledge is stressed, preventing and responding to terrorist activities among educational institutions and human resources in China.

5 NYT: “Terrorists in China” as Muslim social activists

The last section will illustrate how “Chinese Muslim terrorists” in *China Daily* are represented in *The NYT*’s coverage of Chinese Muslims between 2001 and 2015. Are they criminalized or devilized as an outgroup in the American broadsheet, similar to the contours in *China Daily*? Alternatively, is this small group of Chinese Muslims categorized otherwise in the newspaper?

5.1 Social activists and victims

The handful of Chinese Muslims are seen as social activists in the NYT, and they are frequently covered in the newspaper. As was shown in Chapter 4, the topic category of **Muslim protesters** accounts for 14.7% among 448 pieces of articles in the NYT. And the weight of this topic category is 0.09, above the average. Figure 4.2 in this chapter also informed that this topic category increased dramatically after the Urumqi Unrest in 2009. The topic category includes all coverage about this small group of Chinese Muslims, in which they are seen as social activists but divergent from evil and criminal terrorists in *CD*.

The coverage concerns the appreciation and suppression of Chinese Muslim terrorists. There is a typical example of “A Uighur father’s brave fight” (4th May 2014), and the indicators of “freedom”, “democracy”, “human rights” (see Appendix 1). Humanistic discourse is used to reveal the suppression of Muslim social activists undertaken by the CCP. Typical examples include “China points to another leader in exile” (6th July 2009), “sentenced”, “trial”, “charge”. LDA analysis projects another topic of withdrawing films an international film festival (e.g. “withdraw”, “film”, “Melbourne”), implying social hostility of the minority of activists in China (see Appendix 1). Collectively, Muslim social activists, i.e. “Chinese Muslim terrorists” in *China Daily* are depicted as victims in Chinese society. Because of the positive labelling of their ideologies such as “freedom”, the imagery reflects their ingroup membership categorisation in *The NYT*. The ingroup categorisation of a few Muslim social activists is contrasted with outgroup categorisations of most Chinese Muslims. As was explored in Chapter 4 and 5, although most Chinese Muslims are victims of the CCP’s governance, they are potential threats to safety in the non-Muslim world.

Example 12 is a typical example of victimised social activists in the discourse of Muslim protesters. It is written that Chinese hackers attack the official website of Montreal Film festival because of Rebiya Kadeer.

Example 12

A week later 400 Internet users, many traced to China, knocked out the ticketing system on the site, melbournefilmfestival.com.au, in a series of attacks that made it appear as if 125 screenings at the Australian festival were sold out. The cyber assaults and other actions were a protest against the appearance of Ms Kadeer, the Uighur leader, at a screening on Saturday of “The 10 Conditions of Love,” a documentary about her life.

Same to some other instances in our corpus, Rebiya Kadeer, as an Uyghur leader, was portrayed as a victim in China. For this portrait, the journalists pejoratively describe Chinese citizens, while neutrally describe this Uyghur woman. I will discuss this woman in Section 5.3 below. The writer criminalises Chinese citizens in the activities against

Rebiya. It is said that 400 Chinese hackers (i.e. numbers) illegally attack the official website of the film festival “to protest against the appearance of Ms Kadeer”. “Knock(ing) out the ticketing system”, “a series of attacks” and “cyber assaults” all infer that the protest against Rebiya Kadeer is disobedient to universal laws. With 400 criminal internet users vs one Rebiya Kadeer, it is easy to assume that this Uyghur woman is seen as a victim of the Chinese majority. In *China Daily*, by contrast, criminality is attributed to Rebiya Kadeer per se. More than that, it is explicated in Example 12 that “400 internet users, many traced to China” behave illegally with intentionality. And the intentionality in hacking can intensify people’s illegality while intensifying the victimisation of Rebiya. According to transitivity analysis, “400 internet users” are the actor in the material process “knock(ing) out”, which targets “the ticketing system”. 400 Chinese are given the power to decide the action of attacking box office. Most of the alternative expressions can minimise the initiative of these Chinese, e.g. the ticketing system on the site was knocked out.

Is Rebiya positively represented in contrast to 400 Chinese internet users? The journalist does not praise this Uyghur woman notably with positive markers. Instead, the neutral expressions of “an Uyghur leader” and “Mrs Kadeer” can enhance her innocence, which is more powerful than direct appreciations. The presentation of Kadeer again evidences that victimised Kadeer is given an ingroup identity in *The NYT*.

Muslim social activists as victims in China is also revealed in the discourse of fear and shock from social activists per se. According to the findings from the attitudinal analysis (Also see Appendix 2), **fear and shock** are two marked negative attitudes in the NYT compared to the CD corpus. The SMC of Fear/shock has the k value of 30.53 in such a corpus compared with its counterpart. Shown in Figure 6.11 below, the journalist uses voices from social activists, saying that “I am always afraid I’ll disappear” (Line 2), “I was very afraid” (Line 3) and “this accusation is absurd” (Line 4). Horror and astonishment reveal that the small number of Chinese Muslims, harbouring disobedience in China, feeling vulnerable in China. This information makes them mental victims to Chinese power. The ideological categorisation of Muslim social activists arisen from this

portrayal will be elaborated in Example 13 below.

1. who would give only a partial name, Muhammad, for	fear	of government retribution. "Excitable people thin
2. time. It's not from fear - although I'm always	afraid	I'll disappear at any moment - but from frustration (see Example 13)
3. treatment: "My friends were dying, and I was very	afraid	." The way the authorities handled Mr. Almijan, in
4. Anyone who knows my father knows this accusation is	absurd	My father loves his country and has never advocated violence.
5. "These accusations are completely	absurd	." he said by telephone. "We are very stressed out."

Figure 6.11 Sample concordance lines about Fear/shock and Insensibility in the NYT

What are typical linguistic patterns for the portrait of victimised social activists in this discourse? It is evident from Figure 6.11 above that voices from Muslim social activists are employed to describe the miserable experience they have undergone. For instance, an activist claims "I am always afraid" (Line 2) to showcase his powerlessness to the powerful Chinese society and the Chinese government. Another Muslim complains that "this accusation is absurd" (Line 4) to imply his innocence to the situation, riots and violence. Generally, they are victimised by other Chinese and the Chinese government. Referring to the discussion before Section 5, I have discussed that voices from Muslim social activists are almost muted in *CD*.

Example 13 (also see Line 2 in Figure 6.11 above) is a typical example for the embodiment of Muslim social activists as victims. The portrait is situated in the discourse of fear, which is related to the attitudinal analysis. In the example, Ilham Tohti expresses absolute fear about his experience in China.

Example 13

I feel like I'm under pressure all the time. It's not from **fear** — although I'm always afraid I'll disappear at any moment — but from frustration and feelings of helplessness. But this is my life, the one I've given myself. (NYT, 23rd Sept. 2014)⁷⁶

⁷⁶ The New York Times (2014, 23 September) "Ilham Tohti, Uighur scholar, on life under scrutiny in China"

Similar to the discussion the previous paragraphs, the expressions of “under pressure”, “fear”, “afraid”, “frustration”, “helplessness” and “painful” all describe sufferings of Ilham Tohti, the speaker. By the repetitive use of “I”, first-personal pronoun, the writer stresses that it is Tohti who have the frustration of Chinese society, live under pressure and feel horrors. As we discussed in Section 1.2 (Chapter 6), he is an Uyghur scholar imprisoned by the Chinese government, basically for showing dissident opinions. Therefore, the self-statement of horror and disappointment shows the mental victimisation of Uyghur social activists to Chinese authority. In Clause [1], Tohti not only specifies his identity as a victim but CCP’s deprivation of humanitarianism (i.e. the topos of humanitarianism). With the modal verb of “I will” and the activity of “disappear(ing) at any moment”, he anticipates secret detention by the CCP. The secret detention reveals that the Chinese government punish a social activist with power abuse, which stresses the victimisation of Tohti.

The journalist reveals firmness of Tohti in Example 13, from which victimised Toht is given ingroup identities in the American broadsheet. Instead of retreating, Tohti means that “giv(ing) myself” to career is his destiny. The label “but” indicates the contrast between previous information, his suffering, and his toughness. Linking two aspects of information, suppression of Tohti is negativised, and his firmness in the fight is appreciated. Moreover, his initiative in devotion to his career is specified, which accentuates the identity of a victim and a fearless fighter. “I” is the actor in the material process “have given”, which targets at the animate goal “myself”. Though recipient is omitted in the sentence, the conjunction “but” links the recipient to Tohti’s career. Same to any other instances discussed previously, any alternative expressions will decrease the initiative of Tohti in the pursuit of his career. For instance, “my career is my life”. The ingroup membership categorisation of Ilham Tohti in this *NYT extract* is contrasted with the outgroup categorisation in *China Daily*. Section 1.2.2 in this Chapter explicated that this Chinese Muslim scholar deliberately offended Chinese laws and moral values internationally acknowledged for disseminating terrorism and separatism. He is treated as a typical Chinese Muslim terrorist in the Chinese broadsheet.

Example 13 was extracted from the interview transcript of Ilham Tohti, an Uyghur scholar. This *NYT* new says that he always provides “an insightful and spirited assessment of the central government’s latest development initiative in Xinjiang”. However, he is imprisoned by the Chinese government, because of critiques about the CCP’s propaganda about Xinjiang. In stark contrast, *China Daily* also published a news article about this Uyghur scholar on the 23rd of September 2014. The news says that “Uygur teacher Ilham Tohti is sentenced to life in prison for separatism in Urumqi, China”. The reason is that he uses “a website he set up, ‘UighurOnline’, to spread rumours and separatist thought”.

5.2 *Brave social activists*

Fearless social activities are another portrayal of the handful of Chinese Muslims in the NYT. The portrait is first contextualised in the discourse of Muslim protesters (same as Section 5.1 before) and bravery of Muslim social activists. Analytical results from attitude analysis suggest that **bravery** is a significant positive attitudinal feature in the NYT, which is signified by words such as “brave” and “fearless”. Chapter 4 reported that Bravery is a homogeneous SMC between the NYT and the CD, based on the similar occurrences in data ($p=0.98$ close to 1) (also See Appendix 2).

In this discourse context, Muslim social activists are claimed to “challenge the one-party state” (*NYT*, 2nd August 2008)⁷⁷, in which social activists are appreciated for their heroic behaviours to challenge the authoritarian government. Also seen from Figure 6.12 below, a family member of social activists says that “I’m not scared. My father is strong, brave and, above all, honest.” (Line 3). Journalists describe social activists to “put on a brave face” (Line 1), “dare to point out the flaws” (Line 4) and “criticise state policy in Xinjiang”. These Chinese Muslims neither behave illegally nor immorally, as was addressed in *China Daily*. Instead, they are pictured as refusing the authoritarian government, thus are brave social activists with an ingroup membership categorisation in the broadsheet.

77 The New York Times (2008, 2 August). “On a people’s train from Urumqi to Beijing”.

1	rumqi, Han and Uighur residents tried	brave	face , saying the attack would not succeed in
2	to put on a lives in suburban Virginia. “They	brave	drivi influential intellectual like him on the streets.”
3	don’t want a tell them. I’m not scared. My father	brave	(see Example 13) and above all, honest. He protected me for 18
4	is strong eaning advice, he was a rare scholar	dared	yea to point out the flaws in official policies. By p
5	in China who ng ethnic hatred,” what they meant	dared	to criticize state policy in Xinjiang. Not that h
	was that he		

Figure 6.12 Sample concordance lines about Brave in the NYT

Example 14 is a typical example to picture them as courageous social activists in the discourse of their bravery. In this extract, a friend of Tohti supported the Uyghur scholar and criticised the crackdown on Muslim social activists in the year 2014.

Example 14

At a time when the authorities are determined to tamp down even the faintest expression of Uighur self-determination, few hold much hope that he *will* be freed anytime soon. “[1] The government can make sure he rots in jail for years,” said Mamatjan Juma, a childhood friend who now lives in suburban Virginia. “They don’t want a **brave**, influential intellectual like him on the streets.” (NYT, 11th May 2014)⁷⁸

Like many other instances in Figure 6.12 above, the writer uses a “childhood friend” of Tohti to voice appreciations. From his name “Mamajan Juma”, he is an Uyghur Muslim. Juma describes Tohti as “a brave influential intellectual” instead of a terrorist in the CD, inferring the case that Tohti is advocated among Uyghur Muslims for being fearless and intelligent. This information reveals that Tohti is seen as an ingroup member in the Chinese Muslim community, and the adoption of Uyghurs’ voice showcase *The NYT*’s alignment with them. Similar to Example 13, the treatment of Ilham Tohti here is contrary to his outgroup identity in *China Daily* (see Section 1.2.2 in Chapter 6).

As is opposite to positive portrayal of Tohti, Juma also denounces the Chinese government for the containment of this activist. The use of Juma’s voice in this aspect

⁷⁸ The New York Times (2014, 11 May). “A devotion to language proves risky”.

increases authenticity of the information, since this childhood friend should know Tohti closely. What do they do to Tohti? Tohti is meant to be harshly treated by the CCP's abuse of power, indicated by the ability to "make sure he rots in jail for years". "Rot(ing) in jail for years", this metaphor foresees a tragedy of this Uyghur scholar and echoes with little hope to "free him". This unfortunate reality is contrastive to the acts of Tohti, i.e. "faintest expression of Uighur self-determination". Juma emphasises his friend performance as "the faintest expression of Uighur self-determination". The item "faintest" intensifies that the CCP allows only for obedience from ethnic Muslim, and so being an authoritarian. Concerning the brave activist previously discussed, the relational pair of authoritarian government vs brave social activist is shaped for this portrait.

Transitivity analysis shows initiative of Juma in complaints and intentionality of the CCP's authoritarianism. In Clause [1], "the (Chinese) government" is the actor in the material process "mak(ing) sure, and this activity is related to making Tohti "rot in jails for years". This expression gives the CCP initiative for the imprisonment of Tohti. Alternative production will decrease the power; for instance, "the CCP has the ability to ensure that he rots in jails". Moreover, "[...] said Mamatjan Juma" is a verbal clause_v in which "Juma" is the sayer in the act, "said", and which concerns about the suppression of Tohti. This expression likewise gives the power to Juma deciding whether or not to criticise the Chinese government, which will be lessened by alternative expressions. For instance, the sentence can be paraphrased that "it was claimed by Mamatjan Juma [...]". By the initiative of both the CCP and the Uyghur individual, *the NYT* emphasises the relational pair of an authoritarian government vs brave Muslim social activists.

The extract was extracted from a piece of news that an Uyghur Muslim faces the lifelong imprisonment for building the chain school for the Uyghur language. In the article, the journalist reports not only the jailing of Tohti but the eradication of Muslim culture in China. Presumably, the whole article gives a positive presentation of Tohti, in contrast with the negative presentation of the Chinese government.

The portrait of fearless Muslim social activists is decoded in the discourse of Rebiya Kadeer in the NYT. As was reported in Chapter 4 (Section 3.2), **Rebiya Kadeer and Ilham Tohti** are recurrent news participants, the personal terms of whom collectively have 476 occurrences in the NYT. This number denotes that these two news participants have 83% share of 572 Muslim/non-Muslim social activists and account for 36% of all 1,317 Chinese news participants in data (see Table 4.3). Ilham Tohti has been elaborated previously and thus will not be reiterated (see Example 13 in this Chapter and Example 16 in Chapter 4 above).

Why is **Kadeer** pictured as a fearless Muslim social activist? Seen from the collocation of “Kadeer” in Figure 6.13 below, the Uyghur woman is described as “a well-known businesswoman and activist” (Line 1)”, a “leader” (Line 3), a “prominent Uighur Muslim” (Line 4) with “tenacity and sense of destiny” (Line 2). These expressions contour her as a strong Uyghur woman with influence on Chinese Muslims, and further equip her with ingroup categorisations. Collocation analysis results can support the above findings. “Kadeer” is paired with “leader”, “accused” and “businesswoman” frequently and closely (see Appendix 3), all of which indicate the influence and bravery of Chinese Muslims. Contrastive to her fearlessness that categorises her as an ingroup in the NYT, the newspaper likewise identifies authoritarian behaviours of the CCP (cf. the presentation of Tohti). “Worsening Chinese repression” in Line2 and “exiled” both indicate the oppression of brave Rebiya Kadeer. Such imagery of fearless social activists suggests their ingroup identity in the American broadsheets, which is contrasted with the outgroup categorisation in *China Daily*. It was discussed in Section 1.2.2 of this chapter that Kadeer is depicted as the head of Chinese Muslim terrorists by leading all illegal and immoral acts to impair social security in China.

1. in 2006. The government cited good behaviour. Ms.	Kadeer	, a well-known businesswoman and activist in China'
2 the worsening Chinese repression of the Uighurs, Rebiya	Kadeer	is displaying the tenacity and sense of destiny that drove her improbable (Example 14)
3 ions were a protest against the appearance of Ms.	Kadeer	, the Uighur leader, at a screening on Saturday of
4 officials have also sought the release of Rebiya	Kadeer	, a prominent Uighur Muslim businesswoman who is im
5 human rights groups welcomed the release of Rebiya	Kadeer	, Xinjiang's best known political prisoner, before

Figure 6.13 Sample concordance lines of KADEER in the NYT

Example 15 (also see Line 2 in Figure 6.13 above) is a typical example to construct fearless Muslim social activists with the narrative of Rebiya Kadeer. It is written that Kadeer is a determined social activist for Chinese Uyghurs, even if she has been harshly treated by the Chinese government.

Example 15

As the global face of resistance to what she calls the worsening Chinese repression of the Uighurs, **Rebiya Kadeer** is displaying the tenacity and sense of destiny that drove her improbable climb inside China in decades past, from laundry girl to famed business mogul. [...] In 1999 she was imprisoned. [...] “Until I lose my consciousness, [1] I’ll stay on as the leader.” (NYT, 8th July. 2009)⁷⁹

Like many other examples in the NYT corpus, Rebiya Kadeer is positively presented. “The tenacity and sense of destiny” in the context of “the worsening Chinese repression of the Uighurs” infers her determination and fearlessness in the service for Chinese Muslims. Thus, her identity as a brave social activist is revealed. Additionally, her historical past is amplified to demonstrate her bravery and firmness. Divergent from illustrating her criminal past in *CD*, *NYT* describes her experience as an inspirational story. The experience from a “laundry girl” to a “famed business mogul” is labelled as an

⁷⁹ The New York Times (2009, 08 July). “Exile in the U.S. become face of Uighurs”

“improbable climb”, which indicates incredible success that comes from her “tenacity and sense of destiny”.

Kadeer was given voices, which is muted in *China Daily*. And her statement reveals her toughness and her strong identity. With transitivity analysis of Clause [1], “I” is the active actor in the material process “stay on”, and these actions are related to the attribute of “as the leader”. The expression means that she has the power to decide to resume the leadership, which will be lessened otherwise. For instance, there is an alternative expression that “I will be the leader”.

In addition to the positive expression of Kadeer, like the previous examples, the Chinese government is negatively depicted. “The worsening Chinese repression of the Uyghurs” and “imprisoned” both construe terrible experience of Chinese Uyghurs and, in turn, a government lacking humanitarianism. It is noticeable that CCP as the actor of inhumane performances is backgrounded in Example 15 above. The Chinese government does occur in the nominalisation, “the worsening of Chinese repression of Uyghurs” and passive voices, which can distract attention to the CCP in inhumane behaviours. CCP’s behaviours can be presented otherwise. The nominalisation can be presented as “the government repressed Chinese Uyghurs more harshly”. The expression “she was imprisoned in 1999” can be replaced by “the Chinese government imprisoned her in 1999”.

The example was extracted from the news piece of “Exile in the U.S become face of Uyghurs”. The news piece was published on the same day as *CD*’s news in which family member Kadeer denounce her behaviours (see Example 8 in Section 4.1). Different from her negative image in that *CD*’s report, The NYT showcases Kadeer’s firmness and the CCP’s repression of Uyghur Muslims. Kadeer Rebiya is thus seen as a prominent person in Muslims’ reports and a brave ingroup in *the NYT*.

6 Summary

“Chinese Muslim terrorists”, constructed in *China Daily*, have acquired a polarised categorisation in *The NYT*, despite that they are the same batch of Chinese Muslims represented oppositely from the construction of most ethnic Muslims in the two broadsheets.

In the CD, the handful of Chinese Muslims, as is reiterated in the newspaper, are categorised as terrorists, extremists and separatists. They are specifically depicted as a lawless and malicious coup threatening Chinese social security. And the first portrait is related to the discourse of violence, damages of Chinese society, Rebiya Kadeer and Ilham Tohti, where they are explicitly called “terrorists”, “extremists” and “separatists” in corresponding with the national policy on anti-terrorism. Second, *CD* journalists treat them as enemies of the world by covering similarities between these Muslims and world terrorists, international condemnations and unification with neighbouring countries in anti-terrorism. Third, *China Daily* gives them a portrayal of opponents of the Chinese government. The contexts of this portrayal include CCP’s reactions to these Muslims as well as CCP’s passion and energy in the crackdown of the few Muslims. Last, these Chinese Muslim are seen as enemies of Chinese (Muslim)citizens especially after 2009. And the portrait is contextualised in the discourse of peoples’ anger and the war against terrorism, religious staff’s suffering and acts against terrorism.

Typical linguistic features for the categorisation of terrorists, extremists and separatists are listed below. *China Daily* uses material clauses frequently to underscore lawless and immoral behaviours of Muslim terrorists and their intention in the acts. The use of negative labelling, the topos of history, numbers, comparison and reality reveal negativity of these Chinese Muslims. For the portrayal of enemies Chinese Muslim terrorists, *China Daily* typically uses material, verbal and mental clauses. With these clauses, anti-terror activities of the CCP and the majority of Chinese Muslims, their voices and mental experience of Chinese Muslims are stressed. Again, the frequent use of modal verbs and occasional use of imperative sentences, the list of three and inclusive “we” can enhance these portraits. Third, *China Daily* stresses that the CCP’s antagonising terrorists are beneficial to the society, by the use of the topos of advantage. The information rationalises the CCP’s acts of anti-terrorism

“Chinese Muslim terrorists” in *CD* are endowed with ingroup categorisations in *the NYT*, and specifically pictured as brave and powerless Muslim social activists. The depiction is contextualised in the discourse of Muslim protesters, Kadeer Rebiya and Ilham Tohti especially, their fear and shocks.

Linguistic features for the portrayal of brave and powerless social activists are listed. *The NYT* frequently covers social activists' performance of fighting for Chinese Muslims and their initiative of doing so. The performance is embodied by acts and words of activists and voices from other sources, presented by material and verbal clauses. Some social activists with great influence are positively labelled to show their ingroup identity in the newspaper. *The NYT* also covers the CCP's repression of social activists with numbers and material processes. The repression suggests the suffering of Muslim social activists and the CCP's lack of humanitarianism. In the acts of repressing Muslims, the CCP as a performer is occasionally backgrounded by nominalisation and passive voice.


Chapter 7 Conclusion

This project has attempted to explore the ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* and *The New York Times*. For such a research purpose, the project used news coverage about Chinese Muslims in the two newspapers, which was published from 2001 to 2015. Van Dijk's socio-cognitive CDA approach in the combination of methods from corpus linguistics was applied in a three-dimensional analytical framework. The use of this framework allows for a systematic revelation of categorisations of ethnic Muslims in China, as well as contexts and typical linguistic features for the representation of Chinese Muslims in the datasets. Again, it is notable that the investigation of context stresses local and global contexts for categorising Chinese Muslims, and the investigation of linguistic patterns explains how Chinese Muslims are linguistically categorised. The exploration of the two dimensions followed the sequence from quantitative corpus analysis to qualitative CDA analysis. The investigation of categorisations shows the specific role of Chinese Muslims in the media, which was identified in the examination of two dimensions above.

The following chapter will draw together significant findings and discussions from the analysis. It will begin with a brief of major findings; then it will move on to discuss the discussion of the theoretical contribution and empirical contribution. Finally, I will discuss the limitation of this project and provide recommendations for further research.

1. Major findings of the study

I will briefly report the major findings from the three dimensions, which address the research questions of how the majority and minority of Chinese Muslims are constructed in the Chinese state English newspaper and the American broadsheet.



Note: A pie chart indicates the overall Chinese Muslim population.

Figure 7.1 Categorisations the majority and the minority of Chinese Muslims in the CD and the NYT

The majority of Chinese Muslims are categorised as an ingroup in *CD* with positive portrayals (see “Chinese Muslims in the CD” in Figure 7.1 above). The newspaper also gives a handful of Chinese Muslims (i.e. Chinese Muslim terrorists in the CD) outgroup membership categorisations with multiple negative portrayals, given that they hold dissidents from the Chinese government. From the next pie chart in the figure, the majority of Chinese Muslims are given outgroup membership categorisations with negative imagery in *the NYT* in contrast to ingroup membership categorisations and positive portrayals the same batch of ethnic Muslims who are presented as terrorists in counterpart corpus. The specific imagery of Chinese Muslims shift before and after Urumqi Unrest in 2009. However, the membership categorisations of the Chinese Muslim majority and minority maintain in both broadsheets.

These membership categorisations of Chinese Muslims are traceable in corpora with similar and dissimilar discourse contexts, topoi, process types and other linguistic devices. Regarding contexts, the majority of Chinese Muslims are constructed in the *CD* corpus with a group of positive attitudinal markers, news participants and topics, which elicits to positive portrayals (e.g. happiness, successful Chinese Muslim individuals and social transformations). Conversely, these contextual elements with negative connotations or denotations in data such as violence facilitate the derogative portrayals of these Chinese Muslim terrorists in *China Daily*. An opposite situation is found in *The New York Times*,

where affirmative attitudinal markers, news participants and topics inherent with negative meaning (e.g. resent) are used for the derogative portrayal of the Chinese Muslim majority. The positive portrayal of “Chinese Muslim terrorists”, i.e. Muslim social campaigners in *the NYT*, is constructed primarily with positive attitudes and news participants such as bravery.

Linguistic analysis suggests that some types of topoi, process types and other linguistic patterns are used across corpora for the divergent portrayals of Chinese Muslims. For example, material and verbal processes are common in both corpora. However, specific linguistic features have more frequent occurrences in the CD corpus than in the NYT corpus and vice versa.

Such representations of Chinese Muslims in the international news reflect the socio-political environment where *CD* and *the NYT* are positioned. *China Daily* is seen to align with stances and ideologies of the Chinese government (Liu, 2012; Stone, 1994; Wu et al., 2015). Thus, the paper necessarily helps the government to disseminate egalitarianism and unification of all ethnic groups that are principal policies to ethnic minorities in China (2001-2015). The policies construe CD’s ingroup membership categorisation of most ethnic Muslim and outgroup categorisation of Chinese Muslim terrorists in the news of this eventful 15 years. When ethnic issues rose, *CD* circulated globally the CCP’s inclusiveness of Chinese Muslims of all ethnicities, whereas exclusiveness of terrorists. *The New York Times* is reputable for its liberal ideologies that underpin democracy and humanitarianism. That explains why Chinese Muslim protesters are given ingroup membership categorisations in the broadsheet. The newspaper’s outgroup categorisation of the Chinese Muslim majority suggests the derogative representation of Muslims in American media.

The representation of Chinese Muslims as ingroup/outgroup implies how Chinese Muslims are ideologically constructed in media discourse, which contributes to the theory of media discourse of Chinese Muslims and critical discourse, as well as dissects my curiosity of media power to disseminate Chinese Muslims.

2. Contributions to media representation of Muslims

The study contributes to the theory of Muslims in media of various regions. In the research on media representation of Muslims, a comparative study concerning Muslims in Asian countries is needed. Moreover, it was highlighted in Chapter 2 that only Zheng (2011) investigates the presentation of Uyghur Muslims in two Chinese newspapers.

In a broader view, this study contributes to the knowledge of ethnic Muslims in China. As was introduced in Chapter one, Chinese Muslims are a significant part of world Muslims and Chinese population. However, the issue of how they are living in China is often de-emphasised in literature. Notably, little research has been conducted about the image of Chinese Muslims in the media nowadays. The findings in this project can enrich the literature on a vast Muslim group in China.

In the following part, I will outline how Chinese Muslims are represented in *China Daily* and *The New York Times*.

2.1 CD: Moderate Muslims and Chinese citizens

Moderate Muslims and Chinese citizens are membership categorisations of most Chinese Muslims in the CD corpus, which reveals that Muslims are categorised as ingroups in *China Daily*. In other words, there is a presence of Islamophilia (i.e. being friendly to Muslims) when *China Daily* represents these ethnic Muslims in China. This ingroup membership categorisation of Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* disagrees with how Muslims are ideologically portrayed in the Western media. Chinese Muslims are not violent groups (e.g. Richardson, 2004), potential terrorists (e.g. Chuang & Roemer, 2013) or a monolithic community different from the Western world (e.g. Kumar, 2010; Said, 1997). Instead, they are represented as a pleasant social group living in China and open-minded in communicating with non-Muslim Chinese (see Chapter 4). The coverage of ethnic groups happily living in China and friendly treatment from non-Muslim Chinese create a harmonious ethnic relationship between the social minority and majority in Chinese society. The portrayal of pleasant Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of happiness, goodness and success pertinent of Muslims. *CD* correspondents emphasise, in the discourse, Muslims' self-initiated activities leading to their happiness, their benefits in China and promising futures. Muslims' actions are represented by material clauses in

which they are actors. Muslims' benefits are expressed by topos of advantage, and modal verbs indicate Muslims' promising future. Voices from multiple sources are employed to authenticate happiness of most Chinese Muslim citizens.

The majority of Chinese Muslims categorised as ingroups in *China Daily* (i.e. moderate Muslims and Chinese citizens) shift pre and post the 2009 Xinjiang Riots (see Chapter 4). Before the riot in 2009, they are portrayed as liberal Muslims, which stresses such a group identity as moderate Muslims. Drawing on the history of Muslims' integration into Chinese society, Chinese Muslims are covered to habitually communicate with the non-Muslim world in maintaining Islam and Muslim culture. The portrayal of Muslims is contextualised in the discourse about Muslim culture and religion. For such portrayals of most ethnic Muslims, *CD* journalists employ lexico-grammatical features, such as modal verbs, general terms and material clauses. It can be indicated that a large population of Chinese Muslims is engaged in communication with initiative. Chinese citizenship of Muslims is stressed after 2009, which is implied by the portrayal of modern (i.e. independent and open-minded) Muslim citizens in China. The coverage on Muslims' socialisation into modern China and the world reveal homogeneity between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese. For instance, Muslim women are covered working in the commercial world like their non-Muslim counterparts. The portrayal of modern Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of community affairs and successful Muslim individuals. *CD* journalists emphasise the terrible situation Muslims are situated and positive acts of Muslims of multiple types, which are realised by the topos of reality, mental/verbal/material clauses. Especially, material clauses reveal that Chinese Muslims actively integrate with modern China.

Chinese Muslims with ingroup membership categorisations in *China Daily* are also reflected in the minority who are called "terrorists" therein as opponents of the majority of ethnic Muslim citizens after 2009. As was addressed in Chapter 6, the discourse of brave Muslim citizens and religious leaders is pertinent to picturing the small group in China as enemies of Muslim citizens. Chinese Muslims launch a war against evil and criminal terrorists, which insinuates the goodness of most Muslim Chinese. Brave actions of Chinese Muslims are detailed, and most Muslims are covered to fight against terrorists by

the initiative. Actions of most Muslim and their initiative in curbing terrorists are expressed, typically by material clauses. A small number of Chinese Muslims are treated as enemies of most Chinese Muslims are also represented by some rhetorical strategies, such as inclusive pronoun we and the list of three.

2.2 *CD: Appreciation of the father-like Chinese government*

In the CD corpus, there are explicit appreciations of the Chinese government in various ideological representations of the holistic ethnic Muslims group in China. Most of the findings here are novel compared to the previous literature on media representation of Muslims.

One point is that Chinese Muslims in *CD* are satisfied recipients of the CCP's paternal care to enjoy religious freedom in the 15-year coverage of ethnic Muslims (see Chapter 5). With positive expressions, Chinese Muslims and the CCP are categorised as ingroups in *CD*. Beijing cares about Muslims, provides food and holidays to Chinese Muslims. It is well-known that Islam is a contentious issue when Muslims are addressed. From the news that Chinese Muslims worship Islam with Beijing's help, CCP has treated most Chinese Muslims as insiders, being good and supportive of the CCP. In other words, Chinese Muslims are likewise moderate Muslims and Chinese citizens. And the Chinese government's help with religious freedom reveals its father-like character to most Muslim citizens. Happiness from Muslims implies a harmonious government-citizen relationship (cf. harmony between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese under the CCP's leadership). Such a portrayal of Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of Muslim religion and Muslims' happiness. Muslims are typically represented by positive labelling and numbers to shape the benefits of Muslims. The use of modal verbs and material clauses elicit that the CCP enthusiastically assists Muslim citizens and treats these subsidisations as a duty of the government.

Furthermore, *CD*'s appreciation of the Chinese government is reflected in representing Muslims as powerless Chinese citizens with the CCP's help. As was addressed in Chapter 5, the representation of Chinese Muslims as beneficiaries of the CCP's assistance to improve living standard is found in the pre-09 coverage. Muslim people are delineated as powerless in some cases. Beijing's strategies and success in

supportive economic policies are prominent topics, same as the findings in Zheng (2011). Also, Zheng (2011) claims that Chinese media promote the economic backwardness in Xinjiang to stress that they need help from Beijing. Different from Zheng's statement, the findings here show that *CD* journalists promote paternal cares from the Chinese government to these powerless good citizens as well as the relationship between Beijing and most ethnic Muslims. Such a portrayal of Muslims is contextualised in the discourse of social transformations, the CCP officials and a number of positive attitudes. The CCP as a performer in providing economic help is usually backgrounded by passive voices or nominalisation. Other linguistic features in the portrayal of Muslims here are overlapping with those in the previous paragraph.

After the Xinjiang Riots in 2009, Chinese Muslims are powerless Chinese groups receiving the CCP's subsidisation to improve intercultural capability, specifically Mandarin proficiency. Mandarin is a symbol of the Chinese national identity, so this depiction of Muslim Chinese reveals *CD*'s strengthening the categorisation of Chinese citizens. This reinforced categorisation further reflects the CCP's paternal cares to ethnic Muslims. It can be assumed that the CCP regards ethnic Muslims as children in a big family, so Muslims are given help to reinforce a collective identity in China. Such a portrayal of Muslims is realised in the discourse of difficulties, ability and intelligence pertinent to Muslims. The topos of reality represent powerless Muslims. Other typical linguistic features are similar to those in the portrayal of Muslims enjoying religious freedom with Beijing's help.

The third point is that *CD*'s appreciation of the Chinese government is also reflected in the portrayal of a minority of Chinese Muslims with dissident political viewpoints as enemies of the CCP, who are labelled as Muslim terrorists in China in the Chinese newspaper. This portrayal of this Muslim group is salient in the post-09 dataset. The discussion in Chapter 6 reveals that the discourse of violence and behaviours of Muslim terrorists (e.g. Rebiya Kadeer) polarises Beijing and some Muslims respectively at the positive and negative end of a spectrum. Bhatia (2015a) identifies that Bush's anti-terrorism speech emphasises a righteous government and evil Muslim terrorists. The relational pairs of defender vs attacker, lawless terrorists vs lawful government are

indicated. Similarly, the findings in the current project reveal that the CCP is represented as a defender against Muslim terrorists to protect the safety of most Chinese citizens in the CD corpus. Muslim terrorists are portrayed as attackers of Chinese citizens. This portrayal of Muslims as attackers further reveals criminals in violation of laws in China. The discourse of military (e.g. attacks and assaults conducted by Muslim terrorists) justify the need for immediate actions from CCP. Beijing's acts of anti-terrorism are situated on a legitimate side, i.e. punishing social criminals for Chinese citizens. Thus, *China Daily* appreciates the CCP's role of fighting against illegitimate terrorists. The CCP has paternal cares to most moderate Muslim citizens to oppose a minority of criminal Muslim terrorists.

It is also found in this study that the portrayal of the few Muslims as enemies of the Chinese government is constructed in the contextual variables of top Chinese politicians, the CCP's success and energy in anti-terrorism. The use of the topos of reality demonstrates the need for punishing criminals for Chinese citizens. Actions of Chinese Muslim terrorists and the CCP are expressed by material clauses. Muslim terrorists play the role of actors in material clauses, which indicates that lawless behaviours are conducted with deliberation. Similarly, CCP as actors in such clauses shows curbing Muslim terrorism as self-initiative acts, reinforcing lawfulness of the government. The use of modal verbs, list of three and the topos of advantage also strengthen lawfulness of the CCP.

2.3 CD: (E)vilification of Muslim terrorists in China

Muslim terrorists in China in the CD, as was addressed previously, are a minority of Chinese Muslims who have dissident political viewpoints from the CCP's governance of China (e.g. Rebiya Kadeer). Because of the dissidence, they are presented to launch violence and labelled as terrorists, extremists and separatists, which symbolises outgroup membership categorisations in *China Daily*.

Such a Muslim minority is portrayed not only as criminals as was reported in the previous discussion, but an evil group. *China Daily* creates a standard relational pair of good vs evil, which indicates the necessity to handle this issue and prevent it from getting worse (see Chapter 6). *CD* journalists highlight evil actions (e.g. killing Chinese Muslim citizens) and fear and anger from Chinese Muslim citizens. Such a portrayal of the few Chinese Muslims agrees with how Western media represent terrorists (e.g. Bhatia, 2015a;

Lazar & Lazar, 2004). These highlights are contextualised in the discourse of violence, terrorism, as well as fear and anger from majority ethnic Muslims. And they help to separate terrorists from the majority of moderate Muslims in China. Good moderate Muslim citizens fall into victims of evil Muslim terrorists. Regarding linguistic features, the use of material clauses where terrorists as actors indicate that Muslims perform evilness purposefully. The topos of numbers and reality are used to inform the consequence of evil activities. (E)vilification of Muslim terrorists also polarises Beijing's anti-terrorism to the side of goodness and justice.

Muslim terrorists around the world are constructed as a group in opposition to anti-terrorist alliance, especially to western civilisation, in the media (e.g. Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Leudar et al., 2004). In the same vein, Muslim terrorists in China, i.e. dissident holders with Muslim ethnicity, are depicted as enemies to the world (see Chapter 6). I have identified in the CD corpus that such a portrayal of Muslim terrorists in China strengthens evilness of the minority of Chinese Muslims and further insinuates the outgroup membership categorisation in *China Daily*. First, interactions between them and international terrorist forces are covered. With negative expressions, similar activities between the two parties are underscored with the topos of comparison. Muslim terrorists in China conduct the same evil activities as what terrorists elsewhere perform. It is implied that Chinese Muslim terrorists are the same as world terrorists. Second, anti-terrorism as a unification force between China and the neighbouring countries demonstrates these Muslims as enemies of the world. And performances of the Chinese government thus deliver justice and reasonability.

The depiction of Chinese Muslim terrorists as international opponents are contextualised in the discourse of Chinese leaders and anti-terrorism. Voices from multiple resources are used, expressed by verbal clauses. Notably, official condemnation from western countries is quoted to boost the portrayal of Muslim terrorists. The conceptions of the CCP and Muslim terrorists are described. Writers frequently use material clauses, in which Beijing and terrorists are actors in the respective activities of building an international anti-terror ally and conducting something immoral to the majority of peaceful Chinese Muslim citizens.

Representing Muslim participants in violence and dissident holders as evil and criminal others, *China Daily* tends to disseminate voices from the CCP. Most ethnic Muslims who follow the CCP are seen as ingroups in *CD*, being moderate, modern, and civilised (see Section 1.1 and 1.2). By contrast, those who disobey the CCP's guides are opposing civilisation. They are constructed by portraying them as lawless and immoral terrorists, which explicitly creates the divide between Us and Them.

2.4 *NYT: Fundamentalists and threats to non-Muslims*

Most Chinese Muslims in *The NYT* are assigned with outgroup membership categorisations, i.e. they are fundamentalists and threats to the non-Muslim world. The negative values of evil side and divergence from the non-Muslim world are stressed in the categorisation of Chinese Muslims.

Orientalisation of Muslims is frequently found in the media representation of Muslims in the West. Muslims are stereotyped as being barbaric, exotic and monolithic, divergent from Western civilisation (e.g. Moore et al., 2008; Richardson, 2004; Said, 1997). Similarly, the NYT corpus shows that Muslims in China are 'Oriental others', i.e. uncivilised and excluding non-Muslims before 2009 (see Chapter 4). In the discourse of Muslim culture in the NYT corpus, correspondents stress the exotic and mysterious elements in Chinese Muslim culture, emphasising the divergence between the Muslim and the non-Muslim world. Moreover, Muslims' excluding of foreigners are described in material clauses in which they are actors. It is implied from the expressions that they are treated as fundamentalists, because they isolate themselves from the modern world, especially the West.

The representation of Muslims in western media is irrational and dangerous (e.g. Moore et al., 2008). Similarly, Chinese Muslims in *The NYT* are portrayed as being resentful and scary especially after 2009. As addressed in Chapter 4, journalists cover resent from most Chinese Muslims to Chinese society and fears coming from non-Muslim Chinese. Given that barbaric Muslims have hatred towards non-Muslims and arouse panics among the social majority in China, this broadsheet highlights Muslims as excluding others and potential threats in Chinese society. Thus, resentful and scary Muslims indicate the membership categorisations of fundamentalists and social threats to non-Muslims. The

divergence between them and the non-Muslim world is further revealed. The majority of the resentful and scary Chinese Muslim population is contextualised in the discourse of dissatisfaction, dislike and fears from Muslim/non-Muslim Chinese, and the narrative ethnic relationship between them. The newspaper frequently uses material and mental clauses, from which Muslims actively feel resentful and perform something terrible to non-Muslim Chinese. The use of voices from non-Muslims and numbers shape bitter reality to the majority of Chinese.

Most Chinese Muslims as an outgroup in *The NYT* is constructed by (e)vilifying them after 2009 (see Chapter 5). It is a similar strategy between the portrayal of terrorists in Western media and the representation of the majority of Chinese Muslims in the American broadsheet. The literature on terrorism in media discourse shows that Muslim terrorists are evil and dangerous others in comparison with the good government (e.g. Bhatia, 2015a; Leudar, 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004). In the post-09 dataset, I found that they are represented as dangerous and disquieting social groups in domestic violence opposing Chinese society and Beijing. They are rioters to oppose Beijing and Chinese society in manners disagreeing with universal morality, such as killing civilians in China. The evilness of Muslims in China categorises them as threats to the non-Muslim world, especially to the West. The dataset implied that if barbaric Muslims are evil, they will seek to destruct civilisation opposite to them. Non-Muslim Chinese are covered as a physical and a moral victim to Muslims partially because being different from Muslims. Further, it can be indicated that evil Chinese Muslim majority formulates threats to the world. Evil Muslims are contextualised in the discourse of violence, terrorism, as well as anger and anxiety from non-Muslim Chinese. *The NYT* journalists describe Muslims' evil actions of the past and present (e.g. violent actions or killing civilians) to indicate the continuity of their immorality. Material clauses are typical in describing immoral actions, in which most Muslims are actors. It is implied that Muslims conduct evil performances with deliberateness and it is their habit to do so. Numbers and negative are used to indicate that Muslims create a terrible situation. The portrayal of evil Chinese Muslims can arouse a sense of morality in all individuals, to outcast the social group as an outgroup.

By the above information, the representation of most Chinese Muslims in this American broadsheet is analogous to the portrayal of Muslims in the Western media, which includes *The NYT* per se.

2.5 NYT: Negative representation of the CCP and most Chinese Muslims

The New York Times stresses CCP's authoritarian governance and Han's social marginalisation of Chinese Muslims in the coverage of Chinese Muslims. The majority of Chinese Muslims are victimised in China because of the government's constraints and social exclusion of this ethnic group. Victimisation of Chinese Muslims suggests their categorisation of fundamentalists and social threats to non-Muslim Chinese. Such a finding in the NYT corpus is another marked feature in comparison with previous studies on media representation of Muslims.

Most Chinese Muslims are represented as victims of the CCP's authoritarianism in the NYT corpus (see Chapter 5). They are deprived of religious freedom and freedom of speech, which indicates Beijing's elimination of the ethnic identity of its Muslim citizen. Muslims are well-known to value the identity of Muslims highly. Beijing's control of Chinese Muslims forces them to become anti-government with continuing violence and evil behaviours. The evilness of Chinese Muslims is activated by Beijing's authoritarian treatment of the ethnic group. Muslims as Them in *The NYT*, i.e. threats to the non-Muslims, is thus related to the CCP as an authoritarian government. Chinese Muslims as victims to Beijing is contextualised in the discourse of social security, top Chinese leaders, freedom and restrains. Multiple information sources are frequently used to describe Beijing's behaviours of restrictions, which forms the topos of humanitarianism. Beijing performs limits deliberately, expressed by material clauses and Beijing as an actor. General terms and numbers are used to explicate that the majority of Chinese Muslims are victimised by the CCP

Most Chinese Muslims are represented as victims of social marginalisation from non-Muslim Chinese, especially Han Chinese after 2009 (see Chapter 4). *The NYT* journalists cover unfair treatments of ethnic Muslims by Han Chinese in the portrayal of resentful and scary Muslims. A causal relationship is formulated in such this topic, similar

to Muslims' victimisation of the CCP; unfairness to Chinese Muslims leads to Muslims full of hatred in China. The portrayal of resentful Muslims embodies Chinese Muslims' exclusion of non-Muslims, as was stated above. The victimisation in Chinese society, therefore, enables Chinese Muslims to become fundamentalists and social threats to the non-Muslim Chinese. Chinese Muslims as victims of Chinese society is contextualised in the discourse of ethnic relations, dislike and dissatisfaction from Muslims. Topos of justice is a typical rhetorical strategy to reveal how Chinese Muslims are treated unequally by Han Chinese.

2.6 *NYT: "Muslim terrorists in China" as brave and powerless social activists*

Derogatory representation of most Chinese Muslims and Chinese society have been identified in the 15-year coverage of ethnic Muslims in China. However, a minority of Muslims group is assigned with an ingroup categorisation in *the NYT* because they incorporate Western values such as freedom, democracy and human rights. They are described using favourable terms in the NYT corpus due to the association with such liberal values. Journalists de-emphasise their identity as Muslims or their possible evil behaviours in China. On the contrary, such a small group of Muslim social activists are described to act against the Chinese government and most Chinese Muslim citizens, and so categorised as terrorists in the CD.

Witterborn (2011) reports that netizens' construction of Chinese social activists with Muslim ethnicity is positive. They are regarded as a group of brave Muslims fighting for the whole ethnic Muslim society in China. Similarly, the current project found that *The NYT* represents a small group of Chinese Muslims (i.e. "Muslim terrorists" in the CD) as courageous Muslim social activists fighting for human rights of ethnic Muslims. Such statement embodies the few Chinese Muslims as ingroups in this broadsheet. The broadsheet attaches attention to Rebiya Kadeer and Tohti Ilham in the coverage of Muslim social activists (cf. Witterborn, 2011). They are covered as a powerless group who feels frustrated about the CCP's treatment of Chinese Muslims. In the view of such group of Muslims, democracy and human rights of the whole ethnic Muslim group, including activists per se, are deprived by the CCP. This topic justifies the behaviours of social

activists. Powerlessness also serves the function of building up the bravery of Muslim social activists, apart from defending their acts of protest. *The NYT* emphasises that social activists with Muslim ethnicity be devoted to protests against the CCP for freedom and the rights of the whole ethnic Muslim group in China. The powerlessness of these Muslims, especially the difficulties they encounter, reveals the toughness and perseverance of social activists in protesting for the holistic Chinese Muslim group. Such a portrayal of brave Muslim social activists is contextualised primarily in the discourse of bravery, fear and shock from social activists and representative social activists (e.g. Rebiya Kadeer).

With regards to the linguistic features, this research reveals that different sources are employed to express the sufferings and achievements of Muslim social activists. Verbal clauses are a typical linguistic feature. Social activists are positively labelled with favourable terms. Especially, glorious experience of Kadeer Rebiya is documented to demonstrate her as a leading social activist, expressed by the topos of history. Besides, brave activities of Muslim social activists are documented by material clauses and Muslims as actors in the clause. It is indicated that they perform bravely in protests by self-initiation. Concerning the suffering of Muslim social activists, the CCP's suppression of social activists is shaped by the topos of humanitarianism. Modal verbs are frequently employed to indicate that social activists will continue to be brave to fight against the CCP's policies towards Muslims.

3. Empirical contributions of the current study

The key empirical contribution of this study is the application of the three-dimensional framework in this project, i.e. social impact (membership categorisation), context and language. The findings contribute not only to the media representation of Muslims but the portrayal of Chinese issues in the international news.

As was stated at the outset of this chapter, the primary **research aim of this project** is to explore:

The ideological representation of Chinese Muslims in *China Daily* and *The New York Times* from 2001 to 2015.

The whole project is a comparison study indicated by the research purpose above. Therefore, two parameters go through such a project — differences and similarities. If the guiding research purpose is connected to the three-dimensional framework, the study aims at investigating similarities and differences in the three aspects of discourse. Specifically, such features in the three aspects between the two newspapers and two periods are targeted in this study.

A number of comparative studies focus on the different representation of Muslims in various media. Like being reviewed in Chapter two, Zheng (2011) focuses on the differences between *China Daily* and *People's Daily* in the portrayal of Uyghur Muslims. Gerhards and Schäfer (2014) concern variations in the representation of a terrorist attack among *BBC*, *ARD*, *CNN* and *Al Jazeera*. The current study, by contrast, sees similarities as important as differences. The findings reveal that there are both similarities and divergence between two newspapers in the coverage Chinese Muslims and pre-/post- the Xinjiang Riots in 2009.

3.1 *Categorisations of Chinese Muslims*

Divergences first lie in categorisations of ethnic Muslims in China between the two broadsheets. Chinese Muslims are categorised entirely differently between *CD* and *The NYT* (see Section one above). Moreover, membership categorisations are consistent in 15-year coverage of Chinese Muslims in each newspaper. The categorisations of Muslim Chinese in two newspapers reflects what Ghareeb (1983: 97) claims in the study about Muslims in American media — “if you [Muslims]’re not 100 percent of us, then you’re an enemy”. From the datasets, the majority of ethnic Muslims are ingroups in *China Daily*, while a minority of them are seen as an outgroup. Most Muslims are categorised as obedient, good citizens under the CCP’s government in such a state newspaper, while the minority of Muslims are categorised as an outgroup in this broadsheet. On the contrary, the minority of Chinese Muslims who are treated as outgroups in *CD* acquire the ingroup membership categorisation in *The NYT*, because of following the Western values of democracy and human rights. Most ethnic Muslims are categorised as an outgroup in *The NYT*, similar to the portrayal of Muslims elsewhere.

The diachronic variations are reported here (see Figure 7.2 and 7.3 above). Despite that categorisation of Chinese Muslim majority and minority maintains in 15-year coverage, multiple portrayals vary pre-/post-2009. First, *The NYT* underlines the majority of Chinese Muslims as a barbaric and closed group, different from the Western world before 2009. After 2009, they are represented as dangerous and evil, since Muslims perform evil acts in domestic violence. Both portrayals of Chinese Muslims above indicate them as an outgroup in this broadsheet. A similar case is found in the ingroup membership categorisation of Muslims in *CD*. Before 2009, the newspaper stresses the ethnic group as liberal Muslims — they maintain Muslim culture and open to non-Muslims. It is stressed in the post-09 news the portrayal of modern Chinese citizens. They are self-reliant, hardworking and open-minded citizens in China. Post-09 news in *CD* also stresses the portrayal of powerless Chinese Muslims receiving the CCP's help for the improvement of intercultural communication after 2009. Second, the derogative portrayals of a small batch of ethnic Muslims are reinforced in post-09 news, i.e. terrorists, enemies of the world, the Chinese government and the majority of Chinese citizens.

Regarding important imagery in 15-years news coverage, *CD* disseminates most Muslims as a joyful group and beneficiary of the CCP's help, while *The NYT* promulgates resentful Chinese Muslim majority and fearless Chinese Muslim protesters.

3.2 Contexts

Dissimilarities and similarities lie in the context of categorising Muslims between *CD* and *The NYT*. As is summarised in Section 1, ethnic Muslims are contextualised differently between the two newspapers. For instance, prosodies in the *CD* corpus are quite positive while in the *NYT* corpus is negative. However, there are cases that Muslim Chinese is categorised oppositely in the same contexts. For instance, Rebiya Kadeer and Ilham Tohti are reported in both newspapers to represent a minority of ethnic Muslims. However, both news participants are given heterogenous portrayals between the *CD* and the *NYT* corpora. Other same contexts between the two newspapers involve terrorism, violence, top Chinese leaders.

Diachronic variations and similarities regarding contexts in the respective newspapers have been identified, and key results are reported here. A set of contexts is primarily related to a specific portrayal of Muslims in a newspaper. Divergent portrayals of Muslims in the same context pre/ post-2009 is rare in a newspaper. The pre-09 *CD* news about Chinese Muslims, the discourse of Muslim culture and religion is emphasised for the portrayal of most liberal Muslims. In the post-09 *CD* news, another set of contexts is stressed to depict Muslims as modern Chinese citizens, i.e. community affairs and Muslims with social achievements. Another list of contextual variables are emphasised, i.e. hardship, ability, violence, anger, fear, dislike and damaging, Kadeer Rebiya/Ilham Tohti, restriction to terrorism/violence, antiterrorism, energy/bravery/anti-terror from most Chinese Muslims. In the NTT, Muslim culture and religion are also prioritised in the pre-09 subcorpus, while negative contexts emerge the importance in the post-09 corpus, such as fear/dislike, terrorism/violence, violence, anger and worries, as well as ethnic tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese.

In both datasets, multiple contextual variables are of the same importance in the pre and post 09 data. The *CD* emphasises ethnic relations, passion and language competence, social transformation, Chinese government officials, and multiple positive attitudinal features such as happiness, enjoyment. In the *NYT*, constraints against Muslims, social security, top Chinese leaders, Muslim protesters (i.e. Kadeer Rebiya, Ilham Tohti), Fear and shock from social protesters, bravery are contextual variables that are constantly addressed for the construction of Chinese Muslims in the 15-year coverage.

3.3 *Linguistic features*

Similarities and differences also lie in the linguistic features in representing Chinese Muslims (see Appendix 4 for details). Section one in Chapter 7 has summarised that one of the most significant similarities is that both newspapers underscore what Muslims and Beijing conduct and the initiative in action. The doings of Muslims are expressed by material clauses. Additionally, voices and mental activities from Chinese Muslims are equally significant in the two news corpora, even if their stances are divergent. To illustrate, Chinese Muslims are satisfied with modern Chinese society in the *CD*, in contrastive to resentful ethnic Muslims in the *NYT* corpus. And, this information infers respectively

ingroup and outgroup categorisations. Other similar linguistic features include the topos of history and general terms. Both traits are employed for different portraits. General terms, for instance, are related to the pleasant and modern Chinese Muslims in the CD. However, in the NYT, resentful and repressed Muslims are presented by this linguistic feature.

In *CD*'s coverage of Chinese Muslims, a number of linguistic features are more significant than in the counterpart dataset. Specifically, strategies with a presence in the CD, as we have identified, involve the topos of comparison, the topos of advantage, list of three, inclusive we and imperative clauses. For instance, the topos of advantage is used to portray Muslims as the beneficiary of Beijing's assistance frequently. This portrayal indicates the categorisation – they are good and pleasant Chinese citizens. Voices from the CCP, modal verbs and positive labelling have more occurrences in the CD than those in the NYT. It is not difficult to imagine that the CCP is a marked source for ingroup categorisation of the Chinese Muslim majority and outgroup categorisation of the minority. The pertinent portraits include Muslims are beneficiaries from Beijing's paternalistic care, as well as terrorists, are Beijing's enemies.

In the NYT, almost ten types of linguistics features have salience. The unique patterns consist of voices from non-Muslim Chinese, the topos of humanitarianism and the topos of justice. As an example, giving voices to non-Muslim Chinese contours their Muslim counterparts as full of hatred and anger, thus categorise them as an extreme menace to the world. Some linguistic patterns have a larger frequency in the NYT than the counterpart corpus. *The NYT* prefers to use voices from multiple sources, the topos of reality and numbers, negative labelling, passive voice, nominalisation and metaphor. For instance, negative labelling is a typical pattern to give an outgroup categorisation of Chinese Muslims and the CCP, respectively Muslims as "Oriental others" and the authoritarian Chinese government.

For the diachronic change of the use of linguistic features, the majority of linguistic patterns have the same importance in the two sub-corpora in the respective corpus, whereas there are diachronic variations before and after 2009. In the CD2 corpus, positive/negative feeling from most Chinese Muslims with mental clauses, lawless/immoral actions by a handful of Chinese Muslims, the CCP's actions in anti-terrorism by material clauses, the

topos of reality, the topos of comparison. The handful of Chinese Muslims, who are called “Chinese Muslim terrorists” because of their disobedience to the CCP, are (e)vilified and illegalised by these features. In the NYT, patterns in the NYT1 construe the orientalization of most of Chinese Muslims, while the topos of justice, voices from Han Chinese by verbal clauses, differentiated social actors and the topos of reality are more significant in the NYT2. These marked features in the NYT 2 construe the (e)vilification of the majority of Chinese Muslims, such as the topos of reality, differentiated social actors.

Generally speaking, *China Daily* and *The NYT* have used similar and dissimilar contexts and linguistic features to categorise divergently ethnic Muslims in the past 15 years. The coverage of Chinese Muslims in the two newspapers is international news about Chinese issues. Besides, Chapter one introduced that the two broadsheets are situated in two journalistic systems with international impacts. These common and uncommon features presented here reflect how they are represented in world media.

4. Contributions to critical discourse analysis

My project demonstrates the benefits of van Dijk’s Critical Discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk, 1995, 1998a, 2001) to unpack the ideological construction of social reality in media discourse, and suitability to combine with multiple analytical tools such as corpus methods, membership category analysis (e.g. Jayyusi, 1984), outcasting strategies (Lazar & Lazar, 2004), topoi etc. The application of this textual analysis approach reveals the taken-for-granted assumptions in the discourse and makes invisible visible. Additionally, the incorporation of multiple analytical tools into elements in van Dijk’s socio-cognitive framework reinforces my research by 1) the systematic exploration of discourse features in corpus and 2) extending the examination of media discourse about Chinese Muslims into the examination of institutional ideologies inherent in the texts. Specifically, the project construes what role Chinese Muslims are playing in media discourse, how they are linguistically constructed and why they are established in a specific way by media outlets. The study generally provides an example of how to integrate additional analytical tools into a study of critical discourse analysis for the ideological representation of social reality, despite that the practice is not a novice in CDA analysis (e.g. Bhatia, 2015b, 2015a).

Another theoretical contribution of this study is to demonstrate the necessity of technical advancement in corpus-assisted discourse analysis. As was claimed in (Hunston, 2011: 4), “corpus linguistics is more than a simple set of techniques, but it is a field where technological advancement and theoretical development go hand in hand”. My research showcases the help of semantic category analysis and topic modelling analysis in an automatic retrieval of highly frequently features in corpus (i.e. topics in discourse and attitudinal features) and the contribution to the ideological construction of social reality. The two corpus methods, especially topic modelling with LDA, are applied less prevalently than traditional methods such as concordance analysis. Whereas, topic modelling has been frequently in social science, such as media and communication and history studies and market research for key content in big data. Collectively, it is hoped that the integration of these corpus methods with technological complexity here serves as a reminder for corpus linguists to include more analytical tools from other disciplines into the analysis.

5. Limitations and future work

One of the most significant limitations of the current study is generalizability. As was mentioned at the outset of this report (see research objectives in Chapter one), it is not an objective in this study. The present study has explored the representation of Muslim in *China Daily* and *The New York Times*. *CD* is an English-language state newspaper targeting at disseminating China’s voice to the world. *The NYT* is a newspaper with international impact favouring liberal causes in the U.S. Results from comparison and contrast in this study cannot represent how Chinese Muslims are ideologically represented in Chinese and American media. It is felt that a comparison of the representation of Chinese Muslims in other newspapers will lead to different analytical results, such as a Chinese-language newspaper vs an English language newspaper in China, *Fox news* vs *The NYT*. Diverse organisational ideologies will influence the representation of ethnic Muslims, regarding categorisations, contexts and language strategies. Studies of these this kind will complement the present study by providing more linguistic evidence of how the Chinese group is represented in the media.

The second limitation concerns the analysis of only words, rather than combing words with pictures. Pictures help readers to understand a particular issue in the news. For

instance, Moore and the colleague (2008) undertake a content analysis of 974 articles about Muslims, including words and visuals. It is identified that pictures in news reports insinuate religious and cultural difference between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims are seen “engaged in religious practices in a way non-Muslims rarely are” (p.4). These pictures also evidence that Muslims are represented as a monolithic group different from the West. However, the present study is not a replicate of Moore’s visual study. Due to the constraints of time and scope, it is impossible for an analyst to study everything in big datasets within three years. I believe that futures studies on visuals can contribute to how ethnic Muslims are represented in the media.

The last limitation that motivates further research is about taking corpus research. Corpus approach is known for “uncovering the obvious” in discourse (Baker et al., 2013: 30). Different methods can be used to foreground language phenomena with high frequency in two corpora to gain the mainstream representation of Chinese Muslims in the media. However, language phenomena with low frequencies are also significant to the portrayal of Muslims. To illustrate, in the analysis, it is found that Chinese Muslims are represented as ‘Oriental others’ in the NYT corpus. Such a portrayal of Chinese Muslims is contextualised in the topic category of Muslim culture and religion, which has a low frequency in the NYT corpus. Based on such experience, it can be assumed that more in-depth analysis of the CD and NYT corpora may lead to more interesting results about the representation of Chinese ethnic Muslims in *China Daily* and *The NYT* from 2001 to 2015.

Appendix 1 Topics from LDA analysis

1. 22 topics in the CD

Topic Id	Top Words...	Topic categories
1	yuan 000 year work local business government years home workers residents village women company kashgar make 100 free chen xinjiang	Social transformations
2	region xinjiang china billion million year products development years economic industry investment foreign enterprises company city urumqi percent central construction	Social transformations
3	chinese zheng china dynasty ancient culture cultural century world years asia history east temple islam time silk book tang 1644	Muslim culture
4	muslims mosque muslim islamic people religious festival mosques hui china islam imam ramadan al prayer ma prayers year imams association	Islam as religion
5	desert jade soccer hotan team navy women iodine 10 sand salt cancer 000 tarim year football taklimakan jiang liu sea	Community affairs
6	city silk road kashgar area tourists xi traditional town house ancient visitors modern houses square street wall day high mosque	Social security
7	terrorist police attacks terrorism terrorists xinjiang people religious attack group terror extremism security uygur china violence extremists activities public killed	Terrorism/violence
8	rioters government chinese people human ethnic rights media attack township uighur world xinjiang reports building forces lukqun riots town innocent	Terrorism/violence
9	east turkistan terrorist terrorists forces china organization xinjiang chinese people county islamic training activities terrorism ethnic guantanamo organizations international kashi	International affairs
10	ningxia chinese muslims china saudi muslim mecca halal arabia pilgrims year hui pilgrimage mosque islamic yinchuan hajj gansu autonomous association	Islam as religion
11	people family life time uygur years year han home good day man told wang back made don lives living mother	Community affairs
12	ethnic areas autonomous minorities minority china state groups government people development tibet regional national languages autonomy chinese yuan central regions	Social security
13	riot urumqi uygur july xinjiang people violence kadeer 5 police sunday han 2009 ethnic injured 1 07 government workers rioters	Reaction to terrorism/violence
14	xinjiang uygur region people china ethnic chinese autonomous updated urumqi group groups uygurs year cn started han daily language 2015	Ethnic relations
15	china chinese countries trade arab cooperation international turkey states world relations economic foreign turkish president forum japan country east middle	International affairs
16	students school language education university uygur college student high schools teachers teacher learn ma teaching exam mandarin dongxiang province classes	Social transformations
17	urumqi xinjiang people china attack injured security region uygur police victims autonomous thursday local friday passengers xinhua morning northwest market	Reaction to terrorism/violence
18	china people million 2013 percent rights government year rural disabled public health system yuan urban 000 environmental services human cases	Social transformations
19	restaurant food lamb mutton beijing restaurants dishes chinese popular meat naan muslim fried noodles customers beef eat cuisine dish kebabs	Muslim culture
20	china 000 river people 1 area xibe local km land water autonomous county mountains village population hui epic ancestors language	Ethnic relations
21	xinjiang people region china ethnic government chinese stability social development groups country uygur committee party regional national unity political autonomous	Ethnic relations
22	music art folk muqam dance dolan songs traditional people beijing huo artists painting time performances games paintings singing cultural performance	Muslim culture

2. 24 topics in the NYT

Topic Id	Top Words...	Topic categories
1	han uighurs uighur government ethnic urumqi china xinjiang people july riots rioting city workers 2009 violence 5 residents 1 capital	Terroism/violence
2	rights human china chinese kadeer ms law political groups government xu international freedom year release democracy years rebiya released legal	Muslim protesters
3	china chinese beijing country economic world political government people years recent leaders make western system don interests west past change	Social transformations
4	religious women muslims muslim mosque islam local government ramadan mosques men hui imam country young islamic religion head years wearing	Muslim culture
5	foreign report law china ms state hoshur reporting mine government gauthier 2015 coal article times paris agents citizens international journalists	Media critique
6	mr tohti uighur court prison sentenced death ilham life ethnic trial charges sentences separatism beijing uighurs students li sentence authorities	Muslim protesters
7	afghanistan china pakistan taliban afghan russia pakistani central asia india asian countries border uzbekistan military cooperation economic security relationship training	International affairs
8	police people chinese officials news killed group reported xinjiang security report xinhua state attack reports official region officers violence ethnic	Terroism/violence
9	uighurs china turkey chinese thai thailand cambodia turkish malaysia ministry plane border passports detained flight nations back foreign country bombing	International affairs
10	police attack officers authorities men station assailants knives street injured kunming vehicle public security people andrew tourists tiananmen fire episode	Terroism/violence
11	han ethnic xinjiang policies percent party uighurs language uighur minorities policy city areas university china education year mandarin development culture	Social transformations
12	jade road restaurant thubron silk river pears museum region lamb restaurants food rice york long russian called asian fragrant asia	Muslim culture
13	people mr father friends book home don life years year family world story business good time son culture days writers	Social transformations
14	china billion year million oil years gas gold sheep region nugget money natural percent xinjiang 1 energy project 40 province	Social transformations
15	kashgar city uighur road chinese silk xinjiang 000 central china urumqi white hotel market day men town back desert place	Muslim culture
16	party chinese communist wang beijing officials state news authorities hu public government media stability tibet china foreign power official journalists	Social security
17	united states officials american china washington countries chinese foreign state government statement year made international governments public told office department	International affairs
18	guant??namo court detainees men administration uighurs states judge government case united department release appeals prisoners obama federal justice supreme ruling	International affairs
19	xinjiang uighurs uighur government china region chinese people ethnic bias beijing han state groups religious tension minority policies news members	Ethnic relations
20	olympics games olympic tibet beijing security cameras tibetans tibetan 2008 posted dalai opening lama bus protests surveillance party place international	Social security
21	mr china president government military policy meeting leaders terrorism senior defense including secretary nations leader efforts administration national	Reaction to terrorism/violence
22	film festival kadeer ms chinese films japanese site web melbourne organizers rebiya kong documentary director australian lives screening artistic ju	Muslim protesters
23	chinese china group islamic terrorist east terrorism turkestan movement attacks uighur beijing uighurs muslim western al qaeda mr groups officials	Terroism/violence
24	internet china sites web information google security online service site services companies social access censors mail censorship business surveillance messaging	Social security

Appendix 2 Key attitudinal semantic categories (SMCs) and frequently occurring items

1. Positive SMCs

Key SMCs	Source	<i>k/p</i>	Top words
A5.1+: Good	CD	265.58	<i>good, improve, great, enhance, progress, renovation, advantage, develop, positive, improvement</i>
A5.4+: Authentic		136.79	<i>actually, actual, authentic, proper, effectively, pure, genuine, original, really, firsthand, sincere</i>
E2+: Like		97.64	<i>enjoy, popular, love, appreciate, tender, precious, cherish, devotion, beloved, keen on</i>
O4.2+: Positive judgment of appearance		78.02	<i>attract, beautiful, grand, decorate, charm, comfortable, clean, attractive, exclusive, elegant</i>
E4.1+: Happy		56.17	<i>celebrate, happy, smile, festive, laugh, relief, fun, happiness, joke, happily</i>
A11.1+: Important		30.47	<i>important, major, key, central, value, fundamental, emphasize, vital, primary, upgrade</i>
X9.2+: Successful		21.01	<i>success, effective, solve, successful, win, achievements, make it, beat, overcome, successfully</i>
X5.2+: Interest and energy		19.29	<i>energy, interest, active, interested, actively, interesting, excited, passion, curious, eager</i>
X 9.1+ Able and intelligent		17.95	<i>able, skill, fluent, capable, ability, talented, intelligence, master, efficient, craftsmanship</i>
A5.2+: True	NYT	176.22	<i>evidence, fact, prove, true, proof, in fact, verify, honest, credible, factual</i>
A1.7- : Free		40.25	<i>release, freedom, escape, break out, leak, at large, liberal, unclassified, freed, liberate</i>
A5.3+: Accurate		27.44	<i>right(rights), properly, correct, accurate, exact, precision, balanced, correcting, rightly</i>

A15+: Safe	CD& NYT	p=0.98	CD: <i>safety, safe, guard, safely, refuge</i> NYT: <i>guard, safety, safe, refuge, safely, comfort zone</i>
E5+: Brave		0.99	CD: <i>courage, heroic, bravery, dare, bravely, boldly</i> NYT: <i>courage, dare, brave, audacious, boldly, fearless, heroic</i>

2. Negative SMCs

Key SMCs	Source	k/p	Top words
E3-: Violent/angry	NYT	- 529.26	<i>attack, violence, threat, violent, unrest, militant, assault, bloodshed, torture, abuse</i>
E6-: Worry		- 152.89	<i>tension, concern, worry, trouble, tense, anxious, nervous, under pressure, racked, concerned with</i>
A1.7+: Constraints		- 396.81	<i>detainee, crackdown, restriction, hard-line, crack down, tighten, limit, confine, restrict, restrictive</i>
E2-: Dislike		-80.58	<i>resentment, grievance, resent, hatred, objection, dislike, antagonize, revulsion</i>
E4.2-: Dissatisfied		-74.70	<i>discontent, frustration, frustrated, disaffected, disgruntled, aggrieved, disappointed, disappointment, displeasure</i>
S1.2.1-: Inapproachable/unfriendly		-41.25	<i>enemy, hostility, sternly, standoff, terse, anti-social, divisive, gruff</i>
X5.2-: Boring		-40.13	<i>restive, reluctant, grudging, banal, boredom, disaffection</i>
E5-: Fear/shock		-30.53	<i>fear, terror, alarm, afraid, quake, frighten, scare, shock, panic</i>
A5.1- : Bad		-20.23	<i>severe, bad, severely, badly, dire, poorly, worsened, deteriorated</i>
X9.2-: Failed		-19.57	<i>fail, lose, breakdown, defeat, gaffes, loser, unsolved, unsuccessful, unwinnable, black mark</i>
A1.4-: Unlucky	CD& NYT	p=0.87	CD: <i>unfortunately, unfortunate, unlucky, mishap, misfortune</i> NYT: <i>unfortunately, hapless, unfortunate, misadventure, luckless, bad luck</i>

S1.2.6-: Insensible		0.99	CD: <i>irresponsible, ridiculous, irrational, silly, stupid, senseless</i> NYT: <i>absurd, ridiculous, irresponsible, nonsensical, unrealistic</i>
S 1.2.3+: Selfish		0.81	CD: <i>boast, arrogance, brazenly, selfish, arrogant, lofty</i> NYT: <i>assertive, boast, brazen, bigotry, gloated</i>

3. Key SMCs in CD1 and CD2

Sub-category	Source	k/p	Top words
A 5.4-: Inauthentic	CD1	10.43	<i>copy, forge, unauthentic, replica, reputed, fake, artificial, modelled</i>
A1.1.2: Damaging	CD2	19.28	<i>destroy, victim, damage, demolish, collapse, harm, blew up, accident, violate</i>
E3-: Violent/angry		791.65	<i>attack, violence, threat, threaten, violent, riot, unrest, clash, militant, angry,</i>
E5-: Fear/shock		32.94	<i>terror, fear, shock, afraid, horrify, quake, horror, panic, scare</i>
E2-: Dislike		26.75	<i>hatred, resentment, hate, abhor, animosity, antagonism, contemptuously, frown on</i>
A12-: Difficult		21.61	<i>problem, challenge, difficult, difficulty, complicated, burden, hard work, arduous, crisis, hardship</i>
S 1.2.3+: Selfish	CD1&CD2	$p=0.97$	CD1: <i>boasts, brazenly, loftiest</i> CD2: <i>boast, arrogance, selfish, arrogant, lofty, bigots</i>
S1.2.2+: Avarice		0.86	CD1: <i>taken advantage, eagerness</i> CD2: <i>envious, envy, preyed, grudge</i>

4. Key SMCs in the NYT1 and the NYT2

Sub-category	<i>k/p</i>	Source	Top words
A1.2+ : Suitable	18.50	NYT1	<i>eligible, appropriate, qualify, relevant, meets, befits, apt, geared to, suitable, suitability</i>
S1.2.1-: Inappropriate/unfriendly	19.43		<i>enemy, formal, formally, hostility, hostile, terse, foes, standoff, sternly, divisive</i>
E3-: Violent/ angry	140.1	NYT2	<i>violence, attack, riot, clash, violent, unrest, militant, threat, bloodshed, anger</i>
S1.2.2+: Avarice	p= 0.85	NYT1 & NYT2	NYT1: <i>taken advantage, mean, coveted</i> NYT2: <i>covet, greedy, begrudgingly</i>
A1.5.2-: Useless	0.87		NYT1: <i>ineffective, futile</i> NYT2: <i>useless, futile, toothless, ineffective</i>
S 1.2.3-: Selfless	0.9		NYT1: <i>sheepishly, modesty, selfless</i> NYT2: <i>humility, self-effacing</i>

Appendix 3 Results from collocation analysis

1. CD: Collocates of TERRORIST

	Terrorist				Terrorists			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	R	attack	L	premeditated	R	xinjiang	R	severe
2	R	attacks	R	cells	L	turkistan	L	vigilant
3	R	activities	L	engaging	L	said	L	punish
4	R	xinjiang	R	camps	L	people	L	handful
5	L	turkistan	R	bases	L	police	R	spare
6	R	forces	L	violent	R	china	L	severely
7	L	violent	R	attacks	R	attacks	L	crack
8	R	organization	R	activities	L	violent	M	targeted
9	R	groups	R	taliban	L	extremists	L	pledged
10	L	people	R	plotted	L	separatists	R	crackdown
11	R	china	L	condemn	R	home	R	incited
12	M	terrorist	R	incidents	R	attacked	L	jinpings
13	R	violence	R	threats	L	uygur	L	arrested
14	L	separatist	L	condemn	R	terrorist	R	broke
15	L	islamic	R	attack	L	severely	L	suspected
16	L	religious	L	turkistan	R	killed	L	bin
17	R	chinese	R	murder	L	group	R	attacked
18	R	kunming	R	cell	L	arrested	M	fear
19	R	countries	R	forces	R	religious	L	dozen
20	L	international	R	explosions	L	crack	L	extremists
21	L	extremist	L	al-qaida	L	training	R	shot
22	R	railway	L	suspected		terrorists	L	turkistan
23	R	suspects	L	extremist	R	shot	L	separatists
24	L	uygur	L	crackdown	L	punish	M	fire
25	L	security	L	combat	R	broke	L	violent
26	L	leading	L	crack	M	abroad	R	extremist
27	L	recent	R	severely	L	government	L	turkestan
28	R	bin	L	organize	L	bin	M	knives
29	L	serious	L	illegally	M	fire	L	explosives
30	L	members	R	severe	M	fear	M	abroad

Note: Top 30 collocates of TERRORIST (content words)

2. CD: Collocates of MUSLIM

	Muslim				Muslims			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	L	chinese	R	specifies	L	chinese	L	specifies
2	R	food	R	commodities	R	china	L	millions
3	L	said	L	able-bodied	L	million	L	able-bodied
4	R	population	R	merchants	L	said	R	calendar
5	R	china	R	weddings	R	xinjiang	R	pray
6	L	hui	R	caps	R	world	L	celebrated
7	R	ethnic	R	entrepreneurs	L	most	R	charter
8	R	people	L	largely	L	religious	R	celebrate
9	L	ningxia	R	tradition	R	pilgrimage	R	visas
10	L	china's	L	alleged	L	local	R	afford
11	R	group	R	population	R	festival	R	afford
12	R	community	R	cuisine	R	ethnic	L	fasting
13	R	world	L	world's	R	people	R	fellow
14	R	religious	R	communities	R	mecca	R	corban
15	L	international	R	food	R	ningxia	R	eid
16	R	restaurant	R	restaurant	L	islamic	R	pilgrimage
17	R	commodities	R	holy	L	home	R	attend
18	R	women	R	dishes	L	food	R	ramadan
19	R	uygur	L	majority	L	urumqi	R	hajj
20	L	halal	R	industrial	L	mosque	R	perform
21	M	region	L	hajj	L	millions	L	allah
22	R	wedding	R	pilgrimage	R	living	R	female
23	R	countries	R	ramadan	R	celebrate	R	neighboring
24	R	xinjiang	L	hui	R	beijing	R	festival
25	L	million	L	halal	R	saudi	R	haj
26	R	home	R	women	R	ramadan	R	guangzhou
27	R	beijing	L	largest	R	hajj	R	mecca
28	R	tradition	R	street	R	countries	L	travel
29	R	products	R	products	R	city	R	chinese
30	R	culture	R	leader	R	should	L	rich

Note: Top 30 collocates of MUSLIM (content words)

3. CD: Collocates of HU (jintao) and XI (jinping)

	HU Jintao				XI Jinping			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	R	obama	R	yanan	R	said	R	pledged
2	R	severely	R	pledged	L	Chinese	R	punish
3	R	uygur	R	severely	L	Xinjiang	L	president
4	R	Xinjiang	M	said	L	stability	R	severely
5	R	pledged	L	Xinjiang	R	severely	R	tour
6	R	sent			R	pledged	L	stability
7					R	punish	L	attack
8					R	tour	R	said
9					L	attack	L	Chinese
10							R	china
11							L	Xinjiang

Note: All collocates (content words) of HU and XI are listed.

4. CD: Collocates of TOHTI and KADEER

	Tohti				Kadeer			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	L	said	L	said	L	said	R	leader
2					R	separatist	R	separatist
3					R	leader	L	Uyghur
4					R	world	L	calls
5					L	congress	L	evidence
6					L	wuc	R	world
7					L	Uyghur	R	riot
8					L	july	L	July
9					L	japan	L	said
10					M	china	L	said
11					L	xinjiang	M	china
12					L	government		
13					L	evidence		
14					L	calls		

Note: All collocates (content words) of TOHTI and KADEER are listed.

5. NYT: Collocates of TERRORIST

	Terrorist				Terrorists			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	R	groups	R	plots	R	said	L	suspected
2	R	attacks	L	organizing	L	xinjiang	L	described
3	R	said	R	gang	L	uighur	R	shot
4	R	china	R	organization	L	against	L	violent
5	L	violent	L	listed	L	government	R	dead
6	R	xinjiang	R	activities	R	separatists	L	islamic
7	R	activities	L	guilty	L	violent	R	groups
8	R	acts	R	acts	L	killed	L	killed
9	L	officials	R	threats	L	islamic	R	official
10	L	uighur	L	leading	L	described	L	authorities
11	R	threat	R	plot	R	shot	R	state
12	L	islamic	L	faces	R	say	R	states
13	R	chinese	L	violent	R	official	R	violence
14	R	suspects	R	planned	L	chinese	R	news
15	R	violence	R	camp	R	violence	L	uighur
16	L	leading	R	attacks	L	suspected	L	government
17	R	united	R	suspects	R	states	L	uighurs
18	L	movement	L	suspected	L	police	L	people
19	R	western	R	groups	R	news	L	xinjiang
20	L	turkestan	R	threat	L	group	R	said
21	R	organizations	R	training	R	dead	L	police
22	L	described	L	described	L	authorities	R	china
23	R	states	R	attack				
24	L	police	L	part				
25	R	planned	L	movement				
26	L	organizing	L	turkestan				
27	R	training	R	group				
28	R	threats	L	east				
29	R	region	L	evidence				
30	R	olympics	L	islamic				

Note: Top 30 collocates of TERRORIST (content words)

6. NYT: Collocates of MUSLIM

	Muslim				Muslims			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	L	uighurs	L	turkic-speaking	L	chinese	L	distinct
2	L	turkic-speaking	L	predominantly	L	uighur	L	hui
3	R	uighur	R	turkic	L	china	L	sunni
4	R	people	L	mostly	L	uighurs	L	radical
5	R	minority	L	largely	R	xinjiang	R	country's
6	R	xinjiang	R	holy	R	western	L	turkic
7	R	china	L	sunni	L	sunni	L	mostly
8	R	western	R	minority	M	said	L	country's
9	R	region	L	ramadan	L	million	L	million
10	R	turkic	R	population	L	people	L	turkic-speaking
11	L	chinese	R	native	L	turkic-speaking	L	china's
12	L	members	L	members	L	turkic	R	western
13	R	population	R	autonomous	R	region	R	minority
14	L	sunni	L	homeland	L	violence	R	should
15	L	predominantly	L	crackdown	L	radical	L	chinese
16	R	separatists	R	western	L	distinct	L	uighur
17	R	groups	M	culture	L	country's	M	including
18	M	government	R	province			L	local
19	R	separatist	R	live			L	islamic
20	L	said	R	ethnic			R	ethnic
21	R	province	L	restrictions			L	uighurs
22	L	crackdown	R	people			L	violence
23	L	violence	R	uighur				
24	L	tensions	L	tensions				
25	L	religious	R	region				
26	L	homeland	R	increasingly				
27	L	home	R	countries				
28	M	culture	L	majority				
29	R	years	L	unrest				
30	L	unrest	L	home				

Note: Top 30 collocates of MUSLIM (content words)

7. NYT: Collocates of HU and XI

	HU Jintao				XI Jinping			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	L	president	L	president	R	said	L	president
2					R	china	L	quoted
3					R	chinese	R	visit
4					R	visit	R	party
5					R	party	L	urumqi
6					L	leader	L	china's
7					L	quoted	L	region
8							L	xinjiang
9							R	said
10							R	chinese

Note: All collocates (content words) of HU and XI are listed.

8. NYT: Collocates of TOHTI and KADEER

	Tohti				Kadeer			
	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates	Position	Frequent collocates	Position	Close collocates
1	L	mr	R	bewitched	R	uighur	R	businesswoman
2	R	uighur	R	economist	R	leader	R	exiled
3	L	said	R	economics	R	businesswoman	L	ms
4	R	professor	R	outspoken	R	exiled	L	appearance
5	R	economics	R	taught	L	chinese	R	leader
6	R	beijing	R	academic	R	lives	R	exile
7	L	xinjiang	L	prosecutors	L	government	L	film
8	R	charges	R	scholar	R	former	R	former
9	L	trial	R	professor	R	china	R	lives
10	R	students	M	moderate	R	united	R	whom
11	R	economist	L	lawyer	R	uighurs	L	accused
12	L	website	L	website	L	film	R	uighur
13	R	university	R	prominent	L	appearance	R	united
14	L	prosecutors	R	charges	L	accused	L	government
15	R	life	L	trial			L	chinese
16	L	lawyer	L	accused			R	said
17	L	accused	R	separatism			R	uighurs
18	L	urumqi	R	students			R	china
19	L	uighurs	R	university				
20	L	september	L	online				
21	R	held	R	life				
22	R	taught	M	sentenced				
23	M	sentenced	R	held				
24	L	regional	L	detention				
25	R	prominent	R	detained				
26	M	moderate	R	told				
27	R	detained	L	authorities				
28	R	chinese	L	against				
29	L	case	R	beijing				
30	R	police	L	urumqi				

Note: All collocates (content words) of TOHTI and KADEER are listed.

Appendix 4 Typical linguistic features in the CD and the NYT

Portraits	CD										NYT					
	Happy Muslims	Liberal Muslims	Modern Muslims	Muslims receiving help from the CCP in religious freedom	(Powerless) Muslims receiving help from the CCP in social transformation	Powerless Muslims receiving help from the CCP in intercultural communication	Muslim terrorists as enemies of Muslim Chinese	Muslim terrorists as Beijing's enemies	Muslim terrorists as enemies of the world	Chinese Muslim terrorists	Muslims as 'Oriental others'	Resentful Muslim Chinese in China	Disquieting Muslims engaged in violence	Muslims suppressed by the CCP and marginalised in China	Brave Muslim social activists	Muslim social activists as victims
Material clauses	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Dynamic actors in material clauses	M	M	M	The CCP	The CCP	The CCP	M/MT	MT/The CCP	MT/The CCP	MT	M	M	M	The CCP	SS	The CCP
Verbal clauses	*		*		*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*
Voice from multiple sources	*								*	*			*	*	*	
Voice from Muslims			*				*									*
Voice from non-Muslim Chinese												*				
Voice from the CCP					*	*		*								
Mental clauses			*				*					*				
Topos of reality			*			*		*	*	*		*	*		*	*
Topos of numbers			*	*	*	*				*		*	*	*	*	*
Topos of history		*	*							*			*		*	
Topos of comparison									*							
Topos of advantages	*			*	*	*		*								
Topos of humanitarianism														*	*	*
Topos of justice														*		
Modal verbs	*	*		*	*		*	*					*	*		
General terms	*	*					*					*		*		
Positive labelling				*	*	*	*								*	
Negative labelling							*	*	*	*			*	*	*	
List of three							*	*								
Inclusive "we"							*	*								
Passive voice					*											
Nominalisation					*										*	
Metaphor							*							*	*	
Imperative clauses							*									

"M" means Chinese Muslims; "MT" means Muslim terrorists; "SS" means Muslim social activists.

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