|Title:||Unbundling institutional determinants of innovation|
|Subject:||Hong Kong Polytechnic University -- Dissertations|
Technological innovations -- Finance
Technological innovations -- Management
|Department:||Faculty of Business|
|Pages:||iii, 89 pages : illustrations|
|Abstract:||Why are some nations wealthy, while others remain mired in poverty? Most prior literature has focused on broader determinants of economic performance, suggesting that institutions, along with culture, geography, and human capital, are among the key drivers, and that technological innovation is also conducive to economic growth. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) unbundled institutions into property rights institutions (PRIs) and contracting institutions (CIs), wherein PRIs afford protection from expropriation by the government and political elites, while CIs allow private parties to conduct commercial transactions. This study is an attempt to systematically and empirically examine the relative effects of PRIs and CIs on innovation, and it has concluded that PRIs have a strong positive effect on innovation, while CIs do not. The concept is of particular importance to many policymakers currently, as developing countries like China look to innovation to reignite their economies and avoid the middle-income trap.|
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