Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor | Graduate School of Business | en_US |
| dc.creator | 李慧鏑 | - |
| dc.creator | Li, Huidi | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://theses.lib.polyu.edu.hk/handle/200/3966 | - |
| dc.language | Chinese | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Hong Kong Polytechnic University | - |
| dc.rights | All rights reserved | en_US |
| dc.title | 法律环境、公司治理与企业价值 : 基于纽交所上市电信企业的实证研究 | en_US |
| dc.title | Fa lu huan jing, gong si zhi li yu qi ye jia zhi : ji yu Niu jiao suo shang shi dian xin qi ye de shi zheng yan jiu | en_US |
| dcterms.abstract | This dissertation examines the relationship between legal environment, corporate governance and firm value using a sample of 84 global telecommunications firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Although the sample firms are traded on the same exchange and are subject to the same listing requirements in terms of information disclosure and regulations, they are incorporated and conduct their businesses in many countries with different legal environments and different governance structures. The unique sample provides us with an excellent opportunity to assess the impact of both external and internal governance mechanisms. Three major findings with regard to the relationship between firm value and internal corporate governance mechanisms are as follows: 1) Firm value is negatively correlated with the level of state-ownership; 2) Firm value is positively correlated with the proportion of independent directors; and 3) Firm value first rises and then declines as ownership concentration increases, exhibiting an inverse U-shaped relationship between the two. Externally, firm value is positively correlated with both the level of shareholder protection and judicial efficiency in a country. I then investigate the interactive effect of both the internal and external governance mechanisms with the following results: l)Firm value is correlated with state-ownership negatively in countries with strong shareholder protection, but positively in countries with weak shareholder protection; 2) Firm value is correlated with the proportion of independent directors only in countries with strong shareholder protection; and 3) In counties with strong shareholder protection, the turning point in the inverse U-shaped relationship between firm value and ownership concentration is higher, implying that it is harder for insiders to expropriate minority shareholders in those countries. | en_US |
| dcterms.alternative | Legal environment, corporate governance and firm value : an empirical study of the telecommunications firms traded in NYSE | - |
| dcterms.extent | ix, 126 leaves : ill., charts (some col.) ; 30 cm. | en_US |
| dcterms.isPartOf | PolyU Electronic Theses | en_US |
| dcterms.issued | 2007 | en_US |
| dcterms.educationalLevel | All Doctorate | en_US |
| dcterms.educationalLevel | D.Mgt. | en_US |
| dcterms.LCSH | Hong Kong Polytechnic University -- Dissertations. | en_US |
| dcterms.LCSH | Telecommunication -- Management. | en_US |
| dcterms.accessRights | restricted access | en_US |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| b22513103.pdf | For All Users (off-campus access for PolyU Staff & Students only) | 3.77 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Copyright Undertaking
As a bona fide Library user, I declare that:
- I will abide by the rules and legal ordinances governing copyright regarding the use of the Database.
- I will use the Database for the purpose of my research or private study only and not for circulation or further reproduction or any other purpose.
- I agree to indemnify and hold the University harmless from and against any loss, damage, cost, liability or expenses arising from copyright infringement or unauthorized usage.
By downloading any item(s) listed above, you acknowledge that you have read and understood the copyright undertaking as stated above, and agree to be bound by all of its terms.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://theses.lib.polyu.edu.hk/handle/200/3966