|Title:||Study on the mechanism of selection of high-speed rail station|
|Subject:||High speed trains -- China|
Railroads -- China -- Management.
Railroads and state -- China.
Hong Kong Polytechnic University -- Dissertations
|Department:||Faculty of Construction and Environment|
|Pages:||vi, 63 leaves : color illustrations ; 30 cm|
|Abstract:||Ministry of Railway issued "Mid-to-Long Term High Speed Rail Planning" in 2003. This plan designed four vertical corridors from north to south and four horizontal corridors from west to east. By 2020, HSR network will be established with 15000 miles and almost 90 percent of population in China will be served by HSR. In domestic level, HSR network was designed to expand the freight capability, shorten travel time and balance the economic development between regions. In international level, HSR construction can improve the Chinese diplomacy relationship. So far, over ten countries have been cooperating or negotiating with State government to construct HSR in their countries. HSR network also meet the needs of political and military needs. Due to unstable political situation Middle East, China needs to reduce dependence on oil import. HSR network can decrease the use of oil. Because of Chinese highly centralized political and administrative structure, HSR network was constructed sooner than any other countries in the world. At the end of 2013, four horizontal corridors have been completed. However, this high speed of construction also caused some problems. Many HSR stations are located far away from city center. Passengers have to spend much time to HSR stations by public transport. This is because many local governments regard HSR as an investment rather than public service. In fact, for local governments, how to consider HSR is a trade-off between long-term and short-term interests. This trade-off is closely related to the mechanism of location selection of HSR stations. This study aims to research how the mechanism influences location selection. This study finds that three main stakeholders, namely MOR, provincial governments and local governments, have different considerations when selecting locations. However, MOR is the final decision-maker due to political structure and capital structure. This leads to conflicts between MOR and local governments, and local governments and urban planners. This study explains reasons of conflicts in detail by analysis of governments' investment and return and their inconsistent objectives and motivations. Two cases, Shenzhen and Suzhou, represent different class of cities to illustrate the conflicts. As local governments play a vital role in the process, this research discusses the role of local governments, and the games between long-term and short-term interests. Finally, according to the analysis and discussion, four suggestions are given, 1) Decentralization of political power; 2) Division right and limit of governments and planners; 3) Finance innovation; 4) Balance of long-term and short-term interests.|
|Rights:||All rights reserved|
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