Zhongguo shang shi gong si guo you gu jian chi yin qi de gu jia bian dong yu gu quan jie gou de xiang guan fen xi
|Other Title:||The effect of reducing state ownership on the relationship between ownership structure and firm value|
|Subject:||Hong Kong Polytechnic University -- Dissertations|
Stockholders -- China
Government ownership -- China
Stocks -- China
|Department:||Graduate School of Business|
|Pages:||x, 140 leaves ; 30 cm|
|Abstract:||The controlling shareholder for most of the listed companies in China is the state, whose shares were non-tradable. As the stock market matures over time, there is an increasing pressure to reduce state ownership in order to minimize political influence over the operations of the listed companies. On June 22 2001, the State Council's promulgation of "The Temporary Rules on Raising Social Security Funds through Selling State-owned Shares" marked a very important concrete step towards the goal of reducing the role of the state in the listed companies' operations. However, the stock market was not impressed, with the stock index dropping about 30% in the four months following the announcement. The market reaction is rather puzzling, since state-ownership often deters a listed firm from pursuing wealth maximization for other shareholders. To the extent that a lower state-ownership will facilitate the establishment of a corporate governance system with more checks and balances, the share price should have increased. In this thesis I will examine the cross-sectional variations in share price revisions around the announcement date and try to find explanations for the variations. Our premise is that, relative to firms with more balanced ownership structure, firms with poorer ownership structure would suffer smaller share price revisions, because they are expected to benefit the most from the resulting improvement in ownership structure. Using a sample of 583 state-controlled listed companies, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, the abnormal returns were higher for firms with either very high or low state ownership levels than firms with medium state ownerships. The "U" shape relationship can be interpreted as supporting evidence that firms with poorer ownership structure had more to gain from the pending reductions of state ownership. Secondly, we find that the abnormal returns are positively related to the pending improvement of the balance between the state and legal-person shares. The second largest shareholder of a Chinese listed firm is usually a legal-person (another firm), whose objective is more aligned with minority shareholders in the sense that it would like the firm to maximize economic instead of political gains. Hence a reduction of state ownership would make it more likely for the second largest shareholder to exert more influence over the operation of a firm. Third, we find a negative relationship between the abnormal returns and institutional ownership. Presumably, institutional ownership should enhance a company's corporate governance and a positive relationship should be expected. However, our findings to the contrary may be easily explained by the fact that institutional investing in China remains in its infancy with very low institutional ownerships. More importantly, institutional investors are unlikely to be stable, active shareholders. Instead, they are probably the ones who reacted most swiftly by dumping shares upon the announcement. Finally, we find no significant relationship between the abnormal returns and the percentage of independent directors. Given the poor ownership structure of most firms in China, independent directors perhaps had little role to play.|
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