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**COPING WITH COMPETING INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA**

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Coping with Competing Institutional Logics in Environmental Governance: Evidence
from China

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Although the existence of competing institutional logics has been widely discussed in hybrid organizations, the literature of public administration has been remarkably silent on this issue. To address this literature gap, this dissertation mainly focuses on the environmental protection logic and economic efficiency logic during the environmental policy implementation in the Chinese context. I analyzed interviews with frontline environmental enforcement officials and relevant archival materials. The results indicated that environmental protection logic increases street-level bureaucrats' workload and responsibility, and the economic efficiency logic makes enforcement officials lack power, resources and incentives. These contradictions generate unclear responsibilities in different bureaus and increasing tasks, limited resources and greater pressure for enforcement officials with fewer rewards, leading to the coping behaviors of street-level bureaucrats. In addition, I proposed two directions for future research. First, to explore whether coping behaviors affect the implementation performance and psychological factors of street-level bureaucrats, I proposed that coping behaviors of moving against regulatees have a mediating effect in policy implementation. Second, as environmental NGOs play an important role in environmental governance, I also discussed how the competing institutional logics may affect their survival and development in China.

Keywords:

Competing institutional logics; environmental governance; street-level bureaucrats; environmental NGOs

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Background

Institutional logics are defined as sets of beliefs, values and norms that shape how actors make sense of their environments (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Logics provide actors with rationales and justifications about what is legitimate and in doing so, they guide the actors' behaviors by determining the salience of issues (i.e. which problems deserve attention) and by assigning appropriate solutions to solve this issues (Yan et al., 2019). The institutional approach posits that social dynamics occur within institutional orders, such as the state, the market, corporations, professions, the family or religions (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012).

In environmental governance, the street-level bureaucrats are crucial. Street-level bureaucrats have to deal with the challenging tasks and various stakeholders in a constantly changing and increasingly demanding environment, they often feel pressure when delivering services to their clients. Since street-level bureaucrats have substantial discretion in handling various situations (Lipsky, 1980), they are able to adopt coping behaviors if they perceive overload, a time limit for decision making, inadequate resources and ambiguity of goals (Kørnøv et al., 2015; Lipsky, 1980; Vink et al., 2015). As street-level bureaucrats face multiple expectations in environmental governance (Liu et al., 2021; Winter, 2002), increasing attention have been paid to their coping behaviors. The inconsistent and conflicting expectations from stakeholders may cause a great amount of psychological influence. Recent empirical studies have explored the factors that influence the coping behaviors of street-level bureaucrats, including the

characteristics of politics and policies (Fowler, 2020; Winter, 2002), structural features and actions of organizations (Aiken & Hage, 1966; Scott, 1997) and individual elements, such as trust, stress, organizational identification and pay satisfaction (Davidovitz & Cohen, 2021; Liu et al., 2021; Tummers & Rocco, 2015). However, less is known about how macro-level institutional logics affect micro-level individual coping behaviors (Meyer et al., 2014; Mohr & White, 2008).

This thesis examines the work of street-level bureaucrats in environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) in China. The EPBs' primary mission is to protect the environment, while they are also compelled to manage resources in a way that conform to an economic efficiency logic. As such, EPBs' employees and decision-makers face competing institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012; Yan et al., 2021). Institutional logics are competing when they impose inconsistent demands and goals that generate internal tensions and contradictions in daily work (Pache & Santos, 2013).

At the same time, I proposed two directions for future research. Existing studies mainly focus on the categories and antecedents of frontline employees' coping behaviors, keeping relatively silent on the effect of coping (Davidovitz & Cohen, 2021; Fowler, 2021; Kørnøv et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2021; Tummers & Rocco, 2015). Future research may attempt to address this literature gap by exploring the mediating role of coping strategies. In addition, I also try to expand the research context of the competing institutional logics in environmental governance by proposing to study the competing institutional logics in environmental NGOs.

1.2 Research Objectives and Contributions

This thesis seeks to fill these research gaps by exploring how competing institutional logics affect environmental policy implementation in Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB) in China. In particular, it examines the influence of two competing institutional logics — economic efficiency logic and environmental protection logic — on environmental policy implementation from a micro-level viewpoint, i.e. by examining how street-level bureaucrats suffer challenges and cope with these challenges in their day-to-day work. In doing so, this thesis addresses a few key research questions. How concretely do individuals deal with multiple competing logics in their daily work? What are the consequences on the attributes of individuals' work and how individuals experience them? How do the competing institutional logics, which refer to environmental protection logic and economic efficiency logic in environmental implementation, influence individual coping behaviors? In this research, I attempt to study the paths through which the competing institutional logics influences the individual coping behavior, making street-level bureaucrats more or less frequent adopt coping behaviors.

This thesis addresses conceptual and empirical research gaps. First, conceptually, while research has so far mostly analyzed the role of institutional logics at the meso-organizational level by focusing on organizational strategies, structure, actions and stakeholder battles (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012), this thesis responds to the call for further research on how logics affect micro-level individual behaviors (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Second, we drive the discussion of institutional logics from symbolic to concrete elements. In this institutional perspective, social

actors — individuals or organizations — need to conform to the prevailing institutional logics' norms (Thornton et al., 2012). Many studies emphasize how individuals or organizations may conform through symbolic dimensions. However, more research should be done to understand concrete, on-the-ground, implications of facing conflicting expectations from institutional logics (Smets et al., 2017). Empirically, this thesis contributes to the literature by exploring a setting that has been relatively overlooked: the public sector (but see Garrow & Grusky 2013, Meyer, Egger-Peitler, Höllerer & Hammerschmid 2014, for recent exceptions), while recent research has investigated social enterprises (Pache & Santos, 2013), for-profit firms (Lounsbury, 2007), cultural organizations (Shymko & Roulet, 2017) or universities (Grossi et al., 2020). Yet, the state and the bureaucratic system also face competing institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012).

This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it explains the reasons for the coexistence of competing institutional logics during environmental policy implementation in China. Secondly, it explores how competing institutional logics influence officials' coping behaviors based on the interview data in Chinese context. Furthermore, this thesis shows how actors cope with these challenges in their daily work. Using the lenses of competing institutional logics allows better apprehending the conflicting mandates and the contradictions between the work objectives and the working conditions during the policy implementation. Overall, this approach is useful to people interested in improving the enforcement efficiency for practical purposes.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 is the general introduction of the whole research. Chapter 2 reviews the literature. Chapter 3 describes the research method. Chapter 4 presents the research findings. Chapter 5 discusses its implications, limitations and introduces the future directions. For the future direction of the research, I proposed that coping behaviors of moving against regulatees have a mediating effect in policy implementation. For this research idea, the preliminary empirical result is presented. Second, by providing theoretical argument and hypotheses development, I also discussed how the competing institutional logics may affect environmental NGOs' survival and development in China. Chapter 6 is conclusion.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Competing Institutional Logics

A premise from the institutional theory is that individuals and organizations secure legitimacy by conforming with the dominant institutions of their social environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The perspective on institutional logics allows understanding of how macro-level institutions connect with micro-level practices and beliefs of actors (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2017). Every institutional order has a dominant logic that guides beliefs and practices, hence the stability of the coordination among actors. However, social change often occurs with the emergence of a new logic (Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009). When it is imported from a different institutional order, a new logic may offer a possibly conflicting set of beliefs, values and norms relatively to the dominant logic (Greenwood et al., 2011). For example, while healthcare organizations are traditionally run with a professional logic, which defines beliefs, values and norms about the appropriate practice of the medical professions, they deal with the introduction of a managerial logic that sets conflicting expectations (Andersson & Liff, 2018). The discussion of competing institutional logics widely exists in social enterprise area. Some social enterprises conform to both social welfare logic and commercial logic to survive (Pache & Santos, 2013). In a similar vein, private universities should comply with contradictory pressures from the State (public rules and control), academic pressures (the academic profession's norms and values) and market pressures (standards and market mechanisms) (Grossi et al., 2020). Thornton (2002) also documented how the market logic replaced the editorial logic in

the academic publishing industry.

Prior research evidenced that individuals or organizations have to respond to conflicting institutional demands (Pache & Santos, 2021). Identifying competing institutional logics allowed apprehending field-level change over time (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Thornton, 2002). Across these various contexts, competing institutional logics bring institutional change that manifests itself in a change of attentional focus, practices, beliefs, or vocabulary. Institutional logics give meaning to activities, guide the attention of actors on certain issues and specify the legitimate means and goals that actors should use and pursue. However, new logics could be imposed externally by various stakeholders, although on-the-ground actors may face difficulties in managing the tensions between competing institutional logics.

Bureaucrats from governmental bureaus may also face a contradiction between logics (Meyer et al., 2014). They embrace a dominant logic that derives from the institutional order of State (e.g., environmental protection logic), while conforming to a logic that derives from the institutional order of the Corporation (e.g., economic efficiency logic). Therefore, actors may face competing institutional logics, that is, the coexistence of contradictory demands and goals (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Reay & Hinings, 2009). The logic of economic efficiency (or managerialism) has gained a stronger influence as governmental administrations gradually adopted the model of “new public management” from the 1980s in many countries. Public sector organizations, like any business, were compelled to adopt managerial tools aimed at securing economic efficiency through performance evaluations, involving cost

maintenance, workforce productivity, “customer” satisfaction, among others. For instance, in the empirical context, some bureaucrats are impelled to use the necessary means to achieve to end-goal of preserving the environment while they also need to act like business managers and conform to the economic efficiency logic by encouraging cost cutting and economic development. In both cases, they adhere to the governmental dual target: achieving economic growth and preserving the environment. In sum, bureaucrats should look after both sides of the fence. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the two competing logics of environmental protection and economic efficiency.

Table 1 Identifying the Competing Institutional Logics

Characteristics	Environment protection logic	Economic efficiency logic
Institutional order	State	Market
Source of identity	Law enforcement official role	Business manager role
Sources of legitimacy	Post-growth legitimacy Environmental protection Loyalty to central government	Performance-based legitimacy Government target of achieving common prosperity Efficiency in managing economic resources
Sources of authority	Central government Public opinion International pressure	Central government Public opinion Business community
Basis of mission	Protecting the quality of environment	Achieving economic efficiency Bolster the economy
Bases of attention	Governmental target in terms of pollution levels Environmental costs Wellbeing of the population	Governmental target in terms of economic growth Economic costs Prosperity of the population and of the business actors

Formal mechanisms of control	Clear KPI from central government Inspection of Ecological and Environmental Protection Campaign-style enforcement	Clear KPI from central government Incentive and preferential policies
Informal mechanisms of control	Attention paid by governmental leaders and the population Pressure from NGOs and media	Attention paid by governmental leaders and local business leaders

2.2 Coping

The coping behaviors in public sectors refers to the “behavioral efforts frontline workers employ when interacting with clients, in order to master, tolerate, or reduce external and internal demands and conflicts they face on an everyday basis” (Tummers et al., 2015, p. 1100). Being exposed to competing institutional logics generates contradictions among sets of beliefs, values and norms. Recent calls stressed the importance of taking a practice-drive, “on-the-ground” approach of institutional logics to understand the individual-level consequences of facing competing institutional logics (Garrow & Grusky, 2013; Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). A large stream of research has studied the mechanisms of coping behaviors both at the individual and at the organizational levels.

2.2.1 Organizational-level coping strategies

To cope with competing institutional logics, organizations may adopt several behaviors. A first strategy is decoupling, which consists in symbolically advocating beliefs and values held by one logic while implementing practices promoted by another logic (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Organizations may also make a compromise by using

balancing, pacifying, and bargaining strategies to comply with different expectations (Oliver, 1991). Hybrid organizations can rather selectively couple elements prescribed by different logic to gain legitimacy (Pache & Santos, 2013).

2.2.2 Individual-level coping strategies

In a conceptual framework developed by Tummers and his colleagues (2015), public workers' coping behaviors are divided into three categories, moving toward clients, moving away clients and moving against clients. This classification is based on the different attitudes of public workers toward clients. Influenced by social work narrative and public service motivation, street-level bureaucrats may adjust to the client's needs in order to help them, a coping practice known as moving toward clients. By contrary, moving against clients involves strict rule-following and aggression whereas moving away from clients entails treating them in a standardized pattern but in a less cold manner than moving against clients. Kørnøv et al. (2015) classified coping behaviors according to how employees classify clients based on their judgment. Coping practices, in their perspective, include referring clients to other colleagues, allocating service to a limited number of clients and inventing their own standard classifications of clients. In a recent study, Davidovitz and Cohen (2021) present two coping behaviors defined by public workers' motivation: acts of self-protection and deviation from formal policy.

2.3 Coping with Competing Institutional Logics in Policy Implementation

2.3.1 Competing institutional logics in policy implementation

The literature on competing institutional logics has shed lights on policy

implementation. During the policy-making process, policymakers have to balance demands from different powerful actors (Gilley, 2006; Wang, 2013). Legitimacy is often obtained at the expense of a lack of consideration of the practicalities and the constraints of departments (Ran, 2013). Therefore, the respective systems of meaning and normative understandings of different institutional logics in policy implementation provide inconsistent expectations (Greenwood et al., 2011). Local bureaus and law enforcement teams often encounter conflicts between legitimacy and efficiency which require them to selectively decouple the formal structures from activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

A few studies have adopted a similar perspective of competing institutional logics to understand the difficulties of policy implementation. Zhou (2012) used institutional logics that includes bureaucratic logic and social institutional logics to describe the implementation of the Paved Road to Every Village (PREV) project. State-agent logics and citizen-agent logics are mentioned as different normative choices for street-level bureaucrats (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). These normative choices instantiate values and beliefs which are very important for street bureaucrats to decide their coping strategies.

2.3.2 Coping in policy implementation

(1) Organizational-level coping strategies: local governments

Previous research shows that the strategies of local governments are not simply decoupling or compromising, but rather constantly adjusting and improvising coping strategies that are based on political judgments, which change according to the central

government's attitude and clarity of objectives (Zhou et al., 2013). The clear objectives of the central government will profoundly affect the actions of local governments. Lo et al. (2019) emphasized the value of shared priorities and clear objectives in closing the enforcement gap.

The responses of local governments to the competing institutional logics are mainly reflected in their different attitudes towards central government policies. Some environmental laws, especially those formulated in general and vague words (Wang & Liu, 1998), will be ignored by local governments without any effective actions. On the contrary, local governments have strong motivations to respond to these ambiguous policy statements with veto power — “yipiao foujue” (Chan & Gao, 2008; Edin, 2003).

(2) Individual-level coping behaviors: street-level bureaucrats

Recent literature suggests that enforcement officials often have to deal with complicated situations which are not specifically taken into consideration (Akosa & Asare, 2017). The certain degree of discretion enables street-level bureaucrats to adopt coping behaviors (Lipsky, 1980; Tummers et al., 2015). In the research about teachers in public school, Mutereko (2009) emphasized discretion as an antecedent of coping behaviors and found that a few factors may lead teachers to use discretion to cope, such as goals, resources and workloads.

At the individual level, competing institutional logics have a significant impact on enforcement officials' enforcement styles and behaviors. Different institutional logics can lead to different recognition of service and dedication. Street-level bureaucrats with

state-agent narrative emphasize regulations and policy procedures, while the citizen-agent narrative encourages street-level bureaucrats to think highly of citizens' benefits even it will make their work more unpleasant, difficult and dangerous (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Enforcement officials sometimes adopt coping strategies for their private interest (Cohen & Gershgoren, 2016). Winter (2002) even argued that the bureaucrats' preferences are more important than their capacity for policy implementation tasks. Officials at lower levels tend to "ignore or circumvent top-level decisions that are vague or inconsistent" (Lieberthal & Lampton, 2018, p. 21). According to Garrow and Grusky (2013, p. 106), "when policy features clash with the core logic, street-level workers are apt to use their discretion to disregard the policy or resist implementation". Holding a certain degree of discretion is one of the major characteristics of enforcement officials. The dilemma enforcement officials face with sits at the nexus of what is "politically acceptable" and what is "administratively feasible" (Nalbandian, 2006).

2.4 Coping with Competing Institutional Logics in China's Environmental Governance

In the past four decades, China has greatly emphasized economic growth and efficiency to the detriment of the environment, as evidenced by chronicle issues of pollution, excessive natural resources consumption and environmental degradation (Cao et al., 2015; Liu & Diamond, 2005; Wang & Xu, 2015). However, China's environmental problems are receiving more and more attention. Thus, while the economic efficiency logic prevailed, the Chinese government has taken a series of

measures to enhance a new environmental protection logic. For instance, stricter environmental and energy targets were set up in the Five-Year Plan and environmental indicators are included in the cadres evaluation system in around 2011 (Kostka & Zhang, 2018; Ran, 2020). Additionally, the central government now takes supervisory measures, such as Inspection of Ecological and Environmental Protection, to ensure that local governments are in line with environmental goals.

2.4.1 Two competing logics: environmental protection and economic efficiency

In practice, however, economic efficiency is still the dominant logic for the local bureaucracy system of China, which hinders the environmental law enforcement (Kostka & Hobbs, 2012; Kostka & Mol, 2013; Mol & Carter, 2006). Bureaucrats prefer to pursue short-term, countable outputs (such as GDP growth) over pollution control activities for the reason that environmental protection requires high sustained investments for little immediate payoff (Economy, 2014). Given the increasing workload due to environmental protection logic and multiple conflicting pressures from government and public, environmental law enforcement officials have to face with challenging and stressful enforcement situations, and struggle for maintaining the balance of multiple tasks. They require more thorough and frequent inspections and receive more complaints from residences.

In response to tensions and multiple pressures, enforcement officials focus on short-term goals and adjust accordingly with different coping strategies (Zhou et al., 2013). Environmental law enforcement officials may act like what Ding (2020) describes as “performative governance”, usually engaging in “more superficial,

reversible activities to demonstrate loyalty or assuage public concerns” (Van der Kamp, 2021, p. 200). They will participate in the large-scale environmental protection activities organized by the central government to demonstrate their loyalty (Wang, 2013, 2017), but in daily enforcement, they are more willing to solve only the pollutants that are the most publicly visible, while paying lower attention to the less visible pollutants (Liang & Langbein, 2015).

Civil servants in local governments rely on campaign-style enforcements which have many pitfalls to meet the minimum goals. They may protect polluting industries when the central government does not impose clear penalties, and then apply crude, one-size-fits-all restrictions and use extreme measures (Van der Kamp, 2021). Campaign-style enforcements hinder long-term enforcement planning and investments (Shin, 2018), discourages the establishment of routine enforcement mechanisms (Ma, 2017; Van Rooij et al., 2017), and suffers from over-mobilization (Kostka & Zhang, 2018) that hurts the enthusiasm of street-level bureaucrats. To date, many of the environmental policies and showcases such as northern China’s rural coal-to-gas heating projects have failed (Ran, 2020).

2.4.2 Linking competing institutional logics with China’s authoritarianism

Environmental policy implementation in the Chinese context is even more subject to competing institutional logics. As extensively documented in the existing literature, the political system in China is characterized by a fragmented authoritarianism framework (Mertha, 2009), with the combination of economic decentralization and centralized power structure (Lieberthal & Lampton, 2018).

First, the party-state of China has been in a transition to rebuild its legitimacy from sustainability in addition to growth-based legitimacy. Most governments need to find sustainable legitimacy in order for their political model to maintain over time. The legitimacy of countries like China is based on ideology, nationalism, charismatic leaders, and performance in delivering economic development and social goods to society (Wang, 2013). In the early decades of China, ideology-based legitimacy came from Marxism-Leninism with charismatic legitimacy (Mao Zedong), and nationalism based on the victory of the Sino-Japanese War in the Second World War (Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Zhao, 2009). The Chinese government has put a greater emphasis on economic growth and efficiency after Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms from 1979 and those policies have achieved great success (Bachman, 1986; Wang, 2013). During this period, environmental protection logic emerged but was still secondary as compared with the economic efficiency logic. While this authoritarian system has been instrument in promoting economic growth (Qian & Weingast, 1997; Xu, 2011), the dramatic economic growth brought about serious social problems (Lewis & Xue, 2003), including uncontrolled urbanization, corruption and environmental damages. The growing satisfaction of material demand went hand-in-hand with raising public concerns about non-material issues such as social justice and social welfare. Therefore, economic growth could no longer be the sole source of legitimacy for the central Government (Gilley & Holbig, 2009; Holbig & Gilley, 2010). Besides the expectations of equality and political participation, environmental degradation has attracted many complaints and even leads to social unrest. Since 2012, the current Xi Jinping

Administration has shifted the political attention on resource conservation and environmental protection as fundamental national policies in order to secure legitimacy (Xinhuanet, 2013). Subsequently, environmental logic has been reinforced and started to compete with the economic development system.

Second, the China government has been struggling in balancing the conflicts between economic efficiency and environmental protection. While managing both logics is challenging, economic growth logic and environmental protection logic are not necessarily opposed (Feiock & Stream, 2001). Indeed, different logics can be compatible or incompatible (Yan et al., 2021), and the categories of relationship between them include conflicting, complementary, coexisting, etc (Yan et al., 2021). When certain conditions are met, environmental protection can bring little or no negative impact on economy. For instance, to achieve both goals, industrial production has to consume less energy and emit fewer pollutants (Cordero et al., 2005). China's economic growth is built on extremely inefficient use of resources and has paid a heavy environmental price for its rapid economic growth (World Bank, 2007, 2018). Environmental degradation costed around RMB 1,892 billion (~USD 295 billion) in 2017, accounting for 2.23% of the China's GDP (Ma et al., 2020). As a result, in China, the growth-based legitimacy was bound to be exhausted (Gilley & Holbig, 2009). In a word, local governments often perceive environmental protection and economic development as conflicting goals (Chen & Jia, 2021; Tang et al., 1997). Therefore, "conflicting institutional demands are particularly likely to emerge in fragmented fields" (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 457). Although it is reasonable for the central government to

place high expectations on economic efficiency and environmental protection for reclaiming legitimacy, it is likely that local governments do encounter difficulties in balancing these conflicting objectives in policy implementation. While the central government struggles to meet the increasingly diverse demands of Chinese society, the fragmentation of the authoritarian system created opportunities for local governments to distort central policies in return for their benefits (Fewsmith & Gao, 2014).

Lastly, the Chinese Cadre Evaluation System has not provided strong incentives for local officials to balance the competing institutional logics. For a long time, China used GDP growth target as the principal criteria for cadre promotion (Chen et al., 2005; Li & Zhou, 2005), overwhelmingly prioritizing economic efficiency over environmental protection and other social welfare issues. Cadres have strong motivation to advance their positions and get promoted (Qian & Weingast, 1997). Those career-minded officials tried to excel in tournament-like competitions, sparing no effort to develop local economies (Lü & Landry, 2014). The promotion tournament means that only those who outperform all the other local peers can impress their superiors and then get promotion (Zhang, 2020). It makes officials focus more on publicly visible and short-term accomplishments (Liang & Langbein, 2015). After the central government has paid more attention to environmental protection, Chinese Cadre Evaluation System has also begun to consider environmental performance. Wang and Lei (2021) demonstrate that environmental protection tournaments have become an influential part of the cadre's promotion since 2007. However, pollution control is still a policy with veto power — “yipiao foujue” (Chan & Gao, 2008; Edin, 2003) which means that there

is no reward for overfulfilling. Bureaucrats with political skills will realize that, until now, environmental laws have been more like symbolic policies and statements. Therefore, local leaders have a strong incentive to boost the local economy because economic development usually have hard targets and are important for political rewards (Ran, 2013).

The objective of this thesis is to better understand *how* these conflicting objectives, coming from competing institutional logics, are affecting the work of street-level bureaucrats. For that, an empirical investigation was conducted among team leaders of Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in China.

CHAPTER 3 DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD

I employ a qualitative design to explore the research questions (Meyers et al., 2007), due to the complex nature of the working conditions that this thesis attempt to investigate (Akosa & Asare, 2017; Lipsky, 1980). The descriptive data was collected through interviews regarding environment policy implementation task and working conditions. I also use an inductive approach to analyze the data without preliminary hypotheses, which help us better understand enforcement officials' boundary-spanning role, which means that their "job-related interactions are ordered and confined within the rules and forms of bureaucratic procedures" (Prottas, 1978, p. 291).

The interviews data is from Dr. Xueyong Zhan. It includes 13 interviews with frontline environmental enforcement officials between July and August 2019. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, which lasted for 60 to 120 minutes. Interviewees are the leaders of enforcement team, who are also directly involved in local policy implementation and who have day-to-day face-to-face interactions with the public or enterprises. The coping behaviors of enforcement officials at different levels will show different characteristics (Patton, 1990). Each interview was conducted at a different enforcement team at the municipal-level or at the district-level. The composition of local fiscal revenue also affects the local government's attitude towards environmental protection policies (Guo et al., 2020). To further ensure the representativeness of our interviews, the interviewees were from industrial-intensive districts, high-tech districts and districts with developed tertiary industries to cover different regions. Extreme case has also been taken into consideration (Etikan et al.,

2016). District K is the district with the largest number of industrial source, which refers to the places where the environment will be harmed by industrial production (Chengdu Bureau of Statistics, 2020). It ranks first in Sichuan province in the amount of administrative penalty for environmental problems. District E is dominated by enterprises in the tertiary industries, with only 10 factories (Chengdu Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Different districts in the sample may face different regulatory tasks, but all indicated in interviews that they were influenced by the competing institutional logics.

In the interviews with bureaucrats, researchers are required to carefully refrain from dealing with sensitive topics to avoid offending interviewees. For example, direct questions were avoiding, such as the government departments have clashed with in the process of enforcement. Instead, interview provide opportunities for them to tell the feelings toward and stories of cooperation with other bureaus. The interview questions were related to enforcement difficulties, social pressure, departmental collaboration and personal development. Interview data was analyzed based on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To perform triangulation (Jick, 1979), I relied on archival data that were obtained from provincial government official website, official website of Municipal Bureau of Ecology and Environment, Public Enterprises and Institutions Open Channel, and other public sources. To analyze the data, I used Nvivo 12 with an open coding following a grounded theory approach.

CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS

The findings revealed that the competing institutional logics are causing the increase of workload and responsibility, lack of power, lack of resource and lack of incentive. These effects prompt street-level bureaucrats to adopt coping strategies. When asked about the general feeling of their jobs, the participants were unanimous in the view that they have been in a difficult situation for a long time. It seems impossible for them to satisfy the demand of government, enterprise and the public under the influence of competing institutional logics. The conflict between economic efficiency and environmental protection is fully reflected in the demands of local governments.

As discussed in interview B that if the frontline enforcement officials rigidly enforce the law, local governments will complain that too many businesses were destroyed. This argument was echoed by several interviewees. Sometimes their enforcement actions and penalties seriously interfere with companies, which is what local governments want to avoid. Interviewees in Region D expressed more directly that the district government does not want the enforcement teams to be so harsh so that the impact on economic development can be reduced.

Table 2 displays the results of coding. It shows that the interviewed teams all suffer from the problems of increased workload and responsibility, lack of power, resources and incentives. Power, resources and incentives are considered as some of the most important factors in determining the success of policy implementation. With these negative effects, enforcement officials have to face with multiple conflicts in daily work. Due to great pressure and poor cooperation, enforcement officials spare no effort to

deal with increasing workload without sufficient resource and rewards they deserved.

Table 2 Coding Frame of the Consequences of Competing Institutional Logics on Environmental Protection Bureaus' Employees

Main code	Subcode	Nb. of Cases	Nb. of Code References	Total nb. of Code References of main code	Total nb. of cases of main code
Environmental Protection Logic					
Increased workload	Increased number of tasks	3	3	14	6
	Increased demand for professionalism in environmental issues	2	3		
	Increased requirements of the central government	2	2		
	Increased demand from the public	3	6		
Increased accountability	Mental stress from the increased number of tasks	5	8	35	11
	Mental stress from the increased variety of tasks	1	2		
	High accountability pressure	9	25		
Economic Efficiency Logic					
Lack of power	Ambiguous responsibilities	4	8	16	7
	Difficult to coordinate different bureaus	5	8		
Lack of resources	Lack of human resources			35	12
	• Number of employees	11	22		
	• Training	2	2		
	Lack of material resources				
	• High technology and equipment	2	4		
• Vehicle	4	5			
• Financial means	1	2			
Lack of incentives	Lack of material incentives	5	8	16	7
	Lack of status incentives				
	• Few opportunities for promotion	4	7		
	• Non-civil servant status	1	1		

4.1 Impact of the Competing Institutional Logics

Central governments, considering the needs of multiple stakeholders including public and business actors, tend to set multiple goals rather than a sole goal (Chen & Jia, 2021). This is manifested in the field of environmental enforcement as the economic efficiency logic competes with the environmental protection logic. Local environmental protection bureaus are affected by these competing institutional logics. The environmental protection logic increases their workload and responsibilities, while the economic efficiency logic prevents them from obtaining sufficient power, resources, and incentives from local governments.

4.1.1 Workload

A shared view amongst interviewees was that workload has largely increased. Although local bureaucratic system primarily follows the economic efficiency logic, it also pursues an environmental protection logic to gain legitimacy and to maintain social stability. The central government imposes higher requirements such as the ambitious goals for building a carbon-neutral future (Ministry Ecology and Environment of PRC, 2021). It creates much more workload and responsibility of enforcement officials. However, as for economic logic, enforcement officials have to take industrial development, tax revenue, and government-enterprise relations into account in the enforcement process.

4.1.2 Responsibility

As the public takes the environment more seriously, there is more pressure from the public. Over the past two decades, China has seen a shift toward “responsive

authoritarianism” which means that “the state allows for a limited degree of public participation and has been increasingly responsive to appeals from nonstate actors” (Marquis & Bird, 2018, p. 948). Since 2009, the public has been allowed to report pollution incidents and participate in environmental supervision. According to the public data, more than 530 thousand complaints were received through the ministry's WeChat account or the hotline in 2019 (Ministry Ecology and Environment of PRC, 2020). In the interviews, District C, District D, and District L all reported that their enforcement team had more than one thousand complains a year.

“Sometimes business firms report their rivals’ pollution cases to the government in order to win the market competition. For every report from the citizens, we have to go to the site and check, which creates tremendous enforcement costs. People don't understand it doesn't necessarily mean that it doesn't emit anything if a company meets the national environmental standards. For example, a factory may meet the national standards, but still has legally allowed emission. But the people report it once they smell it”. (District B)

Interviewees told us that they must respond to all reports and complains from citizens, even some are over demanding or result from conflicts of personal interest. Sometimes, they feel annoyed and thought “it is a lot of waste of our work time and administrative resources” (District E).

4.1.3 Power

Recent literature points out that national and local governments are often divergent over attitudes to economic development. Environmental protection logic affects two

dimensions that Matland (1995) sees as critical in the enforcement process, one is power, and the other is resource. The environmental protection bureaus (EPBS) have long been a politically weak department. A reason is that local governments primarily focus on protecting businesses, employment, and taxation revenues while keeping EPBS at a low rank within the local political hierarchy (Kostka, 2014). As one interviewee said:

“Environmental workers are a vulnerable group. Now the country has requirements, and President Xi Jinping has emphasized that more attention is paid to environmental protection, but when it really comes down to local-level, people don't care about” (District J).

4.1.4 Resources

The lack of human resource and equipment is the most serious problem as reported in the interviews. In District K, 30 people supervise 2,424 pollution sources and over 3,000 enterprises (Chengdu Ecological Environment Bureau et al., 2020).

“Now we are working all day without rest. We are already overloaded. The daily workload of the staff is more than half of what it should be”. (District J)

Interviewees also claim that after the car use policy reform in bureaucratic system, there is no vehicle available, which has brought great inconvenience to their inspection work.

“Our biggest difficulty is that we don't have a car. When the reform of official car use system carried out in 2016 and 2017, our environmental enforcement team was not listed as the enforcement executor of the State Council. Therefore, we auctioned all our seven cars at that time, or transferred them to the District Public Security

Bureau, which has the power of law enforcement. (District L)

An absence of resources can be linked directly to goal displacement (Bohte & Meier, 2000). The coexistence of economic efficiency logic and environmental protection logic imposes multiple expectations on local governments. Resources may be controlled by actors outside the implementing organization that oppose to the policy (Matland, 1995), impeding local EPBs to obtain minimal financial support (Tang et al., 1997). Policies such as permit-related policies are often symbolic because they do not have a clear definition of financial mechanism and related budgetary requirements (Li et al., 2019).

4.1.5 Incentives

The last dimension that was influenced by the economic efficiency logic is the lack of incentives. The central government often provides incongruous political incentives, especially in the environmental protection and economic development. National policymakers neglect the potential negative impacts of environmental policies on economy. Neither individual nor institutional interests encourage local governments to implement environmental policies (Ran, 2013). There were some negative comments from interviewees about their incentive and rewards. They lack material rewards and promotion space. One of the interviewees complained about the overtime allowance issue, which the Public Security Bureau has but environment protection bureaus and units do not. This view was echoed by other informants who add more information about promotion.

“In our team, the last promotion of deputy section chief is in 2005. There has been

no promotion for over 14 years. In fact, it is the section chief and deputy section chief overstuffed. Many of the young people worked in the team all their lives, can only be a section member” (District B).

Many law enforcement officers complain that they do not have civil service status, which often means higher income, more comprehensive benefits, and higher social status.

“We have to undertake the responsibilities of civil servants, but we do not have the rights and fringe benefits that civil servants enjoy” (Municipal).

Almost all the front-line enforcement officers have non-civil servant status while they are managed according to the civil servant system. Non-civil servant status shrinks the promotion opportunities for local EPB staff. After Chengdu’s switch from a horizontal (“kuai”)-based to a vertical (“tiao”)-based management system in the environmental bureaucracy, the career advancement is even more restricted as they are confined to environmental units (Ma, 2017). One interviewee remarked that “with so many people and such a large team, it's very difficult to get promotion, even half a step” (District D).

4.2 Difficulties of Policy Implementation

The difficulties that characterize the enforcement officials’ daily work receive increased concern as conflicts emerge. First of all, increased tasks and limited resources explain the dilemma for them to do their job with scarce budget. In all cases, the informants reported that the workload was dramatically multiplied, especially after the

18th National Congress of CPC in the end of 2012. The number of positions was fixed before and is unchangeable now. According to one of the interviewee:

“Ten years ago, we received about 700 complaints from the public, but up to 1350 last year. The number was doubled, but there was no increase in staff.” (District D)

The interviewee of District L expressed the same concern:

“When government determined the staff size in our team, we received only 200 complaints a year from the public, and now there are more than 1000 complaints a year. The number of complaints has multiplied, but the number of staff allocated to me cannot match the workload.” (District L)

Second, increased workload and responsibility make enforcement officials under great pressure, but with little return. Enforcement officials are afraid to be blamed for not focusing enough on environmental protection since it is more and more under the spotlight. Weaver's (1986) theory of blame avoidance suggests that subjects with low power are more likely to be the targets of blame. Drawing from news and archival data, mayors are the least likely to be blamed; on the contrary, the weak position of EPBs in the local power structure often means that they are most likely to be blamed for an environmental issue (Ran, 2017). Interviewees explained:

“No matter where the inspection team of ecological and environmental protection goes, the EPBs will be punished. That is to say, in any case, we are target and to be blamed.” (District C)

“To work for 24-hour per-day or not, in the end, you are the target to be blamed. This is inevitable.” (District J)

In general, increased workload and responsibility have caused strong dissatisfaction among enforcement officials who say it is difficult to bear such unreasonable demands: “Now we are all unwilling to be in law enforcement team, which is more risky and facing more responsibilities, but the incentive is still the same with other positions” (*District J*).

The lack of power makes it difficult for EPBs to enforce environmental regulations with other government units that are of equal, even higher, hierarchical ranking (Tang et al., 1997). For example, public security often represents higher power in the bureaucratic system. It is difficult for EPBs to cooperate with public security bureau to obtain some evidence of environmental pollution. Unclear responsibilities of each bureaus results in poor coordination among different bureaus. Environmental policy implementation involves multiple departments. Governments have to assigned policy implementation tasks to many agencies whose fundamental bureaucratic interests are to some degree in conflict with the goals. One of interviewees added:

“Many departments are not clear about their environmental responsibility. They believe that every work that involves environmental protection must be done with EPB. For example, the Urban Management and Law Enforcement Bureau is in charge of the lampblack but will ask the EPB to collect evidence and produce the test report. According to law and regulation, the Urban Management and Law Enforcement Bureau is required to collect pollution evidence by themselves.”
(District G)

As described by the interviewees, some objects are under the jurisdiction of the

relevant departments, but when it comes to environmental issues, other departments tend to pass the work to the EPBs. In addition to the lampblack problem of Urban Management and Law Enforcement Bureau, similar situations include the Water Bureau's water management, the Construction Bureau's greening management, and the traffic management bureau's vehicle exhaust control.

4.3 Coping Behaviors in Policy Implementation

Street-level bureaucrats emerged with coping strategies to respond to the contradictions arising from the competing institutional logics. Drawing from the literature and interview data, I found that enforcement officials adopt coping behaviors at the individual level and at the organizational level to respond to the competing institutional logics.

Based on the analysis in the difficulties in policy implementation that brought by competing institutional logics, it is clear that street-level bureaucrats are thus under tremendous pressure and increase the dissatisfaction of their job. Stress and anxiety are regarded as key antecedents of coping behaviors (Jerusalem & Schwarzer, 1989; Tummers & Rocco, 2015). In the research model, I argue that competing institutional logics increase the tendency of enforcement officials to adopt coping behaviors.

First, enforcement teams have adopted different modes of supervision of regulatees to deal with the increasing workload caused by competing institutional logics. From the interviews I found that Chengdu EPB had adopted the random inspection rule (“Shuang sui ji”), which assigned inspection objectives by computer lottery. In addition, local governments proceed to spot inspection (special inspection for key areas, key industries

and key issues), looking back (repeat inspections of previously problematic subjects), and positive lists of Environmental Impact Assessments (reduce supervisions for small and medium-sized enterprises that pollute little and those enterprises that have performed well). Some of these methods have helped to strengthen supervision, while others have helped street-level bureaucrats to lighten their workload and responsibility.


Second, enforcement teams try to make evolutions regarding their cooperation with their partners, as the insufficient power hinders them from working with other sectors. One approach for EFBs is purchasing third-party services (experts, testing agencies, environmental NGOs) in order to increase their professionalism. Also, they seek help from higher level leaders to coordinate cross-bureau cooperation. As described by the interviewees from district H, “once it attracts the attention of senior leaders, things will go smoothly”. For example, they may ask the mayor to set up a focus group. These measures concur to achieve the environmental protection goals while influenced by economic efficiency logic.

Third and finally, street-level bureaucrats also have personal actions to release their stress caused by competing institutional logics. These coping behaviors include problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping. To deal with the problems at hand, street-level bureaucrats will use personal resource, such as working overtime. The purpose of emotion-focused coping is to manage the emotional burden (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). *Avoid*, as a common coping behavior, helps to mitigate the negative emotion. Under great pressure, street-level bureaucrats may leave the current position by resigning from the EFBs or by transferring to another position. Positive

reinterpretation also helps to reduce negative emotions. We found that when talking about increased workload and accountability, street-level bureaucrats emphasize their public service motives and communist party membership (such as the interviewees from district G).

I argue that the macro-level institutional logics have created contradictions on meso-organizational factors, and the contradictions have led individuals to implement coping behaviors to resolve the emerging difficulties. Overall, the conceptual model is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1 The Impact of Competing Institutional Logics on Environmental Policy Implementation



CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSIONS

5.1 Overview of the Results

The findings reveal that all street-level bureaucrats from the local law enforcement teams felt that their daily work was met with considerable difficulties caused by competing institutional logics. Workload, responsibility, power, resources, and incentives are important factors that were frequently mentioned in the policy implementation literature. These factors are related to the competing institutional logics of environmental protection and economic efficiency.

These results suggest that the dilemmas street-level bureaucrats have to cope with on a daily basis are imposed by the institutional logics. Competing institutional logics are often accompanied by contradictions and tensions at the individual level (Greenwood et al., 2011; Sadeh & Zilber, 2019). When the central government presents two potentially contradictory guidelines, local government leaders tend to choose the strategy that is the most aligned with their own political interest. Local government will consider the central government's assessment criteria for them, the high input and slow return characteristics of environmental protection, and also the ways to avoid their own responsibility. At this point, street-level bureaucrats are the group most affected by the competing institutional logics because they are the frontline implementers.

Both central and local governments have responded to this pair of competing institutional logics in a number of ways. The central government has warned local governments to balance economic efficiency and environmental protection through various channels, such as the Inspection of Ecological and Environmental Protection

and a nationwide complaints platform. When the Chinese government fails to enforce environmental protection policy with regular enforcement methods, it strategically mobilizes resources and distribute power through campaign-style enforcement (Liu et al., 2015). Local environmental protection bureaus, on the other hand, by using a random inspection rule (“Shuang sui ji”), they expect to have a reasonable workload, and will not be punished for pollution incidents that go beyond that reasonable workload.

The competing institutional logics affect the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental governance to some extent, but it can be considered as an unavoidable problem for a country in a certain stage. Developing countries always need to face the multiple needs of the public with limited resources and capacity. After further development in economy and technology, the competition between some institutional logics may disappear spontaneously.

5.2 Implications and Limitation

The findings have important implications for future practice of policy implementation. This thesis emphasizes the need for policy makers and bureaucrats to recognize the conflicts in policy goals and mandates, which put street-level bureaucrats under tremendous pressure and bring difficulties that cannot be resolved by themselves. I argue that the scarcity of some essential factors for successful implementation, such as power and resources in local environmental protection bureaus, can be partially caused by competing institutional logics. As for competing institutional logics, previous research focusses on how hybrid organizations internally manage the logics that they

embody. This thesis moves the literature one step forward by exploring the pathways of competing institutional logics influencing officials' coping behaviors during the process of environmental policy implementation. This is not only important in the Chinese context, but also has practical implications for those countries in transition, which also have high pressure of economic development and environmental protection, especially when their industrial structure and technology are not yet ready to support them to achieve both goals at the same time.

This qualitative research has a few limitations. The data collected from the interviews may be subjective which poses a threat to research findings. Meanwhile, the interviews were only conducted in Chengdu city. Future studies can add evidence from different regions to increase the external validity. Besides, competing institutional logics is a dynamic process. The Chinese central government's attitude towards environmental protection has been changing over the past two decades. A more comprehensive understanding of the process of competition between different institutional logics and the effects bring calls for a longitudinal study.

5.3 Future Directions 1: The Mediating Effect of the Coping Behaviors

To further explore the coping for the competing institutional logics in environmental governance, future research can also discuss about the effect of coping behaviors which increased by competing institutional logics.

As previous literature has already discussed about the classification and antecedents of street-level bureaucrats' coping behaviors (Davidovitz & Cohen, 2021;

Fowler, 2021; Kørnøv et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2021; Tummers & Rocco, 2015), I aim to address the literature gap by exploring the mediating effect of coping behaviors related to the street-level bureaucrats' mission attachment, enforcement effectiveness and organizational commitment.

5.3.1 Coping behaviors of moving toward/against regulatees

Some street-level bureaucrats influenced by social work narrative and public service motivation may adjust to the client's needs with the aim to help them. These kinds of behaviors were called moving toward regulatees. As widely reported, in recent years Chinese government has increasingly used heavy-handed approach and inspection campaigns to enforce environmental policies (Liu et al., 2015; Van der Kamp, 2021), so the coping behaviors of moving against regulatees behavior increased. It appears when employees are "sticking to rules in an inflexible way" or "confronting clients in a hostile manner" (Tummers & Rocco, 2015, p. 819).

Figure 2 and figure 3 show the proposed research model. I argue that that law enforcement officials' coping behaviors significantly mediates the relationship between their mission attachment and enforcement effectiveness, and the relationship between mission attachment and organizational commitment. Enforcement officials with stronger mission attachment are more likely to use a moving against coping strategy, resulting in divergent outcomes, including increased perceptions of enforcement effectiveness perception but lower organizational commitment.

Figure 2 Theoretical Framework of Mediating Effect of Moving Against Regulatees





Figure 3 Theoretical Framework of Mediating Effect of Moving Toward Regulatees



Mission attachment is very important for the work of public sector employees. Increasing public service workers' belief in the value of their work and aligning their mission with the organization's purpose are effective ways to motivate them (Khan, 2020). Prior research has evidenced the positive impact of mission attachment on organization performance (Bart & Baetz, 1998; Kim, 2012; Macedo et al., 2016). Higher mission attachment is linking to higher job satisfaction, lower employees'

retention and lower tendency of burnout (Brown & Yoshioka, 2003; Macedo et al., 2016; Wang & Lin, 2011). All these factors are crucial to effectiveness.

Hypothesis 1: For frontline environmental law enforcement officials, mission attachment is positively related to enforcement effectiveness.

Frontline workers may react similarly when institutional environment becomes increasingly adversarial (Liu et al., 2021) and clients act aggressively (Hershcovis & Reich, 2013). Prior studies have documented that when the state has introduced more specific and strict laws, street-level bureaucrats are increasingly adopting moving against behaviors especially when they realized higher resource scarcity and less government support (Liu et al., 2021; Lo et al., 2009).

Lu et al. (2010) found that positive coping strategies like exerting more efforts bring higher job performance, while passive adaptation coping behaviors result in lower job performance. In an enforcement environment with increased tasks and pressures, enforcement officials with higher mission attachment with environmental protection bureaus are more inclined to move against regulatees to improve enforcement effectiveness. Moving toward behaviors include “rule bending” and “rule breaking”(Tummers & Rocco, 2015) which aim to protect regulatees’ benefits. In environmental governance, rule bending and rule breaking are detrimental to law enforcement. Those who have higher mission attachment with environmental protection bureaus will be less likely to adopt the coping behaviors of moving toward regulatees. When people adopt more problem-focused strategies like moving against regulatees, they feel less burned out by effectively reduce attention depletion

(Sideridis, 2006; Wilski et al., 2015). Unlike moving toward regulatees that requires enforcement official to empathize, moving against will lead enforcement officials to higher performance.

Hypothesis 2a: The behaviors of moving against regulatees significantly mediates the relationship between mission attachment and enforcement effectiveness. That is, a street-level bureaucrat's mission attachment is positively related to the behaviors of moving against regulatees, which in turn improves enforcement effectiveness.

Hypothesis 2b: The behaviors of moving toward regulatees significantly mediates the relationship between mission attachment and enforcement effectiveness. That is, a street-level bureaucrat's mission attachment is negatively related to the behaviors of moving toward regulatees, which in turn decrease enforcement effectiveness.

Organizational commitment, defined as employees' psychological affiliation of to the organization (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986), consists of three forms: affective commitment, continuance commitment, normative commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Unlike the continuance commitment that focus on the cost of leaving, affective commitment is associated with the employee's compatibility with the organization in terms of psychological factors, including identification, belief in mission (Robertson et al., 2007), work values (Putti et al., 1989). O'Reilly et al. (1991) suggested that the match between employees and organizational mission is a good predictor of organizational commitment. Many scholars suggested that the match between

employees and organizational mission is a good predictor of organizational commitment (O'Reilly et al., 1991; Vancouver & Schmitt, 1991). Resnick and Siame (2022) argue that this relationship needs to be emphasized more in the public sector, since wages and benefits will not be as substantial in the public sector. I propose mission attachment, which can reflect their recognition of work value and belief in organizational mission, is positively related to organizational commitment.

Hypothesis 3: For frontline environmental law enforcement officials, mission attachment is positively related to their organizational commitment.

Balay (2007) found that conflict management strategies are related to organizational commitment. Coping can be regarded as a common conflict management behavior. Street-level bureaucrats' coping behavior of moving toward regulatees is a lenient means of governance that sustains a harmonious relationship between the enforcement team and regulatees. In contrast, coping behavior of moving against regulatees is stricter and might bring more conflict. A strict and inflexible approach of enforcement can easily lead to destructive conflict and a negative organizational climate, both of which may weaken organizational commitment (Schermerhorn et al., 2011). Thus, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4a: The behaviors of moving against regulatees significantly mediates the relationship between the mission attachment and organizational commitment. That is, a street-level bureaucrat's mission attachment is positively related to the behaviors of moving against regulatees, which in turn reduces organizational commitment.

Hypothesis 4b: The behaviors of moving toward regulatees significantly mediates the relationship between the mission attachment and organizational commitment. That is, a street-level bureaucrat's mission attachment is negatively related to the behaviors of moving toward regulatees, which in turn increase organizational commitment.

Building on the existing coping literature in public administration, this proposed research might provide a deeper insight into the effect of coping behaviors on law enforcement. These findings have practical implications for public sector managers and street-level bureaucrats. As they may hope to improve the performance of frontline enforcement officials through a heavy-handed enforcement approach, the psychological influence on law enforcement officials should not be ignored.

Compared with law enforcement officials who do not share a strong belief in the organization's environmental mission, those with higher score on mission attachment have higher enforcement effectiveness and organizational commitment. Besides, the coping behaviors also have mediating effect in the relationship between mission attachment and organizational commitment. I would like to explore both benefits and drawbacks of coping behaviors. In the short term, adopting the coping strategy of moving against regulatees for strict law enforcement may yield better performance. However, I argue that the coping behavior of moving against regulatees will decrease the positive direct effect of mission attachment on commitment. Previous literature suggested that employees' organizational commitment is closely related to job performance, burnout and turnover (Amri & Ramdani, 2021; Wiener & Vardi, 1980).

It might be detrimental to enforcement performance in the long-run by harming street-level bureaucrats' psychological status.

5.4 Future Direction 2: Impact of Competing Institutional Logics on Environmental NGOs

Environmental NGOs play important roles in environmental governance. Many scholars have recognized the multiple institutional logics exist in NGOs and NPOs (Binder, 2007; Mullins, 2006; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). It is also highly recommended to use institutional logics theory to discuss the NGOs' operation (Mason, 2022). The research in this area can be found in cross-sector social partnerships and use to understand the practice of NGOs. NGOs are widely regarded as a mission-drive organization (Devetak & Higgott, 1999; Komatsu Cipriani et al., 2020). Based on the previous literature, I found that little research has mentioned about the relationship between the institutional logics and NGOs' attitude toward mission.

NGOs and NPOs are considered to cross state, community and market (Knutsen, 2012). In the research based on the rules, values and practice analyze of French and England NGOs, authors found that NGOs combining state, community and market logics are found in the English cases (McMullin & Skelcher, 2018). It is meaningful to discuss the influence of state logic, market logic and community logic on eNGOs mission drift. I hypothesize that market logic increases the risk of eNGOs' mission drift while community logic decreases the risk. As for the influence of state logic on mission drift, it depends on the fit between the government's requirements and the organization's mission.

Unlike the logic of economic group, the community logic requires units to maintain authority and legitimacy from commitment to community values and remaining trustworthy and reciprocal (Thornton et al., 2012). The mission of NGOs is often in line with the community logic. They are expected to make contribution to the community development.

Hypothesis 1: community logic reduces the probability of NGOs mission drift.

Market logic emphasize on generating profit by selling goods and services. ENGO is vulnerable to external influences when they rely on the resources of other organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Source of fund has great influence on mission drift (Mia & Lee, 2017). Some research provide empirical evidence on how ENGO policy advocacy is shaped by their funding sources (Li et al., 2018; Zhan & Tang, 2016) and reveal that NGOs spend most of their time on resource issues (Hsu, 2010). Commercial fund may lead the organizations to consider more about the economic revenue and pay less attention to their social mission.

Hypothesis 2: Market logic increases the probability of NGOs mission drift.

State logic refers to the pattern that allocates social resources through bureaucratic approach. This pattern includes laws, regulation and government contracting out. For instance, higher interest rate cap may generate high degree of mission drift (Mia & Lee, 2017). The funding of contract out has become an important source for NGOs. Under the contract with government, organizations have the risk of mission drift. Bennett and Savani (2011) use the British charities as examples to show that NPOs need to supply contract service, which required by contract but beyond its original mission. Meanwhile,

NGOs can use the state logic to promote their mission through their government ties (Popović, 2020; Zhan & Tang, 2016). The requirement of government sometimes is aligned with the mission of organizations. Otherwise, the state logic may cause the mission drift.

Hypothesis 3a: When government requirements are aligned with the organization's mission, state logic reduces the probability of NGOs mission drift.

Hypothesis 3b: When government requirements are not aligned with the organization's mission, state logic increases the probability of NGOs mission drift.

From the discussion of institutional logic prospective, leaders of NGOs will be inspired to prompt their organizations to reconsider the balance of management tensions and understand the environment in which they operate, especially when they are facing with the challenging funding environment and political issues to survive.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

This thesis aims to deepen the understanding of environmental governance. Based on the analysis of empirical data, I find that competing institutional logics play important roles in shaping bureaucratic coping in environmental policy implementation. Competing institutional logics bring about an increased workload and responsibility coupled with a lack of power, resources and incentives. In turn, to manage both the environmental protection and economic efficiency, EFBs adopt coping that impact the regulatees, their partners or themselves.

The dilemma of street-level bureaucrats in environmental policy implementation needs to be considered at a deeper institutional level. It is not convincing to attribute difficulties in performance improvement to superficial job factors alone. Overall, the results of this thesis clearly demonstrate that both governments at higher level and the public are demanding more from environmental law enforcement officials, but their power, resources, and incentives have not been raised proportionately. Street-level bureaucrats have a hard time accomplishing the required tasks and need to face tougher accountability problems.

I also put forward two directions for future research with hypotheses development. For future direction 1, I proposed that coping behaviors may have mediating effect in street-level bureaucrats' performance and psychological factors. Future direction 2 focus on the influence of competing institutional logics on environmental NGOs' mission drift. Future research may continue to explore coping behaviors and competing institutional logics in environmental governance.

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